NFFO Executive

The Committee:

1. Reviewed the outcomes of the December Council and drew attention to the absurdity of TACs and effort moving in opposite directions
2. Agreed to exert maximum effort during the course of the coming year to secure changes to the EU Cod Management Plan consistent with rebuilding cod stocks and the wellbeing of the fleets
3. Following a meeting on 6th February with Defra officials, agreed to refine and complete the Federation’s policy paper on the Commission’s “non-papers” on CFP reform and to redouble efforts to ensure that the industry’s voice is heard in the European Parliament during the course of the coming, crucial, year.
4. Agreed to work closely with Defra in the English Days at Sea Group to minimise the impact of effort control during the course of the coming effort year (February to January)
5. Resolved to work in the Irish Sea and North Sea to improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries, whilst acknowledging that these are mixed fisheries with different characteristics; to challenge assumptions about uniform discard rates; to resist a one-size-fits-all approach in the form of the Swedish grid
6. Decided to join the Joint Selectivity Working Group to prepare the industry for both the possibility of a discard “ban” and a new technical conservation regulation
7. Agreed to continue to work on the under-10metre quota management issue in the Industry Working Group, towards equitable and effective solutions
8. Resolved to support the work of the International Sustainability Unit and the NFFO’s Ambassador to the ISU.
9. Agreed to continue to support the work of the MPA Fishing Coalition financially, by providing a secretariat and through policy development
10. Determined to challenge the assertion that fishing industry participation in the four regional MCZ stakeholder groups could be interpreted as unquestioned support for the groups’ designation recommendations.
11. Supported the NFFO’s heavy involvement in working towards a satisfactory access arrangements for the Dogger Bank SAC
12. Resolved to continue to work with the Crown Estate and offshore developers on minimising the impact of offshore renewables on fishing operations
13. Determined to resist the proposal by the Welsh Assembly to apply discriminatory access restrictions, thereby setting an unwelcome precedent for devolved administrations
14. Agreed to press Defra for a response to the NFFO’s paper on Shellfish Policy
15. Prepared for a meeting with the Marine Management Organisation on 16th February, where, amongst other items, weighing of fish, e-logbooks, boardings policy and net tagging will be discussed.
16. Received reports from NFFO regional committees and prepared for forthcoming meetings
17. Discussed the Federation’s involvement in the Government’s Red Tape Challenge as Sector Champion
18. Noted intentions to reform the governance in Seafish to give greater transparency and industry involvement in decisions on how the Seafish levy is spent
19. Reviewed the Federation’s work on safety and training, including the working time directive, wearing lifejackets on board and certification
20. Welcomed confirmation that following a successful trading year NFFO Services Limited would be making a grant of £100,000 to the NFFO Training Trust for expenditure in line with the Trust’s purposes
21. Prepared for the NFFO AGM, which this year will be held in York on Thursday 10th May, 2012, with the UK Fisheries Minister in attendance.
22. Reviewed the Federation’s efforts to put industry data collection and provision on a sounder footing.
23. Agreed that the next meeting of the Executive Committee should be on Tuesday 13th March 2012.

The Committee:

1. Reviewed the outcomes of the December Council and drew attention to the absurdity of TACs and effort moving in opposite directions
2. Agreed to exert maximum effort during the course of the coming year to secure changes to the EU Cod Management Plan consistent with rebuilding cod stocks and the wellbeing of the fleets
3. Following a meeting on 6th February with Defra officials, agreed to refine and complete the Federation’s policy paper on the Commission’s “non-papers” on CFP reform and to redouble efforts to ensure that the industry’s voice is heard in the European Parliament during the course of the coming, crucial, year.
4. Agreed to work closely with Defra in the English Days at Sea Group to minimise the impact of effort control during the course of the coming effort year (February to January)
5. Resolved to work in the Irish Sea and North Sea to improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries, whilst acknowledging that these are mixed fisheries with different characteristics; to challenge assumptions about uniform discard rates; to resist a one-size-fits-all approach in the form of the Swedish grid
6. Decided to join the Joint Selectivity Working Group to prepare the industry for both the possibility of a discard “ban” and a new technical conservation regulation
7. Agreed to continue to work on the under-10metre quota management issue in the Industry Working Group, towards equitable and effective solutions
8. Resolved to support the work of the International Sustainability Unit and the NFFO’s Ambassador to the ISU.
9. Agreed to continue to support the work of the MPA Fishing Coalition financially, by providing a secretariat and through policy development
10. Determined to challenge the assertion that fishing industry participation in the four regional MCZ stakeholder groups could be interpreted as unquestioned support for the groups’ designation recommendations.
11. Supported the NFFO’s heavy involvement in working towards a satisfactory access arrangements for the Dogger Bank SAC
12. Resolved to continue to work with the Crown Estate and offshore developers on minimising the impact of offshore renewables on fishing operations
13. Determined to resist the proposal by the Welsh Assembly to apply discriminatory access restrictions, thereby setting an unwelcome precedent for devolved administrations
14. Agreed to press Defra for a response to the NFFO’s paper on Shellfish Policy
15. Prepared for a meeting with the Marine Management Organisation on 16th February, where, amongst other items, weighing of fish, e-logbooks, boardings policy and net tagging will be discussed.
16. Received reports from NFFO regional committees and prepared for forthcoming meetings
17. Discussed the Federation’s involvement in the Government’s Red Tape Challenge as Sector Champion
18. Noted intentions to reform the governance in Seafish to give greater transparency and industry involvement in decisions on how the Seafish levy is spent
19. Reviewed the Federation’s work on safety and training, including the working time directive, wearing lifejackets on board and certification
20. Welcomed confirmation that following a successful trading year NFFO Services Limited would be making a grant of £100,000 to the NFFO Training Trust for expenditure in line with the Trust’s purposes
21. Prepared for the NFFO AGM, which this year will be held in York on Thursday 10th May, 2012, with the UK Fisheries Minister in attendance.
22. Reviewed the Federation’s efforts to put industry data collection and provision on a sounder footing.
23. Agreed that the next meeting of the Executive Committee should be on Tuesday 13th March 2012.

MPAC took the opportunity to present an alternative approach to marine conservation zones to the one currently being pursued by government.

Instead of the four regional projects “faux-stakeholder” approach for marine conservation zones, the Coalition proposed that those affected must be at the centre of an authentic dialogue. The aim must be to achieve conservation objectives without displacing fishing vessels from their customary fishing grounds.

Although the four MCZ regional projects have produced some useful recommendations, MPAC maintain that the current process has failed in four main areas:

• A rushed process leading to poor decisions
• Weak evidence for decisions on site designation and management measures
• Weak coverage of fishing interests representation from those groups potentially affected
• Failure to address the consequences of displacement of fishing activity

To persist with this approach through to management measures within designated sites would inevitably end up with an adversarial trial of strength. By contrast, the policy suggested by the Coalition offers a consensus-based approach with negotiated and agreed outcomes. The key, according to MPAC, is the close direct involvement of those affected in discussions over site and feature boundaries and appropriate management measures within the sites.

MPAC chairman Dr Stephen Lockwood, said after the meeting:

“Whilst, there was some anxiety on the government side about unravelling some of the work on site designation, there did seem to be an appreciation that MPAC’s alternative has obvious merits. There was a commitment to provide a formal response to our ideas and we will discuss that response at our next meeting. We are hopeful that this represents the first step in a process that leads to a genuinely inclusive and participative approach to marine protected areas. We recognise that there is less flexibility in the European Natura sites but our approach has validity here too.

“The weaknesses in the evidence base for SAC and MCZ designation is now well recognised and our approach offers a way in which these uncertainties can be addressed.”

MPAC continues to expand, with applications from Irish fishing groups and pledges of financial support from processors received since Christmas. International fleets increasingly apprehensive of the consequences for their fishing areas and their lack of representation in project consultations. They recognise MPAC as a platform from which to voice their fears and have their interests represented. Concern for the effects of the government’s MPA process on the future of UK fisheries is also growing among processors who depend on local supplies for their factories. Three companies in the southwest have already committed their backing to MPAC and it is hoped that others will follow.

The full text of the MPAC alternative is published below:

A Network Marine Protected Areas: A Good Governance Approach

By virtue of its wide spatial coverage by comparison with other sea users, the fishing industry, in its multiple forms, is likely to bear the main burden as a network of marine protected areas is established in UK waters. The extent to which fishing vessels will be displaced from their customary fishing grounds will depend to a high degree on the process through which marine conservation zones and special areas of conservation are introduced. Specifically, the MPA boundaries and management measures within those boundaries will determine the magnitude of the displacement effect. The MPA Fishing Coalition has highlighted the potential scale of adverse socio-economic consequences, as well the adverse ecological effects in marine areas outside MPAs. The magnitude of these various interactions will be directly related to the way a network of MPAs is introduced.

MPAs are not being introduced in isolation. The cumulative effect of a massive expansion of offshore wind, tidal and wave energy will also potentially carry significant displacement effects, within the same kind of timeframe

The Process to Date: Progress and Limitations

• Four regional stakeholder groups: Representativeness, although improved during the course of the projects was found to be inadequate and was challenged by the fishing industry, not least by international fleets
• Science Advisory Panel: The composition and balance have been questioned by the fishing industry
• Ecological Network Guidance: a failure to recognise the interrelationship between human use of the marine environment and its conservation in achieving ecological coherence, and a disproportionate application of theoretical and untested criteria given the level of knowledge available, and the weight of social and economic considerations at stake
• Scientific research and monitoring: a failure to effectively address the scientific and monitoring needs of MPAs in a measured and coherent way, instead in the selection of reference areas opting for an abrasive and rushed approach whose designations have yet to be justified legally under the Marine and Coastal Access Act.
• Rushed Timeframe: challenged by fishing industry–fishing stakeholders felt like being on a train rushing to an uncertain destination rather than a process they had any influence over and which now, at the post regional project stage, has been relaxed
• NE’s evidence procedure has been criticised, reviewed and modified as a result
• Stakeholder groups have delivered recommended site designations; fishing representatives have lodged reservations and registered disquiet over the designation process

The Evidence Deficit

There is a broad recognition that the process of designating MCZs and SACs has been seriously constrained by inadequate information with regard to:

• Conservation features & management objectives:
• Fishing Patterns: absence of fine-scale data
• Fishing methods: impact on features
• Intensity of fishing: absence of quantitative analysis
• Sensitivity of features
• Natural turbidity
• Site specific data

The Democratic Deficit

If fishermen had the same property rights as farmers there would not be an issue. Independently evaluated compensation would have to be paid directly to those fishermen adversely affected. But fishermen do not have property rights on their fishing grounds, no matter how long they have fished them or no matter how serious the economic consequences of displacement. Like the North American Indians they can legally be displaced from their customary hunting grounds by more powerful economic and political interests. This might be legal but not many would judge it to be fair, equitable or particularly democratic.

