After 20 years of what we could politely call sub-optimal performance of the CFP's resource policies, you might be surprised to find that the solutions are to be found on You Tube.
The Nobel laureate for economics, Elinor Ostrom, is there on video to explain her life-work on common property resources, the relationship between governance and sustainable resource management.
Essentially, her key insights are:
- That resource management at the appropriate scale can overcome the inherent problems in managing common property resource
- That the involvement and participation of the key stakeholders is critical
- That poly-centric governance facilitates these kind of positive outcomes
- That governance arrangements must give room (and time) for resource users to develop their own, tailored, solutions
- That centralised, top-down, one-size fits all policies provide no panacea and will repeatedly fail
- That the role of the centre should be to provide oversight rather than prescriptive micro-management
All of this has the most profound relevance for the current reform of the CFP.
It is certainly possible to read into the CFP Reform Green Paper an appreciation of these insights.
The transfer of responsibility to the regional level, and to the industry itself ,(think poly centric arrangements) are at the centre of the Green Papers vision of a new and more effective CFP.
The question that now faces us is to what extent the Commission’s reform proposals reflect and deliver the change that is necessary to decentralise the CFP and the degree to which the co-legislators will accept this delegation of responsibility.
On this there are reasons to be far from optimistic:
The Commission rhetoric surrounding the proposal suggests a radical decentralisation of decision-making. But a closer scrutiny suggests that real detailed control would remain at the centre with only responsibility for implementing those decisions delegated.
Some crucial questions are posed?
- Can an institution such as the European Commission created to coordinate centrally delegate meaningfully?
- Is there even the legal authority within the Treaties to do so?
- And how likely is it that the European Parliament which has just been given co-decision authority under the Lisbon Treaty will resist the temptation hang on to its scope to micro-manage?
- Finally having had their fingers burnt with notional delegation of implementation in the EU Cod Management Plan, how many member states will sign up for decentralisation?
Yet the insights made by Prof. Ostrom are there for all to see.
Effective resource management requires decentralisation; it requires arrangements that encourage a much greater level of involvement and participation by the resource users. It requires a decisive move away from a command and control mindset. In a nutshell it requires all the conditions that Prof. Ostrom spells out in her work.
Our fear is that this reform will not succeed in putting those conditions in place and the CFP will face a decade of centralised paralysis (worse than before because of co-decision without decentralisation) until the next reform in 2023.
We hope that we are wrong but the signs are not good.
Regionalisation, transferable fishing concessions, a discard ban and a CFP based on maximum sustainable yield are central components in the Commission’s proposals, and yet are all subject to varied and contested interpretations. It is useful therefore to have some background explanation to the thinking behind them.
Our comments on the four non-papers are detailed below.
Regionalisation
We have been amongst the strongest and earliest advocates of a regionalised and decentralised CFP. Our view is that the primary reason why the CFP has consistently delivered much less than promised over its lifetime has been because of its reliance on an unwieldy, unresponsive and over-centralised command and control approach to resource management. This has led to blunt, one-size-fits-all measures across many diverse fisheries and fleets. As a result many of the measures adopted have failed and have not been supported by the principle stakeholders. This point is now well understood and featured heavily in the CFP Reform Green Paper.
The Green paper, and subsequently the Commission’s CFP Proposals, advanced regionalisation of decision-making as the central means of making the CFP more responsive, relevant and effective by bringing management decisions closer to the fisheries concerned.
The explanation now outlined in the Commission non-paper confirms however, that what is envisaged is a minimalist version of a regionalised decision making process. This is a disappointment and carries great significance for the reform.
It is understandable and reasonable to expect that the EU co-legislators (Commission, Council and Parliament) should retain ultimate responsibility for setting the standards, principles and objectives for the Common Fisheries Policy. Likewise, we agree that the Commission should retain authority to intervene when delegated management has failed for some reason. However, going beyond this to retain responsibility to set specific management goals and time-frames for long-term management plans at European level, and restricting the role for member states at regional level to supplying different means of implementing these decisions, is not, to our view, to encourage genuine independent agency at the regional level. This would be to waste the potential that is available within a genuine regional approach.
Although the jurisprudence remains contested, it may be true that there are currently only two legal alternatives to a protracted co-decision process to give regulatory effect to decisions on, for example , long term management plans arrived at through regional-seas cooperation:
- Providing the Commission with additional delegated powers (within a set of safeguards),
- The potentially chaotic route of individual member states using their national legislation to give effect to a regionally agreed policy
Nevertheless, this is a very long way from our vision of delegated responsibilities, with a significant degree of autonomy, to the regional level and below.
Likewise, the example given of a framework regulation for technical measures is a kind of hesitant half-step towards regionalisation that would be a recipe for repeating the failures, complexity and perversities of the current technical conservation regulation but with the single difference that the opprobrium for failure would rest with the member states rather than with the Commission and Council of Ministers. The parallels with the current EU Cod Management plan are too clear to miss: responsibility for achieving unachievable and un-measurable objectives, within an unrealistic time framework is set at European level – but responsibility for implementation transferred to the member states under the heading and rubric of “flexibility”. This is not a blueprint for an effective or happy management regime.
Legal uncertainty remains over whether the Treaty in fact proscribes delegation of decision-making authority to a decision-making body comprised of relevant member states at regional seas level.
What should not be in dispute, however, is that for shared-stock demersal fisheries regional-seas decision-making with a high degree of involvement by the principal stakeholders is the governance framework that is most likely to be consistent with effective fisheries management. In terms of understanding of the specific characteristics of the fisheries concerned, an ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances, short communication chains, strong cooperation between fisheries managers, fisheries scientists, fishermen and other stakeholders and dealing with the realities of shared stocks, there is no superior model.
It is disappointing that the non-paper suggests that what will emerge from the 2012 reform will fall far short of this.
Transferable Fishing Concessions
The non-paper makes clear that the Commission’s rationale for embracing transferable fishing concessions is that the CFP has failed to deal with the problem of fleet overcapacity. The Commission believes that:
- None of the past policies to tackle overcapacity (multi-annual Guidance Programmes, entry-exit ratios, capping the maximum fleet size, public scrapping schemes) have worked
- A mandatory system of TFCs, properly designed, applied at member state level will address the problem of overcapacity without further public intervention and equally as important, without further expenditure of public funds
The Commission appears as confident in its view of past policy failures as it is now about having identified a panacea to overcapacity in the form of TFCs.
We are less convinced of both propositions. In fact a closer examination of the evidence suggests that whether TFCs or publically funded scrapping schemes are employed to reduce fleet capacity, the design of the scheme is the critical factor which determines success or failure. It is both simplistic and factually untrue to dismiss all publically funded vessel decommissioning schemes as having failed to reduce capacity. Both the Commission and the European Court of Auditors are guilty of over-generalisation in their assessment of what has been achieved through decommissioning part-funded by FIFG and EFF. A broad EU overview is probably correct in concluding that a lot of public money has been spent but that an overcapacity problem remains in the EU. However, by failing to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful decommissioning schemes at fisheries level, the Commission and ECA miss the central point: some decommissioning schemes have been very successful whilst others have been comprehensive failures. We would suggest that the following fisheries have benefitted greatly in terms of reduced fleet capacity, reduced fishing mortality and increased profitability as a direct result of public intervention through decommissioning:
- North Sea cod
- North Sea roundfish stocks
- North Sea plaice
- North Sea sole
- Celtic Sea demersal stocks, especially cod
In the same way that publically funded decommissioning has been dismissed in the non-paper as having failed to deliver, the Commission expresses a rather naïve faith that TFCs will deliver the desired results. This faith may be misplaced because much depends on the context in which TFCs are applied and the design of the TFC arrangements in the member states themselves. Most reasonable observers would agree that the system of TFCs in Denmark has been successful but it is worth noting that the Danish scheme was preceded by several rounds of publically funded decommissioning and that the preconditions for TFCs may not be the same in all member states. In other member states where variants of TFCs are in use it is not yet possible to arrive at definitive conclusions about the relationship between TFCs and effective reduction of overcapacity.
The Commission envisages that the mandatory system of TFCs applied within each member state would be subject to five strict principles:
- TFCs will not confer property rights, but only user rights to exploit them for a limited period. After expiry of that period the TFC will revert to the member state which would then be free to reallocate it using the same or different criteria
- Selling, leasing or swapping of TFCs will be limited to owners of registered and active fishing vessels and will only take place with the purpose of transferring them to the vessels which will use them
- Relative Stability will be respected
- Member states would withdraw TFCs in the case of any serious infringements
- Member states would be obliged to reserve quotas and TFCs for new entrants to the fishery
Whilst the proposal foresees that member states would have flexibility, the Commission’s preference is that member states should allocate a certain % share of the national quotas to the small-scale fleet. The Commission envisages additional safeguards for the small scale fleet, specifically their exemption from TFCs if they use passive gear. The Commission draws heavily on the Danish experience in its advocacy of a TFC system in all member states.
In response:
- We freely acknowledge that within a well designed administrative framework and with certain important preconditions TFCs can be an effective way to manage national quotas. The advantage of a system of rights-based management lies in the security and encouragement of longer-term planning that it provides , along with its discouragement of ‘Olympic fishing”, otherwise known as the ‘race for fish’.
- We consider, however, that it is a moot point whether the Commission has legal competence in this area, given that to date quota management has been a competence that has resided with the member states
- Across the EU and within individual member states a mix of TFCs, pooled quotas, delegated responsibilities and centralised quota limits are currently in use, depending on local adaptations to specific circumstances. The evolution of this complex pattern has largely taken place under member state oversight without involvement or intervention by Brussels and usually in an incremental and organic way after much discussion at member state and local level. The central question must be whether these arrangements within each member state are likely to be enhanced or degraded through centralised controls of the type envisaged. Our view is that we are unlikely to achieve a more effective system of quota management by applying a command and control approach at the European level where it has not existed previously. Removing member state autonomy in this area would in our view be a retrograde step.
