The Evidence Free Campaign to Limit Fishing Grounds

Even when a cumulative impact assessment is undertaken it usually only concerns the immediate region of the development. Where the extent of an impact is unknown, licence conditions are often applied to require a developer to monitor potential effects so that science can be better informed. Precautionary management in these cases is not applied to rule that the development cannot go ahead unless there is a clear evidence based threat to a biological community of interest – birds in the case of some offshore wind farms. Yet the scale of marine installations, particularly for renewable energy, is set to grow massively over the next few years, and not just in UK waters, but also in the waters of neighbouring marine states such as Germany, the Netherlands and France.

Fair Treatment

The same rules do not seem to apply to fishing. In contrast to marine developers, it is the entirety of fishing activity that is now the focus in driving policies that would potentially limit its extent. It is commonly claimed by environmental campaigners and their supporters in the media that the fishing industry has free access to all sea areas, and moreover that as a minimum the vast majority of seabed is subject to regular disturbance by bottom trawling; at its most extreme, bottom trawling is likened to felling rainforests annually by some of the more excitable campaigners, when fishing that returns to the same grounds from year to year can offer no comparison.

The campaign for MPAs has been thinly veiled surrogate for limiting the activities of the fishing industry. Many people, when presented with “heat” maps of fishing activity data graded from blue to an “alarming” shade of red have automatically concluded there must be a problem. Last year the Federation, its members, and others in the industry battled multiple stakeholders on the English Marine Conservation Zones (MCZ) regional projects to prevent those who had drawn this conclusion from allowing the projects to make erroneous recommendations on MCZ site conservation objectives and management measures. In the interests of participatory decision-making, broad stakeholder groups had been given the latitude to make such potentially influential recommendations.

As anyone in the fishing industry knows, you can’t gain a perspective of actual fishing pressures by simply viewing charts of fishing activity spanning huge areas; the scaling of data is completely out of context. Even vessel monitoring system (VMS) data is typically presented as data units categorised by the number of hours fished within a unit area, a necessary generalisation due to the two hourly ping of data points that characterise the underlying raw data. It can easily mislead the lazy and uninformed and form useful propaganda material for those unsympathetic to the fishing industry.

The Truth

The truth of the matter is that we do not yet have a definitive scientific answer over the extent to which the seabed is subject to contact by bottom gears in terms of intensity and extent, let alone whether it is significant for wider ecosystem functioning. One study that has attempted to apply science to the issue have estimated a fishing footprint of as little as 5 – 21% for English and Welsh waters1, standing in stark contrast to environmental campaigners claims that the industry is scraping the barrel of an empty sea. Whilst more work is needed to give more certainty to estimates, it is already clear that nowhere near the whole seabed is subject to fishing contact and the scientific consensus is that it is patchy at both fine as well as large scales of analysis. The Federation is working with scientists to unearth the truth.

Evidence Free Policy Hijack

It is now emerging that the evidence free campaigners are again seeking to influence policy makers. The Commission’s proposals to phase out deep sea trawling represents one disproportionate knee jerk response that would have serious economic and ecological repercussions from displaced fishing effort into the Celtic Sea.

Closer to home, in a recent consultation on setting targets to achieve good environmental status (GES) under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, Defra had first identified a need for further work to better inform the extent of fishing pressures upon UK seabed sediment habitats and acknowledged there was an absence of conclusive evidence to inform the UK targets. Having no new evidence, it is now in danger of substituting this position for the kind of “expert judgement” that is misinformed by the presentational bias of fishing activity data that the public in the MCZ planning process were subjected to. The outcome would be to no longer question whether fishing seabed pressures should be curtailed, only by how much.

Fishing on Sediments

It is no surprise that sediment habitats form the bulk of where bottom fisheries are located. However, many of these habitats, particularly in shallow seas, are subject to natural variation and disturbance from waves and currents that mask the significance of fishing effects. The patchiness of fishing activity at the fine scale is a function of fishermen’s actions to avoid seabed obstacles and follow established fishing tows know to provide good returns. It is also important to take into account that the act of fishing itself is not wholly negative upon ecology. The disturbance of sediments offers some potentially positive functions such as nutrient dispersal and the promotion of food availability for some species that may be of benefit to fisheries. Certainly, highly fished areas continue to be productive fisheries despite the levels of disturbance, demonstrating they cannot be having dramatic damage to fish production. In contrast, in some areas where bottom trawling has been limited such as the North Sea plaice box, for example, the industry has witnessed a decline in fish and the seabed has become dominated by brittle stars and urchins. A question remains unanswered by science over whether a patchy distribution of fishing activity may contribute in some ways to biodiversity due to the variety of levels of disturbance, with some areas not fished at all across a given area.

A Clearer Headed Policy

As with some species of birds and wind farms, there is a case for specific and particularly vulnerable, rare and unique habitats (such as cold water corals or eel grass beds, for example) receiving protection from damaging pressures. However, concluding whether or not towed bottom gears should be curtailed upon sediment habitats in general should first be based upon understanding its extent and its ecological implications. Extent can be derived through the corroboration of various sources of data on fishing activity, and an understanding of gear metrics and seabed contact. Ecological implications need to be better informed through experimentation and monitoring, and its significance reliably linked to ecosystem level functions. In addition, an audit should be undertaken to better understand the economics and practicalities of seafood capture to inform the dependence of sustainable levels of production upon the levels of pressures exerted.

From a global perspective, there is no point, even from an ardent environmental campaigner’s point of view, of preventing maximum sustainable production from our fishery resources, and this even includes deriving sustainable yields from slower growing deep sea fish stocks. There are no viable alternatives to bottom towed gear fisheries for some species (try diving for scallops in 50 metres of water) and even fewer options if economic efficiency is a factor. Significant curtailment of trawl fisheries will only lead to a displacement of food production to other seas with fewer management constraints, or to other food sources which have far higher levels of comparable environmental effects to wild capture fisheries. Most agricultural food production systems are far more energy intensive and are derived from areas that bear no resemblance to the natural habitat that would otherwise occupy the area. By contrast, wild capture fisheries form the largest self-renewing food resource on earth.

Systematic, evidence based, and clear headed approaches to policy making are a pre-requisite for sustainable development. The government’s own sustainable development policy emphasises the responsible application of sound science. It is time that government refocused its attention upon its application of scientifically sound policy making, rather than bend to the alternative hysterical and evidence free nonsense that is emanating from environmental doomsayers.

ENDS

1. Eastwood, P. D., Mills, C. M., Aldridge, J. N., Houghton, C. A., and Rogers, S. I. (2007) Human activities in UK offshore waters: an assessment of direct, physical pressure on the seabed. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 453–463.

This paper is the NFFO response to that proposal.

Summary

This proposal has all the hallmarks of a work in progress that has subsequently been hijacked by a fundamentalist political agenda. It has the potential to do a great deal of harm to fishing businesses and communities both directly and indirectly.

The Proposal departs from the principles of good governance and proportionality. As such it sets an unwelcome precedent for a reformed CFP.

From experience we know that the type of draconian blanket approach proposed is likely to be pregnant with unintended consequences.

The proposal is supported by a 55 page impact assessment but prematurely and capriciously rules out the only viable management option: a risk-based approach which provides necessary protection through specific, targeted, species and area measures.

The Proposal

We can agree with the Commission’s proposal, and associated press release, to the extent that:

• Deep sea species are mainly caught on the continental shelf
• Deep Sea ecosystems and the species that live in them are particularly vulnerable to human activities
• Deep sea stocks are caught both as targeted fisheries and as by-catch in many fisheries, including those which could not be reasonably described as taking place in deep water
• Fishermen already cooperate with scientists to establish a better understanding of deep water ecosystems
• The general objective of the Regulation should be to ensure as far as possible the sustainable exploitation of deep sea stocks whist reducing the environmental impact of these fisheries and to improve the information base for scientific assessment
• A licensing regime for deep water species is an appropriate management tool for controlling fishing access to deep water fisheries

Areas of Contention

We disagree:

• That the Commission’s Proposal has found an appropriate balance between sustainable exploitation and protection for vulnerable species and habitats
• That a blanket approach to bottom trawling and deep water gill nets is a proportionate management response, even within an approach based on the precautionary principle
• That it is possible to conclude on the basis of scientific advice that the current level of fishing activity is excessive on all deep water stocks: ICES’ 2012 advice for a number of deep water species of commercial importance (including Blue Ling, Black Scabbardfish and Roundnose Grenadier ) is quite positive, with recommendations for increased TACs
• That the issues of displacement and other unintended consequences of the type of blanket ban proposed for bottom trawling and deep water gill nets have been adequately assessed
• That it is reasonable to propose or adopt a new deep water species regulation prior to the publication (scheduled for later in 2012) of the conclusions of the Deepfishman scientific project which is specifically tasked to recommend harvest rules based on secondary indicators for the exploitation of deep sea species. At very best, the timing of the Proposal could be considered premature.
• That the Proposal, if adopted and implemented, would lead to a reduction of discards. Even with a 100kg de minimis threshold, given the widespread capture of some “deepwater” species such as Tusk, Ling and Conger, by a variety of fleets unconnected with deep water fisheries, the ban will result in a significant increase in discards that would be inconsistent with the Commission’s general policy objective of eliminating discards

Comment

As a matter of principle it cannot be right in any decision based on natural justice or good governance, to prohibit a particular gear, with potentially serious socio-economic consequences, without a thorough analysis of those consequences and reasonable alternative options. The Proposal contains no Impact Assessment options that are based on an approach targeted by species or a zoned approach to vulnerable ecosystem features.

