Offshore Windfarms: The Crown Estate

A meeting between the Crown Estate and the NFFO was held recently at our York Offices, to discuss ways of minimising the impact of Round 3 offshore wind-farms on the fishing industry.

There is general agreement that the first two rounds, although much smaller in scale than the new round, offered little or no opportunity for the fishing industry to influence the siting of the wind-farms.

We know that Round 3 is expected to generate around 25 gigawatts of power, as against Round two which when complete, will generate around 7 gigawatts. The impact of fishing can therefore be expected to be commensurably larger. As owners of the seabed, the Crown Estate has an important influence on the process of selecting the location and shaping the boundaries of future wind-farms.

The meeting provided an opportunity for the Federation to raise the industry’s concerns:

The first two rounds had conspicuously failed to take the fishing industry’s concerns into account. A clear example was the siting of a proposed wind-farm directly on top of the most lucrative lobster ground in the country
This approach contrasts dismally with the highly collaborative relationship between the fishing and offshore oil and gas industries, that has seen constructive coexistence between the two industries over 25 years, despite massive offshore developments
The body charged with overseeing the development of relations between the fishing and the renewable energy sector (FLOWW) has been a disappointment and failed to make any real impact
There has been minimal attempt to integrate fisheries information (where vessels operate, what they catch, where are the most critically important areas) into the early planning stages. This means that the fishing industry is always placed on the back foot, reacting to proposals that threaten specific fisheries
Crown Estates by jumping the gun and proposing indicative areas for potential wind-farm development have undermined the Strategic Environmental Assessment that, in the absence of a full marine spatial planning process, is supposed to guide decisions on wind-farm location
Our two principal concerns over offshore wind farms arise from the effect of potential displacement of fishing activity. This can have a direct impact, leading to a loss of economic viability for vessels, fishing businesses, and even communities. It can also have a broader impact as displaced vessels are forced into other areas, where they may have to compete with other fishermen. Vessels of limited range obviously have fewer options.
The indicative areas for Round 3 wind-farms (See NFFO Website Regional Notice-boards) are huge, although we are advised that the eventual size of the wind-farms will only occupy a fraction of this zone. Crown Estate reasons that providing indicative areas then negotiating the terms of the contracts with wind-farm developers will give the Estate more control and direction over the process. The overall area of the indicative zones covered by turbines should not exceed 10%. This leaves open the question of how much of a single indicative area may be covered by wind-farms. This is a critical question for the fishing industry and to date we have not heard the safeguards that would give us comfort.
The importance of recognising that fishing patterns can change, sometimes quite radically, over time.

Crown Estates appeared to understand and accept the shortcomings of the approach used to date and has invested in a computer-based Geographic Information System (Marine Resource System, MaRS) which weight different layers of marine activities as part of the planning system.

Although this is a powerful planning tool it is also very apparent that it faces serious difficulties in representing the realities of fishing patterns. It is over-reliant on VMS data, and as to date satellite monitoring only covers the over 15 metre fleet, this can only lead to a distorted and seriously misleading picture unless the data is interpreted carefully.

It is clear that there is a need for the fishing industry to prepare comprehensive charts to defend key fishing areas, not just against badly designed wind-farms but also marine conservation zones (MCZs) and aggregate dredging applications. At present the information that is available is very patchy and the challenge is for the industry to prepare authoritative charts with sufficient detail and at the right scale.

A Way Forward

Against this background the Crown Estate and the NFFO agreed:

To work collaboratively to dramatically improve the quality of data on fishing patterns on the Crown Estate information systems. This should highlight red areas that are critically important to fishing
To use the Federation’s communications and liaison channels to obtain the necessary data from the ports
Where possible, to dovetail with other projects where spatial information on fishing is being collated, such as the various regional marine conservation zone projects
To use the NFFO’s international links through the RACs and Europeche to obtain information on international fleets operating in UK waters
To find a means of interpreting VMS data to ensure that it is not misused

To explore contractual or legal means to ensure that offshore wind developers liaise directly and constructively with the principal fishing industry organisations

Our response is reproduced below.

NFFO Response to the Interim Outcome of Consultation Report February 2009

For the most part, the comments made in our response to the Scottish administration’s original consultation on a separate quota management system are still relevant and stand. (See NFFO News Article below 13/8/08)

We note that a number of adjustments have been made to some of the detailed arrangements proposed, including different variants on how to unilaterally define “Scottish” quota and to apply a Scottish economic link requirement to FQA units deemed to be Scottish
We remain of the view that this part of the proposal is almost certainly illegal, being outside the terms of the devolution settlement as defined in the Scotland Act
The paper posits two alternative ways of imposing Scottish economic link requirements: Either all FQAs transferred out of Scotland would have to be attached to an active Scottish licence and those seeking to employ the quota would have to lease it, or alternatively, an economic link applied through a dual system of licensing would compel vessels holding such units to meet certain licence conditions. The former is clearly outside the authority permitted under the Scotland Act and the latter would be highly bureaucratic, relatively easily circumvented, and if it hampered the businesses of the non-Scottish recipient, would also be in breach of the devolution settlement and probably also UK and EU trade law
To carry on regardless to unilaterally establish a separate quota system, on the lines outlined in the two consultation papers, in light of the clear and unequivocal legal advice that it would be outside the law, would be irresponsible and lead to unnecessary conflict at a time when a coherent, unified UK approach is paramount
We remain of the view that the moves towards a separate quota management system are driven primarily by narrow political considerations rather than what is desired by, or good for, the Scottish or any other part of the UK fishing industry
At a practical level there are fundamental problems with operating separate quota management systems within a single member state. Compensation and penalty arrangements, for example, demand a unified agreed approach that is simply more difficult and complex to apply with separate arrangements. A unified UK approach to negotiations with the European Commission would also be undermined.
We consider that the Interim Response deliberately underplays the strength of opinion against the establishment of a separate quota system in Scotland and completely ignores the views of organisations such as ours, based outside Scotland but with a major stake in the management of Scottish fisheries by virtue of our members’ interests in landing into Scottish ports, fishing in Scottish waters, membership of Scottish POs and registration in Scottish ports
The paper deliberately understates the significant quota transfers that have been made from other parts of the UK to the Scottish fleet over the last 15 years by using a narrow reference period amongst other devices
Decisions on a number of the more difficult issues touched on but not resolved in the original consultation have been parked, to be dealt with in some manner by a working group of indeterminate locus and composition.
All along we have taken the view that it is the Scottish industry that stands to lose as much as anyone out of this irresponsible adventurism
Perhaps in the long-term, the most damaging aspect of this politically inspired manoeuvre is that it has and will distract administrations and industry organisations from far more weighty issues such as cod recovery, effort control and a new control regulation, a new technical conservation regulation, loss of access issues and CFP reform

Clearly then we have major issues with the proposals.

However, our concerns have been eased considerably by the UK Fisheries Minister’s statement that the owners of fishing vessels that are defined as Scottish may at any stage re-register outside Scotland. That vessel will receive a licence from Defra / MFA along with the FQA units associated with the licence. That in effect provides a safety route for any vessel operator who feels that under the new regime in Scotland he or she will be subject to discriminatory treatment.

Nevertheless, despite this important safeguard, we consider that the proposals if implemented would have considerable disruptive consequences for our member’s commercial activities.

On receipt of our original response, the Scottish Executive offered the opportunity to discuss the issues arising from the Scottish proposals. This commitment has never been followed through and despite our status as a significant stakeholder in Scotland’s fisheries we have been effectively disenfranchised and excluded.

Against this background we would urge the Scottish Executive to reengage with other UK administrations and the UK industry on the development of improved and modernised quota management and licensing arrangements.

The meeting was well attended with representatives from fishermen’s associations from across the region, including Whitehaven, Barrow, Heysham, Morecombe and Fleetwood. Ron Graham was appointed as Chairman and Dick Langley as Vice Chairman.

The meeting covered and adopted positions on a wide range of issues ranging from under 10 metre licensing and quota management, effort control, marine conservation planning, through to development funding, where Richard Combe, the Northern Region European Fisheries Fund facilitator advised on the support available to the industry.

The meeting heard that feasibility work to develop a sustainable razor clam fishery in the region had received funding through the Fisheries Science Partnership (FSP) programme.

The Committee will play an important role in defining NFFO policy and in addressing issues affecting the Eastern Irish Sea. Future meetings will be rotated around the region with the next taking place in Barrow

However, following a case to Ministers made by the NFFO, for the first time in over two decades the fishing industry in England is exempt from the charges.

Light dues were extended to fishing vessels to fund the Decca radio-navigation system when the Government took over financial responsibility for it in the late 1980s, when the arrival of GPS undermined Decca’s viability. Despite the final demise of the Decca system a few years later, the Government rejected pleas for the removal of light dues charges from over 10 metre fishing vessels, despite the clear evidence that fishing vessels are only light and sporadic users of the lights system and the UK was the only Government in Europe to levy the charge on its fishing fleets.

The oil price spike of 2008 and reinvigorated representations to Defra eventually persuaded the Ministers to meet this charge from internal budgets. A similar case has been put to the Northern Ireland Minister and we are continuing to press the argument.