- We have elsewhere indicated the folly of searching for a single definition to differentiate small-scale fleets at European level because of the diversity of the fleets and operational realities around the coast. We would also draw attention to the often unforeseen consequences of drawing a more or less arbitrary line through the fleets with substantially different regulatory conditions on either side of that line. A definition which differentiates between under-12 metre vessels using passive gear and the rest is as inadequate a definition as any other. The fact that this will ultimately be a member state area of responsibility provides some assurance that the worst excesses will be avoided. The non-paper makes no mention of other kinds of safeguards for the small-scale fleet, such as a ‘one-way valve’ applied to quota transactions involving the small scale fleet that could be applied by those member states which include this class of vessel (however defined) in TFC arrangements.
- An important legal question relates to the Treaty’s strictures on EU competence where property rights within a member state are concerned. The Commission may consider that a TFC is a use-right rather than a property right but the legal precept of legitimate expectation after many years of custom and practice may lead the courts in the member states, and ultimately the European Court of Justice, to a different conclusion.
In summary, whilst we believe that there is a place for TFCs in those member states which want them, we think that it is wrong in principle for the Commission to propose a mandatory system on all member states. Furthermore, we question whether, even if the EU has the legal authority to impose TFCs within member states, it is desirable or consistent of them to do so within the context of efforts to decentralise the CFP and to delegate more responsibility to the member states and the fishing industry.
CFP Reform – the discard ban
The Commission acknowledges that fishermen across Europe have undertaken a number of good initiatives to reduce discards but considers that these are insufficient to assuage public concern about what it describes as “this wasteful practice”. It has therefore proposed a ban within a “gradual approach in three stages: pelagic species in 2014, most valuable demersal species (cod, hake and sole) in 2015 and other species in 2016.”
The non-paper moves directly to explain how, in the Commission’s view, a discard ban would work in practice. This would involve fishermen and administrations working hand in hand within a regionalised CFP to develop concrete measures to avoid unwanted catches. This could include inter alia:
- More selective gear
- Restricting access to juvenile aggregation areas
- Real time closures
- Administrative redistribution of quota to cover catches
- Pooling of quotas
- Use of TFCs to match fishing opportunities to capacity
- Greater use of international quota swaps and transfers
- Inter PO quota swaps
- Establishment of “by-catch quotas” through which a % of the national allocation will be reserved to cover fish landed that are not covered by individual quotas
- Banking and borrowing of quota
- EMFF funded storage aid and marketing initiatives
- Fish caught below a (regionalised) minimum reference size would have to be landed but only sold for fish meal or pet food
Four points readily occur when reading this list:
- The first is the extent to which many of these measures are already in practice as part of the normal business of quota and fisheries management by POs and member states
- The extent to which the Commission is silent on substantial discarding that is directly related to CFP regulations and CFP management decisions including TAC decisions. This is a very significant omission. Without substantial change to the catch composition rules within the Technical Conservation Regulation and an entirely different approach to setting TACs within mixed fisheries, the Commission’s Proposal for a discard ban cannot work in practice
- The superficial glossing over of the issues involved in administrative redistribution of quota. This is an area fraught with legal and ethical difficulties (and it is only because this is seen from a comfortable distance and it would not be their responsibility) that the Commission can suggest it so blithely
- Interestingly, the non-papers do not mention catch quotas. At present the catch quota projects are at the cutting edge of discard reduction. Using the potential in the tonnages currently listed under the ICES advice discard column, catch quotas have demonstrably motivated behavioural change to reduce discards (and to document that change through the use of CCTV cameras). Catch Quotas have their disadvantages and are certainly not the panacea for all fisheries and fleets but they seems positively superior to Norway’s notional “ban” where ICES estimates that there is still a discard rate of around 15%. We would like encouragement for the expansion of the voluntary catch quota scheme but would be opposed to regarding it as any kind of panacea to be imposed on the fleets in a blanket fashion. Ultimately such an approach would only be counter-productive.
We have already indicated that we share the Commission’s goal of ending large-scale discarding. We agree that discarding wastes the resource and mars the reputation of the fishing industry, although it is always important to locate the issue of discarding within the bigger picture of effective resource management where the mortality rate rather that the end-use is the critical question.
It is worth repeating that substantial progress has already been made in reducing discards and these initiatives have been notified to the Commission. At the same time we are uneasy about applying the word “ban” to the efforts to minimise discards. Although a “ban” plays well with those parts of the media which have focused on the discards issue, the most superficial enquiry will reveal that even in those countries like Norway which ostensibly have a ban on discards, this prohibition is necessarily far from absolute. Unless the aim is to close mixed fisheries down completely and immediately, the practicalities and realities of fishing have to be taken into account.
The non-paper confirms that it is the Commission’s intention to provide some flexibility through a phased approach to the ban by allowing fish with known high survival rates to be returned to the sea. Even accepting that in a regionalised system implementing decisions would be made at the level of the fishery, the non-paper provides little additional illumination about how the necessary flexibility would be applied in practice and how necessary derogations would apply in arrangements still dictated to a large degree from the centre.
Successful management through the delegation of responsibilities will be dependent on achieving a workable balance between a broad management framework and flexibility for the member states and industry organisations to take initiatives within that framework. At present in relation to regionalisation, TFCs and discards, we do not believe that the right balance has been struck. There remains too much evidence of a residual top-down, command and control approach that will set unachievable and impractical targets and therefore set the CFP’s discard policy up for failure.
We suggest that a more systematic approach to discard reduction is employed which:
- Is based on a comprehensive appreciation of the discard reduction initiatives that are already in place
- A dialogue which provides a deeper understanding of what the producer organisations and member states already do to minimise discards
- An assessment of the extent, fishery-by-fishery, that these efforts are constrained and limited by CFP rules such as catch composition and TAC decisions based on single stock considerations
- Integration of measures and management approaches focussed on eliminating this kind of regulatory discards as a precondition for initiatives at the regional level.
CFP Reform – Maximum Sustainable Yield
The North Sea RAC has prepared extensive advice to the Commission on the application of the concept maximum sustainable yield to our fisheries. It is not our intention therefore to repeat all of the arguments here.
It is sufficient to observe that:
- The authors of the WSSD commitment to achieve MSY by 2015 were careful enough to include the words “where possible” to reflect the biological reality that it may not be possible to achieve MSY for all stocks simultaneously
- The non-paper adopts a quite superficial approach that ignores this important qualification and does little to advance policy thinking on how to achieve sustainable high yield fisheries in mixed fisheries.
- It “resolves” the problem of how to apply the MSY concept, which was developed with single stock fisheries in mind, to mixed stock fisheries by proposing that “it should be the most vulnerable stock that determines the limits of exploitation for all other fish taken in the same fishery”
We (and we believe all member states which have to deal with the realities of managing mixed stock fisheries), will reject this crude and dogmatic approach which could cause much damage if co-legislators were naïve enough to adopt it.
Instead, we believe that it should be for decision-makers at regional level to develop their own customised approach to MSY, or some proxy for MSY, within the context of the development of long-term management plans. Usually ‘movement in the right direction’ for a stock or a fishery is a much more significant criterion than endless and often futile discussions on where on the effort/yield curve MSY should be located.
Some of the issues that require consideration in the context of MSY in mixed fisheries are:
- Inextricably mixed stocks
- Sequential targeting within a single trip
- Current Ices work to date on mixed fisheries
- Avoidance plans
- Gear selectivity
- Spatial temporal measures
- Discards in mixed fisheries
- Economic driver stocks and the rest (Main TACs + “Norway Others” type approach)
- “Choke” stocks: minor stocks which could prevent access to main stocks in mixed fisheries
- MSY in mixed species fisheries
- Management plan trade-offs
- Catch composition rules
- Governance issues
Against this background we are strongly opposed to any attempt to impose an unworkable MSY obligation into the basic CFP Regulation.
Conclusions
The CFP is at an important crossroads. The arrival of co-decision has amplified and intensified stresses already apparent in the CFP. Failure to adapt and to decentralise decision-making in a meaningful way in this current reform risks a decade of paralysis until the task is completed in the next reform.
Regionalisation
Having now received the Commission’s clarifications in the form of the ‘non-papers’, we are concerned that in terms of delegating responsibilities to the regional seas level there will be a very wide gap between what was envisaged in the CFP Green Paper and supported by the RACs and the substance of post reform decision-making. Our fear is that very little will change if the role of regional cooperation is narrowly defined and restricted to implementing prescriptive requirements still agreed at the centre. A CFP which retains control over aims, objectives and timetables (as opposed to setting standards, determining overall strategy and intervening where there is a default) will repeat the weaknesses seen in the CFP of the recent past. The current EU Cod Management Plan presents an object lesson in what to avoid.
Transferable Fishing Concessions
Whilst we agree that transferable fishing concessions can be an effective way to manage quotas within each member state, we question whether the EU has legal competence in this sphere; moreover, we doubt the wisdom and logic of applying a top-down blanket approach to this area of policy when the stated orientation for the rest of the CFP is in the opposite direction.
Whilst we draw some comfort from confirmation that the Commission envisages TFCs operating within each member state and within the principle of Relative Stability, we are unconvinced by its blanket rejection of past efforts to reduce fleet overcapacity and its rather naïve faith in TFCs as the new panacea.
We caution against the often perverse and unforeseen consequences of drawing an arbitrary line through the fleet, as the Commission does in relation to differentiating the small-scale fleet, especially when it is explicitly envisaged that different conditions would apply above and below that line.
Discard Ban
Whilst we share the Commission’s objective of minimizing discards, the idea of a ‘ban’ owes more to an overreaction to media sensitivities than the hard, practical task of addressing the various drivers for discarding and the development of equally different solutions for them. We are astounded that the non-paper says nothing about the Commission’s own responsibilities to remove all legislation that currently generates discards. The catch composition rules and certain TAC decisions in mixed fisheries is an obvious place to start.
