A Precautionary MPA Tale

Shortly before Parliament was dissolved for the election, the Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) reported on its latest inquiry into Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Amongst its findings, the EAC concluded that insofar as the MPA network in English waters was concerned:

“The Government should not make perfection the enemy of the good by using a lack of ‘perfect data’ as an excuse to delay the designation of sites. The Government must adopt a precautionary principle approach to Tranche 3 site selection and designations should be made using ‘best available’ data” (i).

A range of organisations including RSPB, the Marine Conservation Society and the Marine Biological Association claimed that the standard of evidence the government required as part of the process was too high and that the goal posts had shifted. This referred to the best available evidence principle stated by the Government at the start of the Marine Conservation Zone (MCZ) planning process in 2010, an elaboration of the precautionary principle that “lack of full scientific certainty should not be a reason for postponing proportionate decisions on site selection”(ii). RSPB stated that the current Government was “requiring full scientific certainty for designation of sites, despite little or no investment in the gathering of further evidence to support the designation of the sites identified within the initial MCZ process”.

In drawing its conclusion, the EAC was apparently convinced by these arguments. The government has yet to respond to the report.

Consequences and Contradictions

The EAC is not the first to hold the government’s feet to the coals over applying the precautionary principle, and the recomendation follows in the vein of its previous MPA inquiry in 2014. As a means of avoiding irreparable environmental damage, the preacuationary principle has a sound footing in environmental policy. But good public policy ideas can cause harm if badly applied as simplistic policy fixes that overrule all else. This is the case with the EAC’s recommendation, which is based on shallow political advocacy that fails to get to grips with the concrete issues associated with handling evidence and decision-making over environmental protection and the management of human activities, and glosses over the fact that evidence is critical in striking the right balance.

A dogmatic pursuit of the precautionary principle also exposes an incoherence among the EAC’s report’s other recommendations and fails to acknowledge what an evidence based process has already delivered for the MCZ planning process.

Contrary to the RSPB claims, since the initial selection of recommended English MCZs in 2011, marine survey campaigns have generated new data that has altered the classification of habitats found in many of the recommended sites. This in turn has led to identifying gaps in the network and subsequently to the identification of new recommended sites by Natural England and JNCC. As the EAC also recommends that the network is completed in full, if government is to refrain from gathering additional evidence it is clear that the network would not meet its set targets to cover representative habitat types.

The EAC’s recommendation that the government reinstate reference areas, which would ban the majority of activities and would become fisheries no take zones, also reveals muddled thinking. These were initially put forward in 2011 by regional stakeholder projects, but were defined in too much of a hurry to be considered sensible proposals. The intention of such sites is that they function as a barometer for the health of the wider network of MPAs. But if government steps away from an evidence based approach, as the EAC advocates, and we do not do not know with any level of confidence what the actual habitats are in such locations, then quite simply they cannot provide that function and our ability to understand whether MCZs are doing anything useful will be compromised.

Wagging the Evidence Dog

Aside from knowing what is actually being protected by MCZs, too often a precautionary approach is called for simply when there is a limited evidence base, irrespective of the level of risk that is implied by human activity (i.e. likelihood that harm can be caused).

But the question of risk is key because despite evidence limitations, the level of risk implied by human activities can be assessed scientifically. In a high-risk setting, the proper application of precaution would be to take action, but in a low risk setting there is less reason to do so.

If, however, we encourage a low standard of evidence by telling government to back off and accuse it of setting unattainable standards, determining whether an activity is low or high risk is more likely to be poorly informed.

This is what the EAC recommendation implies. The report fails to acknowledge that the evidence gathered during the selection and designation phase of planning MPAs is actually also crucial to the management phase. Although it actually refers to “perfection” and “perfect data” in reality this is facetious; the effect of the recommendation on the government’s present approach (which is not one to have perfection and cannot be a realistic expectation anyway) would likely be to downgrade the application of evidence-based policy at all stages of the planning process, not just the designation phase.

In arguing against delaying designations, the report highlights that the Government has deviated from the original stated principle on “best available evidence” in 2010, but this neglects that the Government at that time also recognised that the best available evidence principle was also about “high quality evidence (that) inspires confidence in the decisions that flow from it, and reassures people of the even-handedness of the outcome”(iii). In this the Government outlined the conundrum that it has subsequently found itself in in progressing the MCZ network, which has contributed to delaying its completion, although the original timeframe to designate sites in a two and half year period was always fantasy.

The Other Side of the Precautionary Coin

It is worth looking at what the alternative to an evidence based approach to MPAs is. I’ve already indicated the contradictions of the EAC’s own recommendations over meeting the network criteria and over including reference areas. More important from our perspective, however, is that rolling back on evidence has important ramifications for those who make a living in the areas where MPAs have been identified. If you believe, as we do, that they deserve to be subject to appropriate due process, which requires the proportionate application of evidence based management decisions, then the EAC recommendation is misguided, as it suggests that livelihoods are not worth the due consideration that they should be. If public policy assumes everything is high risk, this will inevitably lead to decisions that disproportionately impact on those who they affect and economic activity will be heavily curtailed.

Appropriate Use of Evidence

Rather than dismissing the central importance of evidence for measured policy decisions, a more useful approach would focus on how evidence should be applied. Evidence primarily should be geared towards informing risk-based management. This does not require massive investment to meet the unattainable level of evidence that the EAC erroneously suggests that the Government is pursuing. It does not require comprehensive survey and monitoring of the state of marine habitats in all MPAs. Resources should be targeted to where they are most needed.

In designated MPAs, where significant levels of human activity could be severely impacted by management measures, or where there are low levels of human activity but a high level of uncertainty over risk, the evidence bar on whether those activities are compatible with the conservation status should be higher and resources directed accordingly.

On the other hand, in an MPA where very little human activity occurs, the level of certainty needed is less important.

Risk assessments will then make use of the available information in a systematic way, aiming to be more detailed where uncertainty and potential impacts are greatest and applying precaution where relevant. Applied to fisheries in MPAs, the methodologies are still relatively novel and evolving, something which we have contributed to with our own work. But the approach more broadly follows in the footsteps of good practice applied under Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures that have formed part of permitting arrangements for a long time. In this system, mitigation is applied where appropriate and monitoring may be used as a means to strengthen the validity of assessed impact likelihoods and the reliability of assessments. As a consequence of this, management and permitting decisions may be adapted as further knowledge and confidence increases.

This has to be a more progressive and fairer approach to MPA planning and management than one that devalues evidence and implicitly asserts that people don’t matter.