The elements of an alternative precautionary, as opposed to an over- precautionary approach, would include:

• Targeted measures, both by species and vulnerable ecosystem features based on available scientific evidence,
• Protection, through appropriately precautionary TACs, for those vulnerable deep water stocks for which there are conservation concerns, underpinned by observer programmes
• Protection for vulnerable ecosystem features through well designed marine protected areas, monitored by VMS. (Extensive scientific work has been undertaken under NEAFC auspices to survey the continental slope and identify ecosystem features which require special protection through marine protected areas)

• De-politicisation of the issue and refocus of management measures on impartial and objective science. Deepwater fisheries have become a trial of strength between a cause celebre for the environmental and those whose livelihoods depend on the deepwater fisheries rather than the focus of proportionate and balanced management measures

• Using a 10% criterion to define a targeted deep sea fishery is arbitrary and disproportionate. A vessel with catch records at a particular point in time suggesting 11% of deep water species will be included but a vessel with 9% excluded. This is bound to create a series of anomalies. Not only that but the Proposal suggests that the type of licence (target or by-catch) will be granted on the basis of catch record during any of the two calendar years preceding entry into force of this regulation, whichever year provides the higher figure. This would almost certainly lead at least some vessel operators to change their activities to secure advantage.

• Articles 6 and 7 provide the basis of a reasonable and proportionate although somewhat bureaucratic approach to managing deep water fisheries. However Article 9 would lead these licences to expire after 2 years following the introduction of the Regulation. This Article shows all the signs of a poorly considered afterthought superimposed on a more reasoned and proportionate underlying approach.

• The proposed prohibition on deep water gill nets is distinctly odd. Transitional technical measures have been in place since 2006. Is there evidence that these measures are not working? Has there been any discussion about the effectiveness of these measures? We are unaware of any such discussions, which strengthens our conviction that a fundamentalist environmental agenda, devoid of any evidence base is at work within at least some parts of the Commission in the preparation of this proposal.

Delegated Acts

There may be instances when it is reasonable to delegate management responsibility to the Commission under tightly defined conditions. This is not one of those instances. In a shared stock fishery, such as this, we do not believe that according member states responsibility to act unilaterally, with loosely defined Commission powers to step in if these prove inadequate is an appropriate arrangement. Individual member states are likely to be reluctant to constrain their own vessels whilst other member state fleets continue unrestricted and handing so much unaccountable authority to the Commission would not be healthy from a good governance perspective. We believe that the regionalisation model broadly along the lines described in the Council’s ‘General Approach’ to CFP reform offers a more attractive framework for management decisions for deep sea stocks.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, we do not think that this proposal is a proportionate, reasoned or appropriate management response to the undoubted challenges of managing a fishery on deep water species on the continental slope. An alternative approach base on well-defined and targeted measures is available and should be substituted for this flawed proposal.

The separation between policy (Defra) and delivery (MMO and IFCAS), may make sense in some areas of government but in fisheries it is the source of much confusion, especially when then overlaid by devolved government and when so many of the rules are derived from Brussels.

During the meeting this was especially apparent in the items on the implementation on EU requirements for vessels between 12m and 15m to fit VMS satellite monitoring equipment, and the reasons why the UK had failed to take advantage of the exemption that is available for vessels that only do day trips or fish exclusively within territorial limits. However, quota management rules, the notification of licence variations, implementation of the concordat between the different fisheries administrations, and management measures for marine protected areas, all gave rise to similar questions about who is responsible for what. It is sometimes difficult to get a real handle on issues when responsibility seems to bounce around like a tennis ball.

Doubtless, in time, someone in the Cabinet office will decide that what is required is more integrated government (joined up government, to coin a phrase) but until then it is important to reduce the scope for confusion. It was agreed, in the meantime, that the appropriate officials from Defra policy would be invited to attend the regular NFFO/MMO meetings, hopefully increasing clarity and the usefulness of the meetings.

Issues Discussed

Apart from the vexed issue of VMS and e-logbooks, the meeting covered

• Quota Management and delays in administering international swaps
• Net tagging: A policy document explaining how a voluntary net tagging scheme could work to reduce the time taken in at- sea inspections, will be circulated shortly
• The implications of the Commission’s non-paper suggesting a TAC for Seabass
• How the MMO could strengthen communication with the industry: (The NFFO will nominate a number of respected individuals who will act as sounding boards on industry views on the MMO)
• An update on MMO’s work on managing European and domestic marine protected areas
• The failure to offer parity to over-10m non-sector vessels in leasing quota
• The division of quota between the devolved administrations, following the signing of the fisheries concordat between FAs
• The likelihood the Royal Navy will continue to hold the contract to enforce fisheries legislation at sea and the importance of quality assurance arrangements given the high turnover of personnel performing this role
• Licence Variations: confusion on whether paper variations must be carried following the advent of an electronic system: (MMO agreed to clarify the issue)

These regular meetings serve an important purpose in bringing the industry’s main issues of concern to the surface and allowing the MMO to update the industry on its own initiatives.

All but 4% of the UK’s quotas are held by producer organisations – collectives of fishermen of which most of the larger class of vessel and some of the smaller boats are members. And this, it is claimed, is why some under-10m fishermen in the South east face problems of quota shortage at some times of the year.

It’s a clear, simple, narrative that has heroes and villains. David and Goliath. And it’s essentially untrue.

The notion that the problems in ports like Hastings lies with the commoditisation of fishing rights in the form of tradable quotas and that this has led to the dispossession of small-scale fishermen by powerful economic interests who are largely anonymous, makes arresting copy but is just not the case.

The Guardian is the latest visitor to Hastings (scenic and a convenient day trip from London) and to come away with a garbled tale of dispossession and malevolent forces within the industry and Government.

But no one in Hastings apparently told the Guardian journalist John Harris that the fundamental quota problem in Hastings lies with cod, nor the fact that the essential issue lies with the UK’s share of the Eastern Channel cod quota, which is less than 10% – the balance going mainly to France. Nor has he been told that everybody in the Channel, big boat or small boat, has a problem of not enough cod quota for exactly the same reason. This is not a problem that can be changed by tinkering with the UK’s domestic management system. And where he got the idea that the under-10m fleet in Hastings is deprived of monkfish and hake quota, which they don’t even catch, goodness knows.

Setting aside the problem of Eastern Channel cod, most under-10 metre vessels don’t catch anything close to their monthly quota limits most of the time. Yes, that’s correct. Most of the small scale fleets don’t catch their quota allocations. Partly that’s because they are targeting stocks like crab, lobster and bass for which no quotas are set. But that fact does put the 4% statistic into some kind of relevant context.

That is not to deny that some under-10s are severely constrained on some quotas for some of the time. And this is a particular problem in areas like the Thames estuary where the fleets have very limited access to non-quota species.

No one believes more strongly than the NFFO that ports like Hastings should retain a strong vibrant inshore fleet. But that is not going to be achieved through misrepresentations of the causes of the problems in Hastings and the Thames ports.

There are solutions to the problems facing ports like Hastings but they will only come into place by addressing the real underlying issues that have been brought to the fore by Buyers and Sellers registration in 2007, (a move which the Guardian should note effectively ended large scale misreporting of catches in the UK).

One of the realities that have led to pressures on parts of the small scale fleets in the South east has been the expansion of the catching capacity of the under-10 metre fleet through the arrival of the super-under 10s. These vessels of 9.5 metres and abovecan out-fish many larger vessels and now catch around 70% of the under-10m pool quotas despite amounting to only 14% of the fleet. A solution that leaves the super-under-10s out of the equation will not be a solution at all.

It is also a fact that fragmented and geographically dispersed, the small scale fleets lack of collective organisation and this has left the under-10s relatively disadvantaged in using their assets (unutilised quota) to secure quotas for the stocks that they do need, in the way that producer organisations do on a daily basis.

It is part of a journalist’s job to simplify complex issues. But when simplification leads to serious distortion and misrepresentation journalists should be called to account. And those in the industry peddling those distortions or misconceptions should ask themselves what they are likely to achieve by it when the narrative falls to bits under the slightest scrutiny.

A breathing space is vital to allow time to address looming implementation problems. The Federation has asked for an urgent meeting to discuss the issue.

Dear Minister

We believe that the implementation of the EU regulation regarding VMS and e-log books has been mishandled.

We fully accept that VMS and e-logs are likely to have an important role to play in the future management of sustainable fisheries, not least in the management of marine protected areas and the reduction of discards.

I am sorry to advise however, that it is our view that the Defra/MMO implementation of the EU requirement to extend VMS to the 12m-15m fleet is seriously deficient. This is largely due to a rushed process in which detailed dialogue with industry organisations, such as the NFFO, on how to implement the EU requirements, has largely been absent.

