CFP Conference Marks New Stage in Reform Process

The conference, held in A Coruna, in Spain, marked the end of the consultative phase that began with the publication of the Green Paper on CFP reform. The Commission’s internal deliberations are expected to take around six months, after which proposals will be presented to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

It is now clear that regionalisation will play a major role in the reform but it is far from clear what this will mean in practice. The Commission appears to recognise that the one-size-fits-all approach lies at the heart of many of the current CFP’s failings. After the Lisbon Treaty extended co-decision making to the European Parliament, the kind of micro-management that has encumbered European fisheries is even less tenable. However, it is clear that the EU Treaties severely limit the extent to which legal decision making jurisdiction can be transferred to regional bodies, even if these are comprised of all the member states with fisheries in a given sea basin. The challenge is to find a way to decentralise policy formulation whilst leaving formal decision making structures intact. There are simple ways to do this and there are over-complex ways and the fear is now that the Commission is planning an over-elaborate structure that is as dysfunctional as the current system and simply adds another layer of bureaucracy.

The core of a successful decentralised regional body would lie with fisheries managers, fishermen and fisheries scientists from the relevant member states working together on long term management plans, technical measures etc. There is a very real danger that by embracing a misplaced inclusiveness, a top-heavy and cumbersome body will result. If this is the outcome it would be a good idea – regional management – spoiled by poor implementation.

On a more positive note, the NFFO’s concrete ideas for giving the fishing industry responsibility through approved and audited sustainable fishing plans has been seen positively by the Commission and are likely to feature in the final proposals, at least as far as anyone outside the Commission’s inner circles can judge.

The Commission’s game plan includes an indirect challenge to relative stability through it plans to introduce some form of international transferable rights, although this is certain to run into serious opposition from member states – only Spain has spoken in favour of a move in this direction. A differentiated regime separating inshore from offshore fleets is likely to figure in the Commission’s proposal as part of this approach, although the definition of “small-scale” excludes trawlers.

Regional advisory councils are seen as one of the most positive developments arising from the 2002 reforms but there are also fears that the RACs could be undermined in a badly designed regional set up. On the other hand, strengthened RACs could operate very well and very closely with a sea-basin regional management body.

The NFFO will continue to work at the highest levels to ensure that the forthcoming reform uses all the opportunities and avoids all the pitfalls associated with the process.

On the agenda were shared concerns about conservation measures for Rays, the potential impact of marine conservation zones and the Round 3 wind-farm destined for the Bristol Channel.

The previous meetings, in London and Ostend, had secured Redercentrale’s support for the North Devon Fishermen’s Association voluntary Ray Box, and this time it was agreed to promote a minimum landing size of 38cms (wingtip to wingtip) within the North West Waters RAC.

The Belgian organisation was again able to provide details of their fleet’s presence in the Bristol Channel which is part of a nomadic pattern of fishing that includes the Irish Sea, the Bristol Channel, the North Sea off the Danish coast and the Bay of Biscay. In turn, the NDFA was able to describe its trials using square mesh panels and increased mesh size (from 80mm to 100mm) in the targeted Ray fishery.

Redercentrale and the NFFO are equally concerned about the rush to establish a network of marine conservation zones in UK waters, in addition to European Natura 2000 protected areas. Although MCZs are being established under UK domestic legislation and therefore, outside the six mile limit will not apply to non-UK vessels, it is clearly the UK’s intention to submit MCZs, once designated, to the Commission for adoption under the Common Fisheries Policy. This means that all international fleets, such as Belgian vessels, would be directly (as well as indirectly) affected. Yet at present the international dimension of fishing outside the six mile limit has hardly been touched on by the four regional projects.

The Atlantic Array wind-farm development, likewise, has the potential for massive displacement of fishing activity from fishermen’s customary grounds. The meeting covered the main features of the development programme and how to ensure that the fishing industry’s interests and concerns will be taken into account, unlike our experience with Rounds 1 and 2 developments, where consultation generally amounted to little more than a box-ticking exercise.

Groundbreaking Initiative: Pilot

The failure to integrate fishermen’s knowledge into fish stock assessments and fisheries policy has been acknowledged as one of the principal reasons why management measures under the CFP have so often delivered much less than they promised. And one of the challenges faced by the fishing industry has been how to ensure that the detailed knowledge held by individual fishermen, sometimes built up over a lifetime, can be employed by the science and management systems and not be dismissed as “anecdotal” or “unsystematic”.

The regionally focused annual fisheries reports will address that problem directly and will put the industry’s knowledge at the heart of the fish stock assessment process and policy decisions on a systematic basis for the first time.

Funded by the Defra Fisheries Challenge Fund, the Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation prepared a pilot annual fisheriesreport on behalf of the NFFO and its reception by ICES, independent scientists and policy makers, suggests that this is the way in which the future lies.

ICES advice for 2009 makes explicit reference to the CFPO annual fisheries report as an influence when making recommendations for 2010’s TACs. And the MEFEPO North West Waters Atlas, which aims to provide guidance on how to apply a European Ecosystem Plan, also relies on it. This suggests that if presented in the right way, industry information can find its way into the thinking of the key decision makers in fisheries.

Phase II: Extension to other NFFO areas

Financial support has been obtained from the Fisheries Challenge Fund (now transferred from Defra to the MMO) to extend annual fisheries reports from the Cornish pilot to the other NFFO producer organisations and regional committees. This work will lay the foundations for a comprehensive picture of the industry in England, Wales and Northern Ireland from a uniquely industry perspective.

At the heart of the annual fisheries report is the structured interview with key skippers in the region. Through this means it is possible to develop a detailed picture of critical features in the local fisheries such as:

• Fleet changes
• Target species
• By-catch issues
• Technological developments
• Changes in the spatial and sectoral distribution of fishing effort
• The fisheries response to new or existing regulation

At present, scientists and policy makers often have only a very broad brush understanding of developments in these areas and their implications are often understood only well after the event. Annual fisheries reports open the prospect of a comprehensive and detailed picture of the industry at an appropriate spatial scale in something approaching real time. Over time the annual fisheries reports will provide a developing picture of the industry’s development that is very patchy at present.

The Future

The immediate task is to develop fisheries plans for all NFFO regions but in the same way that the Fisheries Science Partnerships were pioneered by the NFFO, Defra and CEFAS, then emulated across Europe in one form or another, there is scope to extend industry-led annual fisheries reports across the whole CFP. If we manage to secure the kind of changes to the CFP that we think essential, annual fisheries reports will feed into Sustainable Fishing Plans, developed and applied by the industry as an alternative to the top down micro-management system that we labour under at present.

21/04/10

In the four weeks since its launch in Westminster, fishermen and fishing businesses from Shetland to Cornwall have registered their support and made substantial contributions to the Coalition’s fighting fund.

The latest body to join is the newly formed Dutch Demersal Fishermen’s Association (VisNed) whose members are concerned about the impact of marine protected areas on the operation of their vessels in UK waters.

The MPA Coalition was established to ensure that the fishing industry has a strong voice before decisions are made on the designation of marine protected areas and the management measures required within them.

The Coalition has met with senior Defra officials and Natural England to challenge aspects of the process of establishing MPAs that are unacceptable or opaque and to discuss the fishing industry’s principal areas of concern.

These are:

• Timetable: The wholly artificial, unacceptable and unachievable timetable for establishing marine conservation zones in England. It is a timeframe imposed by Ministers that conflicts with the need to introduce MCZs/MPAs in the least damaging way and with the close involvement of stakeholders not least of which is the fishing industry
• Displacement: The issue of displacement has yet to be adequately addressed. The impact of displaced fishing vessels will be an inevitable consequence of applying highly restrictive zones within MCZs/MPAs and so far there is very little sign of what this will mean for the fishermen concerned, for fishermen who will suffer from effort displaced in this way and for fish stocks and habitat outside the MCZs/MPAs
• Uncertainties: Uncertainties in the data: There are huge deficiencies in the data being used to establish MCZs/MPAs and some of the core concepts such as the connectivity of the MCZs/MPAs are still not understood. The Coalition is concerned to ensure that these uncertainties are dealt with in a rational and proportionate way
• Fishermen’s Information: Fishermen’s data is necessary to ensure that MCZs are not applied to critically important fishing areas. But at a local scale much of this data is highly confidential and commercially sensitive. Understanding this, the Coalition is working hard to ensure that nature conservation agencies should expect to receive no more data than that which is relevant and at the appropriate scale. This would still involve a substantial amount of work to ensure that safeguards are in place to prevent the information being misused. The Coalition has stressed that trust is the key to obtaining fishermen’s chart information.

The next meeting between the Coalition and Natural England will focus on the key question of fishermen’s chart information. In the meantime, the Coalition has been in contact with the Welsh Assembly government and hopes to meet its officials shortly. Also, now that the Scottish legislation has been enacted the Coalition will also seek a meeting with Scottish government officials at the earliest opportunity.

The Coalition independent chairman, Dr Stephen Lockwood, told Fishing News, “Government departments and agencies have shown that they recognise the MPA Fishing Coalition as the body to speak of behalf of the fishing industry at a high strategic level. It is extremely important that every fisherman and fishing organisation supports it no matter how big or small.”

“Marine protected areas are a reality and it will be too late to complain after they are in place. Fishermen who want their voice to be heard at national level should not leave it to others but should support the Coalition – now!”

Any contribution to the fighting fund should be addressed to the MPA Fishing Coalition, c/o NFFO, 30 Monkgate, York, YO31 7PF.

Steps Towards Sustainable Inshore Fisheries

NFFO Response

This paper is the NFFO’s response to the SAIF Proposition Paper which was circulated on 21st January 2010. Our response is in four parts:

Part 1 Introductions

The NFFO

Preface

Vision

Part II Defining Problems/Analysis

Focus

Evolution

Causal Factors

Wider Context

EU Policies

Rights Based Management

Ground Clearing

Disenfranchisement

Part III Defining Solutions/Proposals

One Industry Solutions: Proposals

Local Management

Self Management

Part IV

Concluding Remarks

Part 1 Introductions

The NFFO

The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations is the representative body for fishermen in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Preface

The SAIF Proposition Paper is a staging post in the work of the SAIF project. The project was set up by Defra to address the problems faced by the inshore fleet in England and to identify possible ways forward. It is primarily focused on the issue of quota constraints in the under 10-metre sector.

Although the under-10 metre quota problems are deep rooted and have developed over many years, they have become especially acute since the introduction of Registration of Buyers and Sellers legislation made it a legal requirement for under-10 metre vessels to submit sales notes; this in turn disclosed that catches previously attributed to the under 10m fleet had been significantly underestimated. The additional recorded catch has put pressure on the ‘pool’ system of quota management, leading in recent years to stringent catch limits in a number of key fisheries of importance to the under-10 metre fleet, in order to maintain a 12 month fishery.

The difficulties faced by the under-10 metre fleet have been intensified by the reduction in TACs over the last 20 years, with no corresponding adjustment in the capacity of the inshore fleet.

Vision

In responding to the SAIF Propositions Paper, the NFFO has outlined its own vision for the future of under-10 metre quota management. This is a vision based on different precepts than those that underpin the current debate, which on the whole amount to advocacy for a form of separate development. Instead, the NFFO proposes the reintegration of the under-10 metre fisheries into the mainstream UK rights based management system, as a full and active participant with a high degree of self determination.

Part II Analysis / Defining the Problem

Focus

The SAIF Group Propositions Paper primarily focuses on:

• inshore fisheries in isolation from the rest of the UK fishing industry
• the whitefish sector
• quota issues
• the future

This emphasis has the advantage of directly addressing the most intransigent problems facing the inshore sector. On the other hand, in aiming for intensity of focus, the SAIF paper makes little attempt to situate the discussion within its broader context, especially in relation to:

• the historical evolution of the UK quota management arrangements as a system of rights based management
• the wider under-10 metre fisheries, including shellfish and non- pressure stocks
• the place of inshore fishing in the wider UK fishing industry
• the direction of EU fisheries and environmental policies

Our response tries to refocus the debate on the future of management arrangements for the inshore fisheries within these wider parameters.

