Negotiations Approach Endgame

Those first negotiations can be seen as a trial of strength as the parties positioned themselves for the new fisheries world in which the UK is an independent coastal state, albeit one constrained by the provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. There seems to be a determination for all parties to settle down into a more predictable, manageable, pattern.

Coastal States

There was little surprise that talks between coastal states, the first set of negotiations out of the blocks, set TACS but failed to reach a sharing agreement on stocks like mackerel and blue whiting. A process has been set up to hopefully lay the foundations for a future agreement, although ultimately political heads will have to be knocked together if over-exploitation and stock decline on those pivotal stocks are to be avoided.

Trilaterals

Trilateral negotiations between the UK/Norway and the EU look very close to conclusion on setting TACs for jointly managed stocks in the North Sea. At the heart of the negotiations have been mixed fishery considerations which have had to deal with a recruitment spike in North Sea haddock, a change in scientific perception which recommended a 237% increase in the whiting TAC, whilst simultaneously finding the right balance on cod between rebuilding the biomass and minimising discards and chokes.

A heated dispute between Norway and the EU on TAC and fleet shares for herring in the North Sea has again been a feature of the negotiations.

Bilaterals

Separate bilateral negotiations between the UK and the EU, UK and Norway, UK and Faroes and EU and Norway have been proceeding in parallel. All look like crossing the finishing line in the next week or so. The 10^th December is written into the TCA as the date by which the UK and EU must conclude fisheries negotiations for the following year and it looks like all parties have this deadline in mind.

UK and Norway, and UK and Faroes, talks last year failed to reach a fisheries agreement for 2021, leaving fleets on both sides to deal with sub-optimal fishing opportunities and access arrangements. There seems to be a determination by all to avoid a repeat of this collapse, and to avoid no agreement becoming the new normal. Both sides can be expected to fight hard for their interests, however, and the final outcome will inevitably be a compromise of some sort which will satisfy no one completely. The signs are that conditional reciprocal access arrangements will be reached for the demersal fisheries and that separate arrangements will apply to the pelagic fisheries. Steps to manage hake as a jointly managed stock in the future can also be expected to be part of the deal.

Nothing is Agreed

Whilst all of the negotiating strands are narrowing down to the final few issues, the old mantra that nothing is agreed ‘til everything is agreed applies.

Between the UK and the EU, different philosophical approaches to mixed fisheries in the Celtic Sea are in evidence. Whilst the EU adheres to the CFP’s formulaic, one-dimensional approach based on single stock advice, the UK, now outside the CFP is pressing for an approach that recognises the realities of mixed fisheries and choke risks. A realistic bycatch of cod is essential to avoid chokes. In the case of the UK fleets represents less than 0.5% of the value of total catch, but with the potential to choke an industry worth many millions on which fishing businesses and fishing communities depend.

Seabass remains a contentious area, with the fishing industry pressing for more progress in reducing the dead discards that are generated by the current bycatch rules.

Quota exchanges, which last year were held to ransom in the negotiations, causing damage to all sides, seem to have been resolved through an interim arrangement that permits exchanges initially brokered by industry organisations which looks likely to continue for 2022.

Non-Quota Stocks

A huge amount of uncertainty surrounds the treatment of non-quota stocks – for England and Wales the landings of which are marginally more economically important than quota species. The Specialised Committee for Fisheries has so far limited itself to procedural matters, mainly because the Commission has not had a mandate from member states to enter into detailed discussions. What the agreed record says will be pivotal for the future of these stocks which range over some 200 species from the economically critical to the negligible.

If these stocks are to be managed in a rational, evidence-based, way in the future, full transparency about catches made by the respective fleets will be a fundamental precondition.

Negotiations

Whilst issues remain to be resolved in this set of annual negotiations, information of what is happening in the negotiating room remains limited. The signs are that rumour and speculation will shortly be replaced by a blizzard of numbers and detail when the agreed records are published. The detail of what has been agreed will shape the fortunes of fleets in the coming year. A fundamental flaw in the process (at least for the UK and EU sides) is the remoteness of the negotiations from those impacted by the decisions. A satisfactory way to integrate the fishing industry into the process has still to be resolved. The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (Norges Fiskerlarg) has been an integral part of the Norwegian delegation for many years, bringing invaluable industry knowledge and insight to the process.

In the UK managing the relationship between devolved administrations, and in the EU the tensions between the Commission and member states undoubtedly present obstacles to a more transparent and inclusive approach to international negotiations. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, decisions that have such a direct and significant impact on fishing businesses and communities should not be made without their close involvement.