Our main areas of concern are:

• That the UK has not taken advantage of the scope for an exemption specifically available within the EU Control Regulation for day-boats, and vessels that operate within territorial waters. This derogation, had the UK chosen to take advantage of it, would provide the time for a more orderly, phased approach to the application of new, untried and untested, technology to a section of the fleet in which the challenges are significant. Given the current Red Tape Challenge initiative we are more than a little surprised that the UK has taken the opportunity to gold plate this piece of European legislation when an eminently sensible derogation was and is available, specifically to deal with the practical issues of application which were foreseen by the Commission and Council at least.

• That clear assurances that Defra/MMO would not repeat the Government’s single supplier arrangements for over-15m vessels, which created a monopoly and exposed vessel operators to exploitative maintenance contracts, overcharging and a pitiful level of service, have been reneged on. The explanations provided so far for this volte-face have not been convincing.

• There are a number of specific technical, practical problems associated with the introduction of e-logs to the 12-15m category of vessels that require resolution, and which it would be foolhardy to ignore by pressing on regardless.

No successful fisheries management measures have ever been introduced on the basis of a rushed process where practical problems are ignored. The deadline of 1st November for 12m-15m vessels to have VMS installed will create a chaotic rush to avoid prosecution, which for those vessels falling under the EU derogation, is completely unnecessary. The UK could choose to make use of the derogation to allow for time to introduce VMS and e-logs where and when it makes sense – for example to allow access to MPAs under a zoned management regime or as part of a fully documented fishery, rather than as a blanket measure which has more than a hint of the ‘tick-box’ about it.

Against this background, we would request an urgent meeting to discuss how the new technology can be introduced to this part of the fleet on a more rational, proportionate and practical basis, without exposure to Government created monopolies.

Discussions about international conventions and apparently obscure meetings about bio-diversity and fisheries science, despite appearances, can have profound consequences for the regime under which fishing vessels have to operate years later.

Fishing vessel safety rules and the implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive are two good examples of chickens which come home to roost after many years.

It is for this reason that you will find an NFFO representative in Geneva every year or so at the International Labour Organisation meetings on fishing vessel safety. Having a fishing representative in the room with a practical understanding of fishing can save both lives and hundreds of thousands of pounds through astute interventions.

Similarly, science meetings and policy conferences can sometimes seem remote from the everyday challenges of wresting a living from the sea. But alerting fisheries scientists and policy makers to facets of fishing or fisheries management of which they are unaware can make a crucial difference between successful or unsuccessful policies further down the road. The Federation makes a judgement on the possible long term significance of all meetings and where there are likely to be industry implications we will make the effort to participate.

All this work goes alongside the more immediate, fire-fighting, part of the Federation’s work. But it is much easier to fight fires if the biggest flames have been doused years ago through judicious intervention.

NFFO Chairman, Paul Trebilcock, has voiced alarm that the Commission’s draconian proposals for deep water species, if accepted, will lead to a displacement of a fleet of large capacity vessels into areas in Western Waters such as the Celtic Sea where an ongoing recovery of demersal stocks would be jeopardised.

“The steps taken to rebalance fishing activity with available resources in the Celtic Sea have included significant fleet reductions through vessel decommissioning schemes in France, Ireland and the UK. We are starting to see the rewards in terms of higher TACs and more stability in the stocks. Effort control, with all its unpredictable and often perverse consequences, was successfully resisted in the Celtic Sea. But other measures such as the Trevose Closure and perhaps more significantly substantial fleet reductions have allowed stocks to rebuild. All this would be jeopardised if a large fleet is forced out of the deep sea fisheries by poorly thought- through blanket measures”.

The Celtic Sea is one of the areas that would bear the brunt of this displacement. It wouldn’t be the first time that we had seen damaging unintended consequences as a result of crude blanket measures. The capacity reductions in the demersal fleet would be reversed and all the good work undone”.

“The main problem seems to be in the blanket nature of the deep sea proposals. It is undeniable that slow growing deep water species and ecosystems need special protection. But instead of differentiating between those stocks and areas that can safely sustain continuing fishing activity, and those which need special protection, at 11th hour the Commission has abandoned an approach that would separate safe from harmful fishing, in favour of what amounts to a blanket ban on bottom trawling and even static netting”.

“The issue of displacement does not even seem to have appeared on the Commission’s radar and the suspicion has to be that the environment Commissioner has won the argument in the College of Commissioners, sidelining this and other critical issues in favour of a media focused approach. We have been here before. In 2009 the College of Commissioner’s concerns about how a scientifically justified TAC increase for North Sea cod would be seen by the media, led to a low TAC and the inevitable and predicted 38,000 tonnes of cod discards”.

“The danger is very real of a repeat of this kind of this kind of unintended consequence, driven by well meaning but media focussed and ultimately superficial thinking”.

The NFFO will raise this issue at the next meeting of the North West Waters RAC and directly with the Commission.

“It would be a tragedy if all the hard work in getting the Celtic Sea stocks on track was thrown away.”

It sounds inclusive; supportive. But of course nothing is surer that is the opposite – divisive, and bad news for fishing – which, when all is said and done, is a commercial activity that kills fish, and is never going to be completely compatible with environmental purity.

One cannot deny that Greenpeace are good at what they do. The production values in the You Tube video The Last Fisherman are superb. The message is clear: the small-scale fleet faces catastrophe and its imminent demise is down to one single and simple reason: the “privatisation of the quota system” and the “4% share of the UK’s quota allocated to 77% of the fleet”.

But the Greenpeace goes further than the usual problems of media oversimplification and over-generalisation.

The problem lies in the lies; and the distortions and the selective misrepresentations.

• Any suggestion that the quota problems in the small scale fisheries are mainly limited to a few under-10 metre regionally specific fisheries– the South East and the Thames Estuary – is never mentioned; the implication is that this is a generalised problem and all small-scale fishermen share the same view
• Neither is it mentioned that, outside these few pockets, the overwhelming response from the small-scale fleet to a Defra consultation last summer was to keep the current quota management arrangements
• Nowhere does Greenpeace suggest that most of the UK quotas are caught in areas out of reach of inshore vessels, so the 4%/77% statistic is meaningless, except for its propaganda value
• No one would guess from the Greenpeace propaganda that 70% of the under-10 metre quota is caught by only 14% of the under-10m fleet and that many of the “super under-10s” can out-fish many over-10s in terms of sheer fishing capacity – the development of this part of the fleet is a fundamental reason why parts of the under-10m fleet faces problems today; Greenpeace relies on a simplistic good/bad dichotomy like cowboys with white and black hats.
• It is never mentioned that the main problem in the Eastern Channel has nothing to do with the UK domestic quota system but lies with the relative quota share of cod between France and the UK; if every tonne of UK cod quota was allocated to the under-10m fleet there would still be a quota shortage; is it honest to suppress that fact?
• Or to fail to mention that in many parts of the coast non-quota species make up the bulk of the catch and earnings of the small scale fleet
• Or that that the largest part of the small scale fleet catches high-value shellfish

And what has all this got to do with CFP reform anyway? If the problem (they say) is the UK quota system, CFP reform is rather beside the point, is it not? – other than as a media opportunity.

In fact the NFFO has tried to explain that the reasons underlying the problems facing some of the under-10m fleet are multi-layered and require more than divisive slogans to fix them. What is certain is that Greenpeace’s “problems” and “solutions” are beside the point.

Environmental Impact

We would be amongst the first to say that fishing does have an environmental impact and that the regulatory regime has been a shambles for the last two decades.

But we would also say that contrary to the current hysterical media stereotype, by comparison with other forms of food production, fishing is a relatively low impact economic activity. Furthermore, a fair audit of the progress that has been made by the UK fishing industry over the last decade in the areas of compliance, overcapacity, collaboration with fisheries scientists, and discard reduction, suggests that this is an industry striving valiantly to meet changing societal demands on the conditions under which fish should be caught.

Nutfa, for its own reasons, has hitched its wagon to the Greenpeace train. We are surprised and anxious because it adds a new level of separation between those who advocate division and those who think that the industry should sit down together and agree a way forward on undoubtedly complex issues.

We work on a weekly basis with other environmental NGOs with never a sighting of a Greenpeace type. When the media spotlight moves on so will Greenpeace and the industry will have to pick up the pieces of its divisive campaign.

The critical qualifying criteria will be that such increases are without prejudice to the Commission’s fishing mortality targets.

This clarification of a radical change in policy direction emerged at a recent meeting between the Commission and the Northwest Waters RAC to discuss the future of effort control and the RAC’s work towards a decisive change to the cod management regime in the Irish Sea and West of Scotland.