Other Stakeholders

Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the process of designating MCZ sites to date, it would be wrong to suggest that this work has no value. In fact in many cases it provides a useful though seriously limited starting point for decisions on designation and management measures. When we turn to management measures for fishing impacts within MCZs, it is clear that the spatial scale, the composition and an effective way of dealing with data deficiencies there is a clear need for fisheries-specific arrangements at the appropriate spatial scale.

A Dialogue-Based Approach

Learning the hard won lessons of Lyme Bay, as well as the Australian and Californian experience, it is possible to envisage a different and better approach. The essence of an alternative approach would be the replacement of the current faux-stakeholder process by a genuine dialogue at site level about the area to be designated and the management areas within them.

This would require:

• A focused stakeholder process involving key players in discussion: fisheries managers, fishing industry representatives and independent expertise
• Time for dialogue and preparation and analysis of the available evidence
• Good faith
• Participants with a legitimate mandate to negotiate
• The best information available
• An adaptive approach
• A willingness to compromise if necessary
• Scope to adapt both site boundaries and management measures to achieve an optimum outcome for both the conservation status of vulnerable features and the operation of the fishing industry
• A consensus approach to the level of evidence required in each case that would not necessarily require high levels of expenditure in order to gather additional evidence

Moving Forward

The MCZ process should:

• Build on the progress made to date but with an awareness of its limitations
• Apply an approach based on the principles of good governance
• In the absence of complete information apply a risk-based approach that provides confidence to stakeholders and management authorities that both sufficient levels of protection and proportional management are achieved.
• Move to a process that complements high level strategic engagement between MPAC and SNCBs/Defra/MMO with site specific engagement involving relevant fishing stakeholders potentially affected by the MCZ.Use all metrics, including site boundaries and zoned management measures within MCZs to achieve an optimum outcome for:

• the conservation status of the feature
• the socio-economic status of the fishing industry
• the wider marine environment

• Recognise the inherent limitations to the management information available; and whilst continuing to build the evidence base, reach a consensus position on the boundaries of current understanding and adopt management measures taking those limitations into account through a progressive and adaptive approach.
• Be based on an accurate and comprehensive baseline and effective and targeted monitoring and review regime which should be used to inform management (Where possible opportunities for working collaboratively to gather evidence should be directed towards stakeholders affected by management decisions)
• Ensure that as far as possible the site boundaries and management measures are consistent with the emerging marine spatial plans.

‘independent’ implies acceptability to the majority, if not all interested parties, not just those making the appointment.

… with a recent meeting of the English Days at Sea Group, on which the NFFO sits.

Implementing a management plan that has been evaluated by STECF and found to be flawed, yet obliged to implement its provisions because of the rigidity of the EU decision making process, is deeply depressing; especially as the pre-programmed reductions in effort will make life more difficult for the fleets in 2012.

Tough measures can sometimes be accepted even if not liked, but as STECF has concluded that it is not reasonable to expect fishing mortality to fall in line with effort reductions, the conservation rationale for these reductions simply isn’t there. This makes these measures doubly difficult to accept.

In a difficult set of negotiations at the December Council, the UK and other member states successfully fought off the Commission’s interpretation of Article 13 (effort buy-back provisions) of the Cod Management Plan, which had it stood ,would have gutted the Plan of the only element that STECF believes is effective. Although still hemmed in by the poorly drafted provisions of the Plan, there is plenty evidence noted by STECF that the various kinds of cod avoidance practiced by the UK fleet has substantially reduced discards of cod and helped with the rebuilding of the stocks.

Against this background, our priority has been to manage the UK’s effort allocation to avoid any premature closures of fisheries during 2012 and to maximise the flexibility for the fleets operating within the cod recovery zone.

The details of the effort management regime as a result of these discussions will appear shortly on the MMO website.

Selectivity in the Nephrops Fishery

During the December negotiations it became clear that the Commission currently has discarding in the nephrops fishery in its sights. The UK as part of the negotiations on effort for 2012 was obliged to make commitments to work on measures that would improve selectivity in the nephrops fisheries in the West of Scotland, Irish Sea and North Sea.

The Northern Irish fleet has taken the lead in trialling a range of gears as an alternative to the “Swedish grid” which has a range of disadvantages not least its elimination of “by-catch” for which the vessels have legitimate quota and for which there is a ready market. A gear that is effective but suited to the conditions in the Irish Sea is the urgent goal of a number of industry initiatives.

One of the problems faced is the inadequate information on discard rates in different areas and parts of the fishery. Blanket discard rates give the misleading impression that the problem is the same in all areas, when this is patently not the case.

An alternative to more selective gear for nephrops fisheries where discards of cod are already at a minimal level, or which is characterised by catches of whitefish covered by quota, is to develop some form of fully documented fishery, not necessarily using CCTV cameras, that demonstrates that fact.

STECF 1.5%

The bar for exemption from the effort regime has been set very low. Groups of vessels seeking exemption must demonstrate that they catch no more that 1.5% cod in their catch and that the gears used must be evaluated by STECF as achieving this. The emphasis so far has been on the “Swedish grid” because it has been evaluated and approved by STECF but there are a number of other gears better suited to local conditions in the approvals pipeline.

Exemption for Catch Quota Vessels

Vessels that have volunteered for the Catch Quota scheme should by logic be exempt from the effort regime because their contribution to cod mortality is precisely recorded and the vessels, as part of the scheme rules, discard no cod. STECF has been tasked to provide an early response to the Councils request on this point. Progress on this would be a great relief to the vessels concerned not least because of the cost of purchasing additional days/effort in order to remain viable.

Cod Management Plan

All of this is a holding operation whilst the EU Cod Management Plan is evaluated, alternatives outlined and assessed and the political process of adoption completed. The NFFO as part of the North Sea and North West Waters RAC delegations has participated fully in the STECF evaluation meetings and will be involved in the impact assessment meetings this year. Industry and stakeholder access to these important meetings is much better than in the past and it is hoped that the outcomes will reflect this contribution. The Federation has consistently made the case that effort control is a blind alley that at worst actively undermines the rebuilding of cod stocks

The reform of the CFP and the review of the EU Cod Management Plan are two developments this year with a huge capacity on their own to shape our future – for either good or ill.

At the same time, during the course of the next 12 months it is likely that important decisions will be made in domestic fisheries policy. The shape of the concordat between Defra and the devolved administrations will be revealed at some stage, and there will be further steps to resolution of the difficulties facing parts of the under-10 metre fleet. We expect also that there will be progress in the implementation of a new approach to managing the shellfisheries. These will all bring impacts – but for better or worse remains to be seen. At the same time the industry will have to continue to deal with huge new developments such as the establishment of a network marine protected areas and massive offshore wind-farms which both have the capacity to displace fishing activity from its customary grounds.

There are some who believe that our future is largely preordained and shaped by bigger forces than our relatively small but still important industry. But that is to surrender before the fight has begun. The NFFO will be found throughout the coming year alongside our friends and allies at the heart of all of these issues, arguing for rational, fair and evidence-based policies consistent with a profitable and sustainable future.

One way in which the future can be better than the recent past is by developing and implementing well-thought-through long-term management plans. With a destination in sight and the means to get there agreed, much of the heat can be taken out of TAC decisions and steady progress can be made in building stocks. The North Sea RAC will be continuing its work on a long term management plan for nephrops and the North Western Waters RAC will be building on foundations already laid on the development of a multi-annual plan for the mixed demersal fisheries in the Celtic Sea.

Given that many of the more knotty problems in fisheries management arise from the multi-species and multi-gear character of many of our fisheries, the RACs also have the intention of organising a conference this year on mixed- fisheries. This should provide a useful platform for building these and other management plans.

Beyond the complexities of the demersal fisheries, lies the difficult and sometimes treacherous international political landscape of the pelagic fisheries. Above all else is the need to bring to an end the present period of turbulence in the mackerel fishery before lasting damage is done to the stocks.

The December Council was instructive as the first time that the fishing industry argued, along with member state for the implementation of ICES scientific recommendations, and against the Commission’s hard line, dogmatic proposals. This did not happen out of the blue and reflects a changing relationship between the fishing industry and fisheries scientists that is emerging from fisheries science partnerships of various kinds and a strong dialogue inside and outside the RACS. In many respects this points to the future: the key question will be to what extent even a reformed CFP will trap us within the same old adversarial roles or to what extent the industry will be liberated to work with scientists, fisheries managers and other stakeholders to define its own way forward.

Completing the second year of its existence, MPAC, the alliance of fishing organisations which was formed to defend access to fishing grounds during the establishment of a network of marine protected areas in UK waters, has recently taken stock of progress made so far.

The main markers in the organisation’s short history are:

• Its formation in the Palace of Westminster on 11th February 2009, with support from sympathetic MPs
• The appointment of respected fisheries scientist, Dr Stephen Lockwood, as MPAC Chairman
• Launch of the MPAC Fighting Fund and membership campaign, which quickly secured wide support from across all areas and fishing groupings in the UK
• Regular engagement with senior DEFRA and devolved administration officials
• Meetings with fisheries/environment ministers from DEFRA and the devolved administrations to outline the aims and purposes of MPAC
• The extension of MPAC membership beyond the UK to include Dutch, French, Irish and Belgian fishing organisations, equally concerned about displacement from their customary fishing grounds
• Regular engagement with the Government’s statutory advisors on nature conservancy to challenge the weak parts of the approach to establishing marine conservation zones and EU special areas of conservation (SAC) and special protection areas (SPA)
• Emphasis on 4 main flaws in the MPA approach to date:
  • A rushed timeframe
  • Unrepresentative stakeholder involvement
  • A weak evidence base for designation decisions
  • Failure to address the issue of displacement of fishing activities

Achievements

• Building a broad coalition of fishing interests
• A high profile launch with extensive media coverage
• A commitment to an evidence-based approach
• Support for the introduction of MPAs to provide protection for rare and vulnerable ecology but rejection of flawed, rushed and woolly thinking in government policy
• A successful challenge to Natural England’s initial assertions that it had a role as fisheries managers as opposed to advisors to government
• Bringing a degree of realism to what MPAs can achieve in terms of building commercial fish stocks (as opposed to protecting biodiversity)
• Securing public recognition that the potential contribution to the protection of biodiversity made by marine protected areas needs to be balanced by the contribution made by the fishing industry to the food security of the nation
• Insisting on a more sophisticated measure of the extent of fishing pressure on seabed features
• Challenging the use of extreme language and unsupported assertions by senior officials in the statutory nature conservation bodies – “the infamous rape and pillage remarks”
• Effectively drawing attention to the international dimension of fishing activity outside the 6 mile limit and emphasising the need to adapt consultation and evidence gathering procedures to take account of that fact
• Bringing to bear a rigorous approach to evidence used to designate MCZs, SACs and SPAs
• Drawing attention to the cumulative impact of multiple offshore developments (amongst which is the establishment of marine protected areas) all of which increasingly constrain where fishing activity can safely and legally take place
• Drawing attention to the absence of a formal marine spatial planning framework for rushed decisions on the designation of marine protected areas
• Successfully securing a review of Natural England’s scientific and evidence procedures by the government’s Chief Scientific Officer which resulted in important tightening up of arrangements
• Close involvement of MPAC members in the four MCZ regional stakeholder groups charged with making recommendations on designated sites for MCZs
• Challenging the application of narrowly interpreted theoretical science to the selection of MCZs
• Successfully bringing Government attention to the potential and often unforeseen consequences of displacement of fishing activity
• The articulation of an alternative approach to managing MPAs, based on close involvement and dialogue with of the principle stakeholders at site level
• Building understanding of the need for a local/regional focus along with a consensus approach that minimises the scope for displacement
• Securing a ministerial decision to extend the time allowed for gathering evidence on which site designations will be based
• Securing ministerial commitment to provide additional funds to strengthen the evidence base for the designation of marine conservation zones
• Securing ministerial support for a phased (as opposed to a “big-bang”) approach to the designation of MCZ sites, thus allowing for a more robust evidence based approach
• Securing a written assurance from the UK fisheries minister that no MPA beyond six miles will be formally designated until such times that EU approval ensures that any restrictions will apply to all member states’ vessels, not just those registered in the UK.