Reflection on the Minderoo Foundation’s Global Fishing Index

Ray Hilborn 21 November 2021

This Monday, the Minderoo Foundation released their 2021 Global Fishing Index report meant to give a global picture of fisheries status. I have collaborated with the Minderoo Foundation in the past, but this report is highly flawed and should be viewed sceptically. The report claims over 50% of stocks are overfished and no country gets an “A” or a “B” grade for their management efforts—just six get a “C.” Countries that have essentially eliminated overfishing and are clearly delivering near maximum benefits to their countries are graded a “C.” Why is that not an A?

The report fails to acknowledge that over much of the world, fisheries management is working; overfishing has been greatly reduced and stocks are recovering. Many countries are sustainably producing near maximum benefits from their fish stock. The message that we need to bring fisheries management, including data collection, assessment, regulation, and enforcement to all the world is needed, but not new—agency scientists, academics and NGOs have been working towards this reality for decades and the conclusions and tone of this report dismiss the work of thousands of people.

The most critical flaw in the report’s methodology is their definition of overfished. The authors call any stock whose abundance is below a level thought to produce maximum long-term yield (called the biomass that produces maximum sustainable yield, BMSY) as overfished – and estimate that roughly 50% of stocks are below BMSY, and thus “overfished.” However, if fishing effort was perfectly managed to assure maximum long-term harvest (the typical objective), stocks would fluctuate around BMSY. As a result of natural fluctuations beyond management control, stocks would be above this level half the time, but also below this level half the time.

Thus, a country that was perfectly managing its fish stocks to generate food and employment for it’s people would have half of its stocks called “overfished” by this definition. So if the report estimates that half of fish stocks are “overfished” by their definition, perhaps all world’s fisheries are being well-managed?

The report claims to have assessments of the status of 1,465 individual stocks, but many of those assessments used catch-based estimates. Catch-based estimates are a totally unreliable method of stock assessment. A major scientific journal won’t even review papers submitted to their journal that use them.

The absurdity of their methods and definitions is illustrated by the estimate of the proportion of the assessed stocks in the country that are above the accepted target. In this regard they list Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Myanmar, Malaysia, Nigeria and Thailand as top ranked major fishing countries. This simply fails any test of veracity. These are largely countries with limited fisheries management systems and generally recognized to suffer from significant overfishing.

Their governance index comes to equally bizarre conclusions. Norway, Iceland and the U.S. score 8, but so does Indonesia and the Philippines. Chile scores even higher with a 9.

The report is full of contradictions and cherry-picking to create their overfishing narrative. For instance, they say in the introduction “there have been pockets of success where strong interventions have improved stock health.” Yet then: “globally the state of fish stocks is not improving.”

The first statement is backed by citations showing that across countries that represent half of the worlds’ fish catch (which they call mere pockets), stocks are increasing. The second statement quotes an FAO report showing that the number of overfished stocks is growing slightly. What the report misses is that fisheries management is working in fisheries

encompassing half of the world’s catch, but largely unknown and likely poor in the other half.

Making blanket statements about the state of global fisheries is not helpful.

Overfishing is not a global problem as the report argues, but rather a problem confined to parts of the world where fisheries management is weak. Certainly, even in the best managed places there remain some stocks that are below target levels, but in many cases these stocks are not fished at all or very slightly fished, and their poor status is due to environmental factors like climate change or terrestrial runoff.

If you have heard of the scheme and have been involved in any way and would like to share your experiences, please follow the link below to a short 10-minute survey. Your feedback will help in improving the delivery and impact of FaSS and of similar schemes in the future.

You can access the survey at: https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/FaSS_Survey/

All information you provide in the survey will be confidential and no individual responses will be seen by Defra or MMO.

If you have any questions, please let us know by contacting us at 01603 558 510 or emailing Pippa.VanKuijk@rpaltd.co.uk.

Risk and Policy Analysts Ltd (RPA) 

ABPmer

Cornish fisherman, Andrew Pascoe will continue as president and will chair the NFFO annual general meeting later this week.

Paul comes from a family that has fished the Thames estuary and southern North Sea for over 200 years. Over his time in the fishing industry he has owned and fished seven trawlers and currently has one more vessel under construction. With 30 years as a lifeboatman, and senior helmsman for 20 years, he has received numerous awards, including one from the royal humane society.