The RAC presented its recently agreed policy paper Breaking the Cycle of Decline which outlines an approach that, if adopted, would:

• See TACs aligned with current level of catches rather than landings (currently 92% of the cod caught in the West of Scotland are discarded)
• Remove effort control as a measure that has patently failed to achieve its objectives
• Replace low TACs and effort constraints with a customised system of fully documented fisheries based on reference fleets
• Rebuild the stock assessments to obtain an accurate picture of stock developments in the Irish Sea and West of Scotland

During the course of the meeting it was clear that the Commission was ready to countenance dramatic increases in TACs as part of its preparation for the discard ban foreseen in its CFP reform proposals. However, achieving fishing mortality targets would remain the guiding principle. In other words TAC increases would only be proposed if the final TAC is neutral in terms of the overall proportion of the stock caught.

This approach would be a radical change of direction from the policy of ongoing annual TAC reductions underpinned by effort reductions. STECF’s evaluation of the EU Cod Management Plan last year cast doubt on whether this was an effective approach to rebuilding the cod stocks in the Irish Sea and West of Scotland . It would also create a new incentive for a much greater level of cooperation between the fishing industry, fisheries managers and ICES scientists.

The essence of the new approach would be that more accurate catch information (landings plus discards) would be reflected in higher TACs. At present the system operates in the opposite direction: weak assessments lead to the application of a higher degree of precaution, which in turn lead to lower TACs, which lead to a higher proportion of discards. This is the cycle of decline that the NWWRAC aims to break with its new approach.

The NFFO has played a central part in drafting the RAC position paper as part of a NWWRAC focus group, meeting with stock assessment scientists in Dublin. The next steps for the RAC will be to flesh out the proposal by working with ICES scientists to provide simulations on TACs based on catch rather than landings. The development of a form of fully documented fisheries that would allow the industry to demonstrate total catches with confidence is an equally important part of the approach. The RAC made clear that CCTV cameras are not the appropriate form of verification for all fleets but that alternatives, possibly in the form of reference fleets with rotating observers aboard a small sample of the fleet, with cross-checked catch compositions may provide the way forward.

The Commission has requested that the European Fisheries Control Agency elaborate how such a system could work.

What is certain is that more than a decade of cod recovery measures based on quota and effort reductions have not worked. A radically different approach is required.

The Irish Sea and West of Scotland demersal fisheries demonstrate some important similarities but they are also different in important ways. What they share is that that the failure of management measures has gone hand in hand with a failure of the stock assessment process. Fixing both is at the heart of the RACs proposals.

In its place it has proposed a mandatory system of transferable fishing concessions which it believes would solve any overcapacity issues in the European fleet by facilitating trade in quota; the theory being that any fleet overcapacity will disappear over time as more active, economically stronger vessel operators buy the quota of less active vessels.

At face value, the Commission and the Court of Auditors have a point. Something like a billion Euros has been spent on subsidised fishing vessel scraping schemes – but fleet overcapacity remains a stubborn problem in some fisheries.

However, there is a problem with this picture and it has its roots in the familiar CFP problem of over-generalisation: a blanket view of the problem, with blanket analysis, leading inexorably to blanket solutions, which generally fail.

Decommissioning

If the focus is moved from the broad European level, to the level of specific fisheries, a different conclusion emerges both from the perspective of stock conservation and from the viewpoint of strengthening the economic resilience of the individual units in the fishery.

It is doubtful whether the current progressive rebuilding of the North Sea cod stocks year-on year would now be underway without the large-scale fleet decommissioning schemes by the UK (both England and Scotland) and Denmark. (After all, the underlying problem of depleted cod stocks in the North Sea arose from the dramatic expansion of the fleet on the back of the gadoid outburst in the early 1980s, leaving a capacity overhang as the period of high recruitment passed; this was supercharged by European and domestic construction subsidies). Similarly, the meteoric rise of the North Sea plaice stocks would have been inconceivable without the large scale decommissioning of significant parts of the Dutch and Belgian beam trawl fleets. And the recovery of the Celtic Sea demersal stocks is not wholly unrelated to the significant decommissioning by the French, Irish and the UK.

In each of these cases the turning point in stock development has been the intervention by government with a well designed and targeted decommissioning scheme. The qualifying clause ‘well designed’ is crucial. It is not difficult to squander government money on a poorly thought through decommissioning scheme and there have been plenty of examples over the years. But it is to throw the baby out with the bathwater to reject publicly funded decommissioning in principle because some schemes have been poorly designed and implemented. Contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy, we assert that both from a stock conservation perspective and re-establishing healthy fleet economics, decommissioning has been amongst the few instruments that have actually worked and made a decisive difference.

Money

And then of course there is the money. It is undeniable that in these straitened times governments do not have access to the same level of funds for decommissioning.

On the other hand, (well designed) decommissioning schemes work and the evidence is reasonably clear that many other conservation measures, effort restrictions for example, don’t. A fair economic comparison of the effectiveness of the value for money of different measures would have to take into account the cost of management failures over many years with instruments such as effort control, and mesh size increases undermined by the perverse incentives created by the effort regime. The costs of these ongoing failures would have to be compared to the cost of a decisive strategic intervention through decommissioning. Stumbling on, year after year, with failed or only partially successful policies costs an ongoing fortune and accounts for the fact that in some member states we have reached the bizarre situation in which the cost of managing fisheries outstrips the revenue generated by those fisheries. A well timed decommissioning scheme putting a fishery on the path to recovery may well save a fortune in the medium to long term. But finding the money in the short term is certainly a challenge, not about to be made any easier if the the Commission’s proposal to removing scrapping support from the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund is accepted.

A further value-for-money criticism of publicly funded decommissioning rests on the observation that some vessel operators who have scrapped their vessel and surrendered their licence chose to remain in the industry by buying a licence from an existing vessel and attaching it to a new boat. This certainly could be a problem if there was no cap on licences but in a sealed licensing system (such as ours) one less vessel and one less licence matters, irrespective of who owns it. Again this is a question of scale. The evidence suggests that at the level of fishery rather than individual vessel, or a broad European canvass, decommissioning can make a decisive and positive difference.

Then there is the argument why public money should be used to right-size a fleet made up of private interests?

The answer lies, firstly, in the fact that it has principally been a failure of public policy that led to various stock declines; and, secondly, when it is accepted that civil society has the right to determine the conditions under which fish are caught, it is right that civil society shares some of the costs of achieving those objectives.

Transferable Fishing Concessions

The most salient point about a European system of mandatory transferable fishing concessions is that it will not happen. Member states have made it plain that there is no desire to move in the opposite direction to the rest of CFP reform towards some form of decentralisation, to a system of European quota controls, when this is already a member state competence applied in a wide variety of forms.

Leaving aside the fact that the Commission’s view of TFCs as a panacea for fleet overcapacity always had something of the desperate and unrealistic about it, even a mandatory obligation to apply TFCs at member state level is misconceived. TFCs have proven merits in some fisheries but equally, pool systems have a number of advantages that are evident where there is a need to frequently change target species to meet changing resource or market circumstances. A blanket mandatory system would repeat the problems of inflexibility that is the central problem in many other parts of the CFP.

In any event, there must be some scepticism about whether TFCs would be the panacea for overcapacity that their promoters claim. They certainly can assist with adjusting fleet capacity to match available quota but it is noteworthy that in those member states that have something approximating TFCs – Netherlands, Denmark and the UK – the introduction of TFCs have been accompanied or preceded by large-scale publicly decommissioning schemes. Similarly the establishment of the New Zealand system of Individual Transferable Quotas was accompanies by significant amounts of public expenditure in its early stages.

Policy vacuum

Having put all of its eggs in the TFC basket and having that basket dropped by the member states, the Commission has a policy vacuum on its hands. Depending on TFCs and proposing to remove scrapping subsidies from the new European Maritime Fisheries Fund, and having previously been through failed multiannual guidance programmes I to IV, the CFP no longer appears to have a credible means of dealing with fleet overcapacity where it exists.

Discard Ban

One possible way of circumventing the Commission’s policy impasse on overcapacity would be to put in place management arrangements that ensure that capacity is removed as an issue. This might be an option for some fisheries where there is confidence that all landings are recorded, discards are minimal, and quotas are allocated at individual vessel level. In these fisheries, whether the vessel operator catches his or her quotas with one large vessel, or ten small vessels, or a modern or obsolete vessel, is immaterial from a public policy perspective. As long as all catches are taken into account and are within the target fishing mortalities, these decisions can safely be left to the individual operators.

Against the background of CFP reform moving towards a discard ban and fully documented fisheries, in one form or other, the likelihood is that this will be a solution for an increasing number of fisheries. In these circumstances the capacity of the fleets disappears as issue of concern for fisheries managers.

Technical Creep

And then there is the problem of technical creep – the relentless onward advance of technological developments in fishing which in aggregate lead to an increase in the effective fishing power of the fleets.

But technology can work in two ways. Improved gear selectivity based on the application of research and technology has led to the development of square mesh panels, selectivity grids and other environmentally friendly fishing gear. GPS plotter trackers and net monitoring equipment have led, not just to increased catches, but also to more intelligent fishing, including underpinning cod avoidance strategies. The challenge lies in continuing to applying technology to the pursuit of intelligent fishing. The biggest technological changes in recent years have been the introduction of VMS satellite monitoring, electronic logbooks and CCTV cameras – all linked to the achievement of sustainable fishing.