Going Forward

Despite this impressive list of achievements, there is no scope for complacency. The MPA Fishing Coalition recognises the huge task that it faces to ensure that every marine protected area established in UK waters is justified on the basis of sound evidence and that the impacts on fishing activities are minimised to the least extent possible.

As the focus shifts from site designation to the management measures that will apply within marine protected areas (up to and including complete exclusion of fishing activity) it will be more important than ever for the fishing industry as a whole to work together through the Coalition.

The Coalition stands ready to reinforce the efforts all those fishing groups and individuals who have registered their support for the work of MPAC and who are concerned about their future access to their customary fishing grounds.

The Coalition’s Fighting Fund remains open for contributions and the essential work of the Coalition can only continue with your support:

The MPA Fishing Coalition

30 Monkgate

York

YO31 7PF

This is not the first time that one of the more naïve NGOs has painted the fishing industry and fisheries ministers as “fish deniers” blithely allocating to themselves more fish than can be safely or sustainably afforded.

The reality is a bit different. In fact, for the most part both the NFFO and UK ministers would this year have been more or less content to “follow the science” by translating ICES stocks advice directly into TAC decisions.

In fact, it was the European Commission which this year departed from the science by suggesting 25% TAC cuts to any stock for which ICES could not provide an analytical assessment with population estimates – the data poor stocks. This had nothing to do with science and everything to do with political tactics. It was an attempt to shake up those member states which had not fulfilled their data collection responsibilities by harming the livelihoods of many thousands, including those in member states, the UK included, which had fully met its data provision obligations. This left member states with little option to push back with more responsible and balanced counter-proposals.

Similarly, the Commission’s wilful interpretation of ICES advice to translate “there should be no increase in fishing mortality” to mean a 25% reduction, owed nothing to science and everything to a bullying policy approach with no serious attempt to reach a reasonable balance.

Likewise “no targeted fishery” in the ICES adviceis not the same as a zero TAC in the Commission proposal.

Especially in mixed fisheries, there are difficult choices to be made by fisheries managers when setting TACs each year. Balancing the out-take with efforts to build stocks, whilst minimising discard and adverse socio-economic consequences is a complex task. Member states bring insights and information to TAC decisions to which a small group of bureaucrats in Brussels simply do not have access.

These decisions are not helped by the hysterical sounds offstage by NGOs with only the most superficial understanding of the issues and a simplistic agenda that equates environmental progress with the scale of TAC reductions.

Not all environmental NGOs should be tarred with the same brush. But the Marine Conservation Society is building up a solid reputation for speaking first and thinking afterwards. It is not helpful.

Email No_thumbs_tone@hotmail.com

The NFFO’s South East Committee has recently been reinvigorated through the election of a new Chairman who is determined to ensure that the South East regains a voice in national and European platforms. After an initial meeting in Shoreham it is intended to hold meetings in Leigh-on Sea and in Rye early in 2012. The South East has largely been sidelined in recent years and the NFFO is working to rebuild its previously very strong and active Committee.

The foreseeable challenges facing the South East in the coming year are:

• Under-10 metre Quota Management: The predominantly under-10 metre fleet in the South East faces a range of particular challenges, notably an imbalance between the capacity of the fleet and available quota. The South East Committee will be feeding in its views through the NFFO as the Government comes to final conclusions about how to address the under-10m issue. The inshore fleet’s decisive rejection of the Government’s proposals for a radical change to a fully fledged system of rights based management have left it with little option to test the water through pilots on under-10 self- management that, if successful, would provide the flexibility in quota management that the producer organisations already hold. The NFFO is keen to encourage and strengthen cooperation between the POs and the pilots as a way forward that avoids damaging splits and divisions in the industry.

• TACs and Quotas: The exclusive focus on the issue of distribution of quota by single issue groups has distracted from the bigger picture of the TACs and the under pinning science that can have at least as significant effect on vessel earnings. Through the direct involvement in the process leading to decisions at the December Council the new Chairman of the SE Committee has already made his mark.

• Marine Conservation Zones: The establishment of a network of marine conservation zones, and European Special Areas of Conservation represents a huge potential threat of displacement from customary fishing grounds in the South East. As the focus moves from site designation to management measures it is vital for the South East Committee to coordinate a dialogue at local level between the management authorities and those potentially affected. This work has already begun.

• Shellfish: Fishing for crab and lobster is vitally important to a large number of vessels in the South East For this reason the views of our South East members have been fully taken into account in the development of the Federation’s Shellfish Policy document

• Fisheries Science Partnerships: When the next round of Defra Fisheries Science Partnership projects is invited the South East Committee will be submitting a proposal.

• Offshore Wind-farms: Members from the South East have been cooperating with the NFFO / Crown Estate mapping project to ensure that as far as possible, future offshore wind-farm developments and the cables bringing the electricity ashore avoid the most sensitive fishing grounds

• Aggregate dredging has been a sensitive issue on the South Coast and Thames Estuary for many years. The Committee will be involved in vetting all licence applications

Chairman: Ned Clark, North Shields/Cullercoates

Email: nedclark@aol.com

The Federation’s North East Committee is active in the following policy areas:

• Whiting quota: the severe imbalance between available quota and the abundance of quota on the fishing grounds has led to high levels of discards in recent years. This has been a priority area for the NFFO and the most recent EU Norway agreement included the second successive rise in TAC with additional increases from a quota transfer from Norway and the invocation of the Hague Preference. Whilst this still leaves an imbalance progress in the right direction.
• Long Term Management Plan for Nephrops: The Committee has fed into the important work of the North Sea regional Advisory Council on the development of a long term management plan for the nephrops fishery.
• Days-at Sea: Days at sea restrictions arising from the EU Cod Management Plan have the potential to seriously harm the viability of the North East nephrops/whitefish fleet. For this reason the NE Committee has been an active participant in industry/government discussions on effort control through the English Days at Sea Group
• Mixed fishery Issues: The fishery off the North East Coast is a genuine mixed fishery in which the main economic driver species alternates between nephrops (prawns) and whitefish within a notable seasonality
• Fisheries Science Partnerships: The fishing industry in the North east has taken part in a number of fisheries science partnership projects designed to address issues of concern to the local industry and fill gaps in the more formal stock assessments and fisheries science
• Marine Conservation Zones: The Committee has contributed to both the MPA Fishing Coalition and the regional project Net Gains to protect the most valuable fishing grounds during the process of establishing a network of marine conservation zones
• North East Salmon Fishery: The Committee hosts meeting of the NFFO’s Salmon Committee whose Chairman, Derek Heselton MBE has fought a long and arduous battle in defence of the licenced drift net fishery for salmon over many years.
• Domestic Quota Reform: Given its mix of both under and over-10 metre vessel the Committee has fed into the debate on the future of quota management for the under-10 fleet
• Dialogue with the Marine Management Organisation: The Committee has engaged with the delivery of fisheries policy through the NFFO’s regular meetings with the MMO
• Shellfish: The development of shellfish policy is a priority area for the Committee given the importance of the crab and lobster fishery on the North East Coast
• CFP Reform: The Committee keeps a close eye on developments towards a reformed Common Fisheries Policy and contributes to the Federation’s work in this area, including positions prepared by the North Sea RAC.
• The Committee was active in securing £6million funding for the North Shields West Quay project
• NFFO North East Committee members sit on the Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (IFCA) and the North Eastern IFCA and also the Regional Advisory Council of the Environment Agency

The Council outcomes and the process through which they were reached provide ample evidence of why the CFP must change in the forthcoming reform.

The word “absurd” was used repeatedly by member state delegations to describe the process through which TACs and effort decisions were arrived at in the early hours of Saturday morning, after many hours of tortuous negotiation by the Commission and member states, most of whom have an interest in a handful of stocks but have a say in them all. Equally, the Commission’s attempts to force member states to accept detailed technical measures as part of a deal on effort control, are the epitome of how not to decide and apply conservation measures and directly in the opposite direction to the proposed CFP reform.

Instead of a rational conversation at regional level about appropriate levels to set TACs at we are caught up in a complex and elaborate charade in which:

• The Commission upped the ante and its negotiating leverage early in the process by announcing without prior discussion that data poor stocks would be subject to an automatic 25% TAC reduction. All member states rejected this as an inappropriate response to a genuine problem. But this still left us arguing the case for a more reasoned approach until the 11th hour.
• Another negotiating tactic applied by the Commission was to set TAC proposals according to achieving MSY by 2013 rather than the Johannesburg commitment of MSY by 2015, “where possible”. Again, member states pushed back against this but in doing so spent scarce negotiating capital

Against this background, the casual observer would never guess that ICES stocks advice for this year paints the most positive picture for more than a decade. Despite the flawed process, this positive picture on stocksis reflected in the TAC outcomes: All the more bizarre that the in these mixed fisheries TAC decisions and effort limits (days-at-sea) are moving in opposite directions.

Another layer of absurdity is that, despite recognising the flaws in this approach, the Council and Commission were incapable of moving in a different direction because they are so tied in by previous legislation in the Cod Management Plan; which they also acknowledge is flawed and in urgent need of revision.

The main North Sea joint stock TACs were agreed with Norway in late November and with the exception of saithe, reflect the positive ICES advice for 2001, which in turn reflects the general picture of stocks rebuilding and heading towards or already in the region of maximum sustainable yield. Saithe is an object lesson in the pitfalls of fisheries science and management because it had been regarded as an exemplar species and had achieved low fishing mortality and high levels of biomass in the five preceding years.