Progress on the light dues front is part of a wider NFFO campaign to reduce regulatory costs on the industry.

We have come to the inescapable conclusion that the scale of effort reductions imposed will seriously jeopardise the long term viability of the vessels that are subject to it, even though strenuous efforts are being made to “buyback” days through various cod avoidance measures. The paper below spells out the NFFO position in detail.Cod Recovery and Days at Sea Restrictions: an NFFO Position Paper

The EU Cod Recovery Plan agreed by the Council of Ministers in November and formally adopted in December 2008, imposes a 25% reduction in fishing effort in 2009, with further reductions in subsequent years, dependent on the conservation status of the various cod stocks. The Regulation also provides scope for vessels and fleets to “buy-back” days at sea up to a maximum of the 25% reduction.

Since the start of this year the NFFO has been in detailed discussions with Defra officials over the detail of how the new Kw days regime should be applied during this year and beyond.

Within this context, this paper describes the NFFO’s current position. .

Immediate Issues

A number of immediate issues arise from the interim UK effort regime that will be in place until 30th April. It is appropriate because of this time frame that we address these at the outset of our paper:

We can see no justification for the restriction that applies a penalty for bringing forward days from the rest of the effort year into the interim period. Almost all fisheries are seasonal, some more than others and it wholly arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary to disadvantage vessels operating in fisheries whose main period of activity may be predominantly in the first three months of the year.
The failure to provide licence entitlements with an allocation of days, in the same way as active eligible vessels, is an unsustainable position, which has immediate consequences for operators who find themselves in this position and long-term implications for fleet renewal. It is vital to resolve this issue quickly.

Effort Control as a Management Tool

It is a matter of grave concern to us that effort control has emerged as a key instrument in the CFP without any serious analysis as to its effect, either in terms of fishing mortality or its impact on the economic viability of vessels. Under restrictive time at sea, it is rational economic behaviour for fishermen to fish more intensively during the period during which they are allowed to go to sea, than would otherwise be the case. This is the primary reason why there is a large area of uncertainty over the precise contribution that effort control can make to reducing fishing mortality. Fisheries scientists express this problem as “the non-linear relationship between fishing effort and fishing mortality” and “the fisheries response to restrictive measures” but these phrases hardly capture the scale of the potential misalignment between days at sea and the objective of rebuilding cod stocks. For example, where vessels target inshore stocks to save their days at sea allocations, or high grade to maximize income, or adapt their fishing pattern in a thousand other different ways, effort control can not only be a very blunt and largely ineffective measure, it actually creates a perverse incentive. Despite repeated requests, the Commission has failed to ask of ICES or even STECF, the fundamental question: Does effort control deliver stock recovery? To date we have seen no evidence that recovery plans based on effort control are more successful than those without an effort regime.

What is much more certain than the contribution that effort control can make to the reduction in fishing mortality, is the clear evidence that effort constraints increase fleet costs and reduce operational flexibility, ultimately to the point at which the business viability can be jeopardised. How close our fleets are to that point in 2009 is, so far, an open question.

The impact of effort reductions is absolute, in a way in which quota controls are not. Limitations on time at sea quickly translate to reductions in economic viability. By contrast, when quotas are reduced, there remains a degree of flexibility, for example by changing target species. This type of flexibility is simply not available when a restrictive effort regime applies and suggests that much more care needs to be taken when applying effort controls.

Finally, we would make the point that the application of days at sea reductions in the revised cod recovery plan has been the antitheses of good governance. Days at sea restrictions have been applied under the new regime:

in the absence of a meaningful regulatory impact assessment, despite this being one of the most significant changes to the CFP since its inception
with a scale of reduction from baselines that amounts to the irresponsible
and with reduction rates that are wholly arbitrary , with no clear relationship to ICES advice

It is for these reasons – the questionable status of effort limits as an effective conservation tool, along with its blunt and damaging economic impact – that the NFFO has consistently opposed, and continues to oppose, the application days at sea restrictions, in favour of alternatives.

Effort control is the last throw of the dice of a centralised command and control system that itself is overdue for reform. Its primary merit is cosmetic. It can be applied at a distance by a remote bureaucracy, giving to the gullible the impression of effective intervention and management. Its other advantage for the Commission is that is can be used as an instrument of coercion: to force member states to reduce fishing capacity through publically funded decommissioning schemes, or to apply other management measures that do have a prospect of directly reducing fishing mortality on cod, such as more selective gear or various types of spatial/temporal cod avoidance arrangements.

The NFFO was dragged reluctantly into the UK’s Kw pilot scheme for 2008. It was abundantly clear to us at that stage that the headroom in days permitted by the Commission would not survive the initial introductory period, and so it has proved. The Commission, through the new cod recovery plan, is now in a position to demand the most draconian reductions without having to deal with the problems and practicalities of implementation. These have now been transferred to the member states. We are therefore currently in that uncomfortable period of finding ways to accommodate and ameliorate unmanageable effort reductions.

Effort Control in 2009

The novel features of the new cod recovery plan are:

The establishment of effort baselines relating to fleet effort during the period 2004 – 2006. There are a number of significant concerns over the accuracy of those baselines and the lack of transparency in the process through which they have been established. We have yet to reach the stage when we have confidence in the baselines.
The scale of the effort reductions. As discussed above the 25% reduction is at a level where there is no comparable example, in terms of economic impact or implementation problems
The Kw days approach, which transfers competence for detailed management of days at sea restrictions from the Commission and Council of Ministers, to member states. What was sold as “flexibility” for member states to tailor their own effort regime to their own requirements, becomes a huge, unmanageable burden, with this scale of reduction
The facility for vessels and fleets to “buy-back” the reduction in days at sea allocation up to a maximum of 25% in return for the adoption of various kinds of cod avoidance measures.
The extension of the cod recovery zone in to the west. The absence of adequate consultation on changes to the western boundary of the CRZ has meant the unnecessary inclusion of an area of deep water which harbours a clean saithe fishery in the CRZ.

Against this background, the UK authorities and the devolved administrations, have instigated a number of cod avoidance measures as a means of “buying back” the 25% reduction imposed in 2009. In particular, the Scottish administration as part of the Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme has taken the lead in applying real time closures in both Scottish and Norwegian waters, building on an approach first applied in 2008. Defra / MFA have followed suit with a number of real time closures in English waters and the Northern Irish administration has taken the lead in proposing a number of measures tailored to the fishery in the Irish Sea.

The NFFO has been asked for its views on how to move forward in the context of the circumstances described above. The rest of this paper describes those views.

NFFO Position

The introductory remarks to this paper should have left no doubt that we are strongly opposed to the use of days at sea restrictions for a range of reasons. Nevertheless, we recognise the importance of working collaboratively with Defra and the devolved administrations to secure the “least worst” outcome for 2009, whilst pressing for CFP reform at European level.

Our starting point is that the scale of the 25% reduction applied in 2009 is wholly arbitrary with no basis in scientific advice or in negotiated consent from those to which it applies. Against this background, we wish to make it clear that should there be evidence that days at sea for 2009 are insufficient to allow the fleets to take their legitimate quotas, thereby jeopardising the long term viability of the UK fleets, then we must hold the UK Minister to his commitment to return to Brussels to renegotiate the package. We know this will not be easy and that it is therefore important that we provide the Minister with the strongest possible negotiating hand. In particular, we must demonstrate that the UK has made vigorous efforts to implement the new cod recovery plan.

For these reasons, we outline the following package of measures that the NFFO could support as part of the UK’s buy-back package:

Real Time Closures

RTCs in Scottish Waters: We support real time closures both as an effective means of cod avoidance and as a contribution to buying back days at sea. However, a precondition of that support is that that we are directly involved in defining the conditions and criteria used to apply real time closures to our vessels, whether in English, Northern Irish, Scottish, or Norwegian waters. There have been serious deficiencies in terms of lack of transparency, communication and involvement in the RTCs applied by the Scottish administration. This may be excused by the speed at which they have been applied but it is now essential that the failures of governance are addressed and we are party to any discussions on any real time closures that apply to our fleets.

RTCs in Norwegian Waters: As the terms of the RTC regime in the North Sea are solidified during discussions between EU and Norway scheduled for May, it is critically important that there are strong communication channels between negotiating officials and the NFFO. Indeed on an issue such as this there is a very strong argument for the industry to be direct parties to the negotiations.

What is not acceptable (and we think is now fully understood) is to have one administration making RTC rules for fleets that have not been party to the development of those rules.

It is a matter of demonstrable fact that many NFFO member vessels spend a very high proportion of their time operating in “Scottish” waters and in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. It is imperative therefore that the arrangements that would allow us to shape the RTC programme in Scottish waters are quickly put in place.

RTCs in English Waters: We support the application of RTCs in the English zone as a contribution to cod recovery and as a means of buying-back days. However, given the relatively few vessels operating in the central and southern North Sea, we don’t think that the Scottish arrangements can simply be transferred across, as there will be too few vessels operating to trigger sufficient closures to amount to a credible measure. We suggest that logbook/VMS/LPUE data is used as a substitute. We are happy to discuss this further.