Evolution of the UK Quota Management System and a two tier Approach

It is difficult to appreciate the current position of the under-10 metre fleet, or to suggest ways out of the current impasse, without some understanding of the way that the arrangements for managing the inshore fisheries have evolved.

The respective shares of each member state were agreed in the 1983 CFP Relative Stability settlement and shortly afterwards restrictive measures (fishing vessel licensing and national catch limits) began to be applied in the UK to those fisheries where catches exceeded national allocations.

At the outset of UK management arrangements for “pressure stocks” in the mid 1980s, all quota restrictions were set by Government in consultation with advisory committees, on which industry organisations were represented. Subsequently, during the mid to late 1980s, UK fisheries departments offered producer organisations the option to manage their members’ quotas for specific stocks. Over time, the range of stocks for which “sectoral” management was offered as an option was increased, until the point when POs were given the option of managing all TAC stocks caught by their member vessels – or none. Since then quota management has become a primary role for all producer organisations in the UK.

The two tier approach to quota management in the UK thus had its genesis in a default: quotas for vessels not covered by sectoral arrangements continued to be set centrally by Fisheries Departments, albeit in consultation with industry organisations. The residual over-10 metre “non-sector”, along with the quota uptake of the under-10 metre fleet, continued to be subject to central management whilst the rest of the fleet elected to be managed under PO arrangements.

In fact therefore, the “two tier” approach1 to quota management has a longer pedigree than suggested in the SAIF proposition paper and this is quite significant.

The evolution of the UK’s quota management arrangements into a system of rights based management was not the result of a single, conscious, policy decision but was the result of a series of pragmatic adjustments to fishing vessel licensing and quota management rules, that in combination and in effect introduced tradable fishing entitlements.

The introduction of FQAs was indeed a significant step in the evolution of the UK quota management system towards a rights basedmanagement system. Its intention however was more limited: a move away from the use it or lose it lottery associated with a rolling reference period as the basis for quota entitlements. However, the separation of those parts of the industry who wanted (and were capable of) managing their quota allocations during the course of the quota year, and a residual group of over 10metre vessels who did or could not, along with the under 10 metre fleet predated FQAs by more than a decade.

The reason that producer organisations agreed to take on the (unpaid and sometimes onerous) responsibility of managing quota allocations on behalf of their members, was that, against the background of increasingly restrictive TACs, delegated responsibility for quota management provided an important opportunity for POs to tailor quota arrangements to the specific fishing patterns of their member vessels. It was therefore precisely to escape the negatives associated with blunt and inappropriate quota rules imposed by relatively remote central fisheries managers that the PO sectoral management system evolved.

It is important be clear that the use of the dividing line at 10 metres for quota management purposes was a wholly arbitrary decision. The UK chose to use this breakpoint principally because under-10 metre vessels were not required to complete EU logbooks. However, other member states have defined their inshore fleet, for various purposes, in a variety of different ways, including under-12 metres, under-15 meters, under-17 metres and length of trip.

The divergence between the conditions in the sector and the under-10 metre fleet intensified during the 1990s. Whilst individual POs developed quota arrangements appropriate for their own fleets, the non- sector and under-10s continued to be centrally managed by government. Over time the different POs developed a varied range of approaches to quota management suited to their own membership. These included variations on the pool concept, with monthly/ bi-monthly limits, but also annual vessel allocations, some of which some were linked to historical entitlements and amounted to a form of internal individual transferable quotas.

Additionally, and very significantly during this period, with the exception of Channel cod, North Sea sole and nephrops and Western Channel sole, the under-10 fleets during this period for the most part enjoyed 12 month fisheries unconstrained by quota constraints. Within this context, there was little incentive to develop innovative quota arrangements in the under-10 metre fisheries, so long as the management arrangements delivered a 12 month fishery unconstrained by limits.

In fact, it was the contrast between the relatively relaxed under-10 metre regime and the more stringent (logbook and sales note based) regime for the over-10 metre fleet, that provided the primary motivation that over time led many fishing vessel owners of over-10s to move into the under -10 metre sector. This, in time, contributed significantly to the imbalance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities in the under-10 metre sector and increased pressure on the inshore fisheries quota management.

By contrast, and with some specific notable exceptions, over the last 20 years the difficulties of managing quota in the PO sector have been eased substantially by a dramatic reduction in the capacity of the over-10 metre vessels and therefore the number of fishermen working in the over 10 metre fleet. Of the five decommissioning schemes run by fisheries departments between 1993 and 2009, (worth some £ 75 million) only the last (amounting to £5 million) was focused on the under-10 metre fleet. In a nutshell, driven by EU capacity reduction targets and cod recovery measures, publically funded decommission schemes eligible to over-10 metre vessels, have led to major adjustment between fishing capacity in the over-10 metre fleet and available quotas. The relative inattention afforded to the under 10 metre fleet and the exclusion of under-10 mere vessels from most decommissioning schemes from 1993 to 2008 is one important reason for the lack of “fit” between capacity (including potential capacity) and fishing opportunities in the inshore sector.

Causal Factors

Against this background, it can be said that the problems faced in the under-10 metre sector today have a number of causal factors that have developed over time and have compounded each other:

1. The evolution of a two-tier approach to quota management in which a residual non-sector fleet and under 10 metre fleet continued to be managed centrally by fisheries departments

1. The UK’s decision to use the under 10 metre logbook requirement to differentiate its fleets for quota management purposes when other member states took different decisions in this regard

1. The use of the more or less arbitrary line at 10 metres as the basis for a range of differential licensing and quota restrictions

1. The initially more relaxed regulatory regime in the under 10-metre sector which attracted capital and fishing effort into the inshore fleet from the more heavily restricted over-10 metre fleet.

1. The other side of the same coin, the increasingly restrictive regulatory regime for over-10 metre vessels that led substantial amounts of fishing effort to migrate from the over-10 to the under-10 metre sector. The distribution of this additional capacity and effort was not even. It is possible to make a reasonably strong correlation between the most intense difficulties in under 10-metre quota management with where the development of the fleet in terms of numbers of new-builds proceeded furthest.

1. An uneven approach to fleet structures by UK fisheries departments that largely ignored the under-10 metre fleet – arguably amounting to a policy of neglect.

1. As a subset of 6 above, the failure to adequately address the consequences of the expansion of the active under-10 metre fleet at an earlier enough stage.

1. A high degree of latent capacity represented by the large number of under 10 metre licences attached to inactive or low activity vessels that retain the potential to be attached to more active vessels with the right to fish against pool allocations. This in turn reflected fisheries departments’ extreme unwillingness to licence the under 10 metre fleet until its hand was forced by emerging problems in under 10 metre quota management in 1994. Restrictions on engine power and aggregation of licences were introduced in 1997 as the problems became more manifest.

1. The “threshold effect” which saw the development of a fleet of under-10 metre vessels with a catching capacity much greater than the “traditional” low-capacity under-10. The emergence of the “rule beater” or “super under-10” has been a significant part of the issue confronting under-10 quota management; this has only partially been addressed by restrictions on licence transfers and subsequently by the 2009 decommissioning scheme for under 10s which was weighted to draw out the high catching part of the fleet.

1. The introduction of under-pinning of specific under 10 metre allocations in 1994 (to prevent systematic erosion of under 10 metre allocations as a side effect of the UK quota allocations system) was applied rather too late to provide a comprehensive safeguard for under 10 metre allocations. Had TACs remained broadly at 1994 levels, underpinning could have provided an effective protection for under-10 allocations.

1. An endemic imbalance between UK fishing capacity and available quota on specific stocks (such as Channel cod), arising from inadequate catch statistics and negotiating failures in the 1983 CFP relative stability settlement. The consequence of this failure applies of course across the whole UK fleet in these fisheries

1. The application of a rigorous catch recording and accounting system (Buyers and Sellers legislation) after years of reliance on crude estimates that systematically under-calculated under 10 metre catches.

1. The overall reduction of UK fishing opportunities as the average levels of TACs set by the EU have been reduced under the impact of:

• EU Cod Recovery plans
• The precautionary approach
• Movement to maximum sustainable yield

1. Technological developments in the fleet that have increased catching power of the under-10 metre fleet. One example could be the expansion of trammel nets in the sole fishery

It is evident, therefore, in light of this litany that the genesis of the problems facing the under-10 metre fleet with regard to quota issues are complex and multi-faceted and do not arise from a simple, singular, cause. They are therefore unlikely to yield to a single solution.

Wider Context: Segmentation of the Under-10 Metre Fleet

Pigeon Holing: One consequence of the evolution of the fisheries management regime over the last 20 years has been to increasingly define groups of fishermen by their target species, type of gear used and size of vessel. This categorisation may be an inevitable part of managing fisheries effectively, or it may simply reflect bureaucratic convenience, but it does carry important consequences. The loss of flexibility to change gear, target species and vessel type in response to a range of market conditions and conservation status of particular stocks reduces the economic resilience and flexibility of the fisheries as a whole. It can make a fleet excessively dependent on the fortunes of a single stock and prevent early diversion to alternatives. Specialisation and pigeon holing have become two sides of the same coin and nowhere is this seen more acutely than in the inshore sector. Past (possibly temporary, short term) decisions have been ossified into permanent fleet categories through formal management decisions on licence and quota entitlements.

Segmentation of the under-10 metre fisheries only really took off in the last 10 years, initially with shellfish licences and segmentation based on fishing for quota stocks after 2004. The most recent example is the introduction of two tier under-10 metre licences in 2009.

There is probably no way back from most of this fleet segmentation despite the loss of economic and conservation resilience that it implies. For the foreseeable future the focus will have to be ensuring the biological and economic viability of each segment in its own terms. To a large extent this means dealing with the latent capacity that is a historic legacy of the way that the under 10 metre fisheries have evolved and been managed.

Shellfish: Perhaps understandably, the SAIF project (and therefore this response) has so far focused on the part of the inshore fleet dependent on whitefish pressure stocks, from an economic, management and social perspective, it is important to appreciate that the significance of the shellfish fisheries has been understated. As the current Propositions Paper is a work in progress the significance of the shellfisheries may be addressed later but at present it is a serious and glaring deficiency.

Non-pressure stocks: Likewise, it is important to recognise the significance of non-pressure stock catches in the economic viability of the under-10 metre fleet, and for that matter, parts of the over-10 metre fleet. It will be important for the SAIF project to take this into account as it moves forward.

The fishing industry, including the inshore sector, is diverse, geographically dispersed, segmented by target species, gear type, vessel and enterprise size. On the whole, fishermen tend to be strong individualists for whom cooperative, collaborative actions with other groups of fishermen do not come as second nature. Bureaucratic pigeon-holing has intensified these divisions.

There is however an essential unity in the fishing industry arising from shared experience and shared challenges, which exists despite the divisions and segmentation discussed above. It is our contention that this essential unity should be the basis for future policy.

EU Fisheries and Environmental Policies: A Differentiated Regime?

In considering the future of arrangements for inshore fisheries in England the SAIF project will want to take into account the possibilities in the emerging post reform CFP.

The idea of a differentiated regime has gained considerable currency since its inclusion by the European Commission in its Green Paper on CFP reform and has clearly had an impact on the SAIF Group’s thinking.

It is therefore important that we deal with this directly.

The Commission’s suggestions for a differentiated regime for inshore fisheries is driven primarily and overwhelmingly by its wish to break the principle of relative stability and move towards a system of international individual transferable fishing rights. It is important to understand this motivation rather than to harbour the illusion that the Commission’s approach is driven by its view that there is an intrinsic advantage in a differentiated regime with separate arrangements for inshore fisheries.