The North Sea plaice stock as rebuilt rapidly, doubtless assisted by the substantial decommissioning scheme for beam trawlers undertaken by the Netherlands – a feature that seems to have escaped the notice of the recent European Court of Auditors report on fleet capacity.

The divergent direction of TACs and effort allocations is the most salient and disturbing part of the December Council outcomes for the North Sea and has to raise questions about the inclusion of effort control in future management plans. The provisions of the EU Cod Management Plan and also the EU Flatfish Management Plan have resulted in these perverse outcomes that the fishing industry will have to deal with in 2012.

The wholly Commission’s wholly unnecessary and unwarranted proposal to reduce TACs for data poor stocks was rejected by the Council and will be recorded as one of the more cack-handed approaches to emerge from Brussels. In the event most of the proposed reductions for the North Sea were transformed during the Council negotiations to rollovers – avoiding unnecessary discards and loss of income.

“The December Fisheries Council finished in the early hours of Saturday 17 December in Brussels, when the TACs and quotas for 2012 were finally agreed.

The negotiations took place against the background of extreme proposals from the Commission for big reductions in a number key TACs and quotas for the South West.

Non TAC issues:

Sole Recovery Zone (VIIe) effort levels remain unchanged for 2012.

The Trevose Closure remains in place for 2012 from 1 February to 31 March.

TACs:

“The UK minister and his team were fully briefed, through the NFFO team in Brussels, and made acutely aware of our key priorities ahead of the negotiations and we kept up the pressure throughout the Council.

One of the most disappointing and frustrating outcomes was on Spurdog, Porbeagle and Skate which remain under zero TAC. Despite all the rhetoric from the Commission about the importance reducing discards, these stocks were not up for negotiation. This amounts to a counterproductive, irrational, not to say schizophrenic approach from Commission. UK Minister and negotiating team were made fully aware of all the arguments and implications of such an outcome on these stocks but whilst he acknowledged and agreed with these he was unable to deliver due to the Commission’s immovable position. We all know this will deliver nothing expect increase discards and do nothing for conservation. The CFPO and NFFO will continue to work with CEFAS and DEFRA to develop alternative management proposals during 2012.

The December negotiations are always difficult with an ever growing political and green influence. However the CFPO and the NFFO team in Brussels deployed every scientific, economic and political argument at our disposal.

Where successful, this has been at least in part due to the work done by the NFFO, CFPO and its members through Fisheries Science Partnerships and the improved working relationship with scientists and policy makers.

At the beginning of these negotiations we made it clear the outcome would be judged as a package from our perspective and whilst progress was made on many fronts including fighting of cuts on data poor stocks, clearly the outcome overall did not deliver all of our priorities and in some areas was disappointing.

The CFPO has already begun talks with DEFRA and other member states to secure additional quota through international and domestic swaps and transfers in an effort to maximise fishing opportunities for 2012.”

Paul Trebilcock

Cornish Fish Producers Organisation

PROVISIONAL 2012 TAC CHANGES

Stock Commission Proposal Final Outcome

Cod VIIe-k Increase 140% Increase 150%

Haddock VIIb-k Cut 25% Increase 25%

Whiting VIIb-k Cut 25% Increase 15%Hake Cut 10% Cut 6%

Monk Cut 25% Cut 5%

Megrim Cut 25% Cut 5%Sole hjk Cut 15% Status Quo

Plaice hjk Cut 25% Cut 5%Sole e Increase 9% Increase 9%

Plaice de Cut 10% Increase 8.5%Sole fg Cut 15% Cut 10%

Plaice fg Cut 25% Cut 10%

Sole d Increase 9% Increase 15%

Pollack Cut 25% Status Quo

Saithe Cut 15% Status Quo

Ling Cut 25% Status QuoSkates & Rays VI & VII Cut 25% Cut 13%

(No Landings of Undulate Ray or Skate) Spurdog Zero TAC Zero TAC

Porbeagle Zero TAC Zero TAC

Note: These figures are subject to amendment following post Council clarifications.

“It is clear to me that the industry must stay engaged with the process in Brussels and especially at the December Council. These decisions have a direct impact on fishermen’s livelihoods and the viability of vessels of whatever size. It is often forgotten that arguments about the share of the quotas, after the TAC has been decided, is often secondary to fishermen’s livelihoods to the overall size of the cake.”

“TAC increases in Eastern Channel plaice and sole should ease the position for under-10s and POs next year. And although the approach to Skates and Rays remains far too blunt, a rollover on the TAC for 2012 was a useful result against the background of the Commission’s proposals for a 15% cut. We must continue to press for a more rational management approach that takes into account the different conservation status of different species under the broad heading of “Skates and Rays.”

“The deep rooted problems of the inadequate cod quota in area VIId will not be addressed by the decisions in this Council. A 1% cut is neither here nor there in the scale of things.”

Because the Eastern Channel is within the Cod Recovery Zone, the larger vessels will be subject to all the constraints and perversities of the effort regime.”

Against the background of a proposal from the European Commission for a 19% cut in the nephrops TAC, Northern Ireland’s most important stock, the negotiations ended with a rollover of the 2011 TAC into 2012; however there was less encouraging news for the remnants of Northern Ireland’s whitefish fleet and local herring fishermen.

Speaking after the finish of the Council, Alan McCulla, Chief Executive of the Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers Organisation who was in Brussels for the negotiations said the result left him confused.

“We are relieved that a neutral result was achieved for our nephrop fishery because it is stable and sustainably harvested. According to ICES science a 19% cut in this quota was never justified. In fact the science was consistent with an increase TAC. Nevertheless we are relieved that the Northern Ireland team, led by our Fisheries Minister Michelle O’Neill MLA, secured a rollover. Further deep cuts in the number of days all of our fishermen can spend at sea were tempered by the EC’s agreement to continue to allow our prawn fishermen to ‘buy-back’ days at sea through the adoption of various technical conservation measures. Whilst challenging, the aim during the first half of 2012 will be to identify additional measures to exempt our prawn fishermen from days at sea restrictions.”

“For our few remaining whitefish fishermen the news is not good. A 25% cut in the Irish Sea cod quota, combined with a 25% cut in days at sea may well spell the end of what was once a very important part of the local fleet. The situation with cod typifies the complete lack of logic in the Commission’s approach to these negotiations. Irish Sea cod is one of the stocks the Commission describe as being data poor, but their answer to addressing this problem is to force fishermen to catch less cod, therefore providing less data. This is a something we’ve been discussing with DARD for some considerable time. We urgently need to address this situation as regretfully there is a complete contradiction between the amount of cod fishermen are seeing in the Irish Sea and the amount fisheries scientists say are there.”

“Herring in the Irish Sea presents another contradiction, but this time not between local fishermen and fisheries scientists, but rather between Northern Ireland’s fishing industry, officials and fisheries scientists on one side and the European Commission on the other. All of the evidence, from the fishery and from the science confirms the numbers of herring in the Irish Sea have at least quadrupled in the last four years. Yet after the EC agreeing a 10% rise in this TAC for 2011, the EC has now imposed a 10% cut for 2012. However, there remains an opportunity to resolve this situation in time for the 2012 herring season. There is absolutely no reason why the herring TAC could not be significantly increased.”

“Overall the European Commission has imposed a reduction on the value of fish and shellfish local fishermen can land into Northern Ireland in 2012. This is very disappointing, especially because if the science was followed there should have been an overall increase in the value of fish and shellfish landed into County Down’s fishing ports.”

“On a positive note, against the background of the EC proposals, even if these proposals were part of a broader game of tactics, we have nevertheless ended up with a better result than many predicted. One other issue the entire Northern Ireland team agrees upon is that having Eurocrats and officials from countries as far away as Estonia and Greece decide on what happens in the Irish Sea is a nonsense. The sooner Brussels gets their hands out of the Irish Sea, the better it will be for fish stocks, the fishing industry and the economy of the County Down coast.” said Alan McCulla.

The threat of immediate and widespread bankruptcies has been averted but it was not possible to secure a “pause” in the pre-programmed reductions in permissible days-at-sea required by the now discredited EU Cod Management Plan. This means that the UK whitefish fleets outside the Celtic Sea will face further effort reductions in 2012:

Area Gear Category Effort Reduction in 2012*

North Sea TR1 -18%

North Sea TR2 -18%

North Sea BT2 -9%

Irish Sea TR1 -25%

Irish Sea TR2 -25%

West of Scotland TR1 -25%

West of Scotland TR 2 -25%*Subject to confirmation

A large part of the December Council was devoted to finding a way forward on the effort issue. The Cod Plan has been evaluated by STECF and found to be flawed in some of its essentials. However, the political logjam arising from the Lisbon Treaty’s extension of co-decision to fisheries has left a legal instrument in place with (according to Commission lawyers) no way of amending it quickly.

The result is fleets trapped in ever decreasing effort reductions with little hope of relief before 2014.

This absurd situation, in which process rides roughshod over objectives, common sense is not in sight and the legal tail wags the conservation dog, is intolerable and underlines the need to move rapidly to some form of regional management.

Had the Commission’s interpretation of Article 13 won the day it would have undermined and brought to an abrupt halt all the conservation initiatives – real time closures, catch quotas and selectivity measures – brought in by the UK under the effort buyback provision. The Commission’s efforts, during the negotiations, to secure member states’ commitment to detailed, prescriptive, selectivity measures, especially for the nephrops fleet, had all the hallmarks of the characteristic failings of the CFP. Rushed measures agreed by people under extreme pressure, who only have the faintest grasp of what they are talking about, within a 48 hour time window, is a sure the way to get it wrong. The UK successfully resisted this approach but it is clear that expectations are high that additional selectivity measures to reduce discards in the TR2 fleet will be introduced during 2012.

Stock assessments are expressed within a framework that identifies limit and precautionary reference points for those stocks where the data allows. And EU policy justifies its approach to data deficient stocks by reference to the precautionary approach.

It certainly makes sense to take action where there is a potential risk but we don’t have full information. However, the problem with the application of the precautionary approach (as opposed to the concept) is that it takes place within a framework without limits or guidance on how far to go with it. If environmental considerations alone are applied unconstrained then there is no room for human activity of any kind, anywhere, ever. Not even the more extreme, media-focused, environmental NGOs espouse that view.

How do we balance environmental, economic and social considerations? There is general agreement that the three pillars of sustainability: environmental, economic and social, should all be part of the mix but there is no explicit guidance on how this should be achieved in practical terms.

This leaves us in a situation such as we see for example in the Commission’s precautionary approach to data deficiency – to cut TACs for stocks where ICES is unable to provide an “analytical” TAC with population estimates – by 25%. There is a genuine problem with data deficiencies but the Commission’s approach has been apparently unconstrained by any concern about the economic or social impact of such a policy. Unanimous opposition by member states at the October Council of Ministers have now forced the Commission to soften this hard-line approach but the fact that it could be made in the first place is indicative of a lack of checks and balances in the formulation of policy within the CFP.