Closures in the Irish Sea: The restricted area of the Irish Sea and the existing seasonal closure means that RTCs are not an appropriate approach for this zone. Alternatives are discussed below.

Eliminator Trawl

The NFFO was involved in bringing the eliminator trawl from the United States to the UK and the initial trials on the East Coast.

We remain of the view that this gear represents a breakthrough in the search for a net that is selective for cod. In circumstances where an almost total exclusion of cod from the catch is required it shows great promise. What is also clear, however, is that the eliminator trawl is not a panacea. Much more work is required to demonstrate its utility in a range of different fisheries and with different sizes of vessel and for this reason we have given trials of different variants of the eliminator priority in this year’s Fisheries Science Partnership projects. However, the funding available to provide a complete picture of the eliminator’s potential is not likely to be available from within the FSP budget and we therefore think that it is important to identify alternative sources of finance for this important work.

We see the eliminator being useful in meeting the EU Norway commitments, should uptake of the cod quota reach 90% by 15th November but also as part of cod avoidance plans.Juveniles/ Improved Exploitation Pattern

We believe that more could be done, as part of the buyback programme, to defer capture of juvenile cod, thereby improving the exploitation pattern of the species. In this context we would propose the following:

North Sea

Nephrop trawlers should be able to buyback a relevant proportion of days in return for increasing the selectivity of their gear:

For twin rig trawlers targeting nephrops, an increase in mesh size to 99mm (with a maximum twine size of double 4mm) throughout the North Sea
Single trawls targeting nephrops, should be rewarded with extra days if they increase the mesh size in their mandatory square mesh panel from 90mm to 100mm.

Irish Sea

The following measures are advanced for the Irish Sea as a three stranded approach:

as a contribution towards rebuilding cod stocks
as part of a UK case to the Commission for revisiting the cod recovery plan
as a contribution towards the buy-back of days in 2009

We would support:

The retention of the current seasonal closure in the Irish Sea, appropriately refined in area and duration
The establishment of an “amber” area in the eastern Irish Sea. This area would be closed to those vessels which agree to the closure in return for additional days. A derogation would apply for vessels that catch minimal amounts of cod. Clearly, this measure would be more effective if supported by vessels from other member states.
Whitefish Vessels: Increased mesh size for vessels targeting whitefish from 100mm to 120mm (with max twine size 6mm single or 4mm double as per current legislation)
Nephrops Single Trawl: Mesh size increase from 70mm to 80mm (again constructed from max 6mm or double 4mm twine)
Nephrops Twin-rig Trawl: Mesh size increase from 80mm to 99mm (max 6mm single; 4mm double twine)
Requirement for a 120mm square mesh panel in the tapered section of all nets targeting nephrops (following positive results from ongoing gear trials in the Irish Sea)

It has to be appreciated that the scale of the projected cuts in effort under the Cod Recovery Plan to 2013 are absolutely inconsistent with the economic survival of a whitefish or a nephrops fleet in the Irish Sea. For this reason the forgoing proposals would only be acceptable as part of a package which involves a serious UK commitment to secure a renegotiated CRP with more realistic effort obligations.

Clearly we would wish to discuss the various strands of a renegotiated CRP but the elements of a possible approach that we could find acceptable for the Irish Sea would contain:

The UK, as a high level policy objective, should strive to cap the UK pot of days at 2004 -2006 reference level, on the grounds that 2009 has demonstrated extreme economic dislocation resulting from an arbitrary but very severe reduction of 25%
This allocation should only be reduced in the future to address technical creep or if capacity reductions have not achieved an equivalent reduction. (This is the approach that applies in Faeroes)
It is important to appreciate that the main reductions in cod mortality are secured by the severe constraints on TACs
The implementation of the above should take place within the context of a programme of systematic upgrading of the science on Irish Sea fish stocks and in particular, the state of the cod stock taking into account, interaction with other stocks and the influence of climate change and cyclical pattern

Capacity Reduction: a novel approach

Effort control is a temporary, inadequate, economically perverse substitute for a structural policy. In this we agree with the Commission, which has in general been frustrated by member states’ reluctance to reduce the fishing capacity of their fleets through publically funded decommissioning schemes; and also with the Norwegian Government which has always seen effort control as a failure of political will and commitment to the fishing industry.

The most effective way to reduce fishing capacity is through a voluntary, publically funded decommissioning scheme and the UK has in the past made a substantial contribution to the recovery of cod stocks and underpinning the profitability of the fleet and the prospects for a high level of compliance by funding substantial decommissioning schemes.

We appreciate that given the current financial crisis public finances will be stretched for the indefinite future. We therefore advance the idea of a capacity reduction programme based on co-financing between government and industry.

The merits of this approach would be the permanent reduction of capacity at a lower cost to the public purse than a full decommissioning scheme; a reduction in the fleets targeting cod, and increased viability for the vessels that remain. We are happy to discuss the practicalities of how this might be achieved.

Flat Rate Allocations

One of our principle objections to the Kw days approach is that it would lead to pressures to allocate days to different classes of vessel on a differential basis. This would be highly divisive and involve fisheries managers in a series of value judgements as to whom was more deserving, over and above which vessels should be rewarded for “virtuous” behaviour. It would also embed and institutionalise effort control in a much deeper way than has hitherto been the case.

The way to avoid this is to ensure that effort is allocated on a flat rate basis, with additional days only for various categories of cod avoidance.

Licence Entitlements

At any point in time a number of fishing vessel licenses will not be attached to vessels for a variety of reasons but mainly relating to commercial transactions and restructuring. We have asked that licences in this transitional situation are granted a days at sea allocation in the same way as an active fishing vessel. This was the arrangement under the previous new days at sea regime and is entirely consistent with the principles of equity and flexibility to allow for new investment. The licence represents a potential authority to fish and without a days at sea allocation that potential is stripped away. We consider that both morally and as a matter of law, entitlements should receive an allocation of days in the same way that currently active vessels are.

Exempt Fleets

The provision that allows vessels which catch minimal amounts of cod – below 1.5% cod -exemption from the days at sea regime is an important one and its early availability should be pursued vigorously. We would anticipate that significant parts of the beam trawl, saithe and nephrops fleets would be eligible to take advantage of this clause.

Observer Programme

The absence of derogations for vessels that carry observers to confirm that cod catches remain below 5% and the removal of the derogation for a clean saithe fishery, are proving extremely restrictive. There is a big difference between 5% and 1.5%, especially against the background of a recovering cod stock.

2004-6 Reference Period / Validity of Baselines

In the interests of transparency and to ensure the accuracy of the data we consider it important to find a means to revisit both the rational behind using the 2004-6 reference period and the quality control used in establishing the baselines for the various effort groups. We know of serious deficiencies in the data employed by other member states and it is important that we have the facility to scrutinise the UK data for possible anomalies that may only be obvious to an industry eye with direct experience of the fisheries concerned.

Cod Avoidance Plans

The NFFO, during 2008 trialled a number of individual vessel cod avoidance plans through which the vessels designed and followed a series of spatial, temporal and gear avoidance measures tailored to their own vessels. Although the pilot was late starting, the results were in the main encouraging and we consider that it is important to continue the trial, not least because of the useful data on cod discards and how to avoid them that the trials generate. We appreciate that there are administrative challenges in operating individual cod avoidance plans at fleet level but as an experiment in bottom-up management that gives the industry responsibility for designing and implementing its own arrangements subject to periodic audit, it is an important, ground breaking, initiative that should be continued and supported.

Conclusion

This paper has described the NFFO’s opposition to the Kw days regime. It argues that the scale of the effort reductions in the cod recovery plan is such that the industry will not be able to absorb them and at the same time remain economically viable. It is therefore inevitable that at some stage the Minister will have to return to Brussels to revisit the legislation agreed last November.

We appreciate that the Minister’s negotiating hand will be strengthened if the UK can demonstrate that it has been vigorous in its attempts to implement the cod recovery plan. We therefore put forward a range of suggestions for measures that could be included as part of the buyback arrangements. We also raise a number of concerns about the implementation of the Kw days regime to date.

NFFO March 2009.

“There is a limited time window to appeal. If any fisherman believes that he will be disadvantaged by being placed in the wrong licence category, now is the time to act”, said NFFO Chairman Davy Hill.

“Once the appeals procedure is closed it will be very difficult to change category. But if any skipper thinks that he may have grounds to appeal he should do so without delay “, he said.

“If there was any reason why the vessel could not catch the defined quota species in the reference period (January 2007 –June 2008) he should appeal. The prospects of a successful appeal appear to be quite good. And reasons include family illness or engine breakdown or replacement – as long as some evidence can be produced.”

The NFFO suggests caution about re-registering to Scotland or Wales to escape the new licence arrangements.

“At the moment the under 10metre quota pool is a UK pool but against the background of the devolution settlement and the ambition of the Scottish administration to establish its own quota management system, there is no guarantee that in the future, a Scottish registered vessel might not be able to fish against the English pool and vice versa. Re-registration to the devolved administrations involves some risk.”