(i) Marine Protected Areas Revisted report (para 18)

(ii) Guidance note on Selection and Designation of Marine Conservation Zones (Note 1) (p8)

(iii) The Government’s strategy for contributing to the delivery of a UK network of marine protected areas (para 44)

Leaving the EU will provide an opportunity to manage our fisheries in a different way. We can:

⦁ Learn the lessons of the last 30 years within the CFP (mainly things to avoid)

⦁ Learn from the experience of non-EU countries whose management has evolved in different ways

⦁ Simplify the regulatory regime and reduce the regulatory burden

⦁ Develop an effective integrated fisheries administration

⦁ Explore ways of reducing bureaucracy and cost in fisheries management by shifting away from prescriptive micro-management to a focus on outcomes and results (particularly but not exclusively in the realm of technical conservation measures)

⦁ Shorten communication chains between regulators and regulated

⦁ Use increased confidence in catch reporting to reduce the overall level of detailed restriction

⦁ Redesign an integrated regulatory system to better reflect the new conditions outside the CFP to achieve:

⦁ High quality policy decisions and effective negotiations

⦁ Proportionate risk-focussed enforcement

⦁ High levels of understanding and compliance

⦁ Decisions based on solid evidence base

Governance arrangements and the Management of Fisheries

We envisage two layers of management post- Brexit:

1. The design and implementation of measures by the UK authorities that will apply to all vessels operating within UK waters. These would apply to UK vessels and to non-UK vessels operating within UK waters alike. Technical conservation measures would be the obvious example.

2. Where there are shared stocks, it will be desirable to have a mechanism to jointly set agreed exploitation rates, quota shares, access arrangements and long term management strategies

We anticipate that the UK will have much more freedom of movement than under the CFP to design and apply a customised management regime covering:

⦁ Technical conservation measures

⦁ Fleet management and capacity

⦁ Discard Policy

⦁ Market policy

We envisage all aspects of UK policy will be anchored in sustainability and profitability.

Although the “Great Repeal Bill” will transfer much European law into UK legislation, to be revised by Parliament over time, the Minister makes clear that key aspects will change from day one. Most significantly, the arrangements for TAC setting and access arrangements will reflect the UK’s new status as an independent coastal state.

The industry has concerns about being ensnared in unworkable CFP rules even after the UK has left because of an anticipated bottleneck in Parliamentary time available to revise the law. Top of the list of anxieties is the implementation of the landings obligation which will come fully into force for mixed demersal fisheries on 1st January 2019 without any clear idea of how the problem of chokes will be resolved.

Selected parts of a letter from Fisheries Minister, George Eustice MP, to the NFFO on 19th April 2017

“Fisheries will be a key area in the EU Exit negotiations. We have a ‘once in a generation’ chance to regenerate UK fishing grounds and improve the conditions under which they are fished.

As I have previously mentioned, we are currently analysing all EU fisheries legislation. No decision has yet been made on the extent to which the EU legislation governing the Common Fisheries Policy will be incorporated into domestic law. However, as we leave, we will look to dis-apply the key elements of the CFP that are most unpopular and unworkable for the UK as a coastal state, including those on mutual access and EU-level quota setting. We will take the opportunity to develop a fisheries regime that is better suited to our seas and industries. We are considering the issue of the London Fisheries Convention carefully to ensure that we have full control of UK waters after we leave the EU and, as the Prime Minister said on 29 March 2017, we hope to be able to say something on this point soon.

More specifically, the Government will continue to champion sustainable fisheries and are committed to ongoing co-operation with other countries over the management of shared stocks.

I note your concern about the implementation of the EU landing obligation. I can assure you that we will continue to work with the industry to ensure that the transitions to full implementation in 2019 is as smooth as possible and that we remain committed to ending discards. We are working with other member States and industry to identify the best solutions to deal with choke species.

I have greatly welcomed the information and ideas that you and other stakeholder groups have provided us with, in the months since the referendum. I have asked my officials to step up the level of engagement with you and other stakeholders over the coming months, and I would encourage you to continue your participation. I hope this reassures that the government remains committed to delivering the best possible outcome for the UK fishing industry as we leave the EU.”

The Minister’s letter provide the most detailed insight yet into the Government’s thinking about its aspirations for fishing post Brexit and are closely aligned with the Federation’s own ambitions. Whoever forms the next government after the general election, and whoever forms the ministerial team for fisheries, the NFFO will work to ensure that these commitments are delivered.

What science there is confirms that some ray stocks of commercial interest are doing very well.

Consensus

Throughout the meeting there was broad agreement that the management of these fisheries is not fit for purpose:

• Sustainable fisheries on some ray species are being thwarted and fishing opportunities lost
• A group skates and ray TAC covering 15 individual species is being dragged down by the weakest species
• A blunt application of the precautionary approach drove the overall TAC downward by repeated 20% cuts over successive years, creating a significant regulatory discard problem in mixed fisheries where none previously existed; we are now dealing with the legacy of this blinkered approach
• A combination of data deficiency and the precautionary approach is now denying the fishing industry access to an important resource whilst doing little or nothing for those species which may need additional protection
• Species identification of and therefore the quality of official catch statistics, is a major problem
• A very low group TAC, as at present, or an individual TAC for each of the15 species, will prove to be the ultimate choke when skates and ray fall under the landings obligation on 1st January 2019
• Ray populations can be very loyal to specific areas but the TAC areas are frequently poorly aligned with the biological realities
• Alternative ways of protecting individual sub-species, such as spatial and temporal measures, are likely to be more effective than their inclusion in a group TAC, if they are well designed
• There is good reason to believe that many ray species demonstrate high survival when returned to the sea promptly after capture but the evidence necessary to demonstrate this conclusively is not yet there and will not be for some time, making high survival exemptions from the landings obligation problematic

The looming problems associated with the incorporation of skates and ray under the landings obligation has been one of the main drivers for holding this meeting in the first place, although the issue has also been giving grief to all concerned at successive December Councils.

Next Step

The Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries will now be asked to evaluate a range alternative options with a report produced in late autumn. This will inform future management decisions. The participants in the meeting will have the opportunity to comment on the terms of reference before they go to STECF.

Industry Representatives

Industry representatives, including the NFFO:

• Highlighted the inadequacy of the current arrangements and stressed the need for a new approach
• Supported the views of fishermen in the room with knowledge based on practical and direct experience of local fisheries
• Emphasised the urgency of the issue
• Whilst conceding that there was a problem of limited data on some species, questioned whether there was a generalised problem, against the background of dramatically reduced fishing mortality across all areas and all the main species groups in the NE Atlantic since 2000, as well as positive stock trends on associated species.
• Suggested a phased approach with interim and then longer term solutions

Danger of Delay

Although the speed at which the Commission moved to disapply the TAC for dab and flounder suggests that a new realism may be awakening in the Commission, the worry is that at least another year will go by struggling with a dysfunctional approach to the management of skates and ray. The obvious solution would be an interim measure in 2018 with a separate TAC for those stocks like thornback that are abundant, whilst continuing to develop innovative but realistic protective measures for where it is needed in time for 1st January 2019.