Environmental objectives are vital but so are social and economic dimensions and not just as a brake on environmental policy. Pursuing one of the three pillars, irrespective of the cost to the others is untenable because ultimately they can only be achieved in tandem. The early experiences of game reserves in Africa spelt out the need to take the economic wellbeing of local tribes-people into account in achieving the conservation objectives of the reserve. The same applies to fisheries. STECF’s recent evaluation of the EU Cod Management Plan concluded that a plan that had the support of the principal stakeholders is more likely to be successful that one which doesn’t.

As the debate on CFP reform, and the best way of dealing with mixed fisheries and multi-species issues continues, we need to discuss how it is possible to achieve conservation and environmental objectives in a way that is not lopsided and therefore often ineffective. Recent policy, often too media focused, has failed to achieve that balance. The need now is to find a way in which social and economic costs are considered in a balanced and meaningful part of the formation of fisheries policy, rather than stuck on as an afterthought – an annoying obstacle to be pushed aside for the greater good.

The Council of Ministers meeting this week will be instructive about whether this kind of balance is going to be the way forward. On the table is the Commission’s blunt proposal for TAC reductions for data deficient stocks. The RACs and member states have pointed out that this is not an appropriate police response to the problem of data deficient stocks, and that as well as being inequitable and counterproductive, it will generate increase regulatory discards. The outcome of the Council in this regard will be a test on how the precautionary approach is to be applied within the CFP in future.

Readers will arrive at their own conclusions about what that delay says about the Commissioner’s priorities and predilections.

In the event, this was a useful meeting covering a wide range of important issues.

Regionalisation

Europeche expressed the fishing industry’s support for decentralisation of the Common Fisheries Policy and a move away from micro-management, beginning with a transfer of management decisions to the regional sea basin level. Given the options available within the legal (Treaty) constraints, all of which have a number of disadvantages1, Europeche wondered whether regionalisation would result in a genuine transfer of responsibility; the danger is that, as with the current Cod Management Plan, setting objectives, targets and time-tables at European level but limiting member states’ role (even cooperating at regional level) to the implementation of these fundamental decisions, would amount to the retention of top-down system, this time through a kind of remote control.

The Commissioner seemed quite genuine and animated when she replied that the Commission had no desire to retain responsibility over micro-decisions within the CFP. There was no lack of political will within the Commission in regionalising the CFP but the legal constraints were a reality. She invited Europeche to meet with her in January to discuss further the options for achieving meaningful regionalisation of decision-making within the CFP.

Discards

The Commission’s apparent kneejerk and media driven intention to deal with the undoubted problem of discards through a notional ban was challenged by Europeche. The complex and multifaceted reasons for discards suggested that a fishery-by-fishery approach that deals meaningfully with issues such as differential survival rates for different species and mixed fisheries issues is the approach required. The high level of discarding generated as a result of the Commission’s own regulations was highlighted as an obvious place to start.

The Commissioner was very firm that societal interest in the discard issue meant that the Commission was determined to stick with its ambitious policy approach based on a ban with a mandatory timetable for named species. It might be necessary to build in necessary flexibilities and exemptions but there could be no departure from the central thrust of the policy.

Maximum Sustainable Yield

Europeche listed a growing number of fisheries which had already achieved fishing mortalities consistent with the MSY range and described the progress made by many others towards this destination. There were a number of real success stories that never seemed to attract media attention.

It would make no sense however, to apply a rigid obligation for all fisheries to achieve MSY by an arbitrary fixed date. Especially in mixed and multi-species fisheries there are sound biological as well as socio-economic reasons why forcing all stocks into this rigid template will fail and cause great pain in the process. A more pragmatic approach would still get most stocks to MSY but in a way that dealt with the realities. Progress is already evident in the ICES advice of the general move in this direction of MSY – again a development that has attracted zero media interest.

Commissioner Damanaki seemed unmoved by these arguments and reaffirmed that although there might have to be scope made for some exemptions, the Commission would try to persuade the member states and the European Parliament of the desirability of a mandatory MSY framework.

External Agreements

Concern was expressed about the Commission’s level of commitment to achieving partnership agreements with Third Countries and the self imposed EU conditions which would put EU fleets at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other international fishing fleets.

The Commissioner’s assured Europeche that she was committed to securing a new generation of partnership agreements but that she faced opposition from within the Council as well as the European Parliament.

Small Scale Fleets

The issue of small scale fleets was discussed. Europeche suggested that the Commission’s move away from the notion of a differentiated approach between large-scale and small-scale fleets for fisheries management purposes was wise, given the complexities involved in defining a small-scale, artisanal, low-impact fleet at European rather than at local level and the inter-dependence of large and small-scale fleets. Even the definition (under-12m, passive gear) used in the new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund would give rise to anomalies.

The Commissioner seemed surprised at the level of involvement of small-scale fleets in the Europeche associations and one is left to speculate on the advice that she has been receiving in this respect.

Transferable Fishing Concessions

It was explained that within Europeche there was a range of views on the desirability and effectiveness of transferable fishing quotas within individual member states. However, there was broad Europeche agreement that this should not be an area of Community competence and indeed that this part of the reform package ran against the general arguments in favour of transferring responsibilities downwards not upwards.

The Commissioner seemed genuinely undecided on this issue and invited Europeche to discuss the detailed issues with her further.

European Representation

Europeche noted that the political landscape in fisheries had changed quite radically with the arrival of the regional advisory councils and co-decision with the European Parliament. The Commission had signalled the dissolution of the EU Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture but had yet to explain what consultative arrangements would replace it to deal with the issues of horizontal European interest.

Commissioner Damanaki indicated that reflections on the best way forward on this issue were still under way within the Commission but the fact that ACFA had cost in the region of 500,000 euros to run suggested that a more streamlined approach was required.

Conclusions

This was a useful meeting that possibly cleared up some misconceptions in the Commissioner’s mind. The Chairman of Europeche, Javier Garat, underlined the degree to which the fishing industry now worked maturely and collaboratively with fisheries scientists as well as the authorities in the member states. The Commission’s remoteness means however that there remains a deficit in trust between the Commission towards the fishing industry and the fishing industry towards the Commission. It was Europeche’s desire, aim and intention to build that trust but that took reciprocity.

Despite the changes to the political landscape, and in some cases like co-decision because of those changes, it would remain vital to have a strong dialogue at the European level and Europeche stood ready as the principal fisheries interlocutor at that level to engage with the Commission.

Note

• Co -decision means a very slow decision making process, suited only to very high level strategic decisions
• According additional delegated powers to the Commission, a largely unaccountable body, with minimal transparency and a poor track record does not seem desirable
• Member states making their own rules for their fleets alone raises the obvious question of equivalence with what is introduced by other member states unless there was a very high degree of cooperation and collaboration at regional seas level

North Sea Joint Stocks

Cod -1% (plus up to 12% extra for vessels in the Catch Quota scheme)

Haddock +15%

Whiting +15%

Saithe -15%

Plaice +15%

All in line with long term management plans.

Catch Quotas

The Catch Quota scheme will have up to 12% cod quota over and above the TAC for 2012 (the same percentage as last year). Norway put up strong resistance and argued that the quota should be sourced from within the EU’s allocation. This was rejected by the EU which emphasised the role of the scheme in demonstrably reducing discards. There has been no extension to other stocks. The EU has proposed a joint seminar on Fully Documented Fisheries next year.

North Sea Herring

A final TAC of 405,000t was agreed along with a commitment to review the Long Term Management Plan following the ICES benchmark next year. This TAC is within the range of advice offered by ICES but less than the MSY level.

Long Term Management Plans

Norway will host a seminar on long term management plans, probably in early May, to look at general principles but also specific plans that are due for review (herring, cod, haddock and saithe).

Transfers

1. An additional 400t transfer of whiting to the EU was agreed.
2. There was a reduction in the saithe transfer to Norway larger than the TAC reduction. The transfer has been split between the North Sea and the West of Scotland (VIa) as saithe utilisation is lower in VIa.
3. North East Arctic Cod was secured but at a considerably lower than Norway is obliged to offer under the EEA agreement
4. The Blue Whiting transfer at 30,000t is at a lower percentage than in previous years and significantly lower than Norway wanted.

After one false start, with the 2002-2008 Cod Recovery Plan, days-at-sea restrictions were repackaged and sold to ministers as a more flexible system of kilowatt days. Now the Cod Management Plan whichgives member states a “pot” of kilowatt days to manage, along with scope for effort buyback, in return for various kinds of cod avoidance and discard reduction, is mired in controversy.

The Commission’s STECF has evaluated the plan and found it to be flawed in fundamental ways, not least in its basic assumption that by reducing permitted time at sea a proportionate reduction in fishing mortality is obtained. The evidence suggests that this is not the case and what’s more shouldn’t be expected. There is however, now confusion about what to do about a plan that isn’t working in the way that it was intended but can now only be fully revised through the cumbersome co-decision process with the European Parliament, which could take a minimum of two years. STECF has been tasked to provide options for a revised approach to rebuilding the cod stocks, along with a full impact assessment for each option. It will report sometime next year.

Confusion also reigns about the Commission’s interpretation of the effort buyback provisions and the amount of effort used by member states to reward positive behaviours such as observing real time closures, using more selective gears and the Catch Quota trials. Unless a solution is found quickly, this bean counting approach by the Commission has the potential to derail the conservation initiatives under the buyback provisions that STECF say is one of the few parts of the Cod Management Plan that is working.

Rationale

The original rationale for days-at-sea restriction was the belief that it could address the problem of over-quota landings by underpinning TACs. Later this justification was supplemented by the view that it could contribute to reducing discards. Different means, like the registration of buyers and sellers, have successfully ended the era of large scale black landings and it is now appreciated that restricting time at sea has little influence on what vessels do at sea, including discarding. So, even if effort control had proven to be an effective means of reducing fishing mortality, which it hasn’t, the original reasons why it was introduced are no longer there.

Stocks and Conservation

In the meantime, the cod stocks in EU waters have developed according to their own regional dynamics and in response to those measures that have been effective. The Eastern Baltic stock has rebounded dramatically; the North Sea stock continues to make steady progress, although it is still under the limit reference point. It is difficult to discern what is happening with the Irish Sea and West of Scotland because of the poor quality of the assessment but the general scientific view is that some kind of ecosystem effect is impeding recovery, and in the latter that is likely to be the impact of an expanded grey seal population. The Celtic Sea which (after our and others’ efforts) was never included under the EU Cod Management Plan and therefore the effort regime, is seeing the cod stock recovering strongly.

Fisheries science acknowledges that under-recorded catches which have been a problem in the past have now been pushed to the margin, mainly but not exclusively by tighter landing controls. Decommissioning schemes in the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark and Ireland have played a significant role in reducing fishing pressure on the cod stocks. And more selective gear has been in use in some fisheries.

These measures have all contributed, although it isn’t possible to attribute relative weight to one or other. The one instrument that has yet to prove of any direct value in conservation terms is effort control.