NFFO Chief Executive, Barrie Deas, welcoming the appointment said, “One of the strengths of the NFFO is the pool of diverse talent around our table that we can draw on to support our work. Paul recognises this and has personally made an enormous contribution as Vice-Chairman of the NFFO’s South-East Committee.  I have no doubt that he will make a similar contribution as chair of our Executive Committee. Given the pressures facing our industry, this is a very demanding time to lead the national federation but as well as his direct fishing experience, Paul brings with him a wealth of knowledge based on his time as local councillor and chairman of his local town council. His time spent as vice-chairman of the Kent and Essex Sea Fishery Committee will also provide valuable experience.”

In accepting his new position Paul said, “I would especially like to thank Tony Delahunty and Andrew Pascoe who have been acting as co-chairs following the regrettable departure of former chairman Andrew Locker, who was obliged to seek employment outside the industry. It is comforting to know that I can turn to them for guidance at any time.

Although I have my roots in the inshore sector, like others in the NFFO, I appreciate the importance of a diverse and profitable fleet in the UK, embracing all sizes of vessel and sustainable methods of fishing.”

Paul was amongst the first to flag up the ecological changes observed in the Thames Estuary that have led to a dramatic drop in the catches of some customary commercial species like sole and the rise of other non-commercial species – giving rise to an industry crisis in the area.

Paul will take up his duties at the first meeting of the NFFO Executive following the AGM later this week, which will be attended by the Secretary of State, George Eustice.

This project is being co-ordinated by Fishing into the Future, Fishing Animateurs and The Fishmongers’ Company’ Fisheries Charitable Trust. The three charities are asking the fishing industry to come forward with their initial ideas on research that might improve their fishery.

Further information here.

A communication circulated by the Crown Estate states that:

The position paper sets out how we intend to:

• • • Unlock up to 4GW of new floating wind capacity in the Celtic Sea by 2035.  Working towards awarding Agreements for Lease for early commercial scale floating wind projects in the Celtic Sea as early as the end of 2023.
    • Conduct an integrated spatial design and Plan-Level Habitats Regulations Assessment process ahead of a market tender to select sites, thereby reducing environmental risk and give developers more certainty.
    • Work with others to support a co-ordinated grid solution, and stimulate investment in port infrastructure, thereby creating opportunities for economic development and mitigate impacts on communities onshore.

We have also set out further detail on our next steps for engagement with market and stakeholders.

This announcement represents an exciting new opportunity to unlock the potential of floating wind technology, and support the development of the UK supply chain, balancing the need to protect the marine environment and deliver on net zero targets.

Further information on the announcement can be found here, and the position paper can be downloaded here.

Marine Scotland Communications advise the following:

New evidence will help support implementation of the plan, which identified 15 sustainable options for   future offshore wind energy developments in Scotland waters, including deep water wind technologies.

If you have any relevant, emerging data and analysis to share in this area, we would be grateful for a response by 28 February 2022. 

The evidence must be accompanied by a cover page that is available to download and complete, and should specify the type of evidence and why it is relevant to the plan and its implementation. 

Please send completed cover pages and evidence to SectoralMarinePlanning@gov.scot. Our Technical Advisory Group will consider the evidence and provide a report of findings to the Plan Programme Board. 

If you have any specific queries, please don’t hesitate to contact the above email address.  

The French prime minister’s letter to European Commission president urging that the UK had to be shown that it “causes more damage to leave the EU than to stay in,” may go some way to explain the matter, but it is probably not a view that is shared by all member states. Macron’s shaky position in the forthcoming French presidential election also helps to explain the remarkable belligerence of the rhetoric emanating from the French government over what is essentially a minor technical issue.
Meeting eligibility criteria for EU vessels to fish within the UK 6-12m follows from the TCA which limits this right to vessels that can demonstrate that they have fished there historically. Most licences have been granted. Our understanding is that the UK’s methodology is accepted by the EU as being both fair and robust. In any event, there is absolutely no justification for the aggressive threats being made by the French Government, or for instigating criminal proceedings against a UK scalloper, for what appears to be some kind of administrative slip. This is a matter that in normal times cooperating countries sort out with a phone call.

The president of the Boulogne-sur-Mer fish processing industry got it exactly right when he said that we will all be hurt if this relatively trivial issue escalates into a trade war or tit-for- tat enforcement. Behind the diplomatic rhetoric there are those in the French fishing industry and fish trade that resent the political posturing and being used as a political battering ram in this way. There are businesses on both sides of the channel which depend on the supply of fish and shellfish from the UK for their economic survival. Artificial barriers to trade would hurt everyone. Likewise, should enforcement at sea descend into a tit-for-tat zero tolerance regime, French fishing vessels, by sheer weight of numbers fishing in UK waters, have more to fear than most. This is not a path anyone in the fishing industry on either side should want to go down.