The Brexit shaped elephant in the room, was alluded to on several occasions but as the skates and ray stocks will continued to be shared after the UK leaves the EU (and therefore the CFP), the work done in this meeting will be relevant under any scenario. Ensuring adequate fishing opportunities for fishermen, whilst affording stock protection where it is needed will be at the focus of management concerns, whatever the regime.

Our view is that as a matter of principle, as with any coastal state, the UK’s quota shares should reflect the resources present in our waters.

It may subsequently be in our interest to use some of these resources as currency to negotiate other fishing opportunities, or to secure access to European markets; but the baselines for a post- Brexit fisheries regime should be the renegotiation of the UK’s quota shares to reflect the resources located in UK waters.

As part of the recalibration of quota shares between the UK and EU we would expect The Hague Preference, or other mechanisms derived from the CFP, will to no longer be relevant to the UK.

It is our view that the UK’s quota of stocks shared with other countries should be based on a scientifically robust objective evaluation of the resources located in the respective EEZ.

Given the imminent negotiations on the UK’s departure from
the EU, and therefore the Common Fisheries Policy, the fishing industry will be
looking for clear and unambiguous manifesto commitments to:

• The UK’s status as an independent coastal state,
  as soon as it leaves the EU
• A future UK fisheries policy that is designed
  for and tailored to our fleets
• An exclusive 12 mile limit to protect our
  inshore fleets
• Renegotiation of shared stocks to ensure that
  the UK’s shares broadly reflect the resources in our waters
• Maintenance of unimpeded access to markets and
  external waters fishing opportunities

It is widely recognised that fishing has an iconic status,
within the context of the UK’s departure from the EU, mainly because of the
shabby way our industry has been treated in the past.

Brexit provides an opportunity to move swiftly away from the
CFP and the slanted table that has worked to our severe disadvantage since
1973. The General Election and specifically the party manifestos, provide an
opportunity for the parties to spell clearly spell out their policies on
fishing. It will then be for the electorate to judge.

As this would have fallen into the middle of the election
campaign, when ministers are officially constrained in what they can say, as
ministers, it has been necessary to postpone the AGM until after the election.

Our Executive Committee meeting which was planned for the
same day will go ahead.

We were also due to meet Secretary of State. Andrea Leadsom
on the 18th May and this too will have to be held after the
election.

The AGM will be held on Tuesday, 9th May, at Fishmongers Hall, London Bridge, beginning at 10.30am.

The nearest tube stations are Monument and London Bridge.

All members are welcome to attend. Please advise your intentions to attend to the NFFO office (01904635430) or by email to nffo@nffo.org.uk

It is hard to believe that the EMFF scheme has been open for just over a year now in England – time seems to have moved so fast. When we launched the scheme on 18 January 2016 we were keen to act on customer feedback on the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and so we ensured a user friendly online EMFF application system was in place for launch complemented by a refined website with searchable EMFF guidance.

So where are we now? Well, 210 projects have received grant funding worth £8.4 million, with a total project value of £16.7 million. A further 193 applications have been submitted and are in progress. I am therefore really pleased with how things are developing. Interest in the scheme in general is also high and we have answered 461 expressions of interest. Expressions of interest are something new to this scheme – they allow customers to tell us about the project they wish to undertake and express an interest in receiving funding for them, we can then provide assistance and guidance to the customer before a full application is submitted.

On the subject of EMFF applications and expressions of interest I wanted to take the chance in this blog to urge people to visit our website and look at the wide range of EMFF funding opportunities available. We have also added a ‘focus on’ feature to our marine developments blog where customers can learn more about the benefit EMFF funding has brought to a range of applicants. I would urge people to visit this blog to get ideas and inspiration as to how the funding can be used and the opportunities available.

Please also remember that the funding opportunities under EMFF are very wide – ranging from aquaculture and fisheries to science and innovation. Indeed fishermen’s safety has its own specific budget and a large proportion of funding has been committed to projects such as Seafish Fisherman’s training, over the next two years.

Whilst the majority of applications to EMFF are for projects of less than £100,000, projects with a value exceeding £100,000 are regularly received and these are considered by a panel of experts. The Panel assesses the social, economic and environmental merits of each application and during 2016 we have progressed 37 panel cases. For 2017 one panel has already been held, considering 18 applications and a further three panels will be held later this year. The next available panel application deadline is 7 April 2017 for a panel which will be held on 13 June 2017 and interest is already extremely high. Further panel dates can be found on our website.

Last but by no means least, a key part of EMFF are the Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) which are created to develop community led local development in England. After a rigorous selection process during 2016 the six successful areas were each allocated a £800,000 budget to take forward their Strategies. These are: Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Dorset and East Devon, Hastings, Holderness, North Thames and North of Tyne. All have now successfully launched and are actively working with applicants in their areas. You can find out more about the journey of the FLAGs and their future plans on our marine developments blog.

In closing, as you can see, a great deal is happening and has happened in respect of EMFF in England so please visit our website to learn more about EMFF, or contact our helpline on 020802 65539, or email us at info@marinemanagement.org.uk and learn more about the funding available under EMFF.

Recently, the argument that, after the UK has left the EU, effort control (days at sea limits) could replace quotas as the main management tool in the mixed demersal fisheries, has been finding some currency.

It is not difficult to see the appeal.

At a stroke, the discard problem would be solved, as vessels could land everything that they catch. The messy business of quota management, with its fixed quota allocations, swaps, leasing, top-slicing etc. could be dispensed with overnight. Instead, vessels would be given an annual allocation of days at sea. Full stop. In some versions of the theory, quota shares are converted into effort shares, which admittedly makes things more complex than a flat-rate number of days for every vessel in the fleet.

But before we take the leap of ditching the messy quota system let’s have a look at the other side of the coin. There are a few reasons why effort might not be the road that we want to go down. Here are some of the counter-arguments:

1. Joint management of shared stocks. Even after we have left the EU, over 100 of our most important fisheries are on stocks that are shared with other countries. That will require some form of joint management through international agreement. The quota shares that the UK received under the CFP haven’t reflected anything like the proportion of the fish located in our waters but even post-Brexit we will still have a deep interest in controlling overall fishing pressure on these stocks, wherever they are caught and irrespective of who catches them. That means agreeing, through bilateral or trilateral international agreements, total catches and the shares that each country can take. How do you share the international cake without quotas? Norway has absolutely no interest in effort control; and the EU, that we will have just left, needs its Relative Stability to share its catch internally. To move to a system of effort control it would be necessary to persuade these countries to move to the same arrangement; either that, or persuade them that it’s ok for the UK to fish without quantitative catch limits. That’s quite a tall order.