“Under-10m fishermen are better advised to put their immediate energies into a well argued appeal”

“The NFFO, along with other industry organisations, argued strenuously against the split licence and for a license buyout programme instead, views that were ignored by Defra. The immediate priority must therefore be to ensure that no bona fide fisherman is disadvantaged, when there is a prospect of securing a full license through appeal.”

“We agree that there is an issue of latent capacity in the under 10-metre sector. Our difficulty is with the way that Defra has gone about dealing with it and the impact of this approach on genuine fishermen. It is vital that the damage is kept to a minimum and we see the appeals mechanism as a way to do this”.NFFO staff are available to help NFFO members prepare their appeals.

The closing date for appeals is 23rd March 2009.

The proposal is one of the most poorly thought through documents ever to emerge from Brussels and appears to have all the hallmarks of a proposal produced in panic after the CFP was the subject of “the most critical report by the European Court of Auditors since the start of the European Union”

The proposal ties modern technology to some of the most backward thinking to emerge on fisheries management for some time. A requirement for satellite monitoring and electronic logbooks, for all vessels down to 10 metres, is tied to a series of measures that often treat fishermen like convicted criminals. The whole proposal appears to have been written as a policeman’s wish list. We understand that there is considerable unease about the proposal even from within parts of the Commission itself.

The Federation has been working with the RACS to highlight the parts of the proposal that must change before the proposal is put before the Council of Ministers. These include:

A margin of tolerance between logbook and landing declaration reduced to 5% when it has been repeatedly pointed out that this level of accuracy is simply not achievable on a consistent basis. (For example, to take only one factor, research has demonstrated that monkfish can lose up to 15% of its weight during the course of a trip after capture)
A requirement that fishing vessels must maintain a speed above 6 knots at all times when in a marine protected zone. Apart from whether this is practically realizable for all fishing vessels in all conditions without jeopardising the vessel and crew, it reveals a dismal lack of knowledge about the legislation on MPAs. Some MPAs may become closed areas for fishing but this will be decided as part of a tailored management regime. Many parts of designated MPAs will remain open for some kinds of fishing.
Requirements that cut across and undermine perfectly valid commercial practises in the industry, for no obvious benefit other than a spurious and sometimes dangerous rigidity in areas such as advance notification of landing

A facility to take quota from fishermen who have already been prosecuted for an infringement. This contrives the double jeopardy rules that apply in other areas of criminal justice system
108 other clauses that require scrutiny, comment and where necessary criticism

We fully accept that a high degree of compliance is a precondition for an effective fisheries policy and if we have rules, they must be enforced to ensure that everyone is operating on an even playing field. But the current Commission proposal is a travesty. It is a backward and poorly thought through document which would benefit from being shelved until the CFP reform in 2012 provides the legal basis for a much higher degree of industry involvement for management and control within a framework of audited monitoring. This is not likely to happen as the Commission is desperate to demonstrate that it is reaction to the Court of Auditors report. Unless we can secure radical changes to the proposal we will have to live with the consequences.

The meeting was held in Rome and, along with a large number of Commission officials, was attended by representatives of major fishing organisations from across Europe.

The purpose of the meeting, organised jointly by Europeche, the European Association of Producer Organisations and Cogeca ( the association of fishing cooperatives) was to discuss the contents of the Commission’s forthcoming Green Paper on CFP reform. The Green Paper is expected to be published at the end of April and will signal the start of a year long debate on the reforms. It is planned that the revised CFP will take force from 1st January 2013, although many of the measures would be phased in after that date.

It is already clear that the Commission plan a very deep reform of the CFP. Although the Commission’s earlier working paper was criticised for painting a picture of unrelieved gloom on the state of the Community’s fish stocks, many of the reforms signalled by the Director General were in a direction that the NFFO would applaud.

A break with the one size fits all approach, the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the centre to the regions, to member states and to the fishing industry, are all part of the Commission’s current thinking. At the same time, the Commission made very clear that the general economic climate would make conditions in the fishing industry very difficult in the near future. Whilst member states are dealing with their “monumental debts” this is bound to have an impact on the funding available to the successor to the European Fisheries fund after 2013.

Although a number of the planned reforms are in the direction that the NFFO has been arguing for over a number of years, it is not likely that those arguments have suddenly proved persuasive. Rather, a major driver for the proposed changes is the financial cost of applying a centralised, command and control system and the meagre results.

The cost to the public purse of managing and enforcing European fisheries frequently exceeds the net revenue of those fisheries; and the CFP was the recent subject of the most savagely critical report by the European Court of Auditors in the history of the European Union. In the current circumstances the status quo is seen as untenable. Hence the newfound interest in devolving management responsibility.

Whilst welcoming radical CFP reform, the NFFO is wary of the dangers of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, particularly with regard to any ill-thought through move away from the principle of Relative Stability. The meeting provided the opportunity to warn of the dangers of undermining national quota management arrangements that in some member states were quite sophisticated and already adhered to the principles of rights based management. The Commission was at pains to emphasise that any change would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary and the stability remained a fundamental objective.

It was interesting to hear that the Commission intended to build in a facility to take a step backwards if it judged that it had made a mistake. This kind of adaptive approach would be very welcome and would certainly contrast with the god-like posturing of the past.

The Commission remains of the view that the sector’s profitability and therefore resilience to external shocks, is undermined by fleet overcapacity, although during the meeting it was forced to concede that some member states and some fisheries had made huge efforts to address the issue through publically funded decommissioning schemes. The Commission also agreed that effort control was a profoundly anti-economic instrument, only justifiable where member states have not adequately dealt with the overcapacity issue.

A huge number of issues were addressed over the course of the three day meeting including:

Approaches to discard reduction
Results based management
Long term management plans
Industry self-management
Inshore and offshore fisheries
Markets
Coherence between different parts of the policy
Control systems
Margin of tolerance
External fisheries

The Federation will be preparing a formal written response to the Green Paper when it is published but this meeting provided an invaluable insight into what had been included in the Green Paper and why. It also afforded the fishing industry an opportunity to raise a number of critically important issues.

A project charged with designing a network of Marine Conservation Zones MCZs in the South West by 2012. The Committee will use the seat to make representations on behalf of the NFFO South West membership.

Finding Sanctuary is the first of four regional projects in England intended to implement MCZ legislation contained in the Marine Bill that is currently working its way through parliament. The other three projects are currently being established for the Eastern Channel, North Sea, and Irish Sea. MCZs are expected to control the level of human activity within their boundaries to varying degrees ranging from limited restrictions through to highly protected sites.

The NFFO maintain that claims for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are often ill defined and overblown. Especially for fisheries, MPAs have only marginal relevance to their successful management and direct fleet management will continue to be much more important. What has been lacking in European fisheries has not been a shortage of tools in the tool box but a failure of good governance in applying the tools we do have.

It is regretful that Natural England as conservation advisor to government has on occasion chosen to act as standard bearer to such overblown claims, preceded by sensationalist dogma of impending destruction of our marine environment that does not reflect the trends, certainly in the context of UK waters. Such grandstanding conflicts directly with the regional projects such as Finding Sanctuary, which claim to wish to bring together a wide variety of local stakeholders to plan the MCZ networks under a consensus based approach, and which are supposedly backed by Natural England.

Until hysteria about our marine environment is replaced by considered, objective and evidence based debate there will continue to be unnecessary conflict that only serves to undermine the maintenance and support of sustainable marine livelihoods which NFFO believes must be at the centre of effective marine natural resource policy, but which at present is woefully lacking.

The EFRA (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) Committee is investigating Britain’s ability to feed itself in the future against the background of growing word population and potential political and environmental interruptions to supply.

Apart from being interested in the NFFO’s views on the CFP, as a principal factor in the fish available to the British consumer, the Committee had a number of specific questions:

What were the NFFO’s views on the status of fish stocks generally?
Did we concur with the Food and Agriculture Organisation view that aquaculture should be dramatically increased to fill the looming gap between demand and future supply?
Did Defra give sufficient priority to the marine environment?
Did Defra monitor fish stocks adequately?

In our evidence the NFFO:

Criticised broad brush reports from various quasi-academic and environmental groups that gave the impression that all fish stocks were in a state of collapse
Emphasised that the stocks situation in Community waters could best be described as mixed, with many stocks stable, some rapidly rebuilding but others yet to respond to management measures
Argued that the full potential of the stocks in Community waters had not been realised under the CFP and that the top-down prescriptive approach that had characterised the CFP to date was largely responsible for this under-performance
Suggested that there had already been some progress towards a more participative, tailored CFP had been made and that more progress in this direction was a priority
Indicated that aquaculture certainly had an important role to play in the future food supply but that outside mussel cultivation, a major expansion of sea based aquaculture faced important constraints because of: – Conflict with inshore fishing – Pollution around the cages – Escapees damaging the genetic pool of wild stocks – Dependence on the capture of 4kgs of wild fish to grow 1kg of farmed fish.