To deflect potential criticism that a system of international, tradable fishing rights would inevitably lead to concentration of ownership, with deleterious consequences for small fishing communities, the Commission has advanced the idea of a fundamental dichotomy in the fleet. In this view the “offshore/industrial/large-scale/high-impact” part of the fleet will be governed by economic principles and internationally tradable fishing rights, whilst the “inshore/small-scale/artisanal/low-impact” sector will be eligible for public support3 and local management.

It is an understatement to say that the Commission faces a challenge in defining an “inshore”, “small-scale”, “artisanal”, and “low-impact” fleet that makes sense across the EU. The present definition employed in the EFF Regulation is under-12 metre vessels using passive gear and although this will clearly be the starting point employed by the Commission where this will end up is unclear.

The Commission has indicated that in applying a differentiated approach it will not compromise the EU conservation regime. This suggests that it would be unwise to assume that catches by the inshore fleet would be unconstrained or ignored even under a differentiated regime unless it could be demonstrated that they are negligible.

We would make two comments on the Commission’s ambitions:

1. There is little or no appetite amongst member states for a move away from the principle of relative stability and the 1983 allocation keys, whatever the Commission’ motivations and ambitions. There could however be ways of making relative stability more flexible without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. This means that the impetus for a differentiated regime is likely to lessen rather than increase as the CFP reform negotiations progress.

1. The Commission lines up features assumed to be associated with inshore fisheries: “inshore”, “artisanal”, “low impact”, small scale. The difficulty is that in reality these are not mutually exclusive categories. A large vessel may have a large environmental impact but equally, depending on gear, target species etc it may have a relatively low impact. Equally, small scale vessels in aggregate may have a significant impact on a particular stock. Certain types of “small” vessels can out-fish larger vessels, depending on the criteria of “small” and “large”. Some small vessels operate on a basis very far away from anything that could be described as artisanal. Some small vessels operate quite far from anything that could be described as inshore. In other words, a differentiated regime, applied in a top down fashion, at European level, is a rather theoretical concept, remote from the realities of fishing fleets, fishing patterns and day to day fisheries management

1. There can be good reasons for local management and separate arrangements for inshore vessels but these cannot be successfully applied at EU level through a blanket top-down, one-size-fits all approach.

Clearly, within the UK fishing industry there are large vessels and small vessels, vessels that are closer in scale and style to industrial operations and others that are better described in terms of artisanal fisheries. There are vessels that fish close to shore and others that have greater range and fish far from their home ports and far from the shore. There are also vessels that fish with gear that has a greater environmental impact than other types of gear.

Accepting this reality, however, is not also to accept that it is possible or desirable to design and apply a fleet definition that separates these fleet characteristics into neat bureaucratic categories:

• Some large vessels sometimes fish close to shore as part of their fishing portfolio
• Some relatively small vessels fish far from what under any definition could be considered “inshore”
• Some under 10 metre vessels have the capacity to out-fish some over 10 metre vessels
• Some inshore vessels depending on the type of fishing will have greater environmental impact than some larger vessels
• A few (less than 5 in the UK) inshore fisheries take up to 25% of individual TACs

Untangling these complex and dynamic patterns through a new set of discriminatory rules, or worse still, simply imposing a strict geographical or arbitrary size criteria, would be a recipe for chaos and should not be attempted.

Furthermore, it is almost an iron law of fisheries management, and certainly has been the UK’s experience, that if there is a differentiated management regime, fishing effort will find a way of migrating to the zone that has the most attractive conditions and that controlling this is no simple task.

The essential point that we would make is that a differentiated regime raises a number of fundamental questions the answers to which are not straightforward. These include:

• The definition of an inshore/artisanal/small scale/ low impact fleet or zone
• How to deal with vessels that do not fit the criteria
• How to deal with large vessels that currently fish inshore
• How to deal with relatively small vessels that fish “offshore”
• How to deal with the practical management issues that would be an inevitable part of a differentiated regime
• How to deal with the unintended consequences
• How to handle effort migration from the “offshore/industrial/economically focussed/large scale” sector into the more favourable conditions of the inshore regime

Against this background, we are of the view that whilst separate arrangements for parts of the fleet will make sense in specific areas for specific reasons, these should be made on pragmatic grounds on the basis of subsiduarity, that is at the lowest practicable level and closest to the fisheries concerned. It would be a profound mistake to raise a differentiated regime up to the level of a general organising principle at EU level or for that matter at member state level. This would be to compound errors the consequences we are already dealing within the difficulties facing the under 10 metre fleet.

In short, we disagree with the fashionable, but profoundly mistaken view, that European, UK or English fisheries should be divided into two distinct and separate components operating under different regimes. On the contrary, we take the view that the divisions between under-10 meter and over-10 meter sectors are the result of a wholly artificial bureaucratic set of rules applied for the convenience of fisheries administrators which has had many, and mostly deleterious, unintended consequences.

Disenfranchisement

Although it is certainly true that some under 10-metre vessel operators are well organised in fishermen’s associations and even producer organisations, it is also well recognised that geography and sectional differences, along with a strong element of individualism, works to undermine the involvement of the under-10 metre fleet in collective representative organisations. Even the largest representative organisations and those established specifically to represent under-10s, can only claim to directly represent a small proportion of the overall under-10 metre fleet. Many fishermen in this sector remain wholly outside any representative structures at local, regional, national or international levels.

As the effects of the management regime and specifically, TAC reductions and quota restrictions, have been felt more directly in the under 10 metre sector in the wake of Buyers and Sellers Registration, the sense of alienation felt by the under-10s has become acute.

It was in response to, on the one hand the disengagement of the under-10s from the existing representative structures, and on the other hand their mounting sense of frustration about the direction of management measures, that the NFFO mounted its outreach programme of port visits in 2009/10. NFFO Executive Committee member, Alan McCulla, in an extensive series of port visits and through meetings large and small, discussed the concerns and perspectives of the inshore sector directly with many hundreds of fishermen, many of them operators of under 10 metre vessels. This, partially EFF funded project, remains the only systematic attempt to engage with under-10 fishermen directly in their ports, and to draw them systematically into the dialogue on the future of the sector.

Although as one might expect, a wide range of views were expressed, reflecting different localities, sectional interests and immediate concerns, some unifying themes did emerge:

• A recognition that the under 10s were frequently disadvantaged by not being part of the mainstream dialogue on fisheries management
• A willingness to find new ways to ensure that the voice of this sector could be heard
• Different views were expressed on how this could be achieved, some emphasising on the one hand greater involvement and engagement with existing structures, such as the NFFO regional committees, and on the other hand some advocating separate and exclusive representative structures for under 10 metre operators, up to and including a separate regional advisory council for under-10s.

The primary success of the outreach programme was that it demonstrated that if an effort is made, it is entirely possible to develop new ways through which the voice of the inshore sector can be heard. It was disappointing in the extreme that an ambitious follow-up outreach programme submitted by the NFFO has been rejected for EFF funding.

Representing the under 10s at national and international levels will always be a challenge because of geography and the wide range of interests and views. The role of key individuals in the ports is critical. Outward looking leadership in the ports can provide a strong and effective voice at the highest levels. Equally, insular leadership focused on local empire building can be a major obstacle that frequently short-circuits under-10 metre input.

The NFFO’s view, witnessed by its outreach programme, is that:

• The frustrations felt in the under 10 metre sector are real and valid
• innovative ways of ensuring that the genuine views of the under-10 metre fleet are heard on a systematic basis should be a priority for Defra and the NFFO
• the divide between under and over-10s is a largely artificial division reflecting past bureaucratic decisions: there is an essential continuity of concerns on most issues that transcends the divide at 10 metres
• It is therefore not appropriate for fishermen’s representative structures to passively reflect that divide
• The extension of the outreach programme combined with a reinvigoration of the NFFO regional committees remains the most viable means for inshore voices to be heard directly at national and RAC levels
• This should lead to the formation of a professionally run producer organisation for under 10s. The experience of the French regional committees, whilst not appropriate for the UK in all respects demonstrates that a partnership approach in this area between fishermen and government is a positive model
• A strong case for public funding to support the formation of a producer organisation for those under 10s not covered by other POs can be made, at least in the early years of its development
• The suggestion that there should be a separate regional advisory council for under-10s rather misses the point: RACs’ purpose is to foster dialogue between different parts of the fishing industry and with other stakeholders rather than to create or reinforce new or existing artificial boundaries

Rights Based Management

In recent years, within EU member states and further abroad, there has been a progressive movement within fisheries towards rights based management. This has been seen both within the theory of fisheries management through FAO guidelines on fisheries management, to practical organising principles in the allocations systems of some member states.

The evolution of the UK quota management system, at least for the over 10 metre fleet, has followed a trajectory that has led it close to a rights based management system. The elements of this system are:

• Delegated responsibilities for sectoral quotas to producer organisations and other industry groups ,
• Quota entitlements at vessel level
• Administration of quotas at producer organisation (or group) level
• Progressive liberalisation of rules on transfer and swap arrangements that have facilitated quota transfers and ultimately quota trading
• Entitlements based on a rolling reference period that have subsequently been translated into FQAs
• Quasi-ownership/use rights based on the legal concept of legitimate expectation,

The emergence of an extensive system of quota transfers and quota trade, whilst not without its difficulties, has amounted over time, to a reasonably functional, reasonably well adapted system of rights based management at member state level.

It cannot be denied that the threat of EU infraction proceedings against the UK and increasingly stringent landing controls associated with cod recovery, provided at least part of the impetus for the development of trade in quota, as vessels strove to ensure that their quota entitlements aligned with their landings.

Nevertheless, the UK along with the Netherlands and Demark is now well along the progression to a full rights based management system, the characteristics of which are:

• Defined use rights
• Stability in entitlements
• Safeguards over use rights
• Transparent rules
• Transfer and trading flexibility to allow full usage
• Effective two way flow of information

It seems certain that given the movement of fisheries management in the UK, Europe and indeed the rest of the world, in the direction of rights based management, in the medium to long term, the solution to the problems facing the under 10 metre fisheries will have to be compatible with this approach. Our energies would be best focused on how this could be achieved.

Evidence of reasonably functional, rights based management systems in a number of member states will be an important part of the argument in the coming CFP reform debate within the Council of Ministers and European Parliament to deflect Commission pressure for a pan-European rights based system. It is therefore all the more important therefore to find an equitable and fair way of integrating the under 10s into the UK rights based management system.

It is because rights-based management has progressed so far in the UK that we rule out simple redistribution from the over-10s to the under 10s as a solution to the complex of problems facing the under-10 metre fleet. Such an approach has been advocated by some (in strident or heartfelt terms, depending on one’s perspective) but it is clear already that it would be fraught with legal and political difficulties and it is by no means clear that it would provide a durable solution anyway. An alternative approach which avoids a coercive redistribution but achieves a viable inshore fleet in balance with its fishing opportunities is described below in Part II.

SAIF as a Ground Clearing Exercise: effort control – a blind alley

The SAIF project has already done the debate on the future of inshore fisheries a great service, by clearing away some of the misconceptions and woolly thinking that have hampered the task of identifying a way forward; none more so than in relation to effort control.

Whilst the problems of applying quantitative catch limits in mixed fisheries and the perverse outcomes that this can give rise to are well known, the suggestion that the inshore sector should move to a days-at-sea regime is both naïve and dangerous. The SAIF project has successfully exposed the pitfalls of an effort based regime.