2. How many days? Quotas serve two purposes. They are intended to place a constraint on overall fishing mortality on each species. Secondly, they are a convenient way to distribute fishing rights amongst different countries and groups of fishermen. If there is a shift to effort control, and the fisheries policy is still informed by fisheries science, there is a real likelihood that the number of days would be set in relation to the weakest not the strongest species in the mix: the lowest common denominator. Effort control is not so attractive when the permitted days is around 60, rather than the 150, 200 or 300 days currently used by vessels to catch their quotas. Before we buy a pig-in-a-poke, it will serve us well to look into how many days we would get, rather than assume that it will be roughly similar to present.

3. Effort is a blunt tool and our experience of it, as part of the EU cod recovery plan, has not been a happy one. After 10 years of effort control it has been all but ditched by the EU after the withering conclusion by a key scientific committee that “there is no linear relationship between a reduction in fishing effort and a reduction in fishing mortality.” This is science-speak for the fact that fishing vessels are businesses and will seek to maximise their income by, for example, targeting the most valuable species in the mix, or fishing more intensively during the time they are permitted to go to sea. There are also safety implications associated with limiting time at sea that aren’t there in a quota system.

4. The Faeroes Islands have applied a system of effort control to cod, haddock and saithe since 1996. The steady decline in the spawning stock biomass for cod does not inspire confidence that effort control provides a sound alternative to quotas.

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All this doesn’t mean that it would be impossible to replace quotas with effort as the principal means of managing the mixed demersal fisheries but it does provide food for thought about the consequences of making it work at a practical level.

Capacity

Neither quotas, or effort (or anything else) will work if there is an imbalance between fishing capacity and fishing resources. So the most fundamental element in a post-Brexit fisheries policy will be to ensure that fishing capacity in each sector of the fleet is in line with the fishing opportunities that are available.

Quotas

In questioning whether effort control does in fact provide us with a silver bullet to solve the problems faced in mixed demersal fisheries, there is little point in swinging the pendulum too far the other way to deny that the quota system comes with its own problems and complexities that have to be worked out. Here are some:

1. Discards. Discards have provided the lubrication that has made the system of EU TACs and quotas in mixed fisheries work. If the quota on one species is exhausted it has, until now, been possible to continue fishing whilst discarding catches of that species. Although discards have been significantly reduced over the last 20 years (a 90% reduction in the North Sea groundfish fishery), the EU landing obligation currently being rolled out will end all discards of regulated species unless a specific exemption is granted. There is a growing appreciation that this is going to create a major problem of multiple chokes in our mixed fisheries from January 2019, when the LO is extended to cover all regulated species. It is already clear that the flexibilities that are supposed to deal with the choke issue are going to be inadequate. But if the political will was there, it would be perfectly possible to provide the flexibilities and adjustments that would allow for a workable discard ban. Norway, for example has operated a discard ban for many years but applies individual quotas to many fewer species than the EU. And post-Brexit, the UK will be able to adapt the terms of the landing obligation applied in UK waters without having to go through the cumbersome EU co-decision process.

2. FQAs. The arrival of fixed quota allocations in the late 1990s, was one of the key policies, which allowed us to move away from the damaging and chaotic era of black fish. Over-quota landings were pushed to the margins rather than being central stage. Security of tenure encouraged a sense of stewardship that has served us well as we came through the difficult era of cod recovery. It has underpinned stability and planning for fishing businesses. The main criticisms have come from those marginalised by the FQA arrangements: from the under-10s excluded from the system, who have also been forced to deal with the consequences of effort displaced from the over-10 sector. Criticisms have also come from new entrants and those seeking to expand their businesses, and those facing high lease costs.

Bringing precision quota management to that part of the under-10metre fleet that needs it and exploring whether genuinely low-impact inshore vessels could be taken out of the quota system altogether (under a notional allocation set aside for them) is important work in progress.

Likewise, other elements of the FQA system will be part of the debate on the UK’s post–Brexit regime. There is likely to be a focus on constraints on concentration of quota ownership; how to provide stability and continuity for quota holders through a formal system of use-rights; the best way to encourage new entrants; and the introduction of licence charges.

Eyes wide open

It is good for existing arrangements to be challenged and the potential for alternatives to be thoroughly examined. But it is important to go into the future with our eyes wide open. Our conclusion is that the system of TACs and quotas comes with many challenges, especially within the context of the landings obligation. But a leap into an unworkable system of effort control could be a lot worse.

An Exclusive 12 mile Zone

• The area within the UK’s 12 mile limit should be an exclusive zone in which fishing and access rights should be limited to UK fishing vessels. This is justified in terms of:
• The current absence of symmetry (the UK as very few vessels which fish within in the 12mile limit of another EU member state)
• The increase in fishing capacity of the non-UK fleets claiming historic rights which were established on the basis of much smaller vessels with lower catching capacity
• The provisions of UNCLOS which expressly allow for exclusive rights within the 12 mile zone
• A better basis for future management of inshore fisheries

Notwithstanding the above, it will nevertheless be important to find a way to ensure that the mutual access of the Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland fleets to each other’s territorial waters should continue, on the basis of the neighbourhood agreement which predated the CFP.

But things have changed and will change. When the UK leaves the EU, it will leave the Common Fisheries Policy and will act as an independent coastal state. The principle of equal access will no longer apply, meaning that access to UK waters for non-UK vessels will have to be negotiated.

The European fleets have benefited enormously from free access to UK waters over the last 40 years. Probably the most relevant guide to the future is something like the Norwegian model, where access to fish in Norwegian waters is closely controlled by Norway and tied to conditions that are negotiated each year.

It is to be expected that the European industry will talk up the threat of prohibitive barriers to European markets, and it is true that we need and want to sell much of our product into Europe. But in the long term unimpeded trade is in the mutual interests of both the UK and the EU. After the posturing and threats a deal will be reached.

The bottom line is that the era of equal access is over. We will all have to deal with the necessary readjustments. It the case of the UK fishing industry, that means quota shares that broadly reflect the fish resources located in UK waters. And an exclusive 12 mile limit to protect our inshore fisheries.

Every European fishing organisation in Europe would demand the same of their governments if they were in our position.

This week the focus is on:

National quota shares

The UK shares over 100 stocks with other countries, including EU member states and Norway. Relative Stability is the name given to the quota allocation keys adopted as part of the CFP in 1983. It is widely acknowledged that the interests of the UK’s fishing industry did not occupy a particularly high place in the HMG’s priorities at the time and as a result, the UK’s Relative Stability allocations do not reflect a fair or reasonable share of the stocks which are fished in UK waters.