Technological development is not therefore a one way street; it is already helping to manage stocks more effectively, protect the marine environment more thoroughly, and catch fish more intelligently as well as more efficiently.

Does Fleet Overcapacity Matter? Yes and No

Perhaps a bit late in the day but it is worth asking the question: does fleet overcapacity matter?

The tired rhetoric about too many boats chasing too few fish is no longer helpful, if it ever was.

The answer is that it depends how you define overcapacity. We would suggest that overcapacity should be judged against three criteria:

1. Technical capacity: the capacity to catch considerably more fish that the quotas that are available
2. Compliance: whether there is a significant misreporting problem in a fishery
3. Economics: whether there is chronic lack of profitability in a fleet sector

Applying these criteria to for example the UK pelagic fleet it is possible to say that it has the technical capacity to catch many times its quotas; however it is compliant, as the once considerable black fish problem has been eradicated, and it is highly profitable. Pelagic fishing vessels can be equated to an expensive combine harvester taken out of its shed at certain times of the year at the right season, to harvest the mackerel or herring shoals. There is no overcapacity problem in the pelagic fishery so long as the fishery continues (leaving international fishing politics aside) to be well managed primarily through restrictive licensing policy.

By contrast, parts of the under-10m fleet, since the introduction of buyers and sellers registration have faced technical overcapacity, compliance issues and a chronic lack of profitability. Amongst the different layers of the problems facing the under-10s there is an undoubted overcapacity problem, at least amongst the 14% of the under-10s which catch 70% of the under-10 pool quotas; and it is difficult to see how the issue can be resolved without a publicly funded decommissioning scheme as at least part of the package of measures.

All this suggests that the public policy approach to overcapacity requires:

1. A fishery by fishery approach which identifies where fleet overcapacity presents a problem
2. The use of the three criteria: technical, compliance and profitability to define and identify fleet overcapacity
3. The judicious and targeted use of publicly funded and well designed decommission schemes where appropriate
4. The use of transferable quotas by member states within a system of safeguard where appropriate
5. A European Maritime and Fisheries Fund that supports and facilitates this approach by making decommissioning funds available
6. Steady but careful progress towards a management regime that removes overcapacity as a public policy issue for those fisheries where individual vessel allocations and fully documented fisheries apply.

Conclusions

Overcapacity has been a central issue for the CFP during its much of its life. Where there has been a problem of endemic fleet over-capacity, compliance and adequate profitability have been difficult to achieve, and the short term losses associated with many conservation initiatives difficult to accept.

The evidence at fishery level suggests that well designed decommissioning schemes can break this spiral of decline.

The current orthodoxy which sees decommissioning as a waste of tax payers money are focussed at either the broad European level or the level of the individual vessel. A focus at the fishery level leads to radically different conclusions.

Many of the reform proposals currently under discussion are aimed at bringing a greater degree of flexibility into CFP decision-making so that decisions on issues such as appropriate mesh and twine sizes are no longer made in Brussels, as part of large package deals.

The bad news is that, unless matters change, things are about to get much worse. We are heading for a legislative logjam that will grip fisheries in a policy gridlock, preventing us from moving forward and out of the morass that the CFP has become.

Management Plans

It is broadly agreed that a move to long term management plans (preferred by some to be known as multiannual management plans) offer big advantages. Moving progressively under agreed provisions towards an objective takes much of the heat out of TAC decisions, allows the industry to plan its operations and brings some stability.

However, a huge dispute has arisen between European institutions over who has competence to make TAC decisions within the context of a long term management plans. The European Parliament, which was granted co-decision powers under the Lisbon Treaty, insists that it now has co-responsibility for LTMPs and any TAC and quota decisions within them. The Council of Ministers and the Commission on the dispute this, pointing to the explicit exemption for annual TAC decisions from co-decision.

The dispute over which European institution has legislative competence in this area has already held up agreement on a number of LTMPs and unless it can be resolved quickly, shows every sign of heading for the European Court in Luxemburg. That could take years.

For many of the NFFO’s members, this dispute carries serious and immediate implications in the form of the EU Cod Management Plan. This Plan has been evaluated by the Commission’s Scientific, Technical, Economic Committee for Fisheries and found to be seriously flawed. In addition, all affected member states have made clear that the pre-programmed stepped reductions in fishing effort that are at the heart of the plan, are its biggest problem. In normal circumstances one would therefore have expected the Plan to be reviewed and revised at the earliest opportunity – last December, or this autumn, at the latest. The dispute between the European institutions has however brought things to a halt. The Cod Plan doesn’t work but unless the competence issue is resolved we could be stuck with it for some years.

This has immediate consequences. Unless interim arrangements can be put in place, the demersal fleets in the North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland face further reductions in days at sea next year, against all the evidence that effort reductions of themselves contribute much to reducing fishing mortality and a mountain of evidence that they are causing serious economic stress. The Commission is said to be working on a proposal, to be unveiled later this summer, on interim measures but it is far from clear what this will contain – tinkering with relatively minor elements of the Plan – or real relief from the automatic cuts. The obstacles to an effort freeze are no longer based on conservation arguments – the notion that reductions in effort lead to anything like proportional reductions in fishing mortality has been blown out of the water by STECF; the problems in moving forward out of this mess are primarily related to the dispute about co-decision and respective competence.

Technical Conservation Rules

Another part of the policy logjam lies with the technical conservation rules. The current regulation (EU 850/98) is not fit for purpose and has not been fit for purpose since the day in came into force. Patched up with amendment after amendment, its catch composition rules are one of the drivers of legislative discards. One attempt to revise the rules has already been abandoned by the Commission, and member states had to prevent the Commission rushing an ill-digested Proposal through in 2010 to beat the arrival of co-decision. It is now clear that we are stuck with the current complex, inconsistent, counterproductive set of technical rules until the shape of the CFP reform is decided – 2014 at the earliest.

It is significant that major changes to the technical conservation rules will be required if an obligation to land all named regulated species – in effect a discard ban – is to be deliverable.

Regional Management

The policy logjam spells out in the clearest terms why it is necessary for CFP reform to provide scope and empowerment for decisions on the content of long term management plans and technical measures to be made at the regional level, with oversight but minimal involvement in the detail by the European institutions.

It requires a degree of optimism to believe that the Commission will later this summer propose an effort freeze and other improving adjustments to the Cod Plan as part of an interim package; and that the Parliament, recognising the implications for fish and the fishing industry, will fast track these stop-gap measures pending the development of a new long term plan.

Optimism is also required to believe that the impasse between the Council and Parliament on LTMPs will be resolved quickly through dialogue and that the CFP reform will deliver genuine scope for regional decision-making in fisheries, even if the legislative route to give those decisions the force of law is still through the European institutions.

But if that optimism is misplaced the policy gridlock will be a nightmare to deal with.

The absence of a register of quota holdings is allowing bizarre speculation to run riot and to feed lazy journalists and those prone to conspiracy theories, in their unhealthy pursuits.

Manchester United, ‘quota barons’, Terry Wogan and who knows who else, have been implicated in what one overexcited legal commentator described as the ‘biggest property grab since the Norman Conquest’. This level of distortion and misrepresentation can only exist if there is no way of providing a definitive answer to the question, ‘So who does own UK fishing quotas?’

It is pretty certain that the truth about the pattern of quota ownership in the UK is going to be quite a bit less exciting that the press speculation has suggested.

It is doubtful whether there will be many surprises when full transparency is brought to bear on FQA holdings. For the most part, the individuals and groups which hold quota are likely to be the individuals and groups whose vessels fish those quotas – and whose allocations are mainly based on historical rights. Quota trading (in the form of sale of FQAs ) has in the UK become an important means of bringing quota to where it is required but the amount of quota trading is still likely to be at the margin – well under 10% annually is our best guess.

It is also worth bearing in mind that, with few exceptions, quota in the UK is managed through formally recognised producer organisations (which are owned and controlled by fishermen and vessel operators), or through government set limits, in line with pre-agreed rules.

But until the FQA register is published, there is nothing to stop even wilder speculation. Greenpeace, the Sultan of Brunei, Tesco, David Beckham – why not?

Once we have a register we can have a calm consideration, as part of a proper review of the quota management system, of what safeguards against over-concentration might be appropriate and how to balance quota security with flexibility to trade.

The dangers in this debate tend to lie at the extremes – with those (like the European Commission) who see quota trading as a panacea for fleet overcapacity, or those at the other end of the spectrum, who believe that trade in quota in any circumstances will lead directly to monopoly by outside interests.

The evolution of system of transferable and tradable quotas, linked to a system of devolved responsibility to producer organisations, from a more rigid system of centralised control, has in fact, brought undoubted advantages to the UK, for example in the ability to plan the fishing year and bringing quota to where it is needed. At the same time, a pool system of monthly allocations carries other advantages, notably the ability to change target species with relative ease. It is no accident therefore that some POs mix annual vessel allocations based on FQAs for some species with a pool system for others; and that the Government’s consultation last summer revealed that most under-10m fishermen are wedded to the flexibility that a pool system provides. All this suggests that the best quota system is one which provides maximum flexibility for regional and sectoral variation, within a framework of well thought through safeguards.