Discussed the concept of maximum sustainable yield, its strengths and limitations and the ability of the current science regime to provide accurate information on stocks
Emphasised that moving in the right direction on fish stocks was more useful than arcane and often pointless discussions about destination and targets
Indicated that the Marine Bill currently passing through Parliament demonstrated a serious commitment to the marine environment but that Defra Fisheries Division was under-resourced given its multiple roles and demands of coordinating a UK position in international negotiations

The Chairman indicated that the Committee might wish to revisit the Common Fisheries Policy as part of its future work programme.

Our evidence was followed by a Committee session with the National Farmers’ Union.

A number of NFFO members have received First Class treatment, including heart bypass operations, in this facility. The hospital is situated directly opposite the Houses of Parliament in London.

In cases where fishermen face a queue or delay in receiving treatment through the NHS, this alternative is available.

Seamen’s Hospital Society

Registered Charity No: 231724

The Seamen’s Hospital Society assists seafarers and their dependants in need by making grants to qualifying individuals, as well as to selected organisations. Applications for individual assistance may be made at any time. For further information, please view the Society’s website: www.seahospital.org.uk or contact it’s Greenwich office directly: Tel 020 8858 3696, Email: admin@seahospital.org.uk or by post: 29 King William Walk, Greenwich, London SE10 9HX.

The Seafarers’ Advice & Information Line is managed and operated on behalf of the Seamen’s Hospital Society by Greenwich Citizens Advice Bureaux. It provides advice and help to seafarers (both active and retired) and their dependants on a range of issues including welfare benefits, employment, housing, debt, consumer problems, legal problems, personal relationships, and tax. The service is free, independent, impartial and confidential. For further information visit: www.sailine.org.uk.

The Line may be contacted Mon – Fri 10.00 am – 4.00 pm on tel: 08457 413 318.

All messages left outside these hours are returned as soon as possible.

Alternatively, write to Seafarers’ Advice & Information Line, PO Box 45234, Greenwich, London SE10 9WR or Email: admin@sailine.org.uk.

Dreadnought Medical Service

The Dreadnought Medical Service – often called simply “the Dreadnought” – is a facility offering priority medical treatment to eligible seafarers through the medical services at Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust in London. Its principal aim is to enable serving seafarers to return to work as soon as possible by providing treatment in a shorter timescale than may normally be offered at a seafarer’s local NHS hospital (although this cannot always be guaranteed).

Who is eligible for treatment at the Dreadnought?

The following are eligible for elective priority treatment at the Dreadnought:

active seafarers, pilots, tugboat men, etc
trainee candidates for the merchant navy
fishing vessel personnel
shipping company shore staff essential to the function of the fleet
dependants, where the illness of the spouse or child causes the seafarer grave concern

The following (but not their dependants) are also eligible to be considered for elective treatment:

union officials
retired seafarers

How do I get treatment at the Dreadnought?

You will need a completed referral form and a referral letter from your GP or other approved/company doctor, both of which should be sent to the Dreadnought Administrator (see ‘Contacts’ below). Standard referral forms are available from the Dreadnought Administrator.Can I have dental treatment at the Dreadnought?

Active seafarers may have dental treatment via the Dreadnought. Further information may be obtained from the Dreadnought Dentist (tel: 020 7188 2047) between 10.30 am-12.00 noon on Tues, Weds and Thurs.I’m a retired seafarer – can I still use the Dreadnought?

Seafarers who have retired after spending their working lives at sea, and who have not taken up subsequent employment, are eligible to be considered for treatment at the Dreadnought, although not normally on a priority basis. The dependants of retired seafarers are not entitled to use the Dreadnought.I live some distance away and can’t afford the fare:

If you are on a low income, patient transport services (tel: 020 7188 2888) at Guy’s & St Thomas’ can advise whether you are eligible for help from the Department of Work and Pensions with the cost of fares to and from your home. If you are not eligible for help from this source, but can prove financial need, the Seamen’s Hospital Society (tel: 020 8858 3696) may be able to help with the payment of fares.I can’t manage to travel by public transport – what should I do?

In some instances you may be eligible for ambulance or other special transport, even outside London. Patient transport services (tel: 020 7188 2888) at Guy’s & St Thomas’ can advise you on this.I need overnight accommodation before or after my appointment:

Accommodation can be booked at the hospital or, near St Thomas’, at the Marine Society. Please contact the Dreadnought Administrator for further information and advice.Contact: Dreadnought Administrator

Dreadnought Medical Service

St Thomas’ Hospital

Lambeth Palace Road

London SE1 7EHTel: 020 7188 2049

Fax: 020 7188 2051

Email: dreadnought2@gstt.nhs.uk

Unless fishermen have confidence in the science on which their quotas are based and the rules under which they operate are fixed, fisheries managers will always face an uphill struggle and the industry will resent the constraints that impact on their livelihoods. Scientists, fishermen and fisheries managers all therefore have a common interest in assessments that are accurate, impartial and relevant. In the Irish Sea, something approaching a breakdown between fishermen and scientists has marred and weakened the provision of accurate assessments for some years. An NFFO paper presented to the Irish Sea Working Group of the North Western Waters Regional Advisory Council, which met recently in Madrid, seeks to address this damaging situation

Draft: for Discussion

Irish Sea Fisheries Science Manifesto

Context

The Irish Sea was the first area to experience EU cod recovery measures, initially in the form of industry-led strengthened selectivity requirements and later, in the form of an imposed seasonal closed area during the assumed cod spawning area/period. Subsequently, the whole panoply of EU cod recovery measures, including drastically reduced TACs, the effective decommissioning of a substantial part of the whitefish fleet, strengthened landing controls and effort restrictions were applied. These measures had extensive socio-economic consequences.

Diversion of Effort

Given the economic pressures associated with the recovery measures, the most salient feature of the Irish Sea demersal fisheries since 1999 has been a major diversion of fishing effort from whitefish to nephrops as the principal target species.

Recovery

In contrast to the North Sea, ICES assessments for the Irish Sea have not suggested a significant change in fortunes for the Irish Sea cod stock, although the industry view, which is often more up to date than the formal assessments, is that the local cod stocks are rebuilding quite rapidly.

Stock Assessments

Objectively, Irish Sea fishermen, fisheries scientists, and fisheries managers share a common interest in stock assessments and fisheries advice that is:

accurate
relevant
impartial
accessible
useful

A Broken System

Despite this common interest, it is true to say that during much of the period when, annually and incrementally, additional cod recovery measures were applied, relations between the fishing industry and fisheries scientist in the Irish Sea were strained, even baleful. In large part this reflected the familiar vicious cycle of poor data, leading to poor assessments, leading to precautionary TAC proposals, leading to low TACs, leading to misreporting, leading to poor data.

New Beginnings

A break with this self-destructive pattern was seen with the emergence of a number of initiatives:

The fisheries science partnership projects which from 2003 funded collaborative work between fishermen and fisheries scientists
Collaborative projects outside the FSP framework (expand)
The introduction of buyers and sellers registration that effectively ended large scale misreporting and meant that official landings data could again be used in stock assessments
Collaboration in the Irish Sea Discards Project

Current Position

The current situation is a difficult one for Irish Sea fishermen. Draconian measures have forced many changes on the fleets, including the redirection of fishing effort to alternative species and distant grounds, reducing crew numbers, deferring upgrades etc. At the same time there is little sign that the sacrifices that have been made are having any effect. The layers of successive measures mean that it is not possible to determine which have been effective and which ones haven’t. There is a strong sense of frustration that despite signs at sea that cod stocks are again rebuilding it will be years before this improvement is reflected in ICES assessments and further years before the constraints in the form of extremely low TACs are lifted by the Commission and the Council of Ministers.

It is against this background that we propose a radical change to the science regime in the Irish Sea. By this we do not suggest jettisoning ICES assessments but reinforcing them in various ways with industry data and knowledge in order that they track more closely the main trends in the fishery earlier and more precisely.

Industry Led Science Support

The Irish Sea fishing industry proposes a number of initiatives that would:

Provide ICES scientists with additional data on fishing and fish stock trends through self-sampling to address areas such as discards where there are significant data gaps
Participate in well designed, scientifically valid fisheries science partnership projects that fill significant gaps in ICES knowledge about the Irish Sea fisheries. We envisage research voyages aboard commercial fishing vessels, validated through observers or CC TV coverage
Produce Annual Fisheries Reports that provide industry data on relevant aspects of the Irish Sea demersal fisheries including changes to fishing patterns, reaction to management measures, new technologies, and economic drivers of new behaviours.
Participate in regular dialogue with ICES scientists, including involvement in the new ICES benchmark meetings that will allow fishermen and other stakeholders the opportunity to participate in a fundamental review of the assessments, stock by stock
Make available to ICES fishing diaries which contain precise and useful data on spatial and temporal stock patterns and fishing activity

In aggregate, these initiatives would aim to:

reduce uncertainties in the ICES assessments
bring new streams of knowledge into the assessment process
make ICES advice more relevant by bringing real time data into the assessments
Help to design new measures such as cod avoidance plans and real time closures, that might strengthen protection for cod without unduly impacting on the capacity of individual vessels to earn a living

Conclusion

There is a recognition that over the last decade the fisheries management and information systems in the Irish Sea have witnessed a comprehensive failure. A move to a more collaborative industry/science approach is a prerequisite for a strong scientific underpinning that is required for effective management measures whether the cod stock remains in a depleted state or whether the stocks show signs of recovery. We know from published science and the experience of the North Sea that cod recovery can be quite rapid. We also know that industry sources of information tend to be more up to date than allowed for in the ICES assessment models.