Maximum Sustainable Yield
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with identifying a level of fishing mortality that would consistently deliver high yields and then orienting management decisions to achieve that objective. The difficulty arises when a fetish is made of that objective and sight is lost of the necessary trade-offs, particularly in mixed and multi-species fisheries, that require balance with other objectives. Whilst we can see steady progress in our stocks towards some proxy of MSY, we are absolutely convinced that it would be a serious mistake to tie fisheries managers’ hands at regional seas level by making achievement of MSY a general and mandatory obligation.
Despite the fact that MSY is a somewhat discredited theoretical construction, designed with single stock fisheries in mind, it has served a useful purpose as a political commitment, which has moved the focus in fisheries management from avoiding collapse through over-exploitation, to the inherent economic potential in fisheries – if the right balance can be struck between exploitation and conservation.
Problems however arise when MSY is turned from a theoretical notion to a practical framework for fisheries management. The cost and inherent difficulties in providing analytical stock assessments so that we know, for each and every commercially exploited stock, where on the biomass yield curve we are, is probably beyond our capacity and resources. For this reason identifying a level of fishing mortality (Fmax for the aficionados) that is consistent with a high probability that this will deliver high yields is a more useful indicator for fisheries managers.
Again at a practical level, most realists accept that it is unlikely that it will be possible to maintain all stocks in multi-species, mixed-fisheries simultaneously at MSY. Some kind of pragmatic trade off is required to strike a balance between maximising yield on some stocks, but fishing others at a lower yield and providing protection for particularly vulnerable species.
It is above all, to deal with the realities of mixed fisheries that the all important words where possible were included in the Johannesburg Declaration.
The problem arises when, for political and largely cosmetic reasons, it is proposed that MSY is moved from a political commitment to a mandatory requirement, as we now have in the European Commission’s CFP reform proposals, cheered on by some of the less savvy environmental NGOs. As a political commitment there remains room for manoeuvre to deal with the tricky mixed fishery issues and the necessary trade-offs required; as a mandatory requirement ministers would be committing themselves to permanent failure, or fishing at the lowest common denominator, as there will always be some stock or other which will, for completely extraneous reasons, dip for a period. North Sea saithe is currently a good example which for a number of years, has been fished at levels of mortality below and biomass above MSY, yet has experienced below average recruitment for unknown environmental stock dynamic reasons. Nothing has changed in the fishery to account for this and the likelihood is that it will right itself in due course.
When MSY is moved from being a useful guide and benchmark to becoming an inflexible fetish, fisheries managers’ hands will be tied to deal with this kind of example in a pragmatic way. It is very significant that much of the opposition to using MSY in this crude way comes from fisheries scientists.
The signs are that many member states will press for this part of the proposal of the reform proposals to be taken out. There are other policy formulations that deliver that same commitment without the drawbacks. Our preference is to aim for:
“Levels of fishing effort consistent with high, long-term, sustainable yields”
Another is:
“Low levels of fishing mortality for the major species that will permit high stock sizes without significant loss of long-term yield”
Either of these formulations would avoid the trap of unachievable mandatory obligations to meet the requirements of a theory.
In any event, much more important than arguing about the fine-tuning of the point of destination is whether our fisheries are moving broadly in the right direction. And with a few exceptions the ICES advice for this year’s quotas confirms that this is the case.
Seafish’s existing guidance on potting rollers was published in 2001. As part of its commitment to supporting a safe and sustainable future for the industry, the organisation has decided that this guidance should be reviewed and, if necessary, updated.
The work will be undertaken for NFFO Services by Nathan de Rozarieux. Over the next couple of months, Nathan will be talking with fishermen, boat builders and manufacturers throughout the UK to discuss safety concerns and identify best practice. The results of this research are due to be published by Seafish in April.
Gary Hodgson, Chairman of NFFO’s Shellfish Committee said: “It is important that we strive to minimise the risks associated with potting. This important piece of work will help to uncover those risks and share best practice which will help ultimately to make every fisherman’s working environment safer.”
If you use, design or fit potting rollers or haulers and have any experiences or views on their safe use, design and layout we want to hear from you. Please email Nathan at nathan@tegen-mor.co.uk or contact Seafish on 01472 252 302
The Committee:
- Reviewed the outcomes of the December Council and drew attention to the absurdity of TACs and effort moving in opposite directions
- Agreed to exert maximum effort during the course of the coming year to secure changes to the EU Cod Management Plan consistent with rebuilding cod stocks and the wellbeing of the fleets
- Following a meeting on 6th February with Defra officials, agreed to refine and complete the Federation’s policy paper on the Commission’s “non-papers” on CFP reform and to redouble efforts to ensure that the industry’s voice is heard in the European Parliament during the course of the coming, crucial, year.
- Agreed to work closely with Defra in the English Days at Sea Group to minimise the impact of effort control during the course of the coming effort year (February to January)
- Resolved to work in the Irish Sea and North Sea to improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries, whilst acknowledging that these are mixed fisheries with different characteristics; to challenge assumptions about uniform discard rates; to resist a one-size-fits-all approach in the form of the Swedish grid
- Decided to join the Joint Selectivity Working Group to prepare the industry for both the possibility of a discard “ban” and a new technical conservation regulation
- Agreed to continue to work on the under-10metre quota management issue in the Industry Working Group, towards equitable and effective solutions
- Resolved to support the work of the International Sustainability Unit and the NFFO’s Ambassador to the ISU.
- Agreed to continue to support the work of the MPA Fishing Coalition financially, by providing a secretariat and through policy development
- Determined to challenge the assertion that fishing industry participation in the four regional MCZ stakeholder groups could be interpreted as unquestioned support for the groups’ designation recommendations.
- Supported the NFFO’s heavy involvement in working towards a satisfactory access arrangements for the Dogger Bank SAC
- Resolved to continue to work with the Crown Estate and offshore developers on minimising the impact of offshore renewables on fishing operations
- Determined to resist the proposal by the Welsh Assembly to apply discriminatory access restrictions, thereby setting an unwelcome precedent for devolved administrations
- Agreed to press Defra for a response to the NFFO’s paper on Shellfish Policy
- Prepared for a meeting with the Marine Management Organisation on 16th February, where, amongst other items, weighing of fish, e-logbooks, boardings policy and net tagging will be discussed.
- Received reports from NFFO regional committees and prepared for forthcoming meetings
- Discussed the Federation’s involvement in the Government’s Red Tape Challenge as Sector Champion
- Noted intentions to reform the governance in Seafish to give greater transparency and industry involvement in decisions on how the Seafish levy is spent
- Reviewed the Federation’s work on safety and training, including the working time directive, wearing lifejackets on board and certification
- Welcomed confirmation that following a successful trading year NFFO Services Limited would be making a grant of £100,000 to the NFFO Training Trust for expenditure in line with the Trust’s purposes
- Prepared for the NFFO AGM, which this year will be held in York on Thursday 10th May, 2012, with the UK Fisheries Minister in attendance.
- Reviewed the Federation’s efforts to put industry data collection and provision on a sounder footing.
- Agreed that the next meeting of the Executive Committee should be on Tuesday 13th March 2012.
The Committee:
- Reviewed the outcomes of the December Council and drew attention to the absurdity of TACs and effort moving in opposite directions
- Agreed to exert maximum effort during the course of the coming year to secure changes to the EU Cod Management Plan consistent with rebuilding cod stocks and the wellbeing of the fleets
- Following a meeting on 6th February with Defra officials, agreed to refine and complete the Federation’s policy paper on the Commission’s “non-papers” on CFP reform and to redouble efforts to ensure that the industry’s voice is heard in the European Parliament during the course of the coming, crucial, year.
- Agreed to work closely with Defra in the English Days at Sea Group to minimise the impact of effort control during the course of the coming effort year (February to January)
- Resolved to work in the Irish Sea and North Sea to improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries, whilst acknowledging that these are mixed fisheries with different characteristics; to challenge assumptions about uniform discard rates; to resist a one-size-fits-all approach in the form of the Swedish grid
- Decided to join the Joint Selectivity Working Group to prepare the industry for both the possibility of a discard “ban” and a new technical conservation regulation
- Agreed to continue to work on the under-10metre quota management issue in the Industry Working Group, towards equitable and effective solutions
- Resolved to support the work of the International Sustainability Unit and the NFFO’s Ambassador to the ISU.
- Agreed to continue to support the work of the MPA Fishing Coalition financially, by providing a secretariat and through policy development
- Determined to challenge the assertion that fishing industry participation in the four regional MCZ stakeholder groups could be interpreted as unquestioned support for the groups’ designation recommendations.
- Supported the NFFO’s heavy involvement in working towards a satisfactory access arrangements for the Dogger Bank SAC
- Resolved to continue to work with the Crown Estate and offshore developers on minimising the impact of offshore renewables on fishing operations
- Determined to resist the proposal by the Welsh Assembly to apply discriminatory access restrictions, thereby setting an unwelcome precedent for devolved administrations
- Agreed to press Defra for a response to the NFFO’s paper on Shellfish Policy
- Prepared for a meeting with the Marine Management Organisation on 16th February, where, amongst other items, weighing of fish, e-logbooks, boardings policy and net tagging will be discussed.
- Received reports from NFFO regional committees and prepared for forthcoming meetings
- Discussed the Federation’s involvement in the Government’s Red Tape Challenge as Sector Champion
- Noted intentions to reform the governance in Seafish to give greater transparency and industry involvement in decisions on how the Seafish levy is spent
- Reviewed the Federation’s work on safety and training, including the working time directive, wearing lifejackets on board and certification
- Welcomed confirmation that following a successful trading year NFFO Services Limited would be making a grant of £100,000 to the NFFO Training Trust for expenditure in line with the Trust’s purposes
- Prepared for the NFFO AGM, which this year will be held in York on Thursday 10th May, 2012, with the UK Fisheries Minister in attendance.
- Reviewed the Federation’s efforts to put industry data collection and provision on a sounder footing.
- Agreed that the next meeting of the Executive Committee should be on Tuesday 13th March 2012.
MPAC took the opportunity to present an alternative approach to marine conservation zones to the one currently being pursued by government.