Our view is that as a matter of principle, the UK’s quota shares should reflect the resources present in our waters. It may subsequently be in our interest to use some of these resources as currency to negotiate other fishing opportunities, or to secure access to European markets; but the baselines for a post- Brexit fisheries regime should be the renegotiation of the UK’s quota shares to reflect the resources located in UK waters.

As part of the recalibration of quota shares between the UK and EU we would expect The Hague Preference or other mechanisms derived from the CFP, will to no longer be relevant to the UK.

The UK’s quota of stocks shared with other countries should be based on an objective evaluation of the resources located in the respective EEZ.

International Quota Swaps and Transfers

Irrespective of renegotiated national quota shares, the UK and EU after the UK’s departure from the EU, will have a mutual interest in maintaining a flexible mechanism to initiate and execute international swaps and transfers. Given the dynamic character of fisheries, the swaps mechanism, through which country to country exchanges can be made (often initiated by producer organisations) is the primary way in which in-year shortages and surpluses are smoothed, bringing substantial benefits for all involved and optimising the economic returns across many quite diverse fisheries. The mechanism to swap and transfer quota is an important way to future-proof the availability of quota against biological and market shifts.

Quota exchanges at government level also provide an important mechanism for optimising benefits, either through direct transfers or as part of more complex fisheries trades. It is important also that this type of arrangement continues post-Brexit.

ICES advises that the risk of having no catch limits for the dab and flounder stocks is currently considered to be low and not inconsistent with the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The advice is valid as long as dab and flounder remain largely bycatch species, with the main fleets catching dab and flounder continuing to fish the target species (plaice and sole) sustainably within the FMSY ranges provided by ICES.

ICES has now indicated that as the TAC does not constrain mortality on these two species, and fishing mortality on the main target species (plaice and sole) is already low, and within safe prescribed biological limits, the TAC could be safely removed without contravening the CFP’s self-imposed rules on TAC setting.

It must now be highly likely that this TAC will not appear in the Commission’s proposal for TACs and Quotas in 2018. This is an important development and should be the start of a shift to removing TACs from other stocks where they serve no purpose but clog up the advisory system and make implementing the landings obligation all but impossible.

The NFFO has argued that streamlining the TAC system and removing those TACs on secondary species that serve no purpose, should be an urgent priority as we move towards the full implementation of the landings obligation. Removing TAC status does not mean abrogating responsibility for the safe management of species of secondary commercial importance. They will continue to be monitored in regular surveys and there is an option to escalate monitoring and apply targeted remedial measures if negative signals from the stock are detected. But with this piece of scientific advice and the consequences that follow, the era of blindly applying TACs that serve no purpose is now on notice to quit. This is part of a ground clearing exercise that, logically, should have been undertaken before the start of phased implementation of the landing obligation began.

CFP Requirements and the Landing Obligation

Removing the TAC for dab and flounder will be a very welcome and necessary step. But it won’t be enough. We are sleepwalking into a crisis in 2019 in the mixed fisheries when the landing obligation is extended to all regulated species. It is increasingly obvious to the member states concerned, as well as the advisory councils and the Commission, that that existing tool box provided in the legislation will be inadequate to mitigate against numerous and serious chokes that are expected to arise. The removal of the TAC for dab and flounder in 2018 will be the first decisive step to avoid the economic chaos and social dislocation that will accompany multiple chokes# and therefore premature fisheries closures. This first step is very welcome but in itself it will not be nearly enough. Many more steps are required.

This Federation has already drawn attention to the many legislative obstacles that remain within the CFP to the full implementation of the landings obligation in 2019. The bald fact is that the necessary groundwork has yet to be done to accommodate the landings obligation and to reconcile those EU requirements which pull in different directions. This mess is a direct result of the way that the landings obligation was legislated for in the middle of a full-scale and wholly artificial moral panic in 2013. Thank you, Hugh and Maria.

A few examples:

• The technical conservation regulation is currently under revision and about to enter the tortuous co-decision process; but it remains to be seen whether once all the co-legislators have had their say, it will be compatible with the landing obligation. The flexibility for vessels to reduce unwanted catch by adapting their gear is seriously constrained under the existing technical rules.
• The timetable towards MSY for all stocks by 2020 is not consistent with implementing the landings obligation on a small but not insignificant number of stocks
• Zero TACs are incompatible with the full implementation of the landings obligation; no satisfactory solution has yet been found for this problem. Vessels can’t be prohibited from both discarding and retaining fish caught in their nets.
• Relative Stability quota shares provide a major obstacle to the implementation of the landings obligation and it is unlikely that the system of international quota swaps will be capable of moving quota to where it is needed to cover urgent quota shortages
• Flexible TAC setting rules within multi-annual plans that would help to ease the implementation of the landings obligation, are not yet in place for the North Sea or North Western waters

The bottom line is that it is fundamentally unreasonable to oblige fishing vessels to meet requirements that pull in opposite directions. Of course, all this should have been sorted out before parachuting the landings obligation into European legislation but it wasn’t. But that is another story…

Brexit and the Discard Ban

One of the few concrete indications that UK ministers have given about the shape of the management regime that will apply in UK waters after Britain leaves the EU, is that the principle that landings obligation should be retained. In light of this it would be short-sighted for us in the UK to relax back in the belief that none of this will apply to us. By shedding the yoke of centralised EU control, there should be opportunities to do things differently within the UK fisheries management regime; but we would be deluding ourselves if we think that our ministers would abandon policies that they have publicly argued for whilst the UK was part of the EU. Solutions for chokes will therefore be required in the UK fisheries as well as the residual EU waters.

Sign of things to come

The removal of the TAC for Dab and Flounder is therefore of great significance, not just as a belated attempt by the EU to accommodate the landings obligation but as a part of a shift towards a workable discard ban and a generally more flexible and rational system of fisheries management. The critical question is whether all the necessary changes will be made in time.

Norway

It has not escaped notice that Norway, which has operated a reasonably successful discard ban since the mid-80s, does so on the basis of many fewer individual TACs than the EU. Other aspects in the Norwegian regime have also been adapted to make their approach a workable one. Not everything the Norwegians do will be relevant for our generally more complex fisheries but where there are lessons they should be learnt.

# Chokes occur when fishing vessels are legally obliged to land all quota species and where the exhaustion of quota of one species in a mixed fishery of up to 25 species will oblige that vessel, or whole fleet, to tie up for the rest of the year.

The Federation makes the point that self-employed share fishermen don’t enjoy statutory holiday pay or sickness leave payments and so it is right that there is a proper differential between the contributions made by the self-employed and the employed.

“A surge of opposition has already forced the government into a delay in implementing the changes and we are now hopeful that there will be a more fundamental rethink,” said Tony Delahunty NFFO President.