Effort control should be rejected as a solution for the current problems facing the under 10m fleet because it fails both in conservation and economic terms. This is because:

• The weight of evidence suggests that, driven by macro-level decisions on achieving MSY in European fisheries, reflected in ICES advice, and given the imperatives of the precautionary approach in European and national fisheries policy, there would be a tendency to set effort levels in reference to whichever stock is currently weakest
• The strong likelihood is therefore that number of days allocated to inshore vessels would be much lower than is presently fished by the inshore fleet
• Effort control sets up a dynamic that ensures that vessels fish harder when they are at sea (more gear etc). The Americans call one facet of this intensification “capital stuffing”. Days-at sea limitations are therefore unlikely to achieve its conservation objectives of lowering fishing mortality or necessarily reducing discards
• Effort control is a rigid, blunt and absolute constraint in a way in which quota restrictions are not. Quota swaps, alternative quota species, non-quota species, alternative areas are all possibilities available under a quota regime that are precluded by effort control.
• For North Sea joint stocks, it is unlikely that Norway would concede to exclude any significant level of catches from the EU/Norway reciprocal agreement. Therefore, quantitative restrictions would continue to run in tandem with days-at-sea restrictions.
• Those tempted by the superficial attractions of effort control should cast an eye at the operation of the current Cod Recovery Plan

Never was the phrase out of the frying pan into the fire more apt, even if substituting effort for quota was on the menu at EU level, which to our knowledge it is not. Effort control would be a blind alley for the inshore fleet – as it is currently for the over 10 metre fleet subject to the EU cod recovery plan. This is not an alternative that should be considered and it is helpful that the SAIF paper usefully spells out why.

Part II Defining Solutions/ Proposals

We have made clear above:

1. The problems facing the under 10 metre fleet are complex and have a range of causal factors
2. Notwithstanding the complexity of the issues the corrosive problems facing the under 10 metre sector must be addressed.
3. A differentiated regime would be a wholly artificial construct introduced for spurious reasons far from the realities of real fisheries that would be impossible to apply in practice
4. the solution for the under 10 metre fisheries in the medium to long term will have to be compatible with a rights based management system
5. That an effort regime for the under 10s is a blind alley

One Industry Solutions

It is possible to define the essential problems currently facing the under 10 metre fleet as:

• An imbalance between the available quota in specific under 10 metre fisheries and the catching capacity of vessels in the under 10 metre fleet
• A residual number of super under 10s fishing against under 10 metre pool allocations whose catching capacity is incompatible with stable, viable quota arrangements in the pool system
• Severe resultant challenges to the economic viability of under 10m fleet
• Heavy discarding as a result of shortage of quota
• Fragmentation of the inshore sector that has denied it a fully effective voice at national and international level that has led to a strong sense of disenfranchisement

Against this background it is possible to spell out a range of measures which if implemented in combination could offer a way forward for the under 10-metre sector. The underlying assumption in this approach is that there is one, not two, fishing industries and that the divisions that are now apparent arise from the unintentional consequences of management measures.

Our central thesis is that the under-10 metre fleet should be reintegrated into a single management system where all fishermen are subject to the same regime.

This could be done in the following way:

• A one-off fleet adjustment to bring capacity in line with available fishing opportunities. Following a comprehensive assessment to identify remaining pockets of fleet overcapacity this would mean a substantial fishing vessel decommission scheme which would recompense those owners of vessels both above and below 10 metres who voluntarily elect leave the industry with a Defra/EFF decommissioning grant.
• It would be a condition of the decommissioning scheme that Defra retains the quota associated with the decommissioned vessels. This contrasts with the way quota has been handled in decommissioning rounds from 1995 onwards but not in the 1993/4 decommissioning round, when the quota was retained by fisheries departments and redistributed to the industry on a fixed formulae
• Quota retained from decommissioned vessels would be used in two ways:

• To facilitate the entry of super-under 10s into membership of producer organisations
• To redress historic deficiencies in the under 10 metre allocations arising from the late application of underpinning3

• The establishment of a producer organisation for the under 10 meter fleet with professional management to manage under 10 metre allocations and to participate effectively in national organisations such as the NFFO and UKAFPO, and through the former in regional advisory councils and the European representative structures

• It would be worth exploring the way that the Danish Government, in combination with the Danish Fishermen’s Association , have moved to a rights based management system which embraces substantial parts of the inshore fleet. Our understanding is that inshore vessels can buy quota from offshore vessels and from other inshore vessels but offshore vessels cannot buy quota from inshore vessels. All transactions are voluntary but there safeguards are in place against erosion of the inshore quota base. Whatever the merits of the Danish scheme we do not see this arrangement, if introduced, displacing the need for a one-off adjustment through decommissioning scheme to rebase the

under-10 metre quota pool.

• Even assuming successful outcomes for all of the above strategies, it is clear that in some specific under-10 metre fisheries, quota constraints will remain a profound problem because the underlying difficulty lies not in the domestic quota distribution arrangements but in the relative stability allocation keys. The principle of Relative Stability overall serves the UK well and it is highly doubtful if it was to be removed as a cornerstone of the CFP whether the UK would be able to retain its current TAC shares. There is a compelling argument however for, within the context of CFP reform, of introducing a degree of flexibility into the EU allocations system. More flexible swap and transfer arrangements, always subject to agreement by the contracting parties, could be used to reduce frictions arising from the crude application of relative stability. The obvious candidate here is Channel cod where the UK’s 8.5% share of the TAC is at the heart of the difficulties faced by both under and over 10 metre vessels in the UK fleet, leading to a major discarding problem. All this begs the question of currency and how to secure the agreement of the current quota holders but the RACs have shown how progress can be made on the most intransigent of issues and as the CFP moves towards long term management plans it cannot be feasible that a problem that gives rise to endemic discarding can go unaddressed.

Local Management

Possibly reflecting the composition of the SAIF group, the Propositions makes much of local management.

The NFFO supports local management where it makes sense, following the subsiduarity principle that decisions should be made at the lowest practical level.

But for the most part the SAIF has been dealing with quota issues and these relate exclusively to finfish which for the most part do not lend themselves to local management solutions. If the inshore fleet is a factor in the mortality of a stock that mortality (unless wholly insignificant) will have to be taken account either by the new Regional Management Bodies or by the Commission, Council and member states, as at present.

We can certainly see the force of management of local shell fish stocks at a local level but it is not immediately obvious what IFCAS would manage in terms of finfish. So a degree of caution is necessary here.

Self-Management

To date, the relevance of CFP reform to the under-10 metre fisheries has been discussed in terms of a differentiated regime. There are however other parts of the CFP reform that if implemented, could offer a positive, viable, legal and dynamic future for the under 10 metre fleet.

The CFP Reform Green Paper talks in general terms of a radical decentralisation of the CFP, with a transfer of responsibilities to regional management bodies and to the fishing industry itself. The NFFO has detailed a way through which this transfer of responsibility could be delivered through the concept of sustainable fishing plans, prepared by industry organisations themselves within a system of approvals and audits. (Annex 2)

We are reasonably confident that a facility to move in the direction of a reformed Common Fisheries Policy based on sustainable fishing plans, rather than the present complex system of prescriptive rules, will form part of the Commission’s reform proposals.

This represents a huge opportunity for the fishing industry, including the under 10s. There is no intrinsic reason why the under 10s could not organise themselves as a single producer organisation, or as members of existing POs, to prepare and submit sustainable fishing plans detailing how vessels in each group will fish sustainably over the next 3 to 5 years.

There are certainly obstacles and challenges to the realisation of the vision, but from our point of view, integrating the under 10s into a national rights based management system within a system of delegated responsibilities offers a superior prospective than the divisive and poorly thought through uncertainties of separate development within a differentiated regime – whether that differentiation is at national or EU level.

Those obstacles and challenges include the geographical dispersal of the under-10 metre fleet around the coast, the participation of the fleet in many different fisheries with many different fishing methods and rates of uptake. On the other hand a professionally run under-10 PO within a rights based system would be well placed to benefit from community quota arrangements of the type already in existence such as the Dutchy Quota Company.

A strong case can be made for providing the under-10 meter fleet with public support during an initial period to establish an effective, professionally run producer organisation.

Conclusions

The SAIF project usefully focuses systematic attention on the problems confronting the inshore sector. As a ground clearing exercise its Proposition Paper has already performed a useful service by collating information, isolating issues and tentatively suggesting possible ways forward.

On the other hand, the SAIF Propositions Paper suffers through its rather narrow, self-imposed focus, which does not sufficiently take into account the evolution of the UK’s home grown system of rights based management and the wider EU context in which inshore management takes place (and will continue to take place).

Partly for these reasons the SAIF propositions are inward looking and unduly influenced towards insular solutions which emphasise a continuing and even increasing separation of the under 10 metre fleet from the rest of the UK fishing industry.

By contrast, the NFFO emphasises the essential continuity between the “inshore and “offshore” sectors of the UK fishing industry and points to the essentially artificial and bureaucratic basis for the divide between the under 10 metre fleet and the over-10 metre fleet. On this basis we posit a range of measures that if implemented in combination offers a way out of the blind alleys of unviable quotas and a worse alternative in effort control.

Moreover, the potential opportunities for the under 10 metre sector to organise itself within the context of CFP reform to secure a high degree of self-determination is a prize to be striven for.

Notes

1. Strictly speaking there has been a three-tier system: sector, non-sector and under 10s
2. The anticipated WTO round for 2010 includes provisions to eliminate subsidies in fisheries with the possible exclusion of small scale fisheries in developing countries.
3. It is probably beyond our data to quantify the degree to which the under 10s have been disadvantaged given that underreporting of catches at the time was the norm but that underpinning was introduced in 1994 and certainly initially anyway provided some degree of protection for under 10 allocations

ANNEXs

1. Danish Inshore Fisheries Management. Click here to view
2. Sustainable Fishing Plans: A delivery mechanism for the Common Fisheries Policy Click here to view

ICES scientists at the workshop were tasked with developing guidelines on implementing the MSY approach to its fisheries advice. Such work represents the first practical step towards fulfilling commitments under the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development agreement which sets a target date of 2015 to maintain or recover fisheries to levels consistent with Maximum Sustainable Yield. MSY based catch options including step-by-step options towards the 2015 target are expected to be included in ICES advice for 2011.

The Federation said: “If over the long term an MSY framework could maximise returns from fisheries then that would be no bad thing. In practical terms, on the other hand, there remain significant challenges if science is to inform management effectively. In particular, as fisheries build, a failure to make an accurate assessment of predation and competition in a multi-species context could render MSY management targets unattainable in practice. This would risk sending out a completely false message about the state of stocks. If we are to go down an MSY road what is needed is flexibility to such practical realities and a sustainable transition. The risk, however, is for a draconian response to a rapidly approaching, but nonetheless arbitrary 2015 target. Such a state of affairs that ignore people’s livelihoods would be absurd and totally unacceptable.”

MSY, an Intuitive Goal?

As MSY seeks to maximise long term returns from a fishery there seems at first sight to be little in this basic objective that seems contentious. The green lobby seized upon the concept in current elaboration of what constitutes Good Environmental Status (GES) under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. The Directive seeks to achieve GES by 2020 (see related article, GES Work). Aside from practical considerations, whether MSY should form a prerequisite for achieving Good Environmental Status is a question of whether such legislation should address economically efficient use of fishery resources in addition to being concerned that the resource base does not become impaired – the basis for the existing precautionary approach to fisheries management. The NFFO is against this interpretation of GES for commercial fish stocks. This notwithstanding, within a fisheries management context there would, in principle, be a collective benefit in aiming to maximise returns from fisheries for the benefit of all over the long term that seems intuitive. The devil, however, is likely to be in the practice.

Practical Considerations

There are a number of challenges to delivering an MSY approach, not least the fundamental flaw of applying what is an equilibrium concept based on the false assumption that a fishery will return to a pre-fished “natural” state if fishing pressure is removed that does not hold true in a dynamic environment. Nor in the context of European fisheries is it known what the pre-fished state of stocks looked like, and stock rebuilding will take stock assessments into unchartered waters not seen in the history of many assessments. In addition, because for practical reasons the estimation of MSY is presently heavily dependent upon single species assessment models, in the context of mixed fisheries, inter-stock predation patterns or competition risk MSY management targets being unachievable. For a number of stocks, either a lack of data or existing assessment models will make it difficult if not impossible to assess MSY for the stock with any accuracy. All of these issues will call on the management system to be flexible and adaptive to these realities.