The reasons why the French Government has deliberately escalated what is essentially a technical issue about licences to a level of belligerence that requires the French Ambassador to be summoned to the Foreign Office lie primarily in French domestic politics. Ahead of elections in a matter of months President Macron’s political future is far from secure. Manufactured tensions with a customary foe (and occasional ally) have been the age-old resort of the demagogue to demonstrate steely national resolve. If it wasn’t fishing rights, it would be something else.

Trade and Cooperation Agreement

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement agreed on Christmas Eve was a massive disappointment for the UK fishing industry which had been led to believe in a future as a genuinely independent coastal state. The TCA, however, was sold to the French fishing industry as maintenance of the status quo, when it was not. Access to fish in UK waters had been secured for five years, including within the UK 6–12-mile limit, and quota shares had only changed for France at the margin. But the UK is no longer part of the Common Fisheries Policy and that carries significant implications. The TCA recognises the right of both parties to manage fishing activities in their respective EEZs. The TCA also grants access to the UK’s inshore waters – but only to vessels that can demonstrate that they had fished there historically. 98% of licence applications for EU vessels to fish in UK waters have been granted and by all accounts the UK and EU have worked constructively together on the evidence methodology to justify applications. Some French vessels may have had a theoretical right to fish in UK waters but did not exercise that right during the reference period. Limiting access to fish is one of the foundation stones of sound fisheries management and these kinds of issues arise in domestic fisheries management too.

If our domestic experience is anything to go by, there will be a few difficult threshold cases but there will also be opportunists who try to slip under the bar. All that needs to be sorted out and our understanding is that the residual issues are being dealt with appropriately – at the technical level. Hijacking the issue to send crude political signals is both a sign of political desperation and is potentially very damaging for fishers and fish traders on both sides of the Channel. 

Adjustment and Maturity

The shift from the UK as a member state to an independent coastal state was never going to be easy or straightforward. The first annual negotiations between the UK and the EU took several months and were undeniably difficult as the UK asserted its autonomy and the EU did all it could to place limits and constraints around that autonomy. The hope is that the negotiations for fisheries agreements in 2022 will run a lot smoother. The geo-political reality is that whatever stresses and strains are generated during this adjustment, the UK and EU (including France) share contiguous waters and hundreds of fish stocks. There is a legal and moral obligation to work collaboratively to ensure sustainable exploitation of those important resources. Political posturing may from time to time get in the way of the responsible, mature, pragmatic, relationship that is required to deliver on these obligations, but they can only be allowed to be a temporary spasm.

See Association of IFCAs press release here

Read the report here

French ports where landings may be banned:

Cherbourg, Granville, Barneville-Carteret, Boulogne-sur-mer, Le Havre and Brest.

In order to understand the effect of such measures please provide any feedback on the impact this would have on businesses using the website form or by email to nffo@nffo.org.uk

Chief Executive, Barrie Deas, announced the appointment and said, “Dale Rodmell has built a solid reputation for a careful analytical approach to representing our membership. In particular, he has done exceptionally valuable work in the area of environmental protection, spatial pressures and in building our regional committees. Our best wishes go with him. He will remain however, at the heart of the Federation’s work as CEO of the East of England Fish Producers Organisation, and member of the Executive Committee”

“Mike is very well known in the fishing industry as former Chief Executive of the Holderness Fishing Industry Group and as the NFFO’s Chairman during 2016-18. His return to the frontline in fishing politics will be widely welcomed given his legal and scientific background and wealth of practical experience in the industry.”

Mike will take up his new role at the beginning of January.

The clip can be viewed here.  The letter is reproduced below.

Defra has reported the following:

Incidental mortality and injury (“bycatch”) in fisheries is a threat to the conservation and welfare of marine mammals including cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) and seals, and the UK Government and Devolved Administrations remain committed to tackling this issue as well as ensuring that our practices align with international standards. We are therefore introducing a requirement for all wild-capture commercial fishers to report any incidental mortality and injury (bycatch) of marine mammals during fishing operations to the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) within 48 hours of the end of the trip. This requirement will be incorporated into licence conditions no later than 30th November 2021.