Those tactics are to generate friction with the Westminster administration wherever this suits the independence narrative; and to press for concessions wherever it can. Fisheries is one particularly rich area where the nationalist strategy is being pursued with vigour. There are strong signs that at the point of Brexit, Scotland will announce that as well as preparing a second independence referendum, it will taken full control of the management of UK fisheries within the Scottish zone. It believes that it has the powers to do this under the existing concordat. This will not prevent the SNP government using the politics of grievance to press for further concessions that go beyond the devolution agreement in the meantime. A place at the table in international agreements, for example.

This has been a successful strategy so far. The Westminster Government is highly sensitive to the appeal of nationalism in Scotland and has made a number of important concessions already:

• Fisheries is already devolved responsibility
• The ambiguously written concordat between fisheries administrations has been used to facilitate shifts towards defacto independence on quota management and fishing vessel licensing and fisheries control
• The Westminster Government has colluded with Scotland in a major quota grab from England

The tactical approach serves three purposes:

• It fits with a policy of creeping step-wise independence from the UK
• It placates the Scottish fishing sector which is overwhelming against both independence from the rest of the UK and strongly in favour of exiting the EU and the CFP
• It transfers, power, fishing rights and opportunities from the rest of the UK to Scotland.

The Conservative government in Westminster has shown itself willing to make these kind of concessions, even in the face of criticism that the Scottish tail is waging the UK dog and that no one at ministerial level is looking after the interests of the English fishing industry. Labour, electorally destroyed by the SNP in Scotland and looking for a way back, is following a similar path.

So, we are in familiar territory. A fishing industry is being sacrificed as part of a wider political geo-political game. In 1973 the UK fishing sector was sacrificed to obtain access to the EEC. In 2017, the fishing industry in the rest of the UK is being sacrificed to shore up Scotland’s place within the Union with England that began in 1707.

The fishing industry outside Scotland is feeling pretty raw and vulnerable as their vital interests are traded away in a game of power politics. Internal party politics was a key driver that led to the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. Likewise, the manoeuvring of party politics on the Scottish independence issue that is emerging as a huge determinant of the fate of our industry.

What are the implications?

Until now, any registered UK fishing vessel could operate anywhere within UK waters and land at any port, subject only to zonal restrictions put in place for conservation purposes. Devolution is eroding those rights. The current draft concordat drifts further in the direction of separation and additional and artificial restrictions, driven not by sensible fisheries management but by the nationalist agenda. If an English or Northern Irish Vessel, for purely economic reasons, lands more than 50% of its catch into Scotland, it will deemed to be a Scottish vessel and must be administered by Scotland. This is quite simply part of a power and quota grab.

A post-Brexit regime in which Scotland controls who has access to its waters and under what conditions they may fish, is unlikely to treat “foreign” UK vessels fairly. These vessels are already second-class citizens, having no say as stakeholders, in shaping Scottish fisheries policy. The drift is towards separation and Scottish control that is entirely in line with the nationalist agenda.

To some degree, this is a double-edged sword. Although to date DEFRA/MMO have been reluctant to go down the separatist road with equivalent measures, it can only be a matter of time until there is pressure for equivalency. Only very belatedly did DEFRA apply a one-way-valve on the transfer of English quota rights outside England in response to Scottish measures but in the end it was forced to move.

Scottish registered vessels fishing for scallops in the Channel, or for prawns in the Farne Deeps want/need access to waters now under English jurisdiction and any restrictive measures applied to English or Northern Irish vessels operating in Scottish waters are likely to draw down parallel restrictions. That is the logic of protectionism.

Brexit and Scotland

The nationalist agenda being pursued by the Scottish government, and the Scottish industry’s willingness to go along with it insofar as it brings them immediate benefits, adds another wholly unwelcome layer of complexity to the UK’s departure from the EU. For a start it is difficult to form cross-industry unity.

There is a bitter irony in the thought that if the SNP government in Scotland succeeds in all of its ambitions, Scotland will be back in the EU, and the Scottish fishing industry will be back in the CFP, on the same terms as before – or worse.

Click here to read MMO announcement

Safety

Apart from the disruptive impact on fishing businesses, the NFFO is concerned that the effect of this regulation will impact the efforts of the industry to improve safety. Commercial fishing for bass in the gill net fishery will be limited to bycatch only but there is a danger that fear of losing the entitlement to catch bass in the future will stop vessel owners from investing in new boats. Attaching the entitlement to land bass to the track of the vessel itself, rather than as is more usual the, licence, represents a serious problem, especially in the inshore sector.

Only the MMO know just how many vessels will be affected but it is clear that this regulation will seriously harm the under 10 fleet who typically depend on seasonal fisheries, and cannot avoid bass as a bycatch.

Robert Greenwood, Safety and Training officer at the NFFO said.

“Whilst we are heartened by the MMO allowing representations to be made on limited grounds we are still concerned that safety will be affected if owners cannot invest in better or new vessels for fear of losing their bass track record.”

“Inshore multi species vessels will be unable to improve their vessels because of fear of losing a track record for a bycatch allowance. This obviously represent an increased risk to vessel safety.”

“Putting obstacles in the way of building of new vessels and renewing the fleet it not only reduces the safety of the boats but also undermines the necessary trades supported by the fishing industry, such as boat builders and equipment suppliers.”

Discards

The significant level of discards that the new regulation will generate in mixed fisheries is an important reason that the NFFO has called for a fundamental review of the measures introduced over the last two years. We are calling for talks on alternatives to begin as a matter of urgency.

Amongst other things, the EP asserted
that Brexit would mean:

• “No increase to the UK’s share of fishing
  opportunities for jointly fished stocks (maintaining the existing quota
  distribution in UK and EU waters)
• In order for the UK and EU to keep to
  commitments on sustainable fishing, contained within the United Nations stocks
  agreement, it is difficult to see any alternative to the continued application
  of the common fisheries policy.
• Reciprocal access for the EU and UK fleets to
  the fishing grounds in the UK and the EU waters.”

Leaving aside the low probability that these will be the actual
outcomes of the forthcoming UK/EU exit negotiations, the article signals that we
can expect a great deal of this type of posturing ahead of the talks.

The European Parliament has a vested interest in seeing the
future through rose tinted spectacles. It stands to lose a great deal of its
influence (as well as its British members) when the UK leaves the EU. The
Parliament will no longer have a say on quota levels, quota shares and access arrangements
where stocks are shared, because these decisions will be the subject of
bilateral or trilateral international negotiations. In other words those
decisions will no longer be made in Brussels.

There is no reason why the UK will want to abandon the
progress that has been made in achieving sustainable high-yield fisheries
(often despite poorly designed European policies) Similarly, we are assured that renegotiated
quota shares and access arrangements are be a high priorities for the UK in the
negotiations, once Article 50 is triggered.