Instead of the four regional projects “faux-stakeholder” approach for marine conservation zones, the Coalition proposed that those affected must be at the centre of an authentic dialogue. The aim must be to achieve conservation objectives without displacing fishing vessels from their customary fishing grounds.
Although the four MCZ regional projects have produced some useful recommendations, MPAC maintain that the current process has failed in four main areas:
- A rushed process leading to poor decisions
- Weak evidence for decisions on site designation and management measures
- Weak coverage of fishing interests representation from those groups potentially affected
- Failure to address the consequences of displacement of fishing activity
To persist with this approach through to management measures within designated sites would inevitably end up with an adversarial trial of strength. By contrast, the policy suggested by the Coalition offers a consensus-based approach with negotiated and agreed outcomes. The key, according to MPAC, is the close direct involvement of those affected in discussions over site and feature boundaries and appropriate management measures within the sites.
MPAC chairman Dr Stephen Lockwood, said after the meeting:
“Whilst, there was some anxiety on the government side about unravelling some of the work on site designation, there did seem to be an appreciation that MPAC’s alternative has obvious merits. There was a commitment to provide a formal response to our ideas and we will discuss that response at our next meeting. We are hopeful that this represents the first step in a process that leads to a genuinely inclusive and participative approach to marine protected areas. We recognise that there is less flexibility in the European Natura sites but our approach has validity here too.
“The weaknesses in the evidence base for SAC and MCZ designation is now well recognised and our approach offers a way in which these uncertainties can be addressed.”
MPAC continues to expand, with applications from Irish fishing groups and pledges of financial support from processors received since Christmas. International fleets increasingly apprehensive of the consequences for their fishing areas and their lack of representation in project consultations. They recognise MPAC as a platform from which to voice their fears and have their interests represented. Concern for the effects of the government’s MPA process on the future of UK fisheries is also growing among processors who depend on local supplies for their factories. Three companies in the southwest have already committed their backing to MPAC and it is hoped that others will follow.
The full text of the MPAC alternative is published below:
A Network Marine Protected Areas: A Good Governance Approach
By virtue of its wide spatial coverage by comparison with other sea users, the fishing industry, in its multiple forms, is likely to bear the main burden as a network of marine protected areas is established in UK waters. The extent to which fishing vessels will be displaced from their customary fishing grounds will depend to a high degree on the process through which marine conservation zones and special areas of conservation are introduced. Specifically, the MPA boundaries and management measures within those boundaries will determine the magnitude of the displacement effect. The MPA Fishing Coalition has highlighted the potential scale of adverse socio-economic consequences, as well the adverse ecological effects in marine areas outside MPAs. The magnitude of these various interactions will be directly related to the way a network of MPAs is introduced.
MPAs are not being introduced in isolation. The cumulative effect of a massive expansion of offshore wind, tidal and wave energy will also potentially carry significant displacement effects, within the same kind of timeframe
The Process to Date: Progress and Limitations
- Four regional stakeholder groups: Representativeness, although improved during the course of the projects was found to be inadequate and was challenged by the fishing industry, not least by international fleets
- Science Advisory Panel: The composition and balance have been questioned by the fishing industry
- Ecological Network Guidance: a failure to recognise the interrelationship between human use of the marine environment and its conservation in achieving ecological coherence, and a disproportionate application of theoretical and untested criteria given the level of knowledge available, and the weight of social and economic considerations at stake
- Scientific research and monitoring: a failure to effectively address the scientific and monitoring needs of MPAs in a measured and coherent way, instead in the selection of reference areas opting for an abrasive and rushed approach whose designations have yet to be justified legally under the Marine and Coastal Access Act.
- Rushed Timeframe: challenged by fishing industry–fishing stakeholders felt like being on a train rushing to an uncertain destination rather than a process they had any influence over and which now, at the post regional project stage, has been relaxed
- NE’s evidence procedure has been criticised, reviewed and modified as a result
- Stakeholder groups have delivered recommended site designations; fishing representatives have lodged reservations and registered disquiet over the designation process
The Evidence Deficit
There is a broad recognition that the process of designating MCZs and SACs has been seriously constrained by inadequate information with regard to:
- Conservation features & management objectives:
- Fishing Patterns: absence of fine-scale data
- Fishing methods: impact on features
- Intensity of fishing: absence of quantitative analysis
- Sensitivity of features
- Natural turbidity
- Site specific data
The Democratic Deficit
If fishermen had the same property rights as farmers there would not be an issue. Independently evaluated compensation would have to be paid directly to those fishermen adversely affected. But fishermen do not have property rights on their fishing grounds, no matter how long they have fished them or no matter how serious the economic consequences of displacement. Like the North American Indians they can legally be displaced from their customary hunting grounds by more powerful economic and political interests. This might be legal but not many would judge it to be fair, equitable or particularly democratic.
Other Stakeholders
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the process of designating MCZ sites to date, it would be wrong to suggest that this work has no value. In fact in many cases it provides a useful though seriously limited starting point for decisions on designation and management measures. When we turn to management measures for fishing impacts within MCZs, it is clear that the spatial scale, the composition and an effective way of dealing with data deficiencies there is a clear need for fisheries-specific arrangements at the appropriate spatial scale.
A Dialogue-Based Approach
Learning the hard won lessons of Lyme Bay, as well as the Australian and Californian experience, it is possible to envisage a different and better approach. The essence of an alternative approach would be the replacement of the current faux-stakeholder process by a genuine dialogue at site level about the area to be designated and the management areas within them.
This would require:
- A focused stakeholder process involving key players in discussion: fisheries managers, fishing industry representatives and independent expertise
- Time for dialogue and preparation and analysis of the available evidence
- Good faith
- Participants with a legitimate mandate to negotiate
- The best information available
- An adaptive approach
- A willingness to compromise if necessary
- Scope to adapt both site boundaries and management measures to achieve an optimum outcome for both the conservation status of vulnerable features and the operation of the fishing industry
- A consensus approach to the level of evidence required in each case that would not necessarily require high levels of expenditure in order to gather additional evidence
Moving Forward
The MCZ process should:
- Build on the progress made to date but with an awareness of its limitations
- Apply an approach based on the principles of good governance
- In the absence of complete information apply a risk-based approach that provides confidence to stakeholders and management authorities that both sufficient levels of protection and proportional management are achieved.
- Move to a process that complements high level strategic engagement between MPAC and SNCBs/Defra/MMO with site specific engagement involving relevant fishing stakeholders potentially affected by the MCZ.Use all metrics, including site boundaries and zoned management measures within MCZs to achieve an optimum outcome for:
- the conservation status of the feature
- the socio-economic status of the fishing industry
- the wider marine environment
- Recognise the inherent limitations to the management information available; and whilst continuing to build the evidence base, reach a consensus position on the boundaries of current understanding and adopt management measures taking those limitations into account through a progressive and adaptive approach.
- Be based on an accurate and comprehensive baseline and effective and targeted monitoring and review regime which should be used to inform management (Where possible opportunities for working collaboratively to gather evidence should be directed towards stakeholders affected by management decisions)
- Ensure that as far as possible the site boundaries and management measures are consistent with the emerging marine spatial plans.
‘independent’ implies acceptability to the majority, if not all interested parties, not just those making the appointment.
… with a recent meeting of the English Days at Sea Group, on which the NFFO sits.
Implementing a management plan that has been evaluated by STECF and found to be flawed, yet obliged to implement its provisions because of the rigidity of the EU decision making process, is deeply depressing; especially as the pre-programmed reductions in effort will make life more difficult for the fleets in 2012.
Tough measures can sometimes be accepted even if not liked, but as STECF has concluded that it is not reasonable to expect fishing mortality to fall in line with effort reductions, the conservation rationale for these reductions simply isn’t there. This makes these measures doubly difficult to accept.
In a difficult set of negotiations at the December Council, the UK and other member states successfully fought off the Commission’s interpretation of Article 13 (effort buy-back provisions) of the Cod Management Plan, which had it stood ,would have gutted the Plan of the only element that STECF believes is effective. Although still hemmed in by the poorly drafted provisions of the Plan, there is plenty evidence noted by STECF that the various kinds of cod avoidance practiced by the UK fleet has substantially reduced discards of cod and helped with the rebuilding of the stocks.
Against this background, our priority has been to manage the UK’s effort allocation to avoid any premature closures of fisheries during 2012 and to maximise the flexibility for the fleets operating within the cod recovery zone.
The details of the effort management regime as a result of these discussions will appear shortly on the MMO website.
Selectivity in the Nephrops Fishery
During the December negotiations it became clear that the Commission currently has discarding in the nephrops fishery in its sights. The UK as part of the negotiations on effort for 2012 was obliged to make commitments to work on measures that would improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries in the West of Scotland, Irish Sea and North Sea.
The Northern Irish fleet has taken the lead in trialling a range of gears as an alternative to the “Swedish grid” which has a range of disadvantages not least its elimination of “by-catch” for which the vessels have legitimate quota and for which there is a ready market. A gear that is effective but suited to the conditions in the Irish Sea is the urgent goal of a number of industry initiatives.
One of the problems faced is the inadequate information on discard rates in different areas and parts of the fishery. Blanket discard rates give the misleading impression that the problem is the same in all areas, when this is patently not the case.
An alternative to more selective gear for nephrops fisheries where discards of cod are already at a minimal level, or which is characterised by catches of whitefish covered by quota, is to develop some form of fully documented fishery, not necessarily using CCTV cameras, that demonstrates that fact.
STECF 1.5%
The bar for exemption from the effort regime has been set very low. Groups of vessels seeking exemption must demonstrate that they catch no more that 1.5% cod in their catch and that the gears used must be evaluated by STECF as achieving this. The emphasis so far has been on the “Swedish grid” because it has been evaluated and approved by STECF but there are a number of other gears better suited to local conditions in the approvals pipeline.