Further Burdens upon Already Stressed Fleets?

It would be unrealistic to assume that moving to an MSY management framework would not imply any additional tightening of fishing opportunities over the precautionary approach which forms the basis for the existing European system. There is the potential that it could result in advice that would imply further burdens upon already heavily stressed fleets. Nonetheless, this will vary stock by stock. Once the implications are known for each stock it would then be sensible to start to plan a transition to the new system that balances the vitally important need of maintaining viable fishing fleets and communities and avoiding abrupt dislocation. It is in the transitioning to the new approach where the main grounds for caution lie.

Sustainable Change, Not Environmental Alarmism

This is because actions are only just commencing to operationalise the MSY approach with only 5 years to spare before the 2015 target is supposed to be attained under the 2002 Johannesburg agreement. Consequently, it is clear that in cases where significant reductions in fishing patterns are implied, arbitrary targets and rapidly shrinking timeframes have the potential to turn into a lethal cocktail for the fishing livelihoods affected. Such a state of affairs would be unacceptable and must be avoided.

We have been here before when the precautionary approach was implemented in too much haste. The legacy of this last change has yet to be fully digested or realised – stocks take time to respond to management changes. Moreover, whereas the precautionary approach deals with the risk of stock reproductive failure, the MSY framework deals principally with matters of economic efficiency. Consequently, alarmist actions that dislocate fishing communities are far less justified. Rather, communities dependent upon the success of the fish stocks that support them should be central to designing and realising long term management objectives. Pragmatism suggests such objectives should be tied to known historical levels of stock abundance rather than any theoretical notions of MSY1.

In rebuilding fish stocks, travelling in the right direction is much more important than any arbitrary timing of the arrival at the destination. Managing change requires due care and attention. It is not the responsibility of fishing communities, therefore, to bare an unwarranted fallout resulting from either the formation of an arbitrary target that ignores how best to manage change or from a delay on the part of the authorities to implement what they have signed up to.

1. See, for example, Hilborn, R. and K. Stokes (2010) Defining Overfished Stocks: Have We Lost the Plot? Fisheries, 35(3).

The suggested questions were provided by the NFFO whilst the questions have been completed by Defra

Industry Q&A on the North Sea catch quota project, with remote electronic monitoring.

1. What is a catch-quota system?

A catch-quota is a quota that accounts for the mortality of all fish caught, rather than just fish landed at port. When transferring from traditional landings quota to a catch-quota, the quota is increased to include the estimated mortality in a fishery (e.g. landings mortality plus estimated discard mortality).

In the upcoming pilot all catches of cod (including under Minimum Landing Size) will be counted against quota and no discarding of cod will be allowed (except those under MLS). Fishermen will get more quota and are expected to maximise the value of their catches by using their professional knowledge and skills. Catches of all other species will operate under traditional landings quotas and discards of these species will be allowed, however, normal fishing legislation applies and vessels will still be subject to the high-grading ban.

2. What is the project for?

The purpose of the project is to assess the ability of a catch-quota system to reduce discards, reduce stock mortality, and see if the system encourages fishermen to fish more selectively. The pilot will also assess the ability of Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) technology to verify a catch-quota system and provide improved scientific data. This trial of a fully documented catch-quota system will provide useful evidence on whether the system is a suitable option to pursue for CFP reform in 2012.

3. When does the project begin and end?

Defra and Cefas plan to have the English pilot running from the 1st May 2010. Before May, vessels will need to apply for the scheme (deadline – 12 noon – 12th April 2010), be selected by Cefas (based on scientific selection criteria – see question 5.) and have their vessels fitted with the REM technology. Operation of a catch-quota system and REM data collection will end 31st December 2010. From the 1st of January 2011, participating vessels will no longer have additional catch-quota or additional days at sea and will resume standard fishing practices and rules. Although the trial of a catch quota system with REM ends in December 2010 participating vessels will be held in contract until the 31st March 2011 for administrative and scientific purposes, for example, so that Cefas can remove the REM technology from the vessels.

4. Who is eligible to participate?

In the English scheme only English registered vessels over 10m in overall length and in membership of a PO are eligible to enter. Defra and Cefas encourage a range of vessel sizes to apply and would ideally like to include a variety of vessels and gear types (e.g. TR1, TR2, long-liners, and gillnetters) which target cod or will have a significant bycatch of this species during the trial period.

5. How do I apply?

Cefas have advertised the scheme in the fishing news (26/03/2010). You can access an application form through the news and events page on the Cefas website http://www.cefas.co.uk/news-and-events.aspx (see 25th March 2010 – Catch quota pilot project with Remote Electronic Monitoring). Hard copies can be requested from Cefas. Contact details can be found at end of this article.

Vessels will be selected based on the scientific criteria for the project. Fishermen will need to fill out details in the application form, part of which includes a short fishing plan of how they could manage their quota/fishing over the duration of the project, to ensure they do not go over their catch quota limit. This fishing plan will be one of the criteria that vessels will be selected against. If selected, further advice may be given by Cefas on techniques participants could consider as part of developing and sticking to their fishing plan.

6. How much additional cod quota will I get if I am selected to participate in the project?

Vessels participating in the scheme can get up to 30% additional cod quota based on the amount of cod a vessel has landed according to the reference period (2008-2009). The amount receivable will be made available on the official start date of the project.

As part of the application process, applicants have been asked to bid on how much quota they would be willing to receive to participate in the scheme, up to a maximum of 30%. This bidding process means that we don’t exclude those vessels that catch the largest amount of cod. The total quota available cannot exceed the English share of 137 tonnes of the 5% additional quota received from the European Commission for the scheme.

7. What will happen when my cod quota is exhausted?

When a vessel’s cod quota is exhausted the vessel will either have to stop fishing (unless there is no chance of it catching cod, e.g. lobster potting) or buy in additional quota. Fishermen will need to manage their cod catches against the other quotas they fish against, using their professional knowledge and skills.

8. Can I lease cod quota in or out during the year or the project?

Throughout the duration of the trial (May – December 31st 2010), all vessels participating in the scheme will not be able to sell or lease out cod quota to vessels within or outside the catch-quota scheme. However, participating vessels will be allowed to buy-in or lease in cod quota from other vessels. Bought in/leased in cod quota will also be subject to the rules of the catch-quota.

9. How many extra days at sea will I get if I am selected?

Trawlers (TR1 and TR2) will be offered additional days at sea to allow for more flexible fishing operations throughout the year, to encourage cod avoidance behaviour and so avoid unnecessary tie up. Gillnetters and long-liners participating in the trial will not be eligible to receive extra days.

TR1 vessels receiving a 12 month flat rate allocation shall receive around 25 additional days and TR2 vessels shall receive around 34 additional days, however, total days receivable will be no more than 100% of a vessels track record. TR1 and TR2 vessel joining in the course of the year will receive a pro rata allocation in the normal way. Participating vessels shall not be permitted to transfer out days at sea.

10. Will the extra days allocated to participating vessels be at the cost to the rest of the fleet?

The extra days allocated should not be at the cost of the rest of the fleet. The UK plans to redeem the days through a buyback provision for days under the cod recovery plan, as the scheme will decrease overall cod mortality.

11. Will discards of all fish be prohibited during the period of the project?

All catches of cod must be landed if they are above the minimum landing size. Discarding of undersize cod will be allowed once it is counted against quota and discarding of species other than cod is permitted, providing it adheres to the requirements of the high grading ban. Discard estimates for cod, haddock and whiting will also be recorded as part of the scheme.

12. What are the CCTV cameras for?

The purpose of the CCTV element of the remote electronic monitoring (REM) system is to verify catches and discards when operating a catch quota system. The main questions we aim to answer are:

• Is the REM technology good enough to monitor a catch quota system in a mixed fishery; can cameras allow us to verify catches, discards, or distinguish between different species (cod, haddock, and whiting) and sizes of these fish?
• Does the REM technology work with different sized vessels and for a range of different gear types (trawlers, gillnetters and long-liners)?

13. What will the film be used for?

The film footage will be analysed by trained Cefas shore based observers to verify if filmed catches and discards equate to logged catches. Cefas will use filmed data to form scientific reports on the project and if the data retrieved is suitable it may be used to inform fisheries data collection that is required of us by the EU (e.g. catch composition or informing stock analysis)

14. What will happen to the film after each trip and after the end of the project?

When the hard drive reaches its capacity it will be exchanged for another hard drive. The film on the hard drive will be analysed for the purposes of project and any data presented in Cefas reports will aggregated and made anonymous. Reports will be submitted to the European Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF), so that they can review the project. The film data will then be deleted from the portable hard-drive and returned to a vessel for further data collection. Data may be transferred from hard drives and temporarily retained for up to 6 months after the end of the project to provide a record of the scheme and allow scientific papers to be written.

15. Who will have access to the film and for what purpose? What safeguards will be in place to ensure that the film will not be misused or used for any purpose other than agreed in the terms and conditions of the project?

Cefas and Defra data controllers will have access and ownership of film data and are subject to the laws of data protection. These data controllers will ensure data is not used for purposes other than those specified in the schemes terms and conditions. Information obtained by the REM system and by observers may be released to other bodies if it is necessary for the investigation or prosecution of persons, or for any other purpose required by law.

16. Who will install the camera, who will own them and what will happen to them at the end of the project?

Engineers contracted by Cefas and the systems suppliers (Archipelago Marine Research Ltd) will position and install the remote electronic monitoring systems. Cefas own the camera’s and will retrieve them after data collection ends on 31st December 2010.

17. What will the implications be if I am operating in the Norwegian sector?

All vessels participating in the scheme will abide by standard fishing rules and legislation for the sector they are fishing in. Vessels fishing in the Norwegian sector will be expected to operate within the rules agreed to in the catch quota project contract and also the standard fishing laws expected to be abided by in the Norwegian sector (e.g. Norwegian discard ban).

18. Will my PO be involved?

POs and MMO will be involved and will ensure participating vessels receive their calculated additional quota allocations. Cefas and Defra will inform POs exactly how much extra quota the participating vessel/s has been allocated.

The text of the letter reads:

Dear Minister

Undulate Ray

I enclose a communication prepared by Jersey and French fishermen with the help of IFREMER, the French national fisheries institute. It is strongly supported by the NFFO.

Against the background of the blanket EU prohibition on landing undulate ray, the paper proposes a more targeted and evidence based approach; it has the dual merits of reducing discards, whilst strengthening information for the future management of fishing on this species.

The contrast between the direct experience of local abundance of undulate Ray in the South-Eastern part of the Western Channel (VIIe) and the overall weakness of ICES survey and landings data on skates and rays, gives this initiative, based on close collaboration between the fishing industry and scientists, a singular importance. If a means of enabling a targeted, managed, fishery under close scientific supervision in the undulate ray fishery is proved feasible, there is scope to explore whether a similar approach has relevance elsewhere.

The aim of the initiative is to provide the evidence-base that would allow a move away from blanket measures, that often have perverse consequences, and toward a sustainable, targeted fishery underpinned by robust collaborative science.

The point of writing to you is to solicit the UK’s support in making approaches to the Commission for approval for this important initiative.

We would be happy to discuss the proposal with you directly, should you want more detail.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Barrie Deas

Chief Executive

Comit~ Conjoint Consultatifde Ia Baje de Granville

Saint-Malo, 16 mars 2010

Mntinn eamnuuune

Ride brunette, Undulate Ray (Raja Undulata)

(English Translation)

The Regional Fishery Committees of Brittany (CRPMEM Br) and Basse-Normandie (CRPMEM RN) and the Jersey Fishermen’s Association (WA) present at the 16th of March 2010 meeting of the Joint Advisory Committee of the Bay de Granville Agreement, in the strongest possible terms, urgently reQuest that the Fisheries Ministers of the UK and France address the EU Commission on the particular case of the undulate ray (Raja Undulata) which is particularly abundant in the western area of the ICES VII E western Channel, also known as the statistical areas 26, 27, 28 E7 and 26. 27 ES.