Therefore, a collaborative science programme to support and supplement the more orthodox, formal, assessments will act as a sentinel for recovering cod stocks and facilitate the early adoption of cod avoidance measures that would avoid problems such as discarding seen in the North Sea. This paper is an attempt to take the initiative by launching a new comprehensive and systematic partnership approach to fisheries science in the Irish Sea.

The Proposal was discussed at the recent meeting of the North Sea RAC in Berlin, and apart from disbelief at the backward looking tone of the document, the RAC expressed a will to develop a workable, viable, alternative. One participant in the RAC meeting noted that in our kind of societies it is not usual for policemen to write the rules; yet this is what appears to be happening in the case of this Regulation.

There is strong support for a move away from the type of command and control, micro-management, that characterises the present CFP, and the proposed control regulation, to one in which the fishing industry would itself develop and apply management plans, within a broad framework of principles and standards for sustainable fisheries.

What emerged from the Berlin meeting was that there is a real appetite and will for a different system that would transfer responsibility to the industry within a framework that provides important safeguards.

Work has only really just begun on how such a system would work in practice. However some broad outlines are emerging:

Industry groupings would develop, and submit for approval, plans that detail how their vessels will operate sustainably and profitably for the next five years or so
The plans would be required to meet broad principles and standards of sustainable fisheries; these would be established by the Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament after discussion with the RACs
The management plans would be developed in cooperation with fisheries scientists and fisheries economists
They would be audited periodically to ensure that the terms of the plans are being followed
It would be the industry’s responsibility to provide the monitoring and documentation that demonstrate that the fleets are operating in conformity with the plans
Under this new regime there would be no need for the multitude of technical and control rules that currently defeat fishermen, fisheries managers and enforcement authorities. The individual plans would spell out the gear and self imposed constraints that would apply to the vessels in the grouping.

Although this is the broad outline of a system of fisheries self-regulation, clearly much detail still needs to be worked out. For this reason the North Sea RAC has decided to convene a dedicated meeting in April to progress the issue.

What gives this initiative special impetus is that there is an expectation that the forthcoming review of the CFP will afford opportunities for such self regulation arrangements; the more concrete the ideas the RACs can put forward, the more rapidly the move from micro-management to self regulation will proceed.

The proposals contain much that the NFFO could support but also include provisions to tag “Scottish” quota and attach additional Scottish economic link requirements to any quota subsequently sold to non-Scottish vessels. This would undermine the free movement of quota and licences within the UK that has been a fundamental feature of the UK quota arrangements to date.

Despite withering criticism from the NFFO, and a large body of opposition from within the Scottish industry, the SNP-led minority administration in Edinburgh has retained the divisive and almost certainly illegal, economic link requirement. At heart, this is a politically driven initiative, more to do with window dressing than the real substantive issues confronting the UK fishing industry.

In two paragraphs of a short letter to Scottish Fisheries Minister Richard Lochhead, Huw Irranca-Davies has effectively punctured the Scottish economic link requirements:

“Free movement of vessels and quota throughout the UK is a fundamental part of the devolution settlement. I want fishermen across the UK to have clarity and reassurance about the business environment they are operating in. To that end, I must make it clear that UK Government does not recognise permanent Scottish quota as set out in your latest proposals. My position on the Scottish moratorium is unchanged – it is illegal in that it seeks t prevent Scottish vessels re-registering to another Fisheries Administration and taking their FQA units [Fixed Quota Allocations ]with them.

As such, if any Scottish vessel chooses to reregister from Scotland to England we will issue them with a licence and transfer the associated FQAs onto that licence thereby ensuring that they are free to continue to operate their businesses without hindrance”

The UK Minister’s response is measured, decisive – and very reassuring for those vessel operators who would have potentially affected by the Scottish economic link requirements. Many NFFO member vessels are registered in Scotland, land into Scottish ports and are members of Scottish producer organisations. The Minister’s commitment provides them with a clear assurance that the Scottish administration’s protectionist measures can be circumvented by re-registration.

The Scottish Administration’s decision to proceed on a course that will inevitably put it in conflict with the UK Minister is of course, a political tactic that has nothing to do with the fishing industry and its fortunes. It is, however, of the utmost concern that ministers, officials and industry representatives will now be focused on this internecine struggle rather than the real issues confronting the industry – days at sea restrictions, a new control regulation, marine conservation zones and the 2012 reform of the CFP to mention a few. This will be a major distraction, a huge own goal for the UK, that can only damage the industry’s interests.

Joint Belgian and UK Fishing Industry Collaboration and Cooperation Initiative for the Bristol Channel Ray Fisheries (Between the 6 and 12 mile Limits)

The undernoted parties met in London on Friday 13th February 2009, at a meeting facilitated by the Marine and Fisheries Agency, and agreed to collaborate in the establishment of a joint conservation initiative focused on the ray stocks in the Bristol Channel.

The principal elements of the agreement are:

Fishing Capacity :To monitor fishing capacity and fishing effort in the Bristol channel fisheries and to discuss the matter further if the anticipated reductions (due to a planned decommissioning scheme for Belgian vessels) do not materialise.
Minimum Landing Size: To consider whether progress can be made in providing additional protection to juvenile ray through an increase in the minimum landing size. As there appears to be some advantage to measuring rays from wing tip to wing tip, it is agreed to examine whether this should be adopted as a general approach.
Enhanced Survival Rates: Noting the current encouraging scientific research results on survival rates for discarded ray, it was agreed to further this work through additional collaborative research and also through the preparation of an educational leaflet and other materials designed to encourage better handling of rays returned to the sea.
Joint Fisheries Science Projects: To consider joint Fisheries Science projects aimed at underpinning improved exploitation patterns in the Bristol Channel ray fishery.
Voluntary Seasonal Closed Area: The Belgian industry agreed to consider compliance with the voluntary seasonal closed area in the Bristol Channel. The UK industry undertook to provide data on the rationale and justification for the closed area.
Improved Selectivity: To jointly investigate what progress can be made in improving the selectivity of fishing gears in the Bristol Channel ray fishery through improved technical measures. In this context the introduction of square mesh panels and other selectivity devices appropriate to different metiers to be trialled.
Regular Meetings: To meet regularly to ensure that the various initiatives are progressed at a reasonable speed
North West Waters Regional Advisory Council: To advise the NWWRAC of the joint initiative.
Next Meeting: To meet in Belgium in around two months to agree the next steps

Parties to the Agreement

National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations

Rederscentrale

North Devon Fishermen’s Association

South Wales Fishing Communities

Cornish Fish Producer Organisation

Supporting Parties

Marine and Fisheries Agency

Belgian Sea Fisheries Administration

Joint Belgian and UK Fishing Industry Collaboration and Cooperation Initiative for the Bristol Channel Ray Fisheries (Between the 6 and 12 mile Limits)

The principal elements of the agreement are:

Fishing Capacity :To monitor fishing capacity and fishing effort in the Bristol channel fisheries and to discuss the matter further if the anticipated reductions (due to a planned decommissioning scheme for Belgian vessels) do not materialise.
Minimum Landing Size: To consider whether progress can be made in providing additional protection to juvenile ray through an increase in the minimum landing size. As there appears to be some advantage to measuring rays from wing tip to wing tip, it is agreed to examine whether this should be adopted as a general approach.
Enhanced Survival Rates: Noting the current encouraging scientific research results on survival rates for discarded ray, it was agreed to further this work through additional collaborative research and also through the preparation of an educational leaflet and other materials designed to encourage better handling of rays returned to the sea.
Joint Fisheries Science Projects: To consider joint Fisheries Science projects aimed at underpinning improved exploitation patterns in the Bristol Channel ray fishery.
Voluntary Seasonal Closed Area: The Belgian industry agreed to consider compliance with the voluntary seasonal closed area in the Bristol Channel. The UK industry undertook to provide data on the rationale and justification for the closed area.
Improved Selectivity: To jointly investigate what progress can be made in improving the selectivity of fishing gears in the Bristol Channel ray fishery through improved technical measures. In this context the introduction of square mesh panels and other selectivity devices appropriate to different metiers to be trialled.
Regular Meetings: To meet regularly to ensure that the various initiatives are progressed at a reasonable speed
North West Waters Regional Advisory Council: To advise the NWWRAC of the joint initiative.
Next Meeting: To meet in Belgium in around two months to agree the next steps

Parties to the Agreement

National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations

Rederscentrale

North Devon Fishermen’s Association

South Wales Fishing Communities

Cornish Fish Producer Organisation

Supporting Parties

Marine and Fisheries Agency

Belgian Sea Fisheries Administration

The move follows a recent meeting between JNCC and NFFO in York to discuss the latest round of areas to be designated as Special Areas of Conservation under the EU Habitats Directive.