The data will feed into UK bycatch monitoring programmes and help identify, and where possible reduce, any potential fisheries interactions with sensitive marine species, including marine mammals. This requirement aligns with a broader programme of work to meet the Fisheries Act ecosystem objective that “incidental catches of sensitive species are minimised and, where possible, eliminated”. This is also necessary in order for the UK to continue exporting wild-capture seafood to the US from 1st January 2023 as required by the US Marine Mammal Protection Act. Information will be reported by submitting an online form. Data required as per the licence condition is limited to:

• Vessel name
• Vessel registration number
• Interaction date
• Approx. interaction time
• Approx. location (lat/long)
• Species of marine mammal
• Gear type
• Target species
• Whether an observer is present
• Any other information
• Action taken (if any)

Mitigation trials have been undertaken to reduce the risk of bycatch of marine mammals in fisheries and to explore non-lethal means to deter seals from depredating fishing nets.

Further details, including reporting mechanism, to follow.

• Stakeholders are asked to share views on the management of sandeel stocks and Norway pout
• UK to use freedoms as an independent coastal state to explore new measures to address stock declines
• Sandeels and Norway pout play a key role in the wider ecosystem as a food source for commercial fish stocks and marine mammals

More information can be found here: Future management of Sandeel and Norway pout in UK waters: call for evidence – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

The Fishing Industry Safety Group has secured £200,000 to help prevent man overboard incidents. This is being used to fund the delivery of in-water awareness events to explain how to avoid going over the side and what can be done to improve the chances of survival.

Man overboard Awareness events are run by Seafish and the RNLI at environmental training pools across the UK. Anyone working on a commercial fishing vessel is encouraged to book up to attend the events, which are fully funded. Spaces are limited so early sign up is recommended.

Further information, dates and venues and how to book are available on the Seafish website here.

The ITECMER Conference, Lorient, 8^th October 2021, was not large and attracted limited publicity. Nevertheless, the event probably presents a more reliable weather-vane for the future than the current media coverage of fisheries relations where the word war tends to be rather overused.

Not that the conference ducked the difficult issues that lie between France and the UK as we navigate the transition to a new relationship on fisheries. Time was spent hearing about the wide range of practical and political challenges faced by vessel operators on both sides of the Channel.

Evolving Perceptions

Perceptions in France seemed to have evolved from an initial jubilation that the TCA had maintained the CFP status quo in all important respects. Access to UK waters, including the UK 6-12m zone had been maintained. Adjustments to quota shares had been relatively minor (Ireland takes a different view). The European Commission is confident that the TCA has enough dissuasive powers to prevent any radical departures after 2026. This is all as it should be, from the French perspective because, after all, French vessels have been fishing in what is now the UK EEZ for generations, if not centuries.

Ten months into the TCA, a slightly different perspective has emerged. The UK had retained tariff free access to the important market EU for fisheries products (albeit with substantially increased costs and bureaucracy) but negotiations for the first UK/EU fisheries agreement had been prolonged and painful. The delay in agreeing a mechanism for in-year quota swaps had been particularly harmful all round. The terms of the TCA on the granting of fishing licences contained clauses that had perhaps not been immediately understood when the deal was signed on 24^th December and were now an area of noisy dispute. Above all, the UK now has regulatory autonomy and has signalled its intention to use those new powers to gradually move away from those aspects of the CFP where this makes sense. There is a nervousness in France about what this will mean.

By contrast, on Christmas Eve, the fishing industry in the UK had immediately understood that (in an echo of 1973) our government had prioritised a trade deal over fishing rights. It was clear right away that the outcome would be very different from the promises made by those at the top of government. We would not have what other coastal states take for granted under international law. We would not have an exclusive 12m zone to protect our inshore fisheries. Quota shares would not reflect the resources in our waters.

Adjustments to quota shares had been marginal (with, the exception of mackerel), leaving areas of acute quota shortage unaddressed, for example Eastern Channel cod, where the UK share is 9% and the French share is 84%. Putting everything together and projecting forward to 2026, a recent analysis conducted on behalf of the NFFO suggested that in contrast to Government claims that we would be as an industry £148 million better off by 2026, we will in fact be £300 million worse off, unless things change in the interim.

Both sides have learnt, if we didn’t know it before, that there can be a large gulf between politicians’ rhetoric and reality, especially if there is a referendum or presidential election looming.

The Past

Leaving aside quota shares and access, which as a zero-sum game, can only be about different winners and losers, in fact French and UK fishers share an extensive history of cooperation. When faced with the monolithic blunt power of the Common Fisheries Policy, over the years French and British fishermen found many ways to cooperate and where necessary, to resist the Commission.