So, it’s probably best to understand the report, not so much
as an objective and thorough analysis of the factors in play as a wish list….

NFFO Safety and Training Officer Robert Greenwood, who is also the chairman of the FISG Promotion of Safety Group commented: “The biggest improvement in terms of safety isn’t necessarily going to come from the equipment but the requirement for emergency drills. If every vessel did regular emergency drills they not only would be prepared in case the worst ever happened, but they would also be raising awareness of what and how an accident could occur – hopefully this awareness will reduce the chance of an accident.”

The FISG members are all keen to ensure that for these particular items there should be a two year phase-in period to help owners reduce the cost of the equipment. The phase-in period allows EMFF money to be used to help with the cost of the items which remain non-mandatory during the phase-in period.

“This is a great example of the type of co-operation that occurs as a result of the Fishing Industry Safety Group,” Robert Greenwood said. “Although not a requirement, it is recommended that all vessels carry both a vessel mounted EPIRB and PLBs for everyone.”

“EMFF offers a great opportunity to improve safety and we will help any members with their needs, as I am sure all federations and associations will. This year we have a focus on man overboard and have worked with Fibrelight to develop an affordable man overboard ‘dummy’ which is now available from ADEC Marine where members can receive a 12.5% discount on all sales, servicing and hiring,’ he said.

“I would encourage owners wishing to submit an EMFF application to consider adding MOB prevention, mitigation and rescue into their plans.”

“Dear Minister

You have given instructions to top-slice the FPO’s allocation of North East Arctic Cod for 2017. This will mean that 1500 tonnes of quota for which that organisation had a legitimate expectation under the FQA system, will ostensibly now be used by the MMO to deal with chokes that are expected to arise as the landings obligation is progressively applied.

We have a number of problems with what you have done.

1. The Scottish Minister, Fergus Ewing, and the Scottish industry have made no secret that this concession was made after extensive lobbying on their part; and there is an expectation that Scotland will be the major beneficiaries. Unless it is also your intention to also overturn the UK’s external waters licencing regime Scotland will not be able to fish this quota directly but will use it for swap currency.

2. This is a move which is detrimental to the interests of the UK as a whole, for it would appear, the benefit of a small number of Scottish interests. Other member states will now derive the economic benefit of high-value cod throughout the supply chain; the bulk of the catches made under the incoming quota (if they are principally saithe and hake) will be exported for value-adding and final sale.

3. If this initiative was really an attempt to deal with the undoubted problem of chokes, it has been done in a way that is utterly arbitrary, completely discriminatory, and without even cursory consultation with those who will be adversely affected. A genuine and systematic approach to a level of quota redistribution that might be needed to deal with the problem of chokes would not focus on the allocation of a single group or country; neither would it be done in the complete absence of discussion with those affected.

4. The way that you have caved-in to the aggressive nationalist agenda being pursued by the administration in Edinburgh in line with its wider political objectives, is deeply worrying; we now have absolutely no confidence that anyone at ministerial level is now looking out for the interests of the English fleet, unlike the devolved administrations, each of whom has a dedicated minister batting for their industry.

5. It is now clear that the value of FQAs can be degraded at any time on ministerial whim. Although we recognise the need for ministerial interventions from time to time, you should be very wary of undermining the stability and stewardship benefits that the evolution of the FQA system has brought.

6. Combined with the provisions of the revised concordat that has been agreed with Scotland, and which if implemented would lead to the transfer of administration of the English North Sea whitefish fleet to Scotland, we regard your actions as a major threat to the integrity and future of the English fishing sector.

Our concern is that what we are seeing is a departure and drift from relatively stable and consensual fisheries management in the UK, towards a regime of characterised by arbitrary ministerial decisions in the context of unrelenting pressure from Scotland. This is a matter of deep concern and for that reason our request is for an urgent meeting with you to discuss these important matters.”

Meeting

During the meeting the Minister did not dispute the essential force of our argument that he had caved in to Scottish pressure to top-slice 1400 tonnes of the English North East Arctic cod allocation. However, he described our criticisms as a caricature.

In turn, we did not accept that he was justified in raiding a single organisation (the Humber based FPO) to address the issue of chokes caused by the landings obligation. Chokes are a real and serious threat but our delegation made plain that an unprincipled and opportunistic quota grab is not the way to deal with it.

Despite the crowing noises from north of the border, it remains to seen who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of this raid. The complete lack of prior discussion with those affected by the reallocation, has meant that the government has not foreseen a number of significant obstacles to using North East Arctic quota as swap currency.

It was left that there remained some considerable distance between us on the issue.

Concordat

The minister was keen to stress that DEFRA consultation on the concordat between the four administrations was a genuine and meaningful exercise, notwithstanding statements from Scotland that it is a done deal.

The Federation has now responded forcefully to the consultation. Our delegation spelt out our concerns that the revised draft concordat reflects, more than anything else, the unrelenting nationalist agenda being pursued by the Scottish administration. Practical examples of how the operations of English vessels owners would be further prejudiced, if the revised form of the concordat were accepted, were given to illustrate our central point. This is that entirely artificial barriers to the legitimate operations of vessels with owners who are based outside Scotland are being constructed as part of a quota and power grab. Forcing English and Northern Irish vessels to reregister in, and be administered by, Scotland if they choose to land more than 50% of their catch in Scottish ports, is an entirely artificial and prejudicial development.

Time will tell whether the Scottish administration will be faced down on this issue or whether our fears that the devolution means that there is no one at ministerial level to defend our interests.

The issues raised were the absence of an appeals process from vessels unfairly excluded from the fishery and the inability to transfer eligibility when a vessel changes hands.

It was stressed that some flexibility in the MMO guidance could reduce the difficulties faced by many inshore vessels and would be still be consistent with the European legislation and further more would not add a single bass being killed.

The Minister and DEFRA officials agreed to look at the request as a matter of urgency and talks between DEFRA and the MMO have already begun.

The case was also made for deeper thinking about the measures that have been brought in over that last two years, many of which bear the hallmarks of rushed, poorly through through, sticking plasters. Finding ways to reduce fishing mortality on bass without generating discards is going to become an ever more crucial issue as the full implementation of the discard ban in 2019. The Minister and officials agreed to begin a strand of work in preparation for the next December, and in the slightly longer term, the landings obligation.

The Minister remarked that dealing with issues such as these should become easier once the UK leaves the EU and the CFP. In the meantime it was agreed to look into the issues raised by the Federation as a matter of urgency.