ICES does not possess relevant data to justify such a radical decision as a total ban of the undulate ray fishery in all European waters. Notably, it is known that the distribution of this species is very uneven in European waters.

Following a demand made by France, the EU Commission requested the “STECF” issue new recommendations in April 2010. However, the STECF have very little data, most of which originate from oceanographic surveys in the East Channel where the undulate ray has only ever been found infrequently. (The same applies to “CPUE” from insufficient fish market data.)

The Granville Bay fishermen have always fished Undulate Ray and on a regular basis, but the landings were only classified as “Rays”. The only fish market to record undulate rays separately is the Cherbourg one. This enabled the CRPM of Basse-Normandie to have an overview of landings in Cherbourg. The CRPM RN has also carried out observations on board fishing boats and have registered the percentage of undulate rays in their catch, which can represent up to 35 % in tr~uwlk ,rncl 700/n in net entnhe~

Scientific observation surveys at sea are presently being carried out by the “OBSMER” (scientific observation aboard commercial vessels) and “FILMANCET” programs and can add data relevant to the undulate ray.

Jersey has carried out ray tagging campaigns and is acquiring biological data on captures (such as distribution and male maturity size).

In order to acquire more pertinent data, in terms of resource abundance and its localization but also for the biology of the species (graphs pertaining to size and weight, sex-ratio and minimum reproduction size) it would be important to reopen the fishery under scientific supervision — the conditions will have to be defined by the scientists of the various parties involved.

These data are obviously lacking in the ICES and STECE and would be necessary for them to give accurate and appropriate recommendations on the state of the resource and the effects of fishing in this precise area of the Normano-Breton Gulf

The new organisation will absorb the Marine and Fisheries Agency and will be the administrative instrument through which marine spatial planning will be given effect. It will therefore have a much broader focus and responsibilities than the MFA, although at port level the same, or similar, presence will be maintained.

In preparation for these changes the NFFO recently met the new MMO Chief Executive, Steven Gant, at its new Newcastle headquarters, to establish lines of communication, hear about the new organisations priorities, and to outline the fishing industry’s principle areas of concern.

Given that fishing will now be only one of many marine “sectors”, dealt with through an integrated approach there are obvious concerns that fishing’s influence will be further relegated.

The MMO was keen to confirm that it would be open and transparent, with a genuine commitment to stakeholder involvement in its decisions. Its job, in terms of marine spatial planning would be to balance the competing claims for space between the various offshore activities including oil and gas exploitation, wind-farm, wave and tidal energy, aggregate dredging, military and fishing.

The Federation was able to express its concern that marine conservation zones and massive wind-farm developments were underway before a rational process of marine spatial planning is in place. Fishing being an inherently dispersed, hunting activity is at an automatic disadvantage if a narrow £per metre of marine space is employed.

The opportunity was taken to emphasise the repeated cyclical failures of the over-centralised, over- prescriptive, CFP and how the role of the MMO could be transformed from a policeman of often perverse rules, to a broad auditing role by transferring management responsibilities to fishing industry organisations

This was a useful and constructive first meeting that paved the way for a closer working relationship. As an industry we are suffering from the problems of transition, relocation and break in continuity as the move from MFA to MMO proceeds. The sooner that the MMO is fully up and running, the sooner we will be in a position to judge whether the new organisation’s commitment to genuine industry involvement in its decisions is genuine or mere rhetoric.

There is little mileage to be gained from moaning about the deficiencies of the present arrangements. Our energies are most usefully employed to work closely with the MMO to ensure that the delivery arm of fisheries policy is made fully aware of the threats but also the opportunities that lie ahead as we chart the choppy waters of CFP reform, devolution, financial restraint, marine conservation zones, gigantic wind-farms and all the unpredictable fluctuations that habitually confront fishing.

A good start has been made; and Steven Gant will shortly meet the NFFO Executive Committee to hear of the critical issues directly, fleet segment by fleet segment, and region by region.

Following extensive and detailed discussions, the Committee adopted the policy described below.

Background

The review of NFFO policy took place against the background of:

• The deliberations of the UK and Ireland Crab Working Group
• Meetings in Paris (28th January 2010) and Edinburgh ( ) of Irish, Scottish and English crab interests
• Publication of the report The Future on Management of the Brown Crab Fisheries by Nautilus Consultants
• Cefas Assessment of the Brown Crab Fisheries Edible Crab Stock Assessment And Fishery Status Reports 2009

Conservation Status of the Brown Crab Stocks

After a thorough review of the scientific stock assessments for the stocks of Brown Crab exploited by the UK fleet, and noting the range of uncertainties and complexities associated with this advice, the NFFO Shellfish Committee agreed:

• Of the Brown crab stocks that are known at present, it is reasonable to conclude that fishing effort is currently at, or close to the top of the potential of the fishery. Additional effort is likely to increase expenses in exploiting the fishery, lead to space conflicts and reduced average earnings for those in the fishery, all other things being equal
• That the current level of effort is as much as is needed to exploit the fishery and it would be prudent at this stage to find ways of placing an overall cap on effort

Effort Limitation: Principles

Against this background, the Committee takes the view that it would be desirable to find a reasonably unobtrusive way to cap fishing effort in the brown crab fishery, acknowledging that any measures in this regard would apply also to the lobster fishery.

It was agreed that the effort cap should by applied in ways that are compatible with the following principles:

• A national framework which follows a results-based approach through which broad objectives are defined nationally, whilst regional bodies design and apply tailored implementation measures)
• A strong regional basis to the approach with flexibility to tailor measures in ways that are specific to the fisheries concerned
• A stepwise approach that deals initially, with latent effort in the shellfish sector, before going on to cap effort in the active shellfish fleet

Elements of an Effort Limitation Scheme

Latent Effort

It seems to make little sense to curb the expansion of the active shellfish fleet, if it is still possible for inactive or low-activity shellfish licences to be attached to vessels which subsequently increase their fishing effort in this fishery. If the purpose of an effort cap is to be met, dealing with latent effort in the shellfish fisheries will have to be a precondition.

Given the importance of the shellfisheries to the inshore sector and the current SAIF initiative, which amongst other items, has been tasked to address the issue of latent capacity in the under 10 metre whitefish sector, we would argue that the issue of latent capacity in the shellfisheries should be part of a broad approach aimed at putting the whole inshore sector on a sustainable footing.

Accepting the present difficult state of public finances, we nevertheless make the case for to a publically funded, one-off adjustment, to take out latent capacity in the shellfish sector. There is no disguising that this will be expensive but it is important to set this in context against the high cost of repeated policy failures that have afflicted management measures. Breaking free of the cycle of past policy failures will require a decisive and novel approach which addresses both governance and overcapacity issues.

It is difficult to see how a solution the endemic problems of the under 10 metre whitefish fleet and the linked issue of latent capacity in the shellfish sector, can be achieved without recognising that even inactive licences have an economic value. A licence buyout /and where relevant a decommissioning scheme, properly managed, would put these fleets on a solid footing for a profitable and sustainable future. Without such an adjustment it is likely that fisheries policy in both of these sectors will continue to flounder.

Effort Limitation

On the assumption that the issue of latent capacity is dealt with, we could envisage and support an effort limitation that:

• Operates within a broad framework set at national level
• Delegates the main design and implementation features to regional bodies (in the case of England, for the inshore zone, this would probable mean the Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities).

In other words, through appropriate enabling legislation, it would be a national obligation on regional managers to apply limitations to ensure that a cap is placed on effort in the shellfisheries within their area of jurisdiction; but the form of those limitations, whether a pot limitation scheme or other means, would be decided and implemented at the regional level. This approach would have a number of advantages:

• It would place an overall cap on fishing effort in the crab and lobster fisheries, simultaneously improving the economic outlook and applying a precautionary approach for the shell fisheries
• It would avoid a cumbersome, complex, top-down, highly bureaucratic superstructure that we see as the primary objection to an effort limitation scheme
• It would be tailored to the particularities of the individual shell fisheries in the regions
• It could meet the obligation to limit effort in the crab and lobster fisheries in ways that met local requirements from a menu that could include:
  • limitation on pots
  • tie-up scheme
  • catch limits per vessel
• The menu approach would extend to the way in which regional managers:
  • Set the terms of any pot limitation scheme in its area of jurisdiction, including the cap on the number of pots deployed by any vessel
  • Fixed the arrangements for monitoring and policing any pot limitations in place
  • Applied any licence succession policy (for example, fully tradable licence permits, or licences that are surrendered on retirement, or specific arrangements for young entrants)
• Following the observation that pot limits within limited geographical areas (and within a three dimensional marine environment) faces intrinsic enforcement challenges, and that the most successful pot limitation schemes (in Jersey and Brittany) are those with a high degree of commitment and involvement by the local fishing industry, the regionalised approach advocated here lends itself to a high degree of industry buy-in, in a way that a broad national scheme never could
• By placing an overall cap on any future expansion on the shell fisheries but avoiding an intrusive effort reduction regime, it should be possible to avoid the perverse consequences that seem to be an intrinsic aspect of all effort reduction systems: this is the adjustment of fishing activities to offset economic disadvantage. In the case of the shell fisheries this could mean the type and size of pot or the intensity with which they are fished.

Offshore

The arrangements described above relate primarily to the inshore zone, although there is an important debate to be had on whether for shellfish management purposes this jurisdiction should mean 6 or 12 nautical miles.

• It is recognised that the offshore zone is different and requires a separate tailored approach. The offshore fishery comprises two main components:
  • Vessels that operate essentially as an extension of an inshore shellfishery but part of their portfolio of fishing locations are located offshore. Thus a vessel may operate pots in the 0-6 miles zone, 6 to 12 mile zone as well as offshore 20 or 40 miles from shore
  • The larger, more or less nomadic, vessels frequently using vivier tanks, that constitute the bulk of landings in the Brown Crab fishery
• A further reference point in considering effort limitation in the offshore fishery is the recognition outside the 6 mile limit of its inherently international dimension

It is also important to recognise that important steps towards self-regulation by the principal operators in the offshore crab fishery, on an international basis, are in motion following meetings in Paris, Edinburgh and London. This important initiative is entirely compatible with the main thrust of this paper. Both advocate:

• a results focused approach
• measures tailored to specific fisheries
• a high degree of involvement and support from the shellfish industry
• A focus that marries economic realities and sustainability

Against this background, and bearing in mind that the offshore Brown Crab interests are currently fine tuning the terms of a consensus based, voluntary agreement to limit crab production on a seasonal basis, we consider that given the international dimension of the offshore fishery this is likely to be the most effective and the most relevant initiative in the offshore fishery for the foreseeable future and should be strongly and vigorously supported.

It may be desirable that these discussions find a semi-permanent home, possibly within the North-West Waters Regional Advisory Council, where they could be nurtured and supported as a basis for a voluntary, industry driven initiative that aligns itself with the overall objective of harvesting crab sustainably.

Conclusion

The policy approach outlined above is:

• forward looking
• comprehensive
• aligned with the apparent direction of both Defra policy and CFP reform
• focused on a results-based approach
• Emphasises a strong regional dimension
• Advocates a transfer of responsibilities and decision making from centralised management, closer to the fisheries that are managed.

The alignment of effort constraints in the crab and lobster fisheries, along with a decisive, effective but fair approach to the issue of latent capacity, will be the principal criteria that will determine whether the future of the shellfisheries is one of sustainable and profitable exploitation or whether it will be characterised by stagnation and recurring conservation problems.

Risks and Benefits for Fishing

As with most major initiatives like this, marine spatial planning potentially carries both risks and benefits. The benefits are a way of reducing the potential for chaos, as new offshore developments like wind-farms and marine protected areas, jockey for marine space with other seabed, water column and sea surface users, like aggregate dredging, shipping and of course, fishing. A rational, evidence based, fair and open system of planning could carry great advantages over an unplanned law- of- the- jungle approach.