The Mid-Channel spatial agreement between mobile and static gears is a longstanding area of mutual dialogue and cooperation. The UK was a leading member of the EU regional advisory councils. Especially in the early days of the RACs, there was a remarkable level of industry-to-industry cooperation and the expression shared views. The European Fishing Action Group in the early 1990s was also a strong alliance led by the French and British fishing organisations which mounted a united opposition to the Commission’s blunt proposal on effort control. It wasn’t successful but all its arguments have been subsequently vindicated.

Unity came in the face of external threats, and bonds of affection and respect followed.

Faced with external threats much was achieved through dialogue and cooperation.

The Future

There is no crystal ball which can tell us what the future holds. The UK holds the legal status of an independent coastal state, with the right to manage the fisheries in its EEZ.

Big Power Politics are, however, unlikely to go away and have been shown to constrain and limit those rights considerably. Aside from managing this central relationship, there are massive joint challenges ahead including:

• Displacement of fishing activities from the areas designated for offshore windfarms and other renewables
• The Green Lobby which has taken different forms at different times and not all NGOs are the same. In recent years, however, many NGOs have abandoned any semblance of a cooperative approach and have shown their aggressive, legalistic, anti-fishing side. Many of these organisations have access to very expansive funding
• Marine Protected Areas which have an important role to play but applied badly will have a huge displacement effect of fishing that has not been properly understood. 38% of UK waters are now designated as MPAs of one kind or another
• Climate change and shifting patterns of fish distribution raise challenges for the relevance of current management measures and the way the industry operates
• Instability: The gulf between the UK’s legal status as a coastal state and the provisions of the TCA mean that fishing rights are likely to be a source of friction for decades ahead. Any sober assessment will recognise that they will always have the potential to be weaponised by politicians.
• Managing non-quota stocks presents the mother of all challenges and will require careful consideration and handling

All of these challenges are faced by the fishing industry whether the vessels operate out of ports in the UK or in France.

Realities

As we find a way forward in these changing and uncertain circumstances there are a number of realities that ought to anchor the debate on our future relationship:

• We share over 100 stocks. Cooperation is not just a legal requirement under UNCLOS, it is an existential obligation – if we fail to manage exploitation, we are all losers – that is a powerful incentive to find ways to cooperate despite the areas of friction
• The combined effect of offshore wind, MPAs, and an aggressive well-funded (but not necessarily very well informed) environmental lobby has the potential to generate massive displacement and disruption to fishing unless a much more measured and intelligent way can be found to co-exist

We have found ways to cooperate in the past. The aim should be to find a new equilibrium that respects our legitimate interests whilst recognising that the world has changed and will continue to evolve. A priority should be to find means through which that dialogue at industry level can be maintained. There are dangers in using politicians as a conduit and megaphone diplomacy, where only the loudest get heard. Direct dialogue is a strong antidote to those risks.

Licences

The current area of dispute is over the criteria for granting licences to fish within the UK 6-12 zone. The TCA is in fact quite clear that licences will only be granted to vessels which can demonstrate a historic record of fishing there. And vessels should be replaced like-with-like to prevent a backdoor expansion of fishing activity in biologically sensitive areas. There is no mystery over why this is contentious. Sound fisheries management requires, as its very basis, that access to any given fishery must be limited. That requires hard administrative and political choices. Capping the UK domestic under-10m fleet over a decade ago generated a similar outcry over evidence and the impact on those whose fishing rights were reduced. The claims for licences, now like then, will involve a mix of legitimate borderline cases which hangs on the types of evidence available and a good spread of opportunists. Separating the wheat from the chaff and finding a fair methodology is best done through quiet dialogue and far from excitable politicians with the next election uppermost in their minds

Lorient

The Chairman of the Lorient event summed up the conference perfectly. Everyone must stop posturing.

The fishing industry has nothing to gain and much to lose by the posturing surrounding the implementation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Posturing by the UK Government on fishing rights, may have bought it votes in the referendum and general election, but it has left us with a TCA that ditches most of the characteristics of an independent coastal state. Posturing by the French Government and the more excitable parts of the French fishing industry have led to wild threats about a trade war and stopping electricity supplies that would be disproportionate and incompatible with the TCA.

A sense of proportion and any consideration of where such steps would lead seem to have been left far behind. We know from experience that in these circumstances parts of the media will amplify any area of dispute in fisheries until it is almost unrecognisable. Social media has the same effect. Those at the sharp end of the industry, operating fishing vessels under difficult and uncertain conditions will not thank us for such distractions.