Perhaps this is all too complex for papers like the Sunday Times to grasp. It is journalists’ job to dramatise and simplify but when reporting and comment slips into a world of black and white and pantomime villains it is time for the industry itself to call for a halt,

A quota register is unlikely to completely end this type of misrepresentation but it would remove some of the scope for wilder, evidence free, assertions being made.

*Fixed Quota Allocation – an entitlement to a share of UK quota of a given species in a given area

To date the Commission’s public statements have focused on achieving MSY by 2015 in absolute terms, with no real acknowledgement of the real obstacles and practical difficulties of applying such an approach in mixed fisheries. Fisheries scientists however, have repeatedly pointed to the fact that MSY was developed as a management idea in relation to single stock fisheries and faces serious limitations when applied to mixed fisheries.

At a recent consultative meeting in Brussels, attended by the NFFO, the Commission indicated that it recognised the mixed fishery issues and would be pursuing a ‘proportionate and intelligent’ solution. At its most blunt an MSY approach could trip up over choke stocks, (relatively minor species caught as by-catch which, in a rigid set of arrangements, could close mixed fisheries down with serious socio-economic consequences).

A ‘proportionate and intelligent’ approach to MSY in mixed fisheries would find ways of providing protection for vulnerable stocks whilst avoiding a blunt lowest common denominator approach. Such an approach would find support with the industry in the identification of measures such as avoidance plans whilst avoiding disproportionate closures.

All vessel sizes, types of fishing and areas are represented on the Executive Committee, giving its consensus views a unique authority.

The Executive:

• Received a report on the outcome of the Council of Minister’s recent agreement on CFP Reform. The Executive agreed to accept an invitation to meet with the Defra Fisheries Director in the near future to discuss the both the content of the Council’s ‘General Approach’ to CFP reform and to plan the next stages including engagement with the European Parliament,
• Discussed the Minister’s positive reception the Federation’s constructive ideas for resolving the quota problems facing parts of the under-10m fleet. It was agreed to seek a further meeting at official level to progress these initiatives, given the stalemate that seemed to have developed.
• Agreed to seek an urgent meeting with Defra officials to clarify the implications for different parts of the industry of the concordat between Defra and the devolved administrations
• Resolved to prepare a careful and detailed rebuttal of the deliberate misrepresentations of the fishing industry contained in recent Sunday Times articles; to summit a parallel complaint to the Press Complaints Commission
• Agreed to continue to work with STECF, the North Sea and North West Waters RACs, Defra and in the context of EU Norway negotiations for a more flexible and effective approach to rebuilding the cod stocks through a multi-species management plan
• Received an update on the Federation’s work on the Irish Sea and North Sea on more selective gear in the nephrops fisheries to meet UK commitments made at the December Council
• Agreed to participate in Defra working group on the practical application of a discard ban and new approaches to fishing gear selectivity
• Agreed that the success or otherwise of an EU discard ban would be entirely contingent on the coherence of the condition as and accompanying measures such as TAC increase, catch composition rules etc
• Agree to prepare the Federation’s position on the Commission’s Policy Statement on its approach to setting TACs in 2013, with particular reference to an improved approach to data-poor stocks, opposing functional unit TACs for nephrops, a cautious approach to extending TACs to new stocks.
• Prepared for the next NFFO meeting with the Marine Management Organisation, provisionally scheduled for 7th August; approved a strong letter objecting to a single supplier monopoly for VMS equipment for under-15m vessel
• Agreed to accept an offer from Defra to discuss the way forward on stalled shellfish policy at senior official level
• Agreed to continue to support the MPA Fishing Coalition by providing a secretariat and policy guidance
• Continue to work for an acceptable, balanced and evidenced approach to management measures in the Dogger Bank Special Area of Conservation, not least because of the precedent for other European Marine Sites
• Agreed to investigate the possibility of a grant application for bulk purchase of personal flotation devices for NFFO members
• Agreed to notify members that under incoming legislation engaging a single crew member under an employment contract (as opposed to share arrangements) means that the whole vessel will be subject to various rafts of employment legislation from which share fishing vessels are currently exempt
• Agreed to again raise the anomaly through which non-sector vessels are prohibited from leasing additional quota
• Agreed to circulate an easily accessible booklet on fishermen’s health

Dale Rodmell, a spokesperson for the Coalition said: “This is a welcome recognition of what the legislation allows for and follows a sustained campaign of the Coalition to shine a light on the legal logic underpinning MCZs designated under the Marine and Coastal Access Act.”

Official guidance from Natural England and JNCC, as well as Defra had previously indicated that all fishing would be automatically banned in such areas. This acknowledgement puts such requirements in clear doubt.

The Coalition is calling for such areas, identified as controls to compare ecology with other MCZ sites, to be scrapped as part of the network of MCZs.

He continued: “Such areas were identified in haste with minimal knowledge of what was actually located in the areas; more akin to a pin the tail on the donkey approach to Marine Protected Area (MPA) planning.”

“Planning for MPA marine science needs to be far more carefully thought through, drawing on a sufficient evidence base and giving careful consideration to finding synergies with existing human uses.”

“For all of the touted stakeholder led approach to planning English MCZs, this aspect has been especially controversial, conducted under a camouflaged, top-down manner that charged stakeholder groups at last minute to identify a set quota of sufficiently sized sites. At best it was controversial; at worst it amounted to coaxing members of the public, many who had no direct interest in the areas, to do the bidding for an iron fist approach,” he said.

Welsh MCZs

The same legal requirements of the Act also apply to the Welsh MCZs that are proposed as no take zones, of which there are 10 options currently subject to public consultation.

Following a selection process conducted behind government closed doors, these options have raised considerable irk among a whole section of interests, as well as the fishing industry, in response to the prospect of banning the majority of activities in sites that overwhelmingly are near-shore, extending seawards from the coastline.

“It is difficult to see how such proposals can remain viable in their current form against the backdrop of the legal requirements of the Act”, Dale Rodmell said.

Even the best NGOs – those who work with the industry on the regional advisory committees – succumbed to a formulaic response that could have been prepared 12 months ago, for all the relevance it had to the issues discussed and agreed in Luxembourg. For the fishing industry, this ritual demand of ‘further, faster’ whatever measures are adopted, has become more than a little frustrating.

Whilst the industry and fisheries managers struggle to deal with the complex practical issues involved in reducing discards and rebuilding stocks in mixed fisheries, the NGOs’ repetition of the further, faster, refrain to journalists, from their comfortable offices, is at best unhelpful. Some NGOs know perfectly well that a great deal of progress has already been made in reducing discards. They also know that whilst fisheries scientists acknowledge MSY may be a legitimate political aspiration (when suitably qualified) they also consider that it is a poor, indeed impossible, guide to practical fisheries management. All this is known but suppressed by the NGOs in the service of a punchy sound-bite that portrays fishermen as rapacious pantomime villains and ministers as hapless dupes of the all-powerful fishing lobby.

We have become used to the reduction of complex issues to these kinds of stereotypes; it happens each December when ministers set Total Allowable Catches for the coming year. It is neither accurate, fair, or truthful.

The fishing industry has had to mature and acknowledge that civil society has a legitimate say in determining the conditions under which fish are caught, landed and sold. It is now time for a new equivalent maturity and sense of responsibility in the NGOs’ public statements. Bellowing Further! Faster! and urging politicians to adopt more rigid rules and shorter timetables for implementation is part of the old discredited CFP that most of us want to now move beyond. Indeed this approach is a substantial part of the reason that so many CFP measures have failed to deliver in the past.

This document will form the basis of a negotiation position when a trialogue opens with the European Parliament and the European Commission, beginning this autumn and possibly extending over the next 12 months.

The conclusions of this important meeting should therefore best be regarded as an important staging post on the way to reform of the Common Fisheries Policy.

An NFFO delegation travelled to Luxembourg for the talks and met before during and after the Council with the UK Fisheries Minister, Richard Benyon, and his officials to ensure that the industry’s views were taken into account.

Regionalisation

The General Approach takes a significant step towards regionalisation of the CFP, now widely regarded as a necessary precondition for responsive and effective management of European fisheries. All of the UK’s proposals in this respect have been picked up and it is fair to say that the UK has driven this aspect of the reform forward, although with substantial support from other member states at various stages.

The new provisions, if adopted, would allow member states which hold fishing rights for a particular regional sea (e.g. North Sea, Irish Sea, Celtic Sea, Channel) to work together on management arrangements; and where there is agreement, the Commission will adopt those measures using its delegated or implementing powers, without adding its own layer of control. This ought to provide a substantial degree of empowerment of Member States at regional level. The big issue now is whether the European Parliament will be able to resist the temptation to micro-manage fisheries rather than leaving it to the member states working with the advisory committees at regional level.

Discard Ban

The Council adopted the principle of an obligation for fishing vessels to land their whole catch of named regulated species, with a phase out of discards beginning with the pelagic fisheries on 2014 and the others over the period 2015 -2018, starting with lead species. This dramatic and media focused headline begs a number of important questions about how it could be achieved at the practical level, given that there are different reasons for discards including a number of EU fisheries regulations, low or no consumer demand, or insufficiently selective fishing gear.