Exemption for Catch Quota Vessels
Vessels that have volunteered for the Catch Quota scheme should by logic be exempt from the effort regime because their contribution to cod mortality is precisely recorded and the vessels, as part of the scheme rules, discard no cod. STECF has been tasked to provide an early response to the Councils request on this point. Progress on this would be a great relief to the vessels concerned not least because of the cost of purchasing additional days/effort in order to remain viable.
Cod Management Plan
All of this is a holding operation whilst the EU Cod Management Plan is evaluated, alternatives outlined and assessed and the political process of adoption completed. The NFFO as part of the North Sea and North West Waters RAC delegations has participated fully in the STECF evaluation meetings and will be involved in the impact assessment meetings this year. Industry and stakeholder access to these important meetings is much better than in the past and it is hoped that the outcomes will reflect this contribution. The Federation has consistently made the case that effort control is a blind alley that at worst actively undermines the rebuilding of cod stocks
The reform of the CFP and the review of the EU Cod Management Plan are two developments this year with a huge capacity on their own to shape our future – for either good or ill.
At the same time, during the course of the next 12 months it is likely that important decisions will be made in domestic fisheries policy. The shape of the concordat between Defra and the devolved administrations will be revealed at some stage, and there will be further steps to resolution of the difficulties facing parts of the under-10 metre fleet. We expect also that there will be progress in the implementation of a new approach to managing the shellfisheries. These will all bring impacts – but for better or worse remains to be seen. At the same time the industry will have to continue to deal with huge new developments such as the establishment of a network marine protected areas and massive offshore wind-farms which both have the capacity to displace fishing activity from its customary grounds.
There are some who believe that our future is largely preordained and shaped by bigger forces than our relatively small but still important industry. But that is to surrender before the fight has begun. The NFFO will be found throughout the coming year alongside our friends and allies at the heart of all of these issues, arguing for rational, fair and evidence-based policies consistent with a profitable and sustainable future.
One way in which the future can be better than the recent past is by developing and implementing well-thought-through long-term management plans. With a destination in sight and the means to get there agreed, much of the heat can be taken out of TAC decisions and steady progress can be made in building stocks. The North Sea RAC will be continuing its work on a long term management plan for nephrops and the North Western Waters RAC will be building on foundations already laid on the development of a multi-annual plan for the mixed demersal fisheries in the Celtic Sea.
Given that many of the more knotty problems in fisheries management arise from the multi-species and multi-gear character of many of our fisheries, the RACs also have the intention of organising a conference this year on mixed- fisheries. This should provide a useful platform for building these and other management plans.
Beyond the complexities of the demersal fisheries, lies the difficult and sometimes treacherous international political landscape of the pelagic fisheries. Above all else is the need to bring to an end the present period of turbulence in the mackerel fishery before lasting damage is done to the stocks.
The December Council was instructive as the first time that the fishing industry argued, along with member state for the implementation of ICES scientific recommendations, and against the Commission’s hard line, dogmatic proposals. This did not happen out of the blue and reflects a changing relationship between the fishing industry and fisheries scientists that is emerging from fisheries science partnerships of various kinds and a strong dialogue inside and outside the RACS. In many respects this points to the future: the key question will be to what extent even a reformed CFP will trap us within the same old adversarial roles or to what extent the industry will be liberated to work with scientists, fisheries managers and other stakeholders to define its own way forward.
Completing the second year of its existence, MPAC, the alliance of fishing organisations which was formed to defend access to fishing grounds during the establishment of a network of marine protected areas in UK waters, has recently taken stock of progress made so far.
The main markers in the organisation’s short history are:
- Its formation in the Palace of Westminster on 11th February 2009, with support from sympathetic MPs
- The appointment of respected fisheries scientist, Dr Stephen Lockwood, as MPAC Chairman
- Launch of the MPAC Fighting Fund and membership campaign, which quickly secured wide support from across all areas and fishing groupings in the UK
- Regular engagement with senior DEFRA and devolved administration officials
- Meetings with fisheries/environment ministers from DEFRA and the devolved administrations to outline the aims and purposes of MPAC
- The extension of MPAC membership beyond the UK to include Dutch, French, Irish and Belgian fishing organisations, equally concerned about displacement from their customary fishing grounds
- Regular engagement with the Government’s statutory advisors on nature conservancy to challenge the weak parts of the approach to establishing marine conservation zones and EU special areas of conservation (SAC) and special protection areas (SPA)
- Emphasis on 4 main flaws in the MPA approach to date:
- A rushed timeframe
- Unrepresentative stakeholder involvement
- A weak evidence base for designation decisions
- Failure to address the issue of displacement of fishing activities
Achievements
- Building a broad coalition of fishing interests
- A high profile launch with extensive media coverage
- A commitment to an evidence-based approach
- Support for the introduction of MPAs to provide protection for rare and vulnerable ecology but rejection of flawed, rushed and woolly thinking in government policy
- A successful challenge to Natural England’s initial assertions that it had a role as fisheries managers as opposed to advisors to government
- Bringing a degree of realism to what MPAs can achieve in terms of building commercial fish stocks (as opposed to protecting biodiversity)
- Securing public recognition that the potential contribution to the protection of biodiversity made by marine protected areas needs to be balanced by the contribution made by the fishing industry to the food security of the nation
- Insisting on a more sophisticated measure of the extent of fishing pressure on seabed features
- Challenging the use of extreme language and unsupported assertions by senior officials in the statutory nature conservation bodies – “the infamous rape and pillage remarks”
- Effectively drawing attention to the international dimension of fishing activity outside the 6 mile limit and emphasising the need to adapt consultation and evidence gathering procedures to take account of that fact
- Bringing to bear a rigorous approach to evidence used to designate MCZs, SACs and SPAs
- Drawing attention to the cumulative impact of multiple offshore developments (amongst which is the establishment of marine protected areas) all of which increasingly constrain where fishing activity can safely and legally take place
- Drawing attention to the absence of a formal marine spatial planning framework for rushed decisions on the designation of marine protected areas
- Successfully securing a review of Natural England’s scientific and evidence procedures by the government’s Chief Scientific Officer which resulted in important tightening up of arrangements
- Close involvement of MPAC members in the four MCZ regional stakeholder groups charged with making recommendations on designated sites for MCZs
- Challenging the application of narrowly interpreted theoretical science to the selection of MCZs
- Successfully bringing Government attention to the potential and often unforeseen consequences of displacement of fishing activity
- The articulation of an alternative approach to managing MPAs, based on close involvement and dialogue with of the principle stakeholders at site level
- Building understanding of the need for a local/regional focus along with a consensus approach that minimises the scope for displacement
- Securing a ministerial decision to extend the time allowed for gathering evidence on which site designations will be based
- Securing ministerial commitment to provide additional funds to strengthen the evidence base for the designation of marine conservation zones
- Securing ministerial support for a phased (as opposed to a “big-bang”) approach to the designation of MCZ sites, thus allowing for a more robust evidence based approach
- Securing a written assurance from the UK fisheries minister that no MPA beyond six miles will be formally designated until such times that EU approval ensures that any restrictions will apply to all member states’ vessels, not just those registered in the UK.
Going Forward
Despite this impressive list of achievements, there is no scope for complacency. The MPA Fishing Coalition recognises the huge task that it faces to ensure that every marine protected area established in UK waters is justified on the basis of sound evidence and that the impacts on fishing activities are minimised to the least extent possible.
As the focus shifts from site designation to the management measures that will apply within marine protected areas (up to and including complete exclusion of fishing activity) it will be more important than ever for the fishing industry as a whole to work together through the Coalition.
The Coalition stands ready to reinforce the efforts all those fishing groups and individuals who have registered their support for the work of MPAC and who are concerned about their future access to their customary fishing grounds.
The Coalition’s Fighting Fund remains open for contributions and the essential work of the Coalition can only continue with your support:
The MPA Fishing Coalition
30 Monkgate
York
YO31 7PF
This is not the first time that one of the more naïve NGOs has painted the fishing industry and fisheries ministers as “fish deniers” blithely allocating to themselves more fish than can be safely or sustainably afforded.
The reality is a bit different. In fact, for the most part both the NFFO and UK ministers would this year have been more or less content to “follow the science” by translating ICES stocks advice directly into TAC decisions.
In fact, it was the European Commission which this year departed from the science by suggesting 25% TAC cuts to any stock for which ICES could not provide an analytical assessment with population estimates – the data poor stocks. This had nothing to do with science and everything to do with political tactics. It was an attempt to shake up those member states which had not fulfilled their data collection responsibilities by harming the livelihoods of many thousands, including those in member states, the UK included, which had fully met its data provision obligations. This left member states with little option to push back with more responsible and balanced counter-proposals.
Similarly, the Commission’s wilful interpretation of ICES advice to translate “there should be no increase in fishing mortality” to mean a 25% reduction, owed nothing to science and everything to a bullying policy approach with no serious attempt to reach a reasonable balance.
Likewise “no targeted fishery” in the ICES adviceis not the same as a zero TAC in the Commission proposal.
Especially in mixed fisheries, there are difficult choices to be made by fisheries managers when setting TACs each year. Balancing the out-take with efforts to build stocks, whilst minimising discard and adverse socio-economic consequences is a complex task. Member states bring insights and information to TAC decisions to which a small group of bureaucrats in Brussels simply do not have access.
These decisions are not helped by the hysterical sounds offstage by NGOs with only the most superficial understanding of the issues and a simplistic agenda that equates environmental progress with the scale of TAC reductions.
Not all environmental NGOs should be tarred with the same brush. But the Marine Conservation Society is building up a solid reputation for speaking first and thinking afterwards. It is not helpful.
Email No_thumbs_tone@hotmail.com
The NFFO’s South East Committee has recently been reinvigorated through the election of a new Chairman who is determined to ensure that the South East regains a voice in national and European platforms. After an initial meeting in Shoreham it is intended to hold meetings in Leigh-on Sea and in Rye early in 2012. The South East has largely been sidelined in recent years and the NFFO is working to rebuild its previously very strong and active Committee.