There are particular dangers in marine spatial planning for fishing despite its prior claim on most sea areas, at least on the continental shelf. The wide dispersal of fishing activities often means that a crude indicator, such as £ per sq metre of different economic activities, will almost invariably put fishing at a disadvantage. Moving fishing aside to make space for higher-value-per-mere activities would be a built in feature of such an approach. Unless unchecked it would eventually lead to the displacement of fishing to such an extent that this important contributor to the country’s food security would be seriously affected.

Ground-breaking Initiative

In what may come to be seen as a ground-breaking initiative, a conference was held recently in Newcastle, organised by the North Sea Commission – a coordinating body for local authorities around the North Sea – that brought together many of the stakeholders that would be affected by marine spatial planning. Shipping, oil and gas, wind-farm, nature conservancy, scientific, recreational, as well as fishing interests were amongst the stakeholders who met with representatives from the Commission and national governments around the North Sea. It was recognised by all the participants that this was the first time that many of the different stakeholders who will be affected by marine spatial planning had been brought together.

Sketching out the pitfalls to avoid and the governance structures and approaches that would be most likely to deliver effective and balanced marine spatial planning, provided the main focus of the conference.

Commission

The European Commission described the six priorities driving marine spatial planning:

1. Integrated marine governance that requires new administrative structures
2. Specific instruments to deliver this integrated policy• Marine knowledge• Marine surveillance• Integrated spatial planning
3. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive that will mean that decision-making on fisheries will be integrated with wider environmental policy
4. A sea-basin (regional) approach based on coherent geographical units such as the North Sea – if such an approach brings “added value” over and above measures applied by the member states
5. Sea-basin cooperation between all parties
6. A focus on economic growth and employment in line with the European Union’s meta-policies.

It was clear that the Commission views the North Sea as likely to be one of the first “sea-basins” out of the blocks on marine spatial planning, citing the higher levels of information and levels of existing cooperation between sectors as reasons. Other sea-areas would follow.

UK Minister

UK Fisheries Minister Huw Irranca-Davies gave the keynote speech and made the important point that whilst the integration of decision-making in fisheries with broader environmental policy was inevitable, there were already examples of good practice and cooperation between sectors that might at first sight to have conflicting interests. The NFFO and SFFs’ cooperative and collaborative relationship with the oil and gas industry, at a variety of levels, over 20 years, was cited as an example worthy of study and emulation.

NFFO

The Federation:

1. played an active part in the discussions
2. regretted that the massive expansion of offshore wind-farms and marine protected areas was proceeding at a pace and on a timescale that will beat the arrival of a coherent system of marine spatial planning
3. Emphasised the need for the fishing industry to find ways through which its key fishing areas can be defended. This will require detailed maps within a system of safeguards over the use that would be made of this often commercially sensitive information
4. Raised the issue of the legal basis for new regional management bodies within the CFP or in the context of marine spatial planning given that the EU treaties make no specific provision for regional law making bodies
5. Gave a presentation on the generally very positive first meeting between the North Sea Regional Advisory Council and Forewind, the developer of the Dogger Bank wind-farm

Future Coordination of Offshore Stakeholders

The conference was very similar in tone to the 1998 meeting in Haddo House, in Aberdeenshire, that gave rise to the North Sea Commission (Fisheries Partnership) which provided an international forum for fishermen and scientists, and which later went on to form the North Sea RAC. There are clear advantages of being aware of developments and thinking in other offshore sectors, as well as engaging with the authorities on the shape of marine spatial planning, as it develops. It is likely that this conference will be the first step in providing a permanent focus for these exchanges.

Brown Crab will be the focus for a comprehensive examination of policy when the NFFO Shellfish Committee meets in London on 9th March. The Committee will examine and respond to recent reports on the state of the fisheries and management. One of these, “Future Management of Brown Crab in UK and Ireland”, which featured in the Fishing News (29th January 2010) is the outcome of work commissioned by the UK and Republic of Ireland Brown Crab Working Group, an industry led group which includes the Federation. This formed in 2008 to address the slumping markets that have plagued the industry, and progress conservation measures that have been mired for the past decade. The Committee will also examine the results of recent stocks assessment work undertaken by Cefas that has assessed the majority of the fisheries to be overfished.

NFFO Shellfish Committee Chairman, Gary Hodgson said: “In the past shellfish has tended to take a back seat to whitefish in the eyes of fisheries managers but it is clear this is now starting to change. With this in mind, it is important that shellfishermen from all coasts take the lead through their representative bodies in deciding on how the fisheries should be managed in the future. We have always been clear that the regional differences in the fleet mean that whatever approach emerges, it must be one that is tailored to suit these differences.”

“This meeting marks the start of a major review of Federation policy. We have already been working with a wide range of other industry organisations to draw together an evidence base to inform the way forward. The fact that such collaboration is taking place shows there is a broad appetite as well as the means to secure a profitable and sustainable future for the fleet on the industry’s own terms. It is essential that we achieve this rather than face the possibility of the Commission at some later stage indiscriminately wielding a big stick over the industry. The last thing anyone in this industry would want would be to look back in another ten years to see the unhappy story of whitefish repeating itself here.”

The meeting follows in the wake of recent moves by the UK and Republic of Ireland vivier fleet to progress voluntary measures to limit landings in a bid to stem a collapse in market prices as the spring crabbing season gets underway.

The Federation will take forward the results of the review in negotiations with other industry organisations, and in talks with Defra, where it is anticipated a formal government consultation on conservation measures will be forthcoming.

NFFO members from around the regions are strongly encouraged to send representation to this meeting to take part in the review process. The meeting will take place on 9th March at One Queen Anne’s Gate, London, SW1H 9BT, commencing at 11am. Those intending to attend should notify the NFFO Offices on 01904 635430.

New Industry Body formed to Fight MPA Issue

MPA Fishing Coalition

A new industry body has been formed, supported by two national federations, NFFO and SFF and involving a wide range of other fishermen’s’ organisations. Its purpose is to ensure that the marine protected areas foreseen in the Marine & Coastal Access Act are introduced in a way that minimises adverse consequences for fishermen.

A spokesman for the new Group, the MPA Fishing Coalition, said:

“The displacement of fishermen from established fishing grounds is a direct threat from the Government decision to establish a network of marine conservation zones in both inshore and offshore waters around the UK.

“Our intention in establishing the MPA Fishing Coalition is to provide the fishing industry with a powerful negotiating platform. In many instances the only way fishermen are going to avoid being swept off fishing grounds is by presenting a strong, coherent case backed by factual evidence. The MPA Fishing Coalition has been formed as an instrument of mutual support to ensure individual fishermen or groups of fishermen will have strong backing in putting forward the strongest case possible for maintaining open access to fishing grounds.

“It is intended that this group represent all sectors of the industry – every fisherman in the UK should consider joining, whatever other affiliations they hold. Unity is strength and the industry has never faced a threat like this before.”

“Whether derived from the European Habitats and Birds Directives or the new Marine Act, MPAs have the capacity to displace fishermen from their grounds. The scale of displacement will depend on the management measures applied within the designated areas. These could range from light monitoring to complete closure. Displacement could mean loss of livelihoods and diverted effort can have severe implications for fishing effort and stock management in adjacent areas.

“It is clear that just lodging a protest – even a very loud protest – is simply not going to be enough. The MPA Fishing coalition will use the evidence – some provided directly by the fishing industry itself – to defend our established fishing areas.

“We are launching a fighting fund with immediate effect to ensure that we have the resources to meet the challenge we are facing. All donations will be accepted, recorded and fully accounted for. Every penny will be used to defend fishermen’s access to their grounds.

“The core of the issue is that MPAs can be established against the industry’s will or they can be negotiated. Our initiative is designed to ensure that the fishing industry is in the strongest possible position to negotiate. The Group will not deal in loud diplomacy. It will be serious and evidenced based. To that end we are fortunate to have secured as Chairman of the Group, the services of Dr Stephen Lockwood, former Director of the Fisheries Laboratory at Conway. His appointment and the experience he brings, experience that includes negotiations over earlier marine conservation areas, signifies that this will be a serious and heavyweight negotiating body.

“By strengthening the fishing industry’s negotiating arm, our aim is to arrive at an accommodation that provides protection for vulnerable marine habitats and features but in a way that allows fishermen to keep fishing. This is about finding the right balance between the nation’s food security and protecting biodiversity.

“Our aim is to transcend all divisions and sectional interests within the fishing industry to provide maximum negotiating leverage at the highest levels.

“The secretariat for the new group will be provided by the national federations but it is stressed that from the outset this group is for every fishermen in the UK, irrespective of gear type, location on the coast or current memberships and affiliations. There will be no membership fee but the industry is urged to contribute to the fighting fund that has been established.

“MPAs will apply locally and will affect local fisheries as well as those further afield as a result of displaced effort. The purpose of this group is to give weight, support and backing to the fishing interests potentially disadvantaged by specific MPAs.

“We recognise the value of regional stakeholder projects aimed at identifying and agreeing MPAs locally. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this route will deliver all that is required from a fishing industry perspective. Where the regional projects stop is where the role of the MPA Fishing Coalition begins.”

COMMENTS

Davy Hill, NFFO Chairman

“We are determined that this will not be some kind of marine highland clearance, with fishermen callously evicted from their traditional fishing grounds”

Ian Gatt, President, Scottish Fishermen’s Federation

“There is an easy or a difficult way to introduce marine conservation zones. Stanton Bank shows us that it is possible to negotiate an arrangement that delivers protection for habitat features whilst at the same time safeguarding the fishing industry’s access to critically important fishing grounds.”

Jim Portus, South West FPO

“Lyme Bay shows how to introduce a new MPA with maximum pain, maximum disruption and maximum conflict. It doesn’t have to be that way.”

Paul Trebilcock, Chief Executive Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation

“It is absolutely essential that every fisherman in the country gives their active support to this group. It is only by showing absolute unity and by presenting the industry arguments coherently and forcefully that we will be able to defend our most important grounds.”

Gary Hodgson, Chairman NFFO Shellfish Committee

“Static gear fishermen shouldn’t be complacent about marine conservation zones. They may not be in the front line but MPAs have the capacity to affect static pot and net fisheries directly or indirectly through displaced effort.”

Bertie Armstrong, President Scottish Fishermen’s Federation

“If the fishing industry cannot speak with a single, clear voice on this issue, it will be condemned to suffer the consequences. In an indeterminate number of cases this will be to be expelled from the grounds on which we earn our living.”

Dave Pessel, Plymouth

“Every fisherman in the country should support and work with this Group. It is patently in their own interest.”

If you wish to register with the MPA Fishing Coalition please download the application form here and mail to us.

Although few would argue against a method of measuring mesh size in a way that increases consistency and reduces the scope for error, there are now serious doubts whether the Omega Gauge delivers this.

The collective failure of the European Commission, the European Fisheries Control Agency and member states to communicate adequately with the fishing industry on the introduction of the Omega gauge has left fishing vessels with many thousands of pounds worth of nets, on vessels and in net stores that overnight, have been deemed to be illegal. Net manufactures and distributors likewise have been badly affected.

The Commission’s attitude to date has been to ignore the practical issues which the introduction of the gauge has given rise to in the hope that although costly and frustrating for the fishing industry, these are essentially transitional frictions that will die down in due course.

However, as the enforcement authorities across Europe begin to use the Omega in place of the manual wedge gauge, the issues associated with the new gauge are increasing rather than diminishing, raising the question of whether the Omega is fit for purpose.