In the letter, JNCC points to past examples like Stanton Bank and the North Norfolk Sandbanks, where the boundaries of the designated areas have been substantially changed in light of the evidence presented by the fishing industry.

The Federation is currently collating industry information on seabed character and fishing patterns on the Dogger Bank, with the aim of demonstrating that the feature to be protected – in this case a “slightly covered sandbank” – can be safeguarded without restricting the whole area of 14000 square kms, as currently proposed.

A formal consultation on the Dogger Bank is expected shortly.

A pre-consultation meeting between the NFFO and the Government’s statutory advisors on conservation, JNCC, was held recently in the Federation’s York offices to discuss the designation of the Dogger Bank as a Special Area of Conservation, under the requirements of the EU Habitats Directive.

JNCC is scheduled to begin a formal consultation on the designation of 14,000 square kilometers of the Dogger as “shallow sand bank” as a protected area in the next few weeks. Designation is essentially about the boundary of the protected area and the scientific justification for choosing the site. A further process at a later date to decide on what additional restrictions and management arrangements should apply within the designated zone.

It is the enormous size of the proposed designated area and its current and potential use as a fishing area, as well as the location of many offshore activities, such aggregate dredging or wind-farms, that makes this site highly controversial.

It is widely accepted that the Habitats Directive is a flawed piece of European legislation, not least in its stipulation that socio-economic considerations may not be taken into account when designating a Special Area of Conservation, and the inclusion of “slightly covered sand banks” in the list of protected habitats. The former prevents a sensible negotiation on how the area could be shaped to meet both fishing and conservation objectives; it is also conceded that much of the Dogger Bank “has relatively low biodiversity” and is “relatively uninteresting from a marine conservation perspective”. Nevertheless, the UK and other member states face infraction proceedings and huge fines by the European Court if the provisions of the Directive are not met.

The meeting was very useful in that it flagged up:

the importance of parts of the Dogger for fishing activity
that budgetary constraints meant that JNCC were not entirely confident that their characterisation of the whole Dogger as a “sandbank” would stand up to scrutiny
that fishermen who have fished the area hold, collectively, many hundreds of years’ direct experience of dealing with the different seabed conditions on the Dogger. In fact, far from being a relatively uniform sandbank, the Dogger is comprised of a complex mix of seabed types, including sand, stone and sand, clay, mud, maerl, and rocky outcrops.
although the management regime that is eventually applied on the Dogger could contain a range of management measures from the light to complete closure, the fishing industry would be naive to believe that its activities would remain unaffected
In the event that fishing activity is displaced from the Dogger, apart from losing valuable fishing grounds that produce the highest quality North Sea fish, particularly plaice, the displaced effort would be associated with much higher discard rates. (The Dogger is an area characterised by low levels of discards). Potentially, there is therefore a serious lack of coordination between two EC policy initiatives – habitat protection and discard reduction.

Next Steps

These early discussions with JNCC are valuable because they flag up clearly what the fishing industry needs to do. Over the next few weeks the NFFO will be working with experienced skippers from vessels that use various gear types, to produce charts that define both seabed characteristics and fishing patterns. These will be submitted as part of the formal consultation process and will be the subject of further discussions with JNCC.

It is important to note that the German and Dutch authorities are carrying out similar exercises on the Dogger on their side of the median line. For this reason the issue is already a major focus for the North Sea Regional Advisory Council, on which the NFFO is an active member of the Executive Committee.

That was the conclusion of a week long meeting involving scientists, economists and representatives from the regional advisory councils recently held in the ICES headquarters in Copenhagen. There is a widespread recognition that the top-down, command and control method of fisheries management has failed the Common Fisheries Policy, leading to a succession of failed measures and a system characterised by crisis management.

Long term management plans, which establish agreed biological and economic objectives for each fishery and then move progressively and steadily towards those objectives, offers a much better future than stumbling from short term measure to short term measure. The benefits of stability and moving steadily in the right direction, on the basis of a soundly based and agreed approach, will make the effort involved in establishing the plans, worthwhile.

Report on the ICES STECF Joint Meeting on Long Term Management Plans held in Copenhagen 28-30th January 2009.

Participants

The meeting was jointly chaired by Mike Sissenwine (Chairman of the ICES Advisory Committee) and John Casey (Chairman of STECF) and was attended by a wide range of specialists from ICES and STECF. The European Commission was present and the RACs were represented by the NWWRAC, NSRAC, Baltic RAC, Pelagic RAC, Long Distance RAC and the SWWRAC.

Background

The immediate problem facing ICES is a backlog of requests to evaluate existing management plans, including those for several cod fisheries. There is a notable absence of clear criteria and agreed guidelines that would guarantee a consistent and coherent approach.

At the same time, driven by the WSSD commitments on MSY, there are growing expectations from fisheries managers and stakeholders, such as the regional advisory councils, that scientists, economists and other experts and have a central role to play in the development and evaluation of long term management plans and that a new integrated and inclusive process is required to achieve this.

It is recognised that management plans in the future will have to be more than the simple harvest control rules that currently pass for management plans. Specifically, LTMPs will have to be based on both biological and economic objectives, within an ecosystem approach, and will therefore require the integration of biological, social and economic data and perspectives. For this reason it was decided that a joint ICES/ STECF meeting would be a useful way to launch a work programme on long-term management plans. The RACs had been invited to participate in recognition that an inclusive process was likely to deliver stronger management plans than a top-down process. A second meeting is envisaged, probably convened by the European Commission; this will address the policy issues involved in developing soundly based management plans that have a high degree of buy-in from all participants.

Format

The meeting proceeded through a full plenary session for the first day in which a range of presentations were made, followed by a mix of breakout groups and plenary sessions over two days. A full report of the meetings conclusions will be available in due course.

Issues

From the outset it was clear that although all parties recognised the major challenges presented by LTMPs, many of the participants had already absorbed the key points in recent debates about what to do and what not to do when developing and evaluating LTMPS. The most important of these are that:

LTMPs require both biological and economic objectives
LTMPs require something different from “sequential” evaluations, where the science precedes everything else and evaluates progress at various intervals. A new iterative process is required so that all parties can earn from each other in a continuous feedback loop
A major focus of should be on successful implementation of LTMPS and the scope to improve and adapt the plans as they evolve, data improves and lessons are learned.
There is a trade off between models of increasing complexity that may approach closer to reality but also become increasingly difficult to explain to managersand stakeholders as the complexity increases
The need for multi-species models is understood but also the recognition that in complex fisheries they may lack predictive power because of the range of assumptions that are built into them
The need to better understand how the dialogue between scientists, fisheries managers and fisheries stakeholders works
The need to find ways of assessing and taking into account “fishery response variability”, in other words the reaction of fishing vessel operators to management measures that can have profound consequences for the successful implementation of policy
The need to develop feedback models between biology and economics and between specialists and stakeholders
Ways of dealing with complexity and uncertainty, including the “non linearity” between mortality and effort and effort and catches. In other words, time at sea has a very oblique relationship to practise at sea and this can have profound implications for the effectiveness of management measures
We are all looking for a process that is more useful and more interactive than current arrangements
How we(as managers and stakeholders) define the questions we ask ICES, in order to elicit the most useful response, is a central issue
We need to find ways of dealing with the fact that, especially in the EU,” management” is highly diffuse (Commission, Ministers, Member states sub-state level authorities)
LTMPs should develop through trial and error. There must be scope to periodically review and adapt the plans as new data becomes available and in light of the practical experience of implementing the plan. In other words LTM plans should evolve

Stakeholders

The RACs were invited to make presentations to the joint meeting. The Pelagic RAC outlined its mixed experience of working with ICES on a number of management plans including Horse Mackerel and Western Mackerel. A presentation on behalf of all the RACS present representing demersal fisheries, covered the following points:

The RACs have been grappling with how to contribute to the development of long term management plans and in particular, how to engage with the scientific community and stakeholders (vessel operators) on a fishery by fishery basis.
Some valuable preliminary work had been undertaken in a workshop in Edinburgh in March 2006 and a seminar in Nantes in September 2008. These had produced useful guidelines for the development of long term management plans, including the points that:

– LTMPs were desirable in that they offered stability and a move away from ad hoc measures and crisis management

– LTMPS should be tailored to specific fisheries

– The development of LTMPs should be inclusive, involving scientists, economists, managers and stakeholders in an iterative process

– Effective buy in by the fishing industry is a prerequisite for successful implementation of LTM plans

– The role of scientists was seen as more than just as evaluators of plans but as active collaborators in the design of effective plans. Science could prepare various options to achieve desirable objectives for discussion by stakeholders and managers

– The development of effective feedback loops will be the key to successful collaboration in the development of LTMPs

– Given the, sometimes difficult, history of relations between fisheries science and the fishing industry, collaboration in dealing with data gaps and inevitable uncertainties represents a journey from mistrust to trust and mutual confidence

– Put simply, the task confronting all parties is to define:

> where we are now

> Where we want to be in 3/5/10 year’s time

> The best way to get there

– The timeframe for the transition would be a critical factor

– Moving incrementally in the right direction would be more important than an undue emphasis on setting targets

The RACS also held a number of concerns about the development of LTMPs. These include:

The need to ensure that an integrated approach, involving both biology and economics, is achieved
Whether there is the institutional capacity within ICES, within STECF and within the RACs to undertake this substantial undertaking with large transaction costs
That MSY (and therefore the objectives of LTMPs) should not be understood only in terms of a particular fishing mortality or biomass
That strenuous efforts should be made to ensure that the information on which LTMPs will be based is accessible to non-specialists; this will be an essential foundation for the dialogue with stakeholders
It will be important to develop shared definitions: From the outset defining the fishery in terms of the stock, or the fleets, or the gears, all have major implications for the LTMP
Impact Assessments have an important role to play in the development of LTMPs but these should be understood not as a final one-off event but as part of the iterative process of development

Conclusions

This was an important meeting that signals the start of a serious engagement with the major task of developing inclusive long-term management plans. This will be done, unlike the past, on the basis of an approach that integrates biological and economic data and perspectives and involves stakeholders in the process of development. It is clear that no party has an absolutely clear idea of how to proceed in this new territory but there is a general view that by following an iterative, transparent process we can have confidence that much can be achieved.