The Lorient conference was a good antidote to wild talk and unnecessary divisions.

Call 3 is now open and The UK Seafood Innovation Fund is now accepting applications for feasibility studies, up to the value of £50,000, funded for 5 months.

Got an idea?

Apply now. The current funding round is open until 12 noon on 07 January 2022.

Full details:

www.seafoodinnovation.fund 

What are the implications of these political commitments for the fishing industry? 

It is certain that our industry will have to make its own efforts to decarbonise, but at the same time we will also face a huge challenge as the massive expansion of offshore windfarms and other marine renewables, swallow large areas to date used for fishing. 

Fishing and Climate Change

A climate emergency is under way, and it is inconceivable that the fishing industry will be exempt from finding ways to reduce dependence on fossil fuels – especially diesel. Although modern fuel-efficient engines are available on the market, we remain far away from an off-the-shelf solution consistent with carbon net-zero targets. As these obligations are likely to become more stringent following the COP summit, locating solutions will become an urgent overriding imperative.

In addition to pressures on the fishing industry to make its contribution to reach net zero, climate change already carries multiple implications for fishing. These include observable distributional shifts in species, acidification of the oceans and displacement pressures arising from marine protected areas and the rapidly expanding offshore renewables industry.

Then there are two factors which work in opposite directions.

• The emerging but so far less than definitive science which suggests that seabed disturbance releases stored carbon. The significance and scale of this factor has yet to be determined by scientists.

• Global demand for high quality protein from wild fish, and the recognition that substituting fish to meet calls for a large-scale shift to a vegan diet, would inevitably result in an increase in agriculture-based food production systems. Many of these carry a much higher carbon footprint than fishing.

Against this background, apart from our desire to do the right thing within a complex and politically charged atmosphere, there is clearly going to be huge political pressure on the fishing industry to minimise its carbon footprint. The Fisheries Act (2020) explicitly contains climate change as one of its eight core objectives – all future fisheries legislation made under the Act will have to address the implications for climate change.

Partnership

The specific challenge that we face is to find ways of adapting to reduce reliance on fossil fuels that are compatible with an economically viable fishing industry.

Given the time pressures generated by the climate emergency, we suggest that decarbonisation will be most effectively done through a partnership between the fishing industry and government. The EU has already prioritised decarbonisation in its new funding instrument, the EMFAF with a budget of 6.1 billion euros for the next six years.

As an independent coastal state, outside the EU, the UK will not be contributing to that particular budget, but the question of public finance, how much and where it is directed, is likely to be central to the success of any decarbonisation strategy in the UK. 

Stewardship

Directing funding into environmental stewardship, is one model for change that has successfully been used in other sectors, by creating economic incentives that are aligned with the desired objectives. The use of incentivised stewardship has an established history in agriculture. Agriculture in the UK is now largely organised around public subsidies which underpin concrete practises that benefit the environment. Essentially, farmers are paid to depart from a pure economic model of efficiency to build in environmentally desirable agricultural practice.

No such equivalent applies to fishing and, in general, the fishing industry historically has had little interest in a bureaucratic, politically vulnerable, system of monetary subsidies. The time may have arrived, however, to review that position. If fishing businesses can’t make the transition to net zero whist maintaining economic viability, it may be time to look at some form of government support scheme.

A recent report by WWF/ RSPB and the Marine Conservation Society makes clear that there are no off-the-shelf solutions. Hydrogen engines, wind-assisted propulsion and a range of other developments show promise – but the technology is not at a stage that it could simply be transferred into existing fleets. From this, it is clear that research, development and practical trials, will be an urgent priority, as will learning from experience in other countries. Funding, whether from the famous £100 million promised on the hoof by the Prime Minister in the wake of the TCA, or made available from other Treasury pots, could play a pivotal role in putting such initiatives into fast-forward mode. The initial challenge will be how to develop workable solutions (that may involve a reduction in catch, or additional costs) whist maintaining an economically viable fishing business. In this context, financially supported structured scheme to facilitate this type of initiative would ensure volunteer vessels to trial new approaches and overcome short-term financial obstacles to trialling new gears and approaches.

Interim Steps

There are, however, steps that can be taken, even as new technologies and approaches are being developed.

Equipping the current fleet with the most fuel-efficient engines presently available would make sense as an interim step towards net zero. A more coherent and muscular approach to subsidising engine replacement would bring immediate reductions in fuel consumption and should be considered as an urgent interim step. In the longer term, government, science and the fishing industry itself will have to work on solutions, preferably in partnership.