In an agreed Statement a rather loose form of words has been agreed that commits the Commission to review those CFP regulations that generate discards in order to make the landings requirement workable. This review will apparently include the removal of effort control, changes to the technical conservation rules (including the catch composition rules) and various control rules. It also provides for the increase of TACs subject to scientific advice. These are important preconditions if a landings requirement for named regulated species is going to be deliverable.

Maximum Sustainable Yield

The concept of maximum sustainable yield is perhaps useful as a political aspiration but impractical as a guide to day-to-day fisheries management. It was important therefore that the Council adopted an approach to maximum sustainable that allows sufficient flexibility to deal with the realities of mixed and multi-species fisheries. A workable solution that covers MSY in mixed fisheries appears to have been agreed. In particular, alternative conservation measures that would deal with the problem of ‘choke’ stocks within a management plan seem to have been catered for.

Adoption

Most of the main fishing member states agreed to the final text, with the exception of Netherlands, whose Parliament intervened to ensure that its incoming government’s hands were not tied in the future. France did so after getting the Prime Minister out of bed to approve the deal. Sweden opposed the deal on the grounds that it is not green enough. Greece, Malta and a few other member states also opposed for their own reasons.

All of the above will require careful checking against the final text when it becomes available and the Federation will be meeting with Defra officials in the next few weeks to discuss the Council Proposal and the next steps in the reform process.

At a recent meeting, in the NFFO’s offices in York, a NSRAC focus group reviewed progress made to date and discussed next steps. To date, the North Sea RAC has:

• Developed a draft Long Term Management Plan for nephrops
• Discussed the details of the draft plan with fishing vessel operators in the main nephrops ports: North Shields, Pittenweem, Fraserburgh and Eyemouth
• Instigated a research project at the University of Newcastle on options for managing the nephrops fishery at Functional Unit level , focussing on the Farne Deeps , which has shown signs of stress by comparison with other functional units

The Focus Group agreed that considerable progress had been made so far, especially considering that this is ground breaking work which amounts to a serious effort to deliver comprehensive, bottom-up advice on a plan that would move us away from a poorly thought-through, often incoherent, short-term management decisions.

Nevertheless, there are a number of outstanding challenges:

• There is a problem of consistency and overlap with other fisheries plans; noticeably in this case with the EU Cod Management Plan
• To one degree or another, the nephrops fishery is a multi-gear fishery, a mixed fishery, affected by a range of multi-species issues. Scientific advice and management strategies to deal with mixed fishery and multi-species dimensions is still being developed; the challenge for the RAC is how to deal with this emerging perspective
• Dealing with ICES advice that nephrops should be managed at the functional level
• Developing a credible plan that takes functional unit management fully into account without tying the industry into a bureaucratic system of functional unit TACs

At the core of the NSRAC’s approach to functional unit management is the question of how to strike a balance between, on the one hand, administrative flexibility for vessels to move their fishing activity to different functional units with, on the other hand, providing adequate protection for those functional units showing signs of stress. Within this approach, the challenge is to identify concrete measures that would provide adequate protection at FU level but which would be broadly acceptable across the nephrops industry. The series of port meetings, and now the report from Newcastle University, underlined the range of views within the nephrops fleet on this issue. In general, local vessels want restrictions to prevent a recurrence of the kind of surge in activity in the Farne Deeps FU, that saw catches surge in 2006 from 2500 tonnes to something closer to 4500 tonnes. On the other hand, more nomadic fleets wish to maintain access, to all nephrops fishing grounds, even if that access to some areas is made conditional on supplementary measures.

The meeting considered that a menu approach might work, if different measures with broadly equivalent effect could be agreed; these would apply vessels fishing in the FU showing signs of stress, until it has recovered. For example, a visiting vessel wishing to fish in the Farne Deeps would select a condition that it could live with. These could be:

• Gear restrictions
• Additional quota constraints applied through POs (an ‘of which’ quota)
• Seasonal or time restrictions
• Other measures

It was agreed that the FU area could be zoned so that, for example, additional conditions could only apply inside 9 miles.

The aim is to maintain access to all FU areas for all vessels but to dissuade visiting vessels from over-exploiting the local grounds by raising the ‘price’ of entry, at least on a temporary basis. The choice of which condition would apply would lie with the vessel, within an overall framework.

The Group conceded that this is all new territory but that it is important to investigate new ways of managing the nephrops fishery in ways that avoid blunter, top-down, approaches such functional unit TACs or effort control, both of which carry significant disadvantages.

The Group has been encouraged by the example of the Porcupine Bank functional units in North Western waters, where a RAC proposal for a seasonal/area proposal seems to have stabilised the fishery without applying FU TACs.

The Farne Deeps has necessarily been the focus of this discussion in the North Sea, as it is the functional unit facing immediate stresses; but the Group suggested that it should begin work on parallel arrangements for the Fladden grounds to safeguard the most economically significant nephrops fishery in the North Sea. The immediate task will be to strengthen the knowledge base on the Fladdens as the basis of a further dialogue with the vessel operators on the specific measures. The measures would be held in preparation should the science suggest signs of stress on the Fladdens. Thankfully, at present the science suggests that the stocks are and the fishery are both stable.

The nephrops management plan is clearly important in its own right and there is a certain impatience to submit a plan sooner rather than later, if only to dissuade the Commission from proposing functional unit TACs. This work however has a wider significance as a possible template for stakeholder led long term management plans that embrace biological, economic and environmental dimensions.

The progress made will be reported to the Commission and also to the NSRAC Executive Committee which will decide on how this work will be taken forward.

Even the BBC has succumbed to a facile heroes and villains script which pits a crusading European Commission, aided by selfless environmentalists, against an unholy alliance of a rapacious fishing industry, supported by complicit or spineless ministers from those member states with fishing interests. The Commission’s proposals, according to this script, represent the pinnacle of environmental virtue. Anyone opposing the Commission’s drive towards mandatory obligation for all stocks to be fished at MSY, a ban on discards or tradable fishing quotas is either, craven, tainted, or wrongheaded.

The truth lies elsewhere.

Maximum sustainable yield may be a noble political aspiration but all fisheries scientists know that it is a flawed and limited concept when applied to the complex realities of multi-species fisheries. Fisheries managers would be foolish indeed to tie their hands to biomass levels that may be affected by many other factors than fishing. That is why the two simple but critically important words “where possible” were included in the Johannesburg agreement and should be retained now.

A system of mandatory EU transferable fishing concessions will be rejected by member states because it is exactly this type of inflexible top-down command and control approach to managing fisheries that lies at the heart of the CFP’s underperformance over the last 20 years. In any event, the evidence is far from convincing that transferable quotas lead, on their own, to fleet reductions. The most obvious European examples of TFCs have been preceded or accompanied by large scale vessel scrapping schemes using public money so it is difficult to see what caused what.

And calls for a discard ban that ignore the different reasons for discards including the EU’s own fisheries regulations, and therefore the need for a range of different solutions, amount to so much saloon bar bluster. Real progress has been made in reducing discards and the focus should be on maintaining this momentum rather an approach that is 98% PR gesture.

The story that you are not likely to read or hear about in the media is that, despite the hostile press, fishermen are working on a daily basis with fisheries scientists and fisheries managers, within a seriously dysfunctional system, to improve fishing gear and fishing systems. Neither are you likely to hear about the huge progress that has been made over that past 10 years to rebuild depleted stocks, or that many stocks are at or close to their maximum yield.

It is possible to turn the simplistic pantomime villain theme on its head by observing that the CFP’s calamitous record on resource policies, until the very recent past, has been intimately tied in to the Commission’s unswerving commitment to a top-down command and control approach, which is continued in these three aspects of the reform package.

And whilst the fishing industry is well experienced in working collaboratively with environmental NGOs in the RACs, the interventions of the Pew Foundation, an organisation brought into existence in the 1930s to oppose Roosevelt’s New Deal and export American values, has been to cheer on this failed approach.

Regionalisation of the Common Fisheries Policy has moved centre stage since the NFFO (amongst others) advocated it, over a decade ago, as a counterbalance to the crippling over-centralisation of the CFP. Voices from all quarters can now be heard arguing that a strong regional dimension to the CFP would ensure that management measures could be tailored to the characteristics of specific fleets and fisheries.

Realizing this concept and translating it into a practical set of arrangements that are consistent with the Treaty constraints but flexible enough to bring scientists and stakeholders into the heart of the policy development process, took a step forward recently when six member states agreed and presented a paper to the Council of Ministers and won broad support from other member states.

The paper bears the hallmarks of a compromise document. Nevertheless, it presents a reasoned and convincing case for member states in a given regional sea to work collaboratively with the RACs and scientists to deliver well thought through Multi-annual Plans for the management of the fisheries in that area. If agreed unanimously, the management plan would be presented to the Commission with the expectation that it would be translated into legal form through delegated acts that would be accorded to the Commission. If there was no unanimity, the Plan would have to take the long and laborious route through adoption by the Council and European Parliament through co-decision.