The foreseeable challenges facing the South East in the coming year are:
- Under-10 metre Quota Management: The predominantly under-10 metre fleet in the South East faces a range of particular challenges, notably an imbalance between the capacity of the fleet and available quota. The South East Committee will be feeding in its views through the NFFO as the Government comes to final conclusions about how to address the under-10m issue. The inshore fleet’s decisive rejection of the Government’s proposals for a radical change to a fully fledged system of rights based management have left it with little option to test the water through pilots on under-10 self- management that, if successful, would provide the flexibility in quota management that the producer organisations already hold. The NFFO is keen to encourage and strengthen cooperation between the POs and the pilots as a way forward that avoids damaging splits and divisions in the industry.
- TACs and Quotas: The exclusive focus on the issue of distribution of quota by single issue groups has distracted from the bigger picture of the TACs and the under pinning science that can have at least as significant effect on vessel earnings. Through the direct involvement in the process leading to decisions at the December Council the new Chairman of the SE Committee has already made his mark.
- Marine Conservation Zones: The establishment of a network of marine conservation zones, and European Special Areas of Conservation represents a huge potential threat of displacement from customary fishing grounds in the South East. As the focus moves from site designation to management measures it is vital for the South East Committee to coordinate a dialogue at local level between the management authorities and those potentially affected. This work has already begun.
- Shellfish: Fishing for crab and lobster is vitally important to a large number of vessels in the South East For this reason the views of our South East members have been fully taken into account in the development of the Federation’s Shellfish Policy document
- Fisheries Science Partnerships: When the next round of Defra Fisheries Science Partnership projects is invited the South East Committee will be submitting a proposal.
- Offshore Wind-farms: Members from the South East have been cooperating with the NFFO / Crown Estate mapping project to ensure that as far as possible, future offshore wind-farm developments and the cables bringing the electricity ashore avoid the most sensitive fishing grounds
- Aggregate dredging has been a sensitive issue on the South Coast and Thames Estuary for many years. The Committee will be involved in vetting all licence applications
Chairman: Ned Clark, North Shields/Cullercoates
Email: nedclark@aol.com
The Federation’s North East Committee is active in the following policy areas:
- Whiting quota: the severe imbalance between available quota and the abundance of quota on the fishing grounds has led to high levels of discards in recent years. This has been a priority area for the NFFO and the most recent EU Norway agreement included the second successive rise in TAC with additional increases from a quota transfer from Norway and the invocation of the Hague Preference. Whilst this still leaves an imbalance progress in the right direction.
- Long Term Management Plan for Nephrops: The Committee has fed into the important work of the North Sea regional Advisory Council on the development of a long term management plan for the nephrops fishery.
- Days-at Sea: Days at sea restrictions arising from the EU Cod Management Plan have the potential to seriously harm the viability of the North East nephrops/whitefish fleet. For this reason the NE Committee has been an active participant in industry/government discussions on effort control through the English Days at Sea Group
- Mixed fishery Issues: The fishery off the North East Coast is a genuine mixed fishery in which the main economic driver species alternates between nephrops (prawns) and whitefish within a notable seasonality
- Fisheries Science Partnerships: The fishing industry in the North east has taken part in a number of fisheries science partnership projects designed to address issues of concern to the local industry and fill gaps in the more formal stock assessments and fisheries science
- Marine Conservation Zones: The Committee has contributed to both the MPA Fishing Coalition and the regional project Net Gains to protect the most valuable fishing grounds during the process of establishing a network of marine conservation zones
- North East Salmon Fishery: The Committee hosts meeting of the NFFO’s Salmon Committee whose Chairman, Derek Heselton MBE has fought a long and arduous battle in defence of the licenced drift net fishery for salmon over many years.
- Domestic Quota Reform: Given its mix of both under and over-10 metre vessel the Committee has fed into the debate on the future of quota management for the under-10 fleet
- Dialogue with the Marine Management Organisation: The Committee has engaged with the delivery of fisheries policy through the NFFO’s regular meetings with the MMO
- Shellfish: The development of shellfish policy is a priority area for the Committee given the importance of the crab and lobster fishery on the North East Coast
- CFP Reform: The Committee keeps a close eye on developments towards a reformed Common Fisheries Policy and contributes to the Federation’s work in this area, including positions prepared by the North Sea RAC.
- The Committee was active in securing £6million funding for the North Shields West Quay project
- NFFO North East Committee members sit on the Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (IFCA) and the North Eastern IFCA and also the Regional Advisory Council of the Environment Agency
The Council outcomes and the process through which they were reached provide ample evidence of why the CFP must change in the forthcoming reform.
The word “absurd” was used repeatedly by member state delegations to describe the process through which TACs and effort decisions were arrived at in the early hours of Saturday morning, after many hours of tortuous negotiation by the Commission and member states, most of whom have an interest in a handful of stocks but have a say in them all. Equally, the Commission’s attempts to force member states to accept detailed technical measures as part of a deal on effort control, are the epitome of how not to decide and apply conservation measures and directly in the opposite direction to the proposed CFP reform.
Instead of a rational conversation at regional level about appropriate levels to set TACs at we are caught up in a complex and elaborate charade in which:
- The Commission upped the ante and its negotiating leverage early in the process by announcing without prior discussion that data poor stocks would be subject to an automatic 25% TAC reduction. All member states rejected this as an inappropriate response to a genuine problem. But this still left us arguing the case for a more reasoned approach until the 11th hour.
- Another negotiating tactic applied by the Commission was to set TAC proposals according to achieving MSY by 2013 rather than the Johannesburg commitment of MSY by 2015, “where possible”. Again, member states pushed back against this but in doing so spent scarce negotiating capital
Against this background, the casual observer would never guess that ICES stocks advice for this year paints the most positive picture for more than a decade. Despite the flawed process, this positive picture on stocksis reflected in the TAC outcomes: All the more bizarre that the in these mixed fisheries TAC decisions and effort limits (days-at-sea) are moving in opposite directions.
Another layer of absurdity is that, despite recognising the flaws in this approach, the Council and Commission were incapable of moving in a different direction because they are so tied in by previous legislation in the Cod Management Plan; which they also acknowledge is flawed and in urgent need of revision.
The main North Sea joint stock TACs were agreed with Norway in late November and with the exception of saithe, reflect the positive ICES advice for 2001, which in turn reflects the general picture of stocks rebuilding and heading towards or already in the region of maximum sustainable yield. Saithe is an object lesson in the pitfalls of fisheries science and management because it had been regarded as an exemplar species and had achieved low fishing mortality and high levels of biomass in the five preceding years.
The North Sea plaice stock as rebuilt rapidly, doubtless assisted by the substantial decommissioning scheme for beam trawlers undertaken by the Netherlands – a feature that seems to have escaped the notice of the recent European Court of Auditors report on fleet capacity.
The divergent direction of TACs and effort allocations is the most salient and disturbing part of the December Council outcomes for the North Sea and has to raise questions about the inclusion of effort control in future management plans. The provisions of the EU Cod Management Plan and also the EU Flatfish Management Plan have resulted in these perverse outcomes that the fishing industry will have to deal with in 2012.
The wholly Commission’s wholly unnecessary and unwarranted proposal to reduce TACs for data poor stocks was rejected by the Council and will be recorded as one of the more cack-handed approaches to emerge from Brussels. In the event most of the proposed reductions for the North Sea were transformed during the Council negotiations to rollovers – avoiding unnecessary discards and loss of income.
“The December Fisheries Council finished in the early hours of Saturday 17 December in Brussels, when the TACs and quotas for 2012 were finally agreed.
The negotiations took place against the background of extreme proposals from the Commission for big reductions in a number key TACs and quotas for the South West.
Non TAC issues:
Sole Recovery Zone (VIIe) effort levels remain unchanged for 2012.
The Trevose Closure remains in place for 2012 from 1 February to 31 March.
TACs:
“The UK minister and his team were fully briefed, through the NFFO team in Brussels, and made acutely aware of our key priorities ahead of the negotiations and we kept up the pressure throughout the Council.
One of the most disappointing and frustrating outcomes was on Spurdog, Porbeagle and Skate which remain under zero TAC. Despite all the rhetoric from the Commission about the importance reducing discards, these stocks were not up for negotiation. This amounts to a counterproductive, irrational, not to say schizophrenic approach from Commission. UK Minister and negotiating team were made fully aware of all the arguments and implications of such an outcome on these stocks but whilst he acknowledged and agreed with these he was unable to deliver due to the Commission’s immovable position. We all know this will deliver nothing expect increase discards and do nothing for conservation. The CFPO and NFFO will continue to work with CEFAS and DEFRA to develop alternative management proposals during 2012.
The December negotiations are always difficult with an ever growing political and green influence. However the CFPO and the NFFO team in Brussels deployed every scientific, economic and political argument at our disposal.
Where successful, this has been at least in part due to the work done by the NFFO, CFPO and its members through Fisheries Science Partnerships and the improved working relationship with scientists and policy makers.
At the beginning of these negotiations we made it clear the outcome would be judged as a package from our perspective and whilst progress was made on many fronts including fighting of cuts on data poor stocks, clearly the outcome overall did not deliver all of our priorities and in some areas was disappointing.
The CFPO has already begun talks with DEFRA and other member states to secure additional quota through international and domestic swaps and transfers in an effort to maximise fishing opportunities for 2012.”
Paul Trebilcock
Cornish Fish Producers Organisation
PROVISIONAL 2012 TAC CHANGES
Stock Commission Proposal Final Outcome
Cod VIIe-k Increase 140% Increase 150%
Haddock VIIb-k Cut 25% Increase 25%
Whiting VIIb-k Cut 25% Increase 15%Hake Cut 10% Cut 6%
Monk Cut 25% Cut 5%
Megrim Cut 25% Cut 5%Sole hjk Cut 15% Status Quo
Plaice hjk Cut 25% Cut 5%Sole e Increase 9% Increase 9%
Plaice de Cut 10% Increase 8.5%Sole fg Cut 15% Cut 10%
Plaice fg Cut 25% Cut 10%
Sole d Increase 9% Increase 15%
Pollack Cut 25% Status Quo
Saithe Cut 15% Status Quo
Ling Cut 25% Status QuoSkates & Rays VI & VII Cut 25% Cut 13%
(No Landings of Undulate Ray or Skate) Spurdog Zero TAC Zero TAC
Porbeagle Zero TAC Zero TAC
Note: These figures are subject to amendment following post Council clarifications.