Fisheries Science Partnerships

Fisheries Science Partnerships involving industry participation, government funding and scientific expertise, have been an established and successful model since the NFFO, Defra and Cefas developed the concept in 1994. The time may be ripe to adapt this model to the decarbonisation challenge.  A refreshed Fisheries Science Partnership could:

1. Investigate promising methods of reducing or eliminating fossil fuels, or minimising seabed impacts
2. Employ some of the recently announced £24 million government funding to develop fuel reduction concepts to trial level
3. Use chartered fishing vessels to trial new gears
4. Use government financial support to cover costs and economic loss in catch attributable to the new method during the development phase
5. If the method involves a permanent reduction in catch (and to ensure the effort is not diverted into other fisheries) any vessel adopting the new gear would receive financial support – in effect an equivalent system to that which applies in agriculture

The core of this new approach would be to harness the fisheries science partnership approach, first to develop carbon neutral methods of fishing and then to use stewardship finance to encourage its adoption across the fleets.

Displacement

Apart from decarbonising its own activities, the fishing industry faces a huge displacement challenge from the expansion of offshore renewables and marine protected areas. The NFFO has already expressed itself in strong terms about the failure of the marine planning system to protect the most important fishing grounds.

The failure to address displacement at the planning stage carries many potential unintended adverse consequences. One of them is to increase steaming time to available fishing grounds. Much more coherent, joined-up government policies are required to minimise displacement effects.

Unintended Consequences

Those familiar with fisheries management are acutely aware that management measures can often generate unintended consequences, which can undermine the objective sought. Decarbonisation is no less tricky. Displacement from customary fishing grounds can mean longer steaming times to other grounds. Less productive grounds can require longer periods fishing to generate the same catch. All this leads to higher emissions. To point this out is not to make a facile argument against marine protected areas or windfarms but it is a plea to understand the complex of issues in the round. Necessary trade-offs between different objectives are part and parcel of dealing with real-world complexity.

Summary

A climate emergency is upon us. Fishing will be expected to play its part. The most effective solutions will be found where there is a partnership between the fishing industry and government. As an interim step, government should be incentivising the replacement of older engines with the most fuel-efficient engines available. As there are no off-the-shelf solutions that would deliver Net Zero in the fishing industry and research, development and practical trials are therefore urgently required. Fishing science partnerships – properly designed and implemented – have a proven track record and could be harnessed as pathfinders to decarbonise the fishing industry. Finally, if the conventional market economic model is incapable of delivering the widespread change necessary to meet the climate emergency, it may be time to consider a system of structures stewardship for the fishing industry that has been employed for several decade in the agriculture industry

According to the MMO:

“This is a standalone report that discusses the outcome of the EU-UK deal only and does not account for the outcome of annual negotiations that were completed after the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed. This analysis only covers fish stocks subject to quota management and therefore does not include non-quota stocks or account for the impact of access arrangements.”

“The UK government has stated that the full quota share uplift is worth around £146m in fishing opportunities for the UK fleet. This is equal to around 25 per cent of the value of the average EU catch from UK waters and will be phased in over 5 years. This report will explain the methodology, assumptions and caveats behind these figures and provide further context.”

See the MMO report.

The NFFO has undertaken its own analysis of the wider outcomes of the TCA.  See Brexit Balance Sheet.

What we didn’t get and still haven’t received from Government is a clear statement of what has been gained and what has been lost as we left the EU.

In the wake of the TCA the Government made the claim that we were £148 million better off – although it was clear from the beginning that the incoming quota was very unevenly distributed and that there were areas where we had acute quota shortages.  There seemed to be a lot of spin involved.  Then as the year progressed things got worse:

• No international swaps until the second half of the year
• No reciprocal agreements with Norway or Faroes
• Problems in exporting fish to the EU (some like higher export costs and admin were foreseen as we were leaving the single market and customs union – some, like the EU ruling on bivalve molluscs, were not)

As we approach the next cycle of negotiations for a fisheries agreement for 2022, we considered it important to have a clear understanding of where we are: what has been achieved, what has been lost.  For that reason, we asked Gary Taylor, an experienced fisheries negotiator, with long experience in the field, to undertake an analysis on our behalf.  The brief was to make his best estimate of the gains and losses and the winners and losers in this whole process.

To be clear, we would much prefer the Government to publish its definitive cost benefit analysis in a transparent way for public scrutiny and debate.  In the absence of that information, this is our best estimate.