The letter reads:

“You are already aware of our view that whilst it makes sense to implement sensible management measures to safeguard the bass stocks, the current moral panic over bass is largely driven by an artificial EU MSY timetable, a dip in recruitment, and an over-exercised recreational angling sector.

We appreciate that at the December Council, you and your officials helped to block the Commission’s proposal for a complete ban on the gill net fishery for bass. However, we are now surprised that the measures to limit participation in the gill net fishery for bass do not contain provisions to deal with pipeline, or borderline cases, or in fact, the frequent sale and repurchase of vessels. There seems to be no appreciation of the highly dynamic ownership patterns in the inshore fleet. This measure also cuts across the bass fishery as an important entry point for new entrants to the fishing industry.

Generally, in the past, it has been considered that an appeals process was a precondition for a fair and proportionate approach to deal with cases where vessel operators may have entered into binding financial commitments, or have genuine reasons why they were not active during the reference period. The hardship arising from an unduly rigid approach creates very rough justice.

Against this background, we would be grateful if you would reconsider the need for an appeals process.”

Driven by Politics

The bottom line is that the concordat is only at the margins about effective fisheries management. It is primarily about managing the consequences of fisheries as a sphere of devolved responsibility. In general terms we agree with the principle of devolving responsibility to the lowest level that makes practical sense. However, this approach breaks down when, as in the case of the current government in Scotland, decentralised management is hijacked and corrupted by an aggressive nationalist agenda. Even where powers are clearly reserved, for example in international negotiations, there is constant unrelenting pressure for Scottish interests to be pushed centre stage. This is working to the detriment of the industry outside Scotland, which in terms of numbers of fishermen and value of catch, is at least as important as Scotland, although at present lacking a champion.

The concordat is shaped on the one hand by that aggressive nationalist agenda; and on the other by an administration in London willing to make concessions to Scotland, eager to dilute the conditions that would favour a second referendum on Scottish independence.

It is the Scottish administration’s absolute right to make the case for independence and to advance the case for the Scottish fishing industry. The problem for us, in the fishing industry outside Scotland, is the willingness of our ministers to make repeated and damaging concessions to Scotland at our expense. The UK minister has UK responsibilities and the devolved administrations have their champions but in this dual responsibility, who is promoting the English industry’s interests?

The evidence points to a catalogue of concessions to placate Scottish demands but the current political logic in the UK is that Scotland could be handed the keys of the Garden of Eden but they still wouldn’t be happy. The pressure is relentless and a push-back is overdue.

Forced Re-registration

The most egregious provisions in the current draft concordat relate to the sections on Licensing and Vessel Nationality.

Contrary to assurances by officials and ministers, the important right for our vessels to operate anywhere in the waters around the UK and to land at any port in the UK or abroad, where it makes economic or operational sense to do so, has been progressively eroded by the devolution and successive concordats. This is wrong in principle and damaging practice.

Currently it is economically and operationally expedient for our North Sea fleets to land most of our whitefish into Peterhead. The concordat, as currently drafted would introduce a requirement to land over 50% of its catch (by volume) if our vessels are to retain their English “nationality” and therefore administration by their home country.

The provisions on licencing and nationality mean that if our vessels land more that 50% by volume of their catch into Scotland, they will be oblige to re-register as Scottish vessels and be administered by Scotland. Fixed Quota Allocations would follow the vessel and licence to Scotland. The only alternative open to vessels would be to follow a wholly artificial and economically disadvantageous course of landing 51% of their catch into the next least worst option, probably a port in Denmark.

The weakening of Article 3d, which in the previous concordat provides some level of explicit assurance that vessels that have a material and significant link to an administration may continue to be administered by their home administration, regardless of fishing patterns, is fundamental to our concerns over the concordat’s direction of travel. It is imperative that that assurance is retained in the new concordat.

Another case in point lies with the example of a pelagic vessel currently registered in England or Northern Ireland but following economic or operational logic, landing its catch into Norway. If the vessel lands only one tonne into Scotland under the terms of this concordat, it is obliged to change its administration to Scotland. The example is absurd but it highlights the pernicious imbalance that lies at the heart of this concordat.

If the concordat is adopted as proposed and our vessels are forced to re-register in Scotland:

1. This would amount to the biggest quota grab in history; what guarantees are there that the administration in Scotland would not in due course find a way to strip of all or some of the quota entitlements that have accrued over time to our vessels either through track record or purchase?

2. The Scottish administration would owe no duty of care to the English vessels, forced against their will into their administration

3. This is not an economic link requirement. Scotland already benefits from the landings of our vessels into ports like Peterhead; accepting such an arrangement would put our fleets at an operational disadvantage by comparison with other EU member state fleets; it would rightly be regarded as discriminatory and illegal if it was imposed on the vessels other member states

4. There is such a thing as the UK single market and the concordat deliberately works to artificially distort and undermine it

5. The current concordat draft is a convoluted and inadequate response to purely political manoeuvring; the Scottish administration’s political agenda is to create constant frictions to keep Westminster under pressure and wring concessions that advantage Scotland;

6. There is absolutely no evidence that the changes contained in the concordat would change lead to better administration of fisheries; in fact the opposite. By contrast with the Scottish fleet, all of the English whitefish fleet remain in the Fully Documented Fishery programme in which their catches and activities are verified by CCTV

7. The identity of our fleet, in terms of ownership; political links, trade association affiliations, cultural ties and domestic arrangements lies in England.

8. If the provisions of the current draft concordat are accepted, our own ministers will have created the conditions for the demise of a distinctive English whitefish fleet operating in the North Sea, with roots going back over 100 years.

Outrageous

It is outrageous that we even have to defend ourselves in this way from a predatory Scottish administration and our own supine ministers. It is not surprising that the Scottish Fisheries Minister has already presented the document as a fait accompli; it is wholly slanted to accommodate Scotland’s wish list; it is an asymmetrical document which gives away far too much; contains no safeguards; and remains unhealthily ambiguous.

If a concordat is necessary and, given the realities of devolution, we suppose that it is, it should provide clarity, fairness and symmetry. This concordat provides none of these.

We will fight this concordat because it is fundamentally inimical to our interests. We will fight it politically; we will fight it in the court of public opinion; and if necessary we will fight it in the courts.

His appointment will run from 1 February 2017 until 31 January 2020, covering a vital period for the future of our industry, including both the implementation of the landing obligation and the design and application of a post-Brexit management regime.

His wide experience as NFFO Chairman and then President, Chairman of the Sussex Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority and Chairman of the NFFO’s South East Committee, as well as an active skipper of an under-10 metre vessel, will be central to the role.

There are many important issues affecting the fishing industry such as the implementation of the landing obligation, the operation of the VMS and electronic log books, quota management and the operation of the EMFF. Tony’s calm and informed presence on the MMO Board should help to steer the body in positive directions.