Why Effort Control?Why is the Commission wedded to effort control when the evidence since 2002 and from examples from around the world suggests that it is a blunt and generally ineffective measure?

One view could be is that it is an instrument suited to a top-down, command and control approach. All it requires from the Commission is an annex each December in the TACs and Quotas Regulation specifying the number of days by gear type: this is convenient, neat and clean from an administrator’s point of view – but a nightmare to implement by the member states and amounts to insolvency notice for large parts of the fleet – if allowed to proceed to its conclusion.

What Now?

We seem to have reached an impasse where it is no longer plausible to believe that effort control is useful instrument in rebuilding the cod stocks and safeguarding the fleets that depend on mixed fisheries that include cod. But meanwhile, we are tied into a Cod Plan that could take to 2014 to change, and which requires pre-programmed reductions of up to 25% in effort to continue annually.

Something has to give.

Common sense would suggest that we should build on the parts of the Cod Plan that are working, and the progress that has been made so far. STECF indicates that the buyback provisions, although too complex and ambiguous, have generated initiatives that have reduced cod discards and contributed to cod avoidance. This requires the Commission and the affected member states to work collaboratively to find a rational solution. There can be no mileage in pursuing a bankrupt approach that would put whole fleets out of business whilst wrecking the only part of the Cod Management Plan that works.

The decisions taken in the next two weeks will be critical.

Finally, it is worth recalling that STECF has concluded that a cod management plan that has the support and involvement of the stakeholders that are subject to it, is more likely to be successful than one which does not

But multi-species, multi-gear and multi-jurisdiction fisheries were never going to be easy to manage and the most intractable problems we face from a fisheries management point of view can often be traced back to the core issue of how to maximise catch of healthy stocks whilst providing protection for vulnerable species.

It is now recognised that the Commission’s blunt approach to the cod stock over the last decade has been a textbook case of the pitfalls to avoid. An exclusive focus on a single stock; brutal but unfocused measures; and ignoring the need to secure the support and involvement of the stakeholders have led to what has politely been described as a sub-optimal outcome. Even where cod stocks are recovering, this is likely to be in spite of, rather than because of, most of the measures put in place by the EU since 2002.

Belatedly, the Commission has recognised one of the core realities of our demersal fisheries; these are mixed fisheries, exploiting multi-species complexes and the management regime needs to take this fully into account.

It is however, one thing to say that a multi-species, mixed fishery, approach is required. It is quite another to be specific about what this looks like in concrete terms.

It is for this reason that the North Sea, the North Western Waters and the Baltic RACs have decided to convene a major conference on the management of mixed fisheries. The conference will invite world class experts, fisheries managers and representatives from the fishing industry to discuss the various dimensions of exploiting multi-species fisheries. A report of the proceedings will capture the best insights and perspectives and be used to inform the development of multi-annual management plans for a range of mixed fisheries.

Details are being finalised but it is likely that the conference will be held in Copenhagen in early March.

Celtic Sea

The Celtic Sea is at the cutting edge of mixed fisheries issues because of the complex mix of species and the wide range of fleets that exploit them in these waters. The North West Waters RAC is already heavily involved in developing advice on a multi-annual management plan for the Area VII f and g part of the Celtic Sea. The RAC recently wrote to the Commission proposing scientific work to underpin the new RAC advice. Inevitably a multi-species approach involves trade-offs between different management options and fisheries scientists have an important role to play in clarifying and proposing those options. The final choices from those options should however lie with the fisheries managers working closely with the principal stakeholders in the fisheries concerned. All this presupposes a regional management framework, which is why the outcome of the CFP reform is so critical in this respect.

Irish Sea

The fisheries in the Irish Sea are no less in need of a break with the single species focus that has dominated management decisions to date. Uncertainties about changes in the natural mortality rate may go a substantial way in explaining the weak response of the cod stock to a decade of recovery measures. A management approach which incorporates ecosystem considerations is less likely to be surprised by non-responsive stocks. Again, the important starting point is to develop a range of realistic management options on which both RACs and managers can base their advice/decisions.

North Sea

Many of the main commercial stocks in the North Sea are already under some form of management plan. Often however, these are simple harvest control rules that do not take into account species interactions, or mixed fisheries issues, much less a full-blown ecosystem approach.

STECF has been tasked by the Commission to develop an impact assessment with various management options as a replacement for the current EU Cod Management Plan. The recently NFFO attended the scoping meeting for this potentially very important work in Edinburgh and made a presentation on behalf of the RACs on the key elements that should be taken into account in the forthcoming review. We will continue to take the opportunity to be involved in this work until the final report on a revised approach to managing the cod stocks within a multi-annual and multi-species approach is complete.

The Dubious Science of Marine Conservation ZonesCarried on the back of a moral panic that our seas are on trajectory to destruction, the planning of Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) in English waters has raced ahead at break-neck speed. As a result, it has often ridden roughshod over the careful analysis that is needed to take account of those groups of marine users who have derived their livelihoods from the seas for generations. The MPA Fishing Coalition (MPAC) has therefore welcomed the recent decision of the Minster to relax the MCZ timetable and designation process and give a greater focus to the evidence base (MPA Fishing Coalition Welcomes Minister’s Revised MCZ Timetable).

There is in fact growing evidence that the our seas are far from the path to destruction that the doomsayers claim, but are on an improving trend; and without any contribution from a huge network of marine protected areas. In particular, the diversity of demersal fish in UK waters has improved noticeably over the last five years and a progressively increasing number of stocks are being fished sustainably1. There is no reason to suggest this trend will not continue

.

Democratic Deficit

A total of 127 MCZ proposals and 65 highly protected reference area MCZs emerged from the set of 4 regional projects in September (link). The approach through the projects continues to be heralded as stakeholder led but in fact sites were selected under duress imposed by a top-down policy document, the Ecological Network Guidance (ENG), that in many cases offered few, if any, alternatives if the guidance was to be fulfilled. Far from having a strong stakeholder mandate, therefore, many of the sites are deeply contentious. Yet the guidance itself amounts only to an enumerated set of theoretical principles purported to provide the blueprint for an Ecologically Coherent Network. It does not advise on how to find synergies or trade-offs between conservation and the human use of the marine environment.

Blinkered Policy Guidance

MPAC has from its inception argued against what it sees as a fundamentally flawed approach. Displacing existing marine activities for the sake of a contrived ecological ideal that pretended it did not matter what happened to those activities was not just wrong from a social justice perspective, but it risked undermining ecosystem-wide conservation benefits. That is because the displacement of marine activities, and in particular fishing activity from important customary grounds, without careful forethought can lead to a redistribution that increases pressures upon less resilient and more pristine habitats. The conservation gains achieved within an MPA can be more than offset by losses at an ecosystem wide scale.

Some marine scientists have recognised this problem all along2. The Scottish administration appears to have grasped this issue and is a taking a more pragmatic approach to the use of its underlying policy guidance in seeking, early in its MPA planning process, to identify areas that are least used. Such sites have the additional ecological benefit of being in a pristine condition in the first place. Although initial indications are doubtful, the Welsh administration will reveal the extent to which it considers displacement an important factor when it is expected to announce potential sites for consultation in the new year.

Unjustified Seabed Grab

It is not just the failure to account for the interrelationship between ecological outcomes and human marine use, however. The sheer scale of ambition of the ENG when set against existing sustainable uses of the sea and social and economic costs stretches the bounds of reason. Whilst MPAC understands the rationale for a network of MPAs that protects vulnerable and fragile habitats such as cold-water coral reefs for example, the ENG goes well beyond such considerations to include area range targets for every broad-scale habitat that overall fall between 15 and 40% of their total area. Consequently, the results from the regional projects in most cases go well beyond the minimum international targets under the Convention on Biodiversity (10%) and OSPAR (10–20%).

Justifying such a level of intervention should have been built upon an understanding of the level of pressures upon marine habitats in the first place. To that end, whilst fishing with bottom towed gears is considered to have the broadest physical footprint on the seabed compared to other activities, some estimates have put this at between 5.4 and 21.4% for English and Welsh waters3. Much of this fishing pressure takes place on habitats that are already subject to significant levels of natural disturbance from wave, current and storm action; marine habitats are dynamic by definition. Therefore, far from there being a need for vast areas of protected habitat to aid marine recovery, such evidence indicates that large proportions of seabed are not significantly impacted by anything in the first place. Even on sediment habitats that have been subject to heavy fishing activity, scientists have questioned whether there are significant losses of productivity, as the presence of substantial and enduring fisheries in such areas stands as testimony to marine habitats not being chronically damaged4.

Such habitat coverage requirements also place the ENG head-to-head with existing sustainable uses of the sea. Nowhere is this more acute than in the case of nephrops/langoustine fisheries where the guidance seeks to protect the very habitat upon which these fisheries depend. Nephrops forms the largest value fishery in the UK worth £50 million in first sale value and in its form as scampi is well known as a popular family meal, yet every major fishery except one has been earmarked for an MCZ.

In the Irish Sea this has resulted in the selection of sites on some of the most productive parts of the Irish Sea “Dublin Bay prawn” fishery. These fisheries are not only vital to the viability of fishing communities in Northern Ireland in particular; they are promoted as sustainably sourced seafood by the likes of Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall and Heston Blumenthal. The scale of closures that could be implied by MCZ designation risks undermining the long term sustainable yield of the grounds remaining open to fish.

Gerrymandered Science

Whilst the ENG is held up by MPA proponents as the bastion for delivering an ecologically coherent network, the evidence above suggests its single-minded application is far from that.

Before the formation of MPAC, the NFFO had criticised what was emerging as an artificial division in in the application of MPA site selection science patronised only by academic scientists in the absence applied disciplines including fisheries and social science. The appointment of what is claimed to be an independent Science Advisory Panel (SAP) to oversee the delivery of the ENG by the MCZ regional projects included advisers that had close links with green advocacy and who were not only delivering research to underpin the guidance but would also form judgement over its application by participating on the panel (NFFO Challenges MPA Science Panel). Previously, such MPA proponents had lazily dismissed fisheries displacement as a reason to reduce overall fishing effort further. During the passage of regional projects, the panel chose to ignore requests from the regional projects for its views on fisheries displacement. Similarly, the government’s Statutory Nature Conservation Bodies which have been running the English MCZ project have refused to recognise displacement as a conservation issue.

It is of little surprise therefore that in its review of the network proposals released on 15th November (link), the SAP has been at pains to point out what it sees as the failings of the projects in achieving the grand ecological vision of the ENG. In particular, the panel highlights shortfalls in reaching the percentage target of the mud habitat that supports the nephrops fisheries and in reaching the number and desired size of reference area MCZs. These latter areas would be a “no man’s land” banning the vast majority of activities for the sake of establishing a set of scientific research dominions.