“It is clear to me that the industry must stay engaged with the process in Brussels and especially at the December Council. These decisions have a direct impact on fishermen’s livelihoods and the viability of vessels of whatever size. It is often forgotten that arguments about the share of the quotas, after the TAC has been decided, is often secondary to fishermen’s livelihoods to the overall size of the cake.”
“TAC increases in Eastern Channel plaice and sole should ease the position for under-10s and POs next year. And although the approach to Skates and Rays remains far too blunt, a rollover on the TAC for 2012 was a useful result against the background of the Commission’s proposals for a 15% cut. We must continue to press for a more rational management approach that takes into account the different conservation status of different species under the broad heading of “Skates and Rays.”
“The deep rooted problems of the inadequate cod quota in area VIId will not be addressed by the decisions in this Council. A 1% cut is neither here nor there in the scale of things.”
Because the Eastern Channel is within the Cod Recovery Zone, the larger vessels will be subject to all the constraints and perversities of the effort regime.”
Against the background of a proposal from the European Commission for a 19% cut in the nephrops TAC, Northern Ireland’s most important stock, the negotiations ended with a rollover of the 2011 TAC into 2012; however there was less encouraging news for the remnants of Northern Ireland’s whitefish fleet and local herring fishermen.
Speaking after the finish of the Council, Alan McCulla, Chief Executive of the Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers Organisation who was in Brussels for the negotiations said the result left him confused.
“We are relieved that a neutral result was achieved for our nephrop fishery because it is stable and sustainably harvested. According to ICES science a 19% cut in this quota was never justified. In fact the science was consistent with an increase TAC. Nevertheless we are relieved that the Northern Ireland team, led by our Fisheries Minister Michelle O’Neill MLA, secured a rollover. Further deep cuts in the number of days all of our fishermen can spend at sea were tempered by the EC’s agreement to continue to allow our prawn fishermen to ‘buy-back’ days at sea through the adoption of various technical conservation measures. Whilst challenging, the aim during the first half of 2012 will be to identify additional measures to exempt our prawn fishermen from days at sea restrictions.”
“For our few remaining whitefish fishermen the news is not good. A 25% cut in the Irish Sea cod quota, combined with a 25% cut in days at sea may well spell the end of what was once a very important part of the local fleet. The situation with cod typifies the complete lack of logic in the Commission’s approach to these negotiations. Irish Sea cod is one of the stocks the Commission describe as being data poor, but their answer to addressing this problem is to force fishermen to catch less cod, therefore providing less data. This is a something we’ve been discussing with DARD for some considerable time. We urgently need to address this situation as regretfully there is a complete contradiction between the amount of cod fishermen are seeing in the Irish Sea and the amount fisheries scientists say are there.”
“Herring in the Irish Sea presents another contradiction, but this time not between local fishermen and fisheries scientists, but rather between Northern Ireland’s fishing industry, officials and fisheries scientists on one side and the European Commission on the other. All of the evidence, from the fishery and from the science confirms the numbers of herring in the Irish Sea have at least quadrupled in the last four years. Yet after the EC agreeing a 10% rise in this TAC for 2011, the EC has now imposed a 10% cut for 2012. However, there remains an opportunity to resolve this situation in time for the 2012 herring season. There is absolutely no reason why the herring TAC could not be significantly increased.”
“Overall the European Commission has imposed a reduction on the value of fish and shellfish local fishermen can land into Northern Ireland in 2012. This is very disappointing, especially because if the science was followed there should have been an overall increase in the value of fish and shellfish landed into County Down’s fishing ports.”
“On a positive note, against the background of the EC proposals, even if these proposals were part of a broader game of tactics, we have nevertheless ended up with a better result than many predicted. One other issue the entire Northern Ireland team agrees upon is that having Eurocrats and officials from countries as far away as Estonia and Greece decide on what happens in the Irish Sea is a nonsense. The sooner Brussels gets their hands out of the Irish Sea, the better it will be for fish stocks, the fishing industry and the economy of the County Down coast.” said Alan McCulla.
The threat of immediate and widespread bankruptcies has been averted but it was not possible to secure a “pause” in the pre-programmed reductions in permissible days-at-sea required by the now discredited EU Cod Management Plan. This means that the UK whitefish fleets outside the Celtic Sea will face further effort reductions in 2012:
Area Gear Category Effort Reduction in 2012*
North Sea TR1 -18%
North Sea TR2 -18%
North Sea BT2 -9%
Irish Sea TR1 -25%
Irish Sea TR2 -25%
West of Scotland TR1 -25%
West of Scotland TR 2 -25%*Subject to confirmation
A large part of the December Council was devoted to finding a way forward on the effort issue. The Cod Plan has been evaluated by STECF and found to be flawed in some of its essentials. However, the political logjam arising from the Lisbon Treaty’s extension of co-decision to fisheries has left a legal instrument in place with (according to Commission lawyers) no way of amending it quickly.
The result is fleets trapped in ever decreasing effort reductions with little hope of relief before 2014.
This absurd situation, in which process rides roughshod over objectives, common sense is not in sight and the legal tail wags the conservation dog, is intolerable and underlines the need to move rapidly to some form of regional management.
Had the Commission’s interpretation of Article 13 won the day it would have undermined and brought to an abrupt halt all the conservation initiatives – real time closures, catch quotas and selectivity measures – brought in by the UK under the effort buyback provision. The Commission’s efforts, during the negotiations, to secure member states’ commitment to detailed, prescriptive, selectivity measures, especially for the nephrops fleet, had all the hallmarks of the characteristic failings of the CFP. Rushed measures agreed by people under extreme pressure, who only have the faintest grasp of what they are talking about, within a 48 hour time window, is a sure the way to get it wrong. The UK successfully resisted this approach but it is clear that expectations are high that additional selectivity measures to reduce discards in the TR2 fleet will be introduced during 2012.
Stock assessments are expressed within a framework that identifies limit and precautionary reference points for those stocks where the data allows. And EU policy justifies its approach to data deficient stocks by reference to the precautionary approach.
It certainly makes sense to take action where there is a potential risk but we don’t have full information. However, the problem with the application of the precautionary approach (as opposed to the concept) is that it takes place within a framework without limits or guidance on how far to go with it. If environmental considerations alone are applied unconstrained then there is no room for human activity of any kind, anywhere, ever. Not even the more extreme, media-focused, environmental NGOs espouse that view.
How do we balance environmental, economic and social considerations? There is general agreement that the three pillars of sustainability: environmental, economic and social, should all be part of the mix but there is no explicit guidance on how this should be achieved in practical terms.
This leaves us in a situation such as we see for example in the Commission’s precautionary approach to data deficiency – to cut TACs for stocks where ICES is unable to provide an “analytical” TAC with population estimates – by 25%. There is a genuine problem with data deficiencies but the Commission’s approach has been apparently unconstrained by any concern about the economic or social impact of such a policy. Unanimous opposition by member states at the October Council of Ministers have now forced the Commission to soften this hard-line approach but the fact that it could be made in the first place is indicative of a lack of checks and balances in the formulation of policy within the CFP.
Environmental objectives are vital but so are social and economic dimensions and not just as a brake on environmental policy. Pursuing one of the three pillars, irrespective of the cost to the others is untenable because ultimately they can only be achieved in tandem. The early experiences of game reserves in Africa spelt out the need to take the economic wellbeing of local tribes-people into account in achieving the conservation objectives of the reserve. The same applies to fisheries. STECF’s recent evaluation of the EU Cod Management Plan concluded that a plan that had the support of the principal stakeholders is more likely to be successful that one which doesn’t.
As the debate on CFP reform, and the best way of dealing with mixed fisheries and multi-species issues continues, we need to discuss how it is possible to achieve conservation and environmental objectives in a way that is not lopsided and therefore often ineffective. Recent policy, often too media focused, has failed to achieve that balance. The need now is to find a way in which social and economic costs are considered in a balanced and meaningful part of the formation of fisheries policy, rather than stuck on as an afterthought – an annoying obstacle to be pushed aside for the greater good.
The Council of Ministers meeting this week will be instructive about whether this kind of balance is going to be the way forward. On the table is the Commission’s blunt proposal for TAC reductions for data deficient stocks. The RACs and member states have pointed out that this is not an appropriate police response to the problem of data deficient stocks, and that as well as being inequitable and counterproductive, it will generate increase regulatory discards. The outcome of the Council in this regard will be a test on how the precautionary approach is to be applied within the CFP in future.
Readers will arrive at their own conclusions about what that delay says about the Commissioner’s priorities and predilections.
In the event, this was a useful meeting covering a wide range of important issues.
Regionalisation
Europeche expressed the fishing industry’s support for decentralisation of the Common Fisheries Policy and a move away from micro-management, beginning with a transfer of management decisions to the regional sea basin level. Given the options available within the legal (Treaty) constraints, all of which have a number of disadvantages1, Europeche wondered whether regionalisation would result in a genuine transfer of responsibility; the danger is that, as with the current Cod Management Plan, setting objectives, targets and time-tables at European level but limiting member states’ role (even cooperating at regional level) to the implementation of these fundamental decisions, would amount to the retention of top-down system, this time through a kind of remote control.
The Commissioner seemed quite genuine and animated when she replied that the Commission had no desire to retain responsibility over micro-decisions within the CFP. There was no lack of political will within the Commission in regionalising the CFP but the legal constraints were a reality. She invited Europeche to meet with her in January to discuss further the options for achieving meaningful regionalisation of decision-making within the CFP.