The immediate task for ICES is to develop evaluation criteria for the management plans already in place; but it is the development of new management plans, through an entirely new process that offers the bigger challenge over time but also the more substantial benefits.

In order to minimise the impact of the new cod recovery plan on its members, the NFFO has reached broad agreement with Defra on the shape of a UK interim days-at-sea regime that will apply from 1st February until 30th April 2009. The Federation’s support for the arrangements hinges on a number of important conditions that Defra has agreed to address.

The interim arrangements are necessary to:

meet the terms of the EU cod recovery plan which requires a 25% cut in days at sea for vessels operating in the cod recovery zone
but to leave flexibility to adapt the regime after April in light of experience.

The Federation has maintained its opposition to the principle of days-at sea restrictions as a constraint that increases the industry’s costs but that has failed to prove its credentials as a conservation tool. However, given the decision at the November Council of Ministers to introduce a new cod recovery plan based on an allocation of kilowatt days to each member state, it is vitally important to ensure that the new rules are applied in a way that causes least disruption to the fleets’ operations.

A short but intense series of meetings between Defra officials and the NFFO have now concluded in broad agreement that the interim arrangements will apply on a UK basis, with some limited flexibility to take account of regional variations. The scheme will provide maximum scope to take advantage of the provisions to “buy back” the 25% reduction.

Letters to licence-holders will be despatched in the next few days by the Marine and Fisheries Agency with definitive days at sea limits by gear type and area. Some final adjustments are being made but broadly the scheme:

Provides an exemption from the 25% reduction for any vessel that can demonstrate that it will catch less than 5% cod as part of its total catch. In other words, vessels that catch less than 5% will receive an allocation based on the amount of effort deployed by the fleet in the reference period 2004-2006
Vessels that cannot meet this criterion will receive an allocation based on gear type and area of fishing based on the effort used by the fleet in 2004-6, less 25%. These vessels will in principle be able to “buy-back” all of the 25% reduction by:
Obligatory compliance with real time closures
Avoiding a number of cod “hot spots” – areas of historic cod abundance
Use of additional selective gear such as the “eliminator” trawl, a 120mm square mesh panel in the extension, or a 130mm square mesh panel in the cod-end, or a 130mm diamond mesh cod-end

The Federation’s agreement to this approach is contingent on:

Flexibility to transfer effort allocations
Effort allocation to licences rather than vessels
The establishment of a UK forum to oversee the effort arrangements, specifically to ensure that effort constraints are applied equitably throughout the UK
Flexibility to carry over unutilised days from the interim period to the remainder of the year
A commitment to regularly review effort allocation to prevent any UK year-end undershoot
The facility to count time at sea in hours rather than whole days, for all areas and all gear types
Vessels to be permitted to take their full allocations in all areas
A commitment to explore the scope for a further round of decommissioning
Early preparation for 2010 when a further effort reduction is required
Discussions on the continuation of the Federation’s experimental individual vessel cod avoidance plans

That is what Cefas scientists heard at recent NFFO ports visits in Barrow and Fleetwood. Cefas had been invited to the ports to discuss their role in marine development planning and answer questions about environmental impacts. Few others have the in-depth knowledge on local ecology of an area than fishermen, but too often the industry’s views are regarded as “anecdotal” and are discounted by scientists and consultants. In fact, treated in the right way they can form a powerful line of evidence. The meetings heard that there are also opportunities for fishermen to become directly involved in the planning of scientific studies and in data gathering at proposed site locations. Early and proactive engagement by developers in planning projects is key to successful collaboration, together with the support of government agencies such as Cefas.

Under proposals for gas storage and offshore renewable energy installations, the eastern Irish Sea is fast becoming one of the most developed marine areas in the UK. Together with government plans for Marine Conservation Zones, the need for an improved understanding of the marine environment has never been so paramount.

NFFO has worked closely with Cefas and Defra to develop the successful Fisheries Science Partnership programme which has primarily focused on the important area of improving stock assessments. The Barrow and Fleetwood meetings, attended by NFFO’s Dale Rodmell and Alan McCulla heard that it is feared that these kind of offshore developments will have an impact on stock abundance, but such impacts are never factored into the stocks assessment process. Noise from pile driving, interference from electricity cables on electro-sensitive shark species, the discharge of saline brine from the solution mining of gas caverns and the use of pingers to deter marine mammals are of concern to fishermen in their possible effects upon the local stock abundance. Fish stocks in Morecambe Bay are at an historical low according to local industry, despite the low amount of fishing effort taking place. Against this background, Cefas were called upon to shed some light on the problem.

The meeting was hosted by Europeche, the European fishing industry trade federation, as part of the preparations for a Commission Green Paper on the CFP that will be published in the spring.

The Commission insisted that it wanted a full and open dialogue on what type of CFP the industry wanted after 2012 but was challenged by the NFFO, who pointed to the extensive dialogue on the vexed issue of the unachievable 8% margin of tolerance between logbook estimates and the final (accurate) landing declaration. That dialogue which spelt out in detail the practical obstacles to observing an 8% margin of tolerance, especially for small quantities of by-catch species, had taken place over two conferences, numerous RAC meetings, an extensive correspondence and had resulted in a Commission proposal to reduce the MOT from 8% to 5%. Whilst doubtless that figure was included because the Commission is already in negotiating mode on the revised Control Regulation, it did not send a very positive signal on the type of dialogue the Commission was anticipating on the reform of the CFP*.

On the other hand it is worth recalling that the Commission is not a monolithic entity and policy is often the result of power struggles between different groups of officials and within the College of Commissioners. The highly critical but narrowly focused report on the CFP by the European Court of Auditors has spooked the Commission which accounts in large part for the Commission’s almost infantile initial paper on CFP reform.

The NFFO considers that despite these obstacles it is worth putting effort into improving the CFP, simply because there is no sign on the horizon of a realistic alternative and because the 2002 reform suggested that progress can be made and change is possible, even if the pace is glacial.

The Federation has prepared a document that outlines the main areas of reform it would like to see, which will be discussed by the NFFO Executive Committee at its next meeting. The guiding theme is that the CFP cannot be successfully managed on a command and control basis because of its scale and the variety and complexity of the fisheries under it. The alternative is to find ways of delegating management responsibility to the fishing industry, subject to an overall framework and adequate audit arrangements.

*Under questioning, the Commission conceded that 5% was an untenable value for a blanket margin of tolerance and that the issue would have to be resolved as the new Control Regulation passes through the negotiating process on a fishery by fishery basis. It is however far from clear exactly what purpose is served by having legally enforceable catch estimates at all. Where the authorities are confident that landings data are accurate, which is now in many fisheries, the MOT is simply a burden without reason.

Defra is committed to funding up to £1 million worth of FSP projects in each of the next two years. Since the FSP programme was established in 2003, based on the idea of close collaboration between fishermen and fisheries scientists, it has produced a whole new tier of scientifically valid fisheries data that has filled gaps in the more conventional assessments. It has also gone a long way towards breaking down barriers between fishermen and fisheries scientists.

Around two thirds of the FSP projects are part of a time series in which annual surveys aboard commercial fishing vessels build up a picture of trends over the years; these complement and strengthen the information obtained from scientific survey vessels, by using commercial gear and fishermen’s direct knowledge.

Apart from the time series, there is however a budget this year of £320,000 for one off projects and it is this that the Federation is inviting members to submit project suggestions for. The final projects are selected by a committee involving Defra officials, Cefas scientists and NFFO representatives, taking into account the intrinsic worth of the project and regional and sectoral balance. The selection of the actual fishing vessels which undertake the work is through a system of competitive bidding overseen by Cefas.

The success of the Fisheries Science Partnership Projects since it was established has led to it being copied elsewhere in the UK and Europe.

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