The SAP’s medicine to the present situation is for stakeholders to be re-engaged to find additional areas. It seems immune to considering that the key reason for deficiencies in the first place is that fulfilling the guidance in its entirety has simply been too contentious once its implications on the ground became clearer. In particular, the half-baked approach to include reference areas without considering a broader coherent marine monitoring and MPA science strategy, has been especially controversial, a requirement that stands glaringly in the guidance as the most blatant hallmark of scientists-cum-advocates’ gerrymandering of policy. A similar requirement for no-take MCZs in Wales does not even attempt to justify them on scientific grounds, let alone as necessary for the protection of particular conservation features. Seemingly, they represent the unjustified cherry on the cake for a pre-existing extensive network of Welsh European Marine Sites. The Marine Act which provides the legislative basis for MCZs has no requirement for such designations.

It seems a relatively small clique of eco-scientists and MPA advocates, having realised their MPA cause de celebre, have been given the freedom to construct an elaborate policy vision virtually as a scientists’ writ. The certainty that this vision will deliver an ecologically coherent network apparently no-one is to question, nor give consideration to other important needs such as sustainable fisheries. It is about time that those hiding behind this “science is right” charade began to recognise that humans do form part of the marine ecosystem. Otherwise, it is not just people’s livelihoods that stand to be tossed aside like sacrificial pawns; it is the sustainable management of our seas that is at stake.

Notes:

1. UKMMAS (2010) Charting Progress 2: The State of UK Seas, http://chartingprogress.defra.gov.uk/Casey, J (2010) Trends in stocks and fisheries since 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/news_and_events/events/ 140910/john_casey_en.pdf
2. See for example: Halpern, B. S., Lester, S.E. and Mcleod K. L. (2010) Placing marine protected areas onto the ecosystem-based management seascape. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(43): 18312-18317. Dinmore, T. A., Duplisea, D. E., Rackham, B. D., Maxwell, D. L., and Jennings, S. (2003) Impact of a large-scale area closure on patterns of fishing disturbance and the consequences for benthic communities. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60: 371–380. Greenstreet, S. P. R., Fraser, H. M., and Piet, G. J. (2009) Using MPAs to address regional-scale ecological objectives in the North Sea: modelling the effects of fishing effort displacement. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 66: 90–100. Hiddink, J. G., Hutton, T., Jennings, S., and Kaiser, M. J. (2006) Predicting the effects of area closures and fishing effort restrictions, ICES Journal of Marine Science, 63: 822–830. Holland, D. S., and K. E. Schnier (2006) Protecting marine biodiversity: a comparison of individual habitat quotas and marine protected areas, Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 63(7): 1481–1495. Kaiser, M. (2005) Are marine protected areas a red herring or fisheries panacea? Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 62: 1194–1199. Jennings, S. (2009) The role of marine protected areas in environmental management. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 66: 16–21. Excerpts include: Dinmore, et al (2003) concluded that fishing distribution had become slightly more uniform and that “coupled with the displacement of trawling activity to previously unfished areas, is predicted to have slightly greater cumulative impacts on total benthic invertebrate production and lead to localised reductions in benthic biomass for several years.” Two further modelling studies on establishing MPA networks in the North Sea concluded that:“If areas closed to fishing have low levels of production because of high natural disturbance, and/or recover quickly after disturbance, then closure tends to have a negative effect, because trawling effort may redistribute to more productive habitats with longer recovery times… ” (Hiddink, et al, 2006).“MPAs on their own are unlikely to achieve significant regional-scale ecosystem benefits, because local gains are largely negated by fishing effort displacement into the remainder of the North Sea” (Greenstreet, et al, 2009). Such findings led the authors to consider that MPA planning strategies should be combined with measures to limit effort displacement. Jennings (2009) suggests “this is best achieved by making a priori assessment of the potential effects of pressure displacement and ensuring that the need for these assessments is identified in policy. A process for providing scientific advice on MPAs could therefore consist of a simple checklist of analyses that need to be conducted when assessing the effects of designation, and guidance on interpreting the results of these analyses.” Reflecting upon displacement concerns, other authors have considered that direct fleet management is more likely to be successful at achieving regional scale conservation goals rather than closing specific areas to fishing (Kaiser, 2005, Holland and Schnier, 2006).
3. This is based on 2004 fishing activity data, see: Eastwood, P. D., Mills, C. M., Aldridge, J. N., Houghton, C. A., and Rogers, S. I. (2007) Human activities in UK offshore waters: an assessment of direct, physical pressure on the seabed. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 453–463. Further analysis has demonstrated that the distribution has not significantly altered in subsequent years, see: Stelzenmüller, V., Rogers, S. I., and Mills, C. M. (2008). Spatio-temporal patterns of fishing pressure on UK marine landscapes, and their implications for spatial planning and management. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 65: 1081–1091.
4. See for example: Hilborn, R (2007) Reinterpreting the state of fisheries and their management. Ecosystems, 10: 1362–1369 Rijnsdorp, A. D., Buys, A. M., Storbeck, F., and Visser, E. G. (1998) Micro-scale distribution of beam trawl effort in the southern North Sea between 1993 and 1996 in relation to the trawling frequency of the sea bed and the impact on benthic organisms. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 55: 403–419.

The Commission’s reform proposals have been criticised for their lack of detail and we understand that as a result, the Commission will publish four discussion documents (in the jargon non-papers) which promise to illuminate four key areas of the reform:

• Regionalisation
• Transferable Fishing Concessions
• Discards Policy
• Maximum Sustainable Yield

The NFFO has responded to the Commission’s proposals and has also been working within the North West Waters RAC and the North Sea RAC on their advice on the reform.

One area of work which has been somewhat eclipsed by these more high profile issues is the importance of simplifying the CFP.

Working fishermen cannot but be aware of the massive complexity of the CFP rules because they have to deal with them every day at sea. Likewise those who are charged with enforcing the rules regard them as a “nightmare”. Fisheries scientists in ICES and STECF have also repeatedly pointed to the complexity of the management regime as a fundamental reason why it consistently fails to achieve its objectives

There are many examples where the complexity of the CFP means that one set of rules undermine or flatly contradict another set. So:

• The effort regime which allocates a higher number of days-at-sea to vessels using less selective gear has resulted in a the lowering of the average mesh size in use in the North Sea
• The catch composition rules in the Technical Conservation Regulation require fishing vessels to discard fish caught in the “wrong” percentages, contradicting a theoretical ban on high-grading
• TAC decisions in mixed fisheries made for cosmetic reasons increase discard rates without any positive effects on fishing mortality

These examples illustrate the complexities which are inevitably associated with a CFP based on prescriptive micro-management through broad-brush, one-size -fits-all, policies. The Commission’s Reform Green Paper itself identified this as a fundamental reason why the CFP has consistently delivered much less that it has promised. As the reform process enters the trilateral dialogue between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, there is a danger that the simplification agenda that should be at the heart of the debate on an effective CFP will get sidelined.

Sexier issues such as discard policy and transferable fishing concessions will preoccupy the co-decision makers, potentially adding to rather than subtracting from, the complexity of the new regime.

Of course, effective regionalisation of CFP decision-making could represent a substantial first step towards a dramatic simplification of the regime because rules generated through regional cooperation would be focused on and tailored to the characteristics of specific fisheries. This would replace over-general rules which apply to everybody and are subsequently diluted by derogations or exemptions to make them fit. However, if regionalisation turns out to be little more than a degree of flexibility for regional seas member states to implement CFP rules based on objectives, targets and timetables decided at the centre, little will have been achieved. This would not be dissimilar to the current EU Cod Management Plan which is the epitome of complexity, perverse consequences and failure to deliver.

Red Tape Challenge

The UK Government’s Red Tape Challenge is an attempt to simplify the legislative framework within the UK and the Federation will be submitting its views especially in the area of fishing vessel safety. It is difficult however, to see much progress being made in the fisheries realm in the absence of meaningful CFP reform. Over the last decade the NFFO has already undertaken two major exercises to identify rules that could be removed or simplified without seeing any noticeable progress and in fact the situation on the deck or in the wheelhouse has got considerably worse.

Radical Alternatives

The NFFO has, following positive experiences in Australia and Canada, advanced the idea of sustainable fishing plans as a way of delegating responsibilities from centralised command and control systems to the fishing industry itself, within a system of approvals and audits. There is little sign in the Commission’s package of proposals that this radical delivery mechanism for simplifying the CFP will be adopted during this reform, despite strong support from some of the more advanced thinkers within the Commission. Pessimists might say that it will take another decade for this idea to move centre stage, in the way that the NFFO and SFFs’ ideas on regionalisation (Zonal Management) have moved since they were advance prior to the last reform.

Introduction

For well over a decade the NFFO and likeminded bodies have argued that the core problem with the Common Fisheries Policy, and the reason that so many of its policy initiatives have delivered much less than expected, is that it has been dominated by an over-centralised command-and-control system. A centralised CFP has simply not had the capacity to manage numerous highly diverse and complex fisheries, spread over 40 degrees of latitude. Blanket measures, a one-size-fits –all approach, and an inability to tailor measures to local circumstances and respond quickly when measures are patently failing, has been the hallmark of the current regime.

Our criticisms, initially thought extreme, have subsequently moved centre-stage and the Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP essentially makes similar points: to be effective in achieving its objectives, it is necessary to radically decentralise decision-making within the CFP and to transfer responsibilities away from the centre to regional seas level and beyond that to the fishing industry itself; this would take place within an overarching system of safeguards and guarantees.

For reasons apparently largely to do with legal constraints in the Treaties, it is not immediately obvious how the Commission’s proposal will achieve this ambition. There is aspiration but very little detail on how a regionalised and decentralised CFP would function. Perhaps this is inevitable when it appears that the flesh of a regional approach will have to be put on the bones by the member states acting cooperatively at a regional seas level rather than as members of a regional management body with a closely defined role. Nevertheless, we have strong fears that the opportunity to make a decisive break with the past will be lost as the proposal confronts the co-decision process. Some member states fear that regionalisation will simply result in a further layer of bureaucracy and cost; the European Parliament, having been recently given new powers is being asked almost immediately to delegate some of them; and there are valid fears about granting the Commission additional delegated powers.
Against this complex background, as the proposals move forward to the co-legislators for decision with all the compromises involved in that process, we would simply wish to ensure that all parties understand the core importance of achieving a meaningful decentralisation of the CFP.

In particular, it is important to understand that failure to decentralise will lead to a decade of paralysis, given the inevitably slower process of decision-making under co-decision.

Regionalisation

We recognise that achieving a transfer of decision-making responsibilities to the regional seas level will have to take account of a number of legal and political realities, including:

• The provisions in Lisbon Treaty for delegated responsibilities, including the Commission’s right of initiative and co-decision making with the European Parliament
• The fact that there is no scope within the Treaties for the establishment of management bodies with legislative powers at regional seas level
• That there is scope (within the Treaties) for the member states to cooperate administratively at the regional seas level – this would mean engaging closely with the regional advisory councils and fisheries scientists in the development of multi-annual management plans (MAPs);
• MAPs developed in this way, with the backing of the relevant member states and RACs, grounded in the best available science, would go forward for adoption through three possible legal routes (described below)
• MAPs would cover all the main elements required for effective management within a regionalised CFP
• The development of a coherent overarching system of principles and standards agreed by the co-legislators would provide a framework for delegated responsibilities at regional level.