Discards
The Commission’s apparent kneejerk and media driven intention to deal with the undoubted problem of discards through a notional ban was challenged by Europeche. The complex and multifaceted reasons for discards suggested that a fishery-by-fishery approach that deals meaningfully with issues such as differential survival rates for different species and mixed fisheries issues is the approach required. The high level of discarding generated as a result of the Commission’s own regulations was highlighted as an obvious place to start.
The Commissioner was very firm that societal interest in the discard issue meant that the Commission was determined to stick with its ambitious policy approach based on a ban with a mandatory timetable for named species. It might be necessary to build in necessary flexibilities and exemptions but there could be no departure from the central thrust of the policy.
Maximum Sustainable Yield
Europeche listed a growing number of fisheries which had already achieved fishing mortalities consistent with the MSY range and described the progress made by many others towards this destination. There were a number of real success stories that never seemed to attract media attention.
It would make no sense however, to apply a rigid obligation for all fisheries to achieve MSY by an arbitrary fixed date. Especially in mixed and multi-species fisheries there are sound biological as well as socio-economic reasons why forcing all stocks into this rigid template will fail and cause great pain in the process. A more pragmatic approach would still get most stocks to MSY but in a way that dealt with the realities. Progress is already evident in the ICES advice of the general move in this direction of MSY – again a development that has attracted zero media interest.
Commissioner Damanaki seemed unmoved by these arguments and reaffirmed that although there might have to be scope made for some exemptions, the Commission would try to persuade the member states and the European Parliament of the desirability of a mandatory MSY framework.
External Agreements
Concern was expressed about the Commission’s level of commitment to achieving partnership agreements with Third Countries and the self imposed EU conditions which would put EU fleets at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other international fishing fleets.
The Commissioner’s assured Europeche that she was committed to securing a new generation of partnership agreements but that she faced opposition from within the Council as well as the European Parliament.
Small Scale Fleets
The issue of small scale fleets was discussed. Europeche suggested that the Commission’s move away from the notion of a differentiated approach between large-scale and small-scale fleets for fisheries management purposes was wise, given the complexities involved in defining a small-scale, artisanal, low-impact fleet at European rather than at local level and the inter-dependence of large and small-scale fleets. Even the definition (under-12m, passive gear) used in the new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund would give rise to anomalies.
The Commissioner seemed surprised at the level of involvement of small-scale fleets in the Europeche associations and one is left to speculate on the advice that she has been receiving in this respect.
Transferable Fishing Concessions
It was explained that within Europeche there was a range of views on the desirability and effectiveness of transferable fishing quotas within individual member states. However, there was broad Europeche agreement that this should not be an area of Community competence and indeed that this part of the reform package ran against the general arguments in favour of transferring responsibilities downwards not upwards.
The Commissioner seemed genuinely undecided on this issue and invited Europeche to discuss the detailed issues with her further.
European Representation
Europeche noted that the political landscape in fisheries had changed quite radically with the arrival of the regional advisory councils and co-decision with the European Parliament. The Commission had signalled the dissolution of the EU Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture but had yet to explain what consultative arrangements would replace it to deal with the issues of horizontal European interest.
Commissioner Damanaki indicated that reflections on the best way forward on this issue were still under way within the Commission but the fact that ACFA had cost in the region of 500,000 euros to run suggested that a more streamlined approach was required.
Conclusions
This was a useful meeting that possibly cleared up some misconceptions in the Commissioner’s mind. The Chairman of Europeche, Javier Garat, underlined the degree to which the fishing industry now worked maturely and collaboratively with fisheries scientists as well as the authorities in the member states. The Commission’s remoteness means however that there remains a deficit in trust between the Commission towards the fishing industry and the fishing industry towards the Commission. It was Europeche’s desire, aim and intention to build that trust but that took reciprocity.
Despite the changes to the political landscape, and in some cases like co-decision because of those changes, it would remain vital to have a strong dialogue at the European level and Europeche stood ready as the principal fisheries interlocutor at that level to engage with the Commission.
Note
- Co -decision means a very slow decision making process, suited only to very high level strategic decisions
- According additional delegated powers to the Commission, a largely unaccountable body, with minimal transparency and a poor track record does not seem desirable
- Member states making their own rules for their fleets alone raises the obvious question of equivalence with what is introduced by other member states unless there was a very high degree of cooperation and collaboration at regional seas level
North Sea Joint Stocks
Cod -1% (plus up to 12% extra for vessels in the Catch Quota scheme)
Haddock +15%
Whiting +15%
Saithe -15%
Plaice +15%
All in line with long term management plans.
Catch Quotas
The Catch Quota scheme will have up to 12% cod quota over and above the TAC for 2012 (the same percentage as last year). Norway put up strong resistance and argued that the quota should be sourced from within the EU’s allocation. This was rejected by the EU which emphasised the role of the scheme in demonstrably reducing discards. There has been no extension to other stocks. The EU has proposed a joint seminar on Fully Documented Fisheries next year.
North Sea Herring
A final TAC of 405,000t was agreed along with a commitment to review the Long Term Management Plan following the ICES benchmark next year. This TAC is within the range of advice offered by ICES but less than the MSY level.
Long Term Management Plans
Norway will host a seminar on long term management plans, probably in early May, to look at general principles but also specific plans that are due for review (herring, cod, haddock and saithe).
Transfers
- An additional 400t transfer of whiting to the EU was agreed.
- There was a reduction in the saithe transfer to Norway larger than the TAC reduction. The transfer has been split between the North Sea and the West of Scotland (VIa) as saithe utilisation is lower in VIa.
- North East Arctic Cod was secured but at a considerably lower than Norway is obliged to offer under the EEA agreement
- The Blue Whiting transfer at 30,000t is at a lower percentage than in previous years and significantly lower than Norway wanted.
After one false start, with the 2002-2008 Cod Recovery Plan, days-at-sea restrictions were repackaged and sold to ministers as a more flexible system of kilowatt days. Now the Cod Management Plan whichgives member states a “pot” of kilowatt days to manage, along with scope for effort buyback, in return for various kinds of cod avoidance and discard reduction, is mired in controversy.
The Commission’s STECF has evaluated the plan and found it to be flawed in fundamental ways, not least in its basic assumption that by reducing permitted time at sea a proportionate reduction in fishing mortality is obtained. The evidence suggests that this is not the case and what’s more shouldn’t be expected. There is however, now confusion about what to do about a plan that isn’t working in the way that it was intended but can now only be fully revised through the cumbersome co-decision process with the European Parliament, which could take a minimum of two years. STECF has been tasked to provide options for a revised approach to rebuilding the cod stocks, along with a full impact assessment for each option. It will report sometime next year.
Confusion also reigns about the Commission’s interpretation of the effort buyback provisions and the amount of effort used by member states to reward positive behaviours such as observing real time closures, using more selective gears and the Catch Quota trials. Unless a solution is found quickly, this bean counting approach by the Commission has the potential to derail the conservation initiatives under the buyback provisions that STECF say is one of the few parts of the Cod Management Plan that is working.
Rationale
The original rationale for days-at-sea restriction was the belief that it could address the problem of over-quota landings by underpinning TACs. Later this justification was supplemented by the view that it could contribute to reducing discards. Different means, like the registration of buyers and sellers, have successfully ended the era of large scale black landings and it is now appreciated that restricting time at sea has little influence on what vessels do at sea, including discarding. So, even if effort control had proven to be an effective means of reducing fishing mortality, which it hasn’t, the original reasons why it was introduced are no longer there.
Stocks and Conservation
In the meantime, the cod stocks in EU waters have developed according to their own regional dynamics and in response to those measures that have been effective. The Eastern Baltic stock has rebounded dramatically; the North Sea stock continues to make steady progress, although it is still under the limit reference point. It is difficult to discern what is happening with the Irish Sea and West of Scotland because of the poor quality of the assessment but the general scientific view is that some kind of ecosystem effect is impeding recovery, and in the latter that is likely to be the impact of an expanded grey seal population. The Celtic Sea which (after our and others’ efforts) was never included under the EU Cod Management Plan and therefore the effort regime, is seeing the cod stock recovering strongly.
Fisheries science acknowledges that under-recorded catches which have been a problem in the past have now been pushed to the margin, mainly but not exclusively by tighter landing controls. Decommissioning schemes in the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark and Ireland have played a significant role in reducing fishing pressure on the cod stocks. And more selective gear has been in use in some fisheries.
These measures have all contributed, although it isn’t possible to attribute relative weight to one or other. The one instrument that has yet to prove of any direct value in conservation terms is effort control.
Why Effort Control?Why is the Commission wedded to effort control when the evidence since 2002 and from examples from around the world suggests that it is a blunt and generally ineffective measure?
One view could be is that it is an instrument suited to a top-down, command and control approach. All it requires from the Commission is an annex each December in the TACs and Quotas Regulation specifying the number of days by gear type: this is convenient, neat and clean from an administrator’s point of view – but a nightmare to implement by the member states and amounts to insolvency notice for large parts of the fleet – if allowed to proceed to its conclusion.
What Now?
We seem to have reached an impasse where it is no longer plausible to believe that effort control is useful instrument in rebuilding the cod stocks and safeguarding the fleets that depend on mixed fisheries that include cod. But meanwhile, we are tied into a Cod Plan that could take to 2014 to change, and which requires pre-programmed reductions of up to 25% in effort to continue annually.
Something has to give.
Common sense would suggest that we should build on the parts of the Cod Plan that are working, and the progress that has been made so far. STECF indicates that the buyback provisions, although too complex and ambiguous, have generated initiatives that have reduced cod discards and contributed to cod avoidance. This requires the Commission and the affected member states to work collaboratively to find a rational solution. There can be no mileage in pursuing a bankrupt approach that would put whole fleets out of business whilst wrecking the only part of the Cod Management Plan that works.
The decisions taken in the next two weeks will be critical.
Finally, it is worth recalling that STECF has concluded that a cod management plan that has the support and involvement of the stakeholders that are subject to it, is more likely to be successful than one which does not