Although is this is not the perfect form that could be imagined for CFP regionalisation it is a mechanism that if adopted as part of the CFP reform could:

• Speed up fisheries decisions
• Bring the RACs right into the heart of policy formulation process
• Break down the compartmentalisation that has afflicted relations between the fishing industry, fisheries managers and fisheries scientists
• Allow measures to be dropped or changed if they clearly don’t work (contrasting with the present arrangements that are unresponsive and inflexible)
• Allow a decisive movement away from micro-management and a failed command and control approach
• Tailor management measures to fleet and fisheries characteristics
• Build support for management measures by those they affect

Potential obstacles to even this modest form of decentralisation remain however:

• The Commission may object to their room for manoeuvre (although not their right of initiative) being constrained
• Having just been given co-decision powers, the European Parliament may try to cling on to some aspects of micromanagement
• The high level principles, standards and objectives which will still be adopted at European level may contain too much control over the detail of multiannual plans
• A lot of the practical detail on how regional level cooperation would work remains to be worked out
• The transition from the current body of inherited legislation to new comprehensive management plans will have to be negotiated
• In the North Sea, the role of Norway in the development of multi-annual management plans will have to be defined and agreed

Despite the difficulties, this remains the best chance in a generation for a decisive change in the right direction for European fisheries management. If regionalisation is derailed it won’t be because of the fishing industry or the environmental NGOs , or the RACs, have hampered it but because the politicians fail to deliver.

A crucial test for whether regionalisation of European fisheries is going ahead will be at the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxemburg on 19th June. The Danish Presidency will attempt to secure agreement on a “General Approach” on the main CFP reform themes which will essentially be the Council of Ministers negotiating mandate as it enters Trialogue with the Commission and European Parliament. The outcome of which will seal the fate of the CFP – until the next reform in another 10 years.

That was the message delivered by the NFFO and ANIFPO to the Environment Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly on 17th May during its scrutiny of draft Marine Bill legislation.

The organisations are seeking a series of amendments to the draft legislation that would strengthen the Bill in the following ways:

Fisheries Displacement

Marine Protected Area (MPA) planning elsewhere in the UK has so far given insufficient attention to the problems of fisheries displacement. Not only is it of concern that the slightest variation in the available knowledge of seabed habitats should potentially overrule livelihood needs in the selection of sites, which has occurred in the selection of some MCZ proposals in English waters, but such selections upon prime areas of fishing ground risk setting in motion fisheries displacement that actually increases pressures upon the marine environment. Displacement considerations need to be upfront in the selection process and not an afterthought.

As a general rule, marine planning should give a presumption in favour to existing activities when considering how to accommodate new activities and there is a strong case for undertaking marine and MCZ planning in tandem.

Whilst such an approach should form a better basis to realise the synergies between marine use and marine protection, government must not abandon its moral obligation to those whose livelihoods would be affected; and to see that they are not disadvantaged when taking decisions that in the worst cases lead to the loss of lifelong careers or heavy costs to coastal communities.

Evidence

The general lack of evidence and uncertainty in understanding of natural processes in the marine environment, compared to terrestrial environment, mean that decision-making needs to be flexible and adaptive to the provision of new evidence when it becomes available.

Participation

Those affected by marine and MCZ planning should be centrally involved in the planning process, both because they stand to be affected by decisions, and because they often have local scale knowledge that is not otherwise available. There is also a need to strengthen the participation of other departmental bodies who are concerned with the sustainable development of the seas in MCZ planning.

Alan McCulla, Chief Executive of the Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation (ANIFPO) said: “We were able to provide a clear and concise message to the Environment Committee, which on the basis of feedback to date seems to have struck a chord. We are not opposed to MPAs, but as evidence has proven, the creation of such a network will only succeed where it has buy-in from fishermen. In the Irish Sea fishermen from Northern Ireland contribute 80% of the UK’s fishing effort in the area, which does not mean that 80% of the area is fished. Rather, given the knowledge possessed by our fishermen it would seem obvious that they should be to the forefront in helping identify areas for the MPA network.”

Assistant Chief Executive of the NFFO, Dale Rodmell, said: “The weaknesses of the UK Marine Act have been exposed in the MCZ planning process in England and Wales, something which the NFFO had warned against when that Bill was under scrutiny. Northern Ireland legislators need to avoid the pitfalls by strengthening the Northern Ireland Bill’s framework so that it is at the cutting edge in terms of its understanding of how to best allocate sustainable marine use whilst providing marine protection.”

The Federation stressed:

• That the problems facing the under-10s are multi-layered and that domestic quota arrangements are only one facet of the issue
• That the quota difficulties faced by the under-10m fleet are not generalised but are regionally and fisheries specific: with the Eastern Channel and Thames Estuary facing acute difficulties
• That the Government’s focus on quota distribution risked making the situation worse for both under and over-10s
• That a ‘package approach’, embracing the following, was required:
• Latent capacity in the under-10m fleet
• The high-catching under-10s that constitute 14% of the under 10m fleet but catch 70% of the under-10m pool quotas
• Access for the under-10m fleet to much more tailored and responsive quota management
• That Defra could play a positive role in making unutilised quota available to the under 10s by facilitating stronger links and communications between local under-10 fleets and regional POs.

The Minister indicated that if he had access to available funds, a well designed decommissioning scheme would be central to the solution to balancing fleet capacity with quotas available to the under-10m fleet. He welcomed the Federation’s constructive and reasonable approach and indicated that his officials would closely examine the suggestions advanced. He also indicated that apart from UK’s own financial constraints, the Commission’s suspension of EFF funds for decommissioning tied his hands on a publically funded decommissioning scheme. He agreed however was to look closely at other funding possibilities for a voluntary decommissioning scheme.

The Federation has expressed concern that the Government’s focus on redistribution of quota from the producer organisations to the under-10s will destabilise the reasonably well functioning system of fixed quota allocations – a variant of a system of rights based management – without resolving the problems faced by some under-10m fisheries. We remain reasonably convinced that with goodwill on all sides, solutions can be found. However, the current piecemeal approach is divisive without prospect of resolving the core issues.

This was a constructive meeting, focussed on the underlying issues facing a number of specific under-10m fisheries. It will only be through cool heads and goodwill that a way through this complex of problems will be found.

Although the new overarching framework agreement will increase the industry’s costs (as many vessels will have to reregister to match their country/territory of administration), and is unlikely to reduce the complexity of fisheries management, it is very far from the potentially discriminatory package of measures originally floated in Edinburgh.

The Concordat maintains the unhindered transfer of quota and licences within all parts of the UK.

As an agreement between different parts of government, it was not deemed proper to share or consult on early drafts of the Concordat with the industry. Nevertheless, the content was described to the Federation at various meetings with officials and the Federation’s furious reaction to some parts of the proposals may have influenced the final document. In particular the notion that a vessel from one part of the UK could be forcibly reassigned to the administration of another because its fishing pattern was deemed to be ‘Scottish’, or ‘English’, ‘Northern Irish’ or ‘Welsh’ has been dropped.

The purpose of the concordat is to allow the different administrations develop tailored quota and licensing arrangements for their fleets but in a coordinated way that avoids discrimination or adverse consequences for the other administrations. Specifically, the concordat will block the re-registration of vessels seeking to avoid the restrictions applied by one administration by re-registering in another. English vessels which reregistered to avoid the under-10m licence cap are a clear example of this practice that has influenced Defra’s support for a concordat.

Some important features of the concordat are:

• DEFRA will only licence vessels registered in England; likewise DARD will only licence vessels registered in Northern Ireland
• Vessels registered in one area but administered from another will have to change their area of registration
• All 4 administrations will observe EU restrictions and where there are transgressions ( for example in a quota overshoot) the offending administration would pay any penalties
• All allocations will remain UK quotas
• Different licence conditions may be applied by the different administrations
• Vessels, licenses and quotas will remain freely transferable/tradable within the UK
• Transfers of vessels/licences between administrations will only be permitted for genuine reasons
• The concordat will not obstruct vessels joining the producer organisation of their choice
• All ‘English’ vessels will be administered by from an English port of administration
• Vessels currently in a PO should see no immediate effect from the change although some POs will have members in different ‘territories’, with their FQAs and quotas overseen by different administrations. Their allocations will however be managed as a single quota
• There will however be a new step in the allocation of quotas on the basis of FQAs: UK quota will be allocates to the 4 administrations who will then issue the quota tonnages to POs, non-sector and the under-10m pool
• The under-10m pool will be split by ‘nationality’ on the basis of RBS (registration of buyers and sellers) catch records
• There will be no restriction on movement of FQA units but:
• There will be a publically accessible register of FQA holdings
• There will be discussions on the funding of the FQA register
• Administrations consider that FQA holdings do not amount to a right to quota but they ‘recognise the right to trade FQAs and quota’
• An urgent review of the economic link requirements will be held to establish whether they are fit for purpose and in light of what is done in other member states; quota obtained under the economic link arrangements will be handled by the respective administration

It is not unlikely that, as is often the case administrative with changes, such as this there will be a number of unforeseen issues that will arise.