It seems to us that even within the given legal constraints, member states cooperating with RACs at the regional sea basin level to prepare comprehensive multi-annual management plans could amount to de-facto regional management through one of three alternative routes:

• Agreed regional MAPs would be submitted to the Commission as recommendations by the relevant member states for adoption (perhaps after discussion and amendment) as a formal proposal for co-decision-making; clearly, given the time that this process would take, much detail would have to be decided through subsequent implementing legislation; ideally this would take place in some kind of fast track process
• The Commission, using delegated powers, could have authority to approve specified detailed content through some variant of comitology, thus avoiding the cumbersome co-decision process for detailed provisions
• In some circumstances it may be possible/ desirable for cooperating member states to give legal force to specific measures through their own national measures.

All of this is new, potentially messy, in some ways counter-intuitive not without potential pitfalls. Nevertheless, we reaffirm our opinion that it is vital for the co-legislators to navigate their way through the legal constraints to find a political compromise that will deliver an effective form of regional management. There is a responsibility on all of the parties – Commission, European Parliament and member states to find a way forward. To fail will be to condemn European fisheries to a further decade within a dysfunctional system.

We would therefore express, in the strongest possible terms, our wish to see progress to a decentralised Common Fisheries Policy, of which regionalisation is the first logical step, and would urge the co-legislators to work together to achieve this aim.

Delegated Responsibilities

Given the complexities and uncertainties of applying a regional approach to the CFP, it is all the more important to open alternative ways of decentralising and simplifying the current micro-management system. We and some of the RACs have advocated expanding the use of delegated authority through which blocks of responsibility are transferred to fishing industry organisations, such as producer organisations, within a system of approvals and audits. This has been called reversing the burden of proof in fisheries.

The Commission’s proposals on the future of the common organisation of the market makes reference to an enhanced role for producer organisations – but is strikingly devoid of detail on what this might mean, beyond an oblique reference to production and marketing plans. Yet, successful examples of delegated management in Australia and Canada, suggest that this is a potentially fruitful route to simplification, decentralisation, and a high degree of industry participation in management. We believe that this aspect of decentralisation should be afforded a much higher level of priority.

Transferable Fishing Concessions

The Commission has proposed a mandatory system of transferable fishing concessions (TFCs) to be operated by member states for all vessels over 12 metres, along with all vessels below 12 metres which use mobile gear. Applying transferable fishing concessions to passive gear vessels below 12 meters would be at the discretion of the member state. TFCs would amount to a system of use-rights with notice of recall of 1 5 years. Such a system would work explicitly within the principle of relative stability; in other words quota transfers between member states would require approval of those member states.

The UK is one of those member states which have already progressed quite far towards a system of rights-based management, not dissimilar to the system described in the Commission Proposal. Other countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark have also moved successfully in a similar direction.
For the vessels to which it applies, most commentators would agree that the UK quota management system based on Fixed Quota Allocations has been successful in terms of:

• Adjusting available fishing opportunities to capacity
• Using UK quotas more efficiently
• Encouraging a high degree of compliance.

It is those parts of the UK (fleet, principally the under-10 metre sector) that have not been part of the mainstream quota management system (and the associated decommissioning schemes that facilitated the adjustment) which now are subject to quota management problems.

Quota management is also the area of policy where delegated responsibilities have progressed furthest. The lesson was learned early in the UK that adapting quota arrangements to the requirements of specific fleets, operating in specific conditions, is not readily achieved through a centralised system. Given their pivotal position between the fleets and the regulatory system, producer organisations are best placed to judge whether annual individual vessel quotas, or some variant on the pool system with monthly (or similar) limits, is the most appropriate system for groups of vessels in particular circumstances.

This is where we have concerns about the Commission’s proposals. It is not in the concept of user-rights with a reasonable period of recall; our fear lies in that a system of controls at European level would undermine what has been achieved within the UK through the application of a blunt uniformity.

At present, the Commission’s locus, apart from general oversight, ends with setting TACs. It is not at all clear that dictating the detail of member states’ quota management arrangements is an area of Community competence. Quota management to date has been member states’ responsibility. EU rules in this sphere would therefore be a significant step backwards from decentralisation. In any event, the Commission’s enthusiasm for transferable fishing concessions rests largely on its perception that it will be a way of addressing overcapacity in those fisheries where this remains a problem. The danger is that in requiring a mandatory system of TFQs at European level, the very flexibility that has allowed a variety tailored quota management arrangements to flower in the member states (some involving complex hybrids of individual vessel and collective pool quotas) will be lost.

Against the prevailing orthodoxy that publically funded decommissioning schemes do not represent good value for money it is pertinent to reflect on to what extent scrapping subsidies established the preconditions for the successful TFC schemes in Denmark, Netherlands and the UK.

All of the above is not to argue that improvements can’t be made to our domestic quota arrangements. Currently discussions are under way on resolving the problems confronting some parts of the under-10 metre and it would also be wise to improve the transparency of our arrangements and to put in place safeguards against over-concentration of ownership. However, there is a big difference between dealing with these questions at member state level and conceding to blunt pan-European rules in this area.

Our priority therefore should be to ensure that the introduction of TFQs at a European level is not allowed to undermine the progress that has been made within the UK towards a flexible and functioning rights-based management system.

Small Scale Fisheries

Small scale fisheries are a vital component in European fisheries from a number of perspectives including economic, social, employment, and regional policy. We agree however with the Commission that there is no case for a differentiated regime so far as management measures are concerned, partly because this would undermine the coherence of conservation measures but principally because it is simply impossible to conceive a single definition of “small-scale”, “artisanal” or “inshore” that would be meaningful. There are times and places in which it will be useful to use these categories to sub-divide the fleet but this can only realistically be done at member-state or sub-member state level, where it is possible to take account of all relevant circumstances.

Multi-annual Management Plans

We consider that multi-annual management plans will be the principal vehicle for fisheries policy in the future. As MAPs move from a simple set of harvest control rules for single stocks, to plans based on broader, more comprehensive, multi-species models aligned with an ecosystem approach, incorporating the views of stakeholder groups, like the regional advisory councils, will be not only desirable but essential.

At least for demersal fisheries we foresee that within a regionalised CFP, RACs and member states within a regional seas area will cooperate and collaborate very closely in the development and application of MAPS. Strands of this type of cooperation, involving fisheries scientists from ICES and the national laboratories can already be seen in much of RACs’ current work. The addition of fisheries managers from the member states would complete the triumvirate necessary for effective regional management – stakeholders, fisheries managers and fisheries scientists.

Doubtless MAPS would be developed within a framework of principles and standards laid down at the European level by the co-legislators. We would make the important point that if we are to break with the failures of the current CFP, it is essential that anything that smacks of prescriptive micro-management must be removed from the European level. Not only from the perspective of a responsive system dealing rapidly with changing realities but to achieve the benefits of tailored, customised measures with a high degree of buy-in from the fishing industry, it is important that this point is understood.

Maximum Sustainable Yield

We share the Commission’s objective of achieving high yield fisheries on the stocks. We cannot however support the Commission’s proposal to sweep all the necessary caveats and safeguards aside when applying a theoretical concept such as maximum sustainable yield (which was, after all, developed with single stock fisheries in mind), especially when applied to multi-species fisheries. The architects of the WSSD Declaration in Johannesburg specified, for good reason, that MSY should be achieved for depleted stocks by 2015, where possible. Those words reflect a biological reality – that for a number of reasons, including predation patterns, it may not be possible to fish all stocks simultaneously at MSY. It is important for the credibility of the CFP to move to high yield fisheries in a progressive way without tying the policy into an approach that lacks scientific credibility and will create unnecessary rigidities and possibly unachievable objectives.

Discards

We have no difficulty in sharing the Commission’s ambition to reduce the large scale discarding that has wasted the resource, impeded the recovery of depleted stocks and damaged the reputation of the fishing industry. Indeed much progress has been made already, especially in the last two years. And over the last decade discards in the English fleet have been reduced by 50%.

The Commission has clearly in mind systems, such as those that apply in Norway and Iceland, when it proposes a timetable for a mandatory requirement for vessels to land all the fish they catch of named species. Whatever lessons that may be learned from these examples, it is also true that conditions in Norway and Iceland are not the same as exist in our fisheries. This why a stepwise, fishery-by-fishery approach is required, taking fully into account the range of drivers (regulatory, technical, economic, market failure, perverse incentives) for discards. Even in systems such as that as operated in Norway, where ostensibly there is a discard ban, care has been taken to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure that the practicalities of each fishery are fully taken into account.

Where discards have increased in recent years, it has almost invariably been the result of compliance with CFP regulations, including TAC decisions, recovery and management plans and catch composition rules within the technical conservation regulations. Logic therefore dictates that a precondition for an obligation to land all catches will be the elimination of this type of regulatory discards. Judging by the lack of progress in this direction in the Commission’s proposals for TACs and quotas in 2012, this will not be an easy or straightforward task.

RACs/ACs

It is universally acknowledged that the regional advisory councils have exceeded expectations placed upon them at the last reform of the CFP. By virtue of their composition and pivotal position between the regulatory system and specific fisheries RACs (or ACs as we must now learn to call them) are uniquely placed to bring insight and experience to management decisions. RACs have been constrained in the role that they play by the limited resources that are available to them and it is hoped that the new financial settlement for fisheries from 2013 will provide a sound basis for the development of RAC advice. Notwithstanding the positive role played by RACs to date, it is true to say that the current structure of centralised decision-making within the CFP has acted as a bottleneck that has led to many pieces of RAC advice being ignored or placed in a queue for action. The Commission has been incapable of dealing with the sheer quantity of the advice that is prepared and submitted. This underlines the need for a stronger regional dimension to policy formulation and development and RACs have a major potential role to play in engaging with member state authorities and fisheries scientists at the regional seas level to shape and agree policy recommendations. MAPs will clearly be the vehicle for this work.

Conclusions

Our fear is that the vision advanced by the Commission in its Green Paper on CFP reform of a regionalised and decentralised CFP, with a significant transfer of responsibility from the centre to the regions and beyond, will not be realised. Nevertheless, it is precisely this approach that is required if we are to break free of a seriously dysfunctional command and control system that has impeded movement towards a more rational and effective management system.

The first priority of this reform should therefore be to give legislative effect to this vision. Achieving this shift would in itself represent a huge step towards achieving our other goals of moving towards a responsive system that delivers high yield, low discards, reasonably stable, fisheries, within an ecosystem approach.