It is now clear that that:

1. The introduction of the Omega gauge has been associated with a wholesale failure to communicate the implications of the change to the new method. This has cost the fishing industry and net suppliers thousands of pounds.
2. There are systematic differences in the mesh measurements provided by the omega by comparison with the wedge gauge
3. In particular, there are serious doubts whether the new gauges are being calibrated in the way specified by the manufacturers. This could point to a failure in training procedures in the enforcement authorities, or a more deep seated problem with the gauge itself
4. There has been a systematic failure to trial the new gauges in a wide range of practical conditions

Against this background, the NFFO has taken the issue up on a number of fronts:

• We have taken legal advice on the position of fishermen whose nets are measured by the Omega gauge. Whilst of course, to refuse an inspection of gear amounts to criminal obstruction and should not be countenanced, at this stage it is important that skippers, when asked whether they accept the legality of the measurement of their nets using the Omega gauge, do not sign any document to this effect. If there are concerns about the accuracy of the mesh measurement, skippers should question the validity/accuracy of the gauge. It is not necessary to get drawn into lengthy questions on the issue as skippers in this position can quite properly defer further questioning until legal advice is available.
• To issue advice that it is entirely legal for fishing vessels to ask and be given the opportunity to wash their nets to clear sand or mud from the twine that could have an effect on mesh measurement. In borderline cases where under the old method the nets would have been legal but under the Omega determined to be illegal, this could be decisive.
• Through the North Sea and North West Waters RACs to raise, and continue to raise the issue at the highest levels until the failure of governance associated with the introduction of the Omega is recognised and addressed
• To offer, along with other national fishing federations, financial support for an objective study into the performance of the Omega gauge as an instrument fit for purpose

Along with the arrival of offshore wind-farms, the establishment of MPAs represents the biggest potential threat to fishermen’s access to their fishing grounds that the industry has faced in its entire history. There are now legal obligations on ministers both at European level and domestically ( through the new Marine and Coastal Access Act) to introduce MPAs in UK waters. The statutory nature conservancy agencies at present have a massive budget to provide advice to Government on the implementation of both European and domestic MPAs. They are driving the MPA agenda forward at breakneck speed.

Against this background, the purpose of the new all-UK Coalition is to give the fishing industry the strongest possible voice at the highest possible level. It is backed by the two national fishing federations, NFFO and SFF but when it is formally launched, on 23rd February in the House of Commons, it is intended to be wholly inclusive with invitations to join being extended to every fishing organisation in the country.

The timetable for the establishment of the network of MPAs is breathtaking. It is for this reason that the initial discussions between the Coalition and those responsible for implementing MPAs has taken place in advance of its formal launch. These bodies are:

• Natural England (who will advise Government on inshore MPAs),
• JNCC (who will advise on offshore MPAs)
• Defra (who will make the final decisions on site designation and management measures within them in English waters)
• Devolved authorities: A parallel although somewhat different process will apply to establish MPAs in the waters of the devolved administrations and it is our intention for the Coalition to engage here too.

The new body will have two core purposes:

• The first is to engage with the process of implementing MPAs at a high strategic level.
• The second is to provide a serious negotiating platform on the hard cases – in those instances where the regional stakeholder projects fail to find consensus and where political decisions by ministers are required.

The meeting, in Natural England’s London offices, was the first in what is likely to become regular and intense discussions. After receiving an update on the process currently under way to designate both European sites and domestic marine conservation zones, the Coalition outlined the areas in which clarity is required for the fishing industry. Some of these were:

• Objectives: The objectives of MPAs in UK waters are not yet clear, beyond a motherhood and apple pie wish to protect vulnerable features of the marine environment. The key questions for the fishing industry are: what kinds of habitat require protection? What proportion of the vulnerable features requires MPA protection? How is this to be achieved in the least harmful way for the fishing industry? What mitigation measures are envisaged when fishermen’s livelihoods are affected? These are fundamental questions for an industry that plays an important role in the nation’s food security.
• A “network of ecologically coherent marine protected zones” is the frequently used formulae used to describe the overall objective. But almost every word in the phrase raises a range of further questions. The way that these questions are answered will have profound implications for the fishing industry: what does “network mean” in terms of ability to fish? What is the “ecology” referred to and how much is to be protected? What does “coherent” mean in this context? What will MPAs mean, in concrete terms for individual fishermen: coexistence or extinction?
• Timeframe: The timeframe for the establishment of UK MPAs is wholly incompatible with the process of building trust and confidence that MPAs will be introduced in the least harmful way for the fishing industry. How is this to be fixed? The Californian and Australian experience of establishing MPAs both had false starts when an overly ambitious time frame and failure to connect adequately with the fishing industry led back to the drawing board.Uncertainties in the Science: The Marine Science Advisory Panel has been established to advise over the application of “best available science” on MPAs. We know however that this phrase can mean a thorough scientific understanding based on robust data, or, it can mean something pretty close to an evidence free wild guess. How will the inevitable uncertainties in the data and science be dealt with and balanced against the livelihoods that may be affected and why should human factors be outside of the scientific realm (see related story NFFO Challenges MPA Science Panel)? The Coalition is committed to an evidence based approach and monitoring the standard of that evidence will be an important part of its role.
• Displacement: Site designation and management measures within designated sites are two different things. It will be possible to have highly protected (fully closed No Take Zones) as a relatively small part of a wider site in which less onerous restrictions apply. No-one however, is pretending that, in a so-far-unknown number of sites, fishermen will not be displaced from their fishing grounds. The issue of displacement has not even begun to be addressed. Neither are the regional projects (whose focus is precisely regional) capable of addressing this central issue. Displaced fishing effort can affect the livelihoods of fishermen in adjacent areas. Equally, the effects could be felt many hundreds of miles away. Unless addressed and handled very carefully, there is the danger that the MPA process could establish a network of pristine MPAs, whilst degrading the rest of the marine environment by diverting fishing effort into new areas
• Unintended Consequences: Displacement of fishing effort is only one area where there is huge scope for unintended consequences. On past experience, a naïve and poorly informed approach will almost certainly generate damaging consequences further down the line. The evidence of a large increase in the amount of static gear in areas where mobile gears are excluded is already seen in Lyme Bay. Poorly thought through fisheries management measures always throw up unintended consequences and the more severe the measures the greater are those consequences
• Fishing Data: On the one hand, fishermen’s information (on where they fish, for what, using what gear and when) is vital to the process of designing MPA site boundaries and also subsequent management measures. This is essential if we are to find ways of implementing MPAS that both minimise the potential impact on fishing activity, whilst at the same time provide protection for vulnerable feature. On the other hand, fishing charts, both paper and electronic or in fishermen’s heads, represent a lifetime’s work. It is not reasonable to expect fishermen to hand over this type of valuable, highly sensitive data to more or less anonymous bureaucrats, to use as they like without proper and adequate safeguards. To date these have not been provided.
• Windfarms: It would be folly to see MPAs in isolation. Round 3 of offshore wind-farms represents a potential threat no less than MPAs to fishermen’s livelihoods. It is important that the cumulative effect of loss of access through offshore windfarms is addressed simultaneously with the establishment of MPAs. The new kid in the neighbourhood is the Marine Management Organisation with responsibility for marine spatial planning. Hardly yet out of the blocks, it must address the issue of competing parties with different interests on the seabed
• Socio-economic Impact: The whole question of how the socio-economic impact of MPAs will be measured, mitigated and dealt with under the impact of MPAs is a seriously underdeveloped part of the MPA exercise. Natural England has made clear that socio-economic considerations may be taken into account in designating marine conservation zones. The Coalition’s job is to ensure that they are taken into account, and in a way that is adequate and comprehensive.
• Trust and Confidence: If, as all parties assert, trust and confidence should be the preferred basis of the inclusive approach to implementing MPAs, it is important to remove obstacles to building that trust. Natural England’s public statements on more than one occasion have sent out radically mixed messages. Legally charged with championing the environment, the organisation sometimes behaves, and can certainly sound like a fundamentalist environmental NGO. On other occasions, NE is keen to stress its commitment to a consensus and evidence based approach. Mixed messages can only alienate and undermine those in the fishing industry eager to build a positive engagement with the MPA process. It will be the Coalition’s aim to curb Natural England’s less considered self-inflicted statements.

• Outside the 6: In many ways the elephant in the MPA living room is that outside the 6 mile limit where other member states have historic access rights which are enshrined within the Common Fisheries Policy. It would be completely unacceptable from an equity perspective but also from the point of view of seabed feature protection, to impose MPAs on UK fishermen, leaving other member state fleets to fish within the areas. How exactly this issue is to be addressed, remains obscure.

• Europe, the UK and Devolved Administrations: The different legislative drivers for the establishment of marine protected areas are inherently complicated, embracing as they do EU Natura 2000 Special Areas of Conservation and Special Protected Areas; existing SSSIs; Ramsar sites; as well as the domestic marine conservation zones. When these are overlaid by the complexities of their delivery through the different devolved administrations, and the arrival of the Marine Management Organisation, the scope for confusion is immense. Clarifying the roles of the separate competencies and ensuring that where possible overlaps are used positively to meet legislative requirements will be a priority for the Coalition

Ground Clearing

Inevitably for a first engagement, this initial meeting was a ground clearing exercise for all involved. Some important points were clarified. but the most important points to emerge were:

1. The Coalition was recognised as the principal body engaging with statutory advisors and eventual decision makers in Government at a strategic level on the establishment of “an ecologically coherent network of MPAs”
2. During the introduction the Coalition’s credentials as a broad and inclusive body were emphasised
3. Natural England indicated that engagement with the Coalition would become a priority area for them
4. A commitment was made to meet at an early date to begin dialogue
5. Much reliance is being placed by Natural England on the Science Advisory Panel’s Guidance to the regional projects on what will be taken into account when establishing MPAs. This Guidance should become available in early summer 2010
6. The timetable for Natural England to provide its final advice to ministers on the designation of MPA sites is “challenging” in their jargon and “completely incompatible with a consensus base approach” in ours. Final advice is to be presented to ministers on the designation of marine conservation zones by February 2011
7. The cut off point for the inclusion of fishermen’s chart information into the process of designating MPAs is October 2010, yet the ground rules and safeguards for custodianship have yet to be adequately addressed.
8. The power of fishermen’s information was demonstrated by the provision of an example of tows by mobile vessels adjacent to but not over reef areas
9. Formal Impact Assessments will be prepared for each designated sites and will be significant in shaping the management measures (from monitoring to complete closure) that will apply.
10. The coarseness of ICES data, which only goes down in scale to the ICES sub-rectangle was highlighted
11. The trade off between simple enforcement on the one hand and site boundaries tailored to accommodate fishing patterns was discussed.
12. The scope for differentiated management rules within a site (a closed area partially covering the zone, with much more relaxed rules covering the remainder of the site) was discussed
13. The danger of cumulative resistance to MPAs, if the process of introducing them is mishandled, as a very live possibility was highlighted.

These points, although not exhaustive, provide a flavour of the kind of issues raised by the Coalition on its first outing.

Once fully established, the Coalition will provide a high level channel for its members’ concerns, questions, information and insights.

These will be raised and presented for resolution, in a coherent and balanced way to the statutory advisors on conservation but, crucially, also to the ultimate decision makers in Government.

The immediate priority must be for every fishing organisation in the country to register itself as a member of the MPA Fishing Coalition.

The Coalition’s contact details are:

MPA Fishing Coalition

c/o 30 Monkgate

York

YO31 7PF

This was pointed out firmly but in measured terms to Defra officials at a London meeting, and later at a meeting between an NFFO delegation and Fisheries Minister Huw Irranca-Davies.

Crises can often generate opportunities and this may be a case in point. During the course of the extensive meeting with the Minister and his officials, it was agreed:

• that both the Federation and Defra shared the same goal of maximising flexibility within the effort control regime whilst respecting the overall limits imposed by the Cod Recovery Plan.
• that the arrangements to 31st January 2010, had come within 6 days of the annual allocation for the pressure point –TR1 gear in the North Sea, not a bad achievement
• that the 13% reduction (10% reduction + estimated 3% overshoot) for TR1 gear to February 2011 looks manageable with tightening up on transfers and gears using two gear types
• that this may become even more manageable when the scale of the buyback available for real time closures and other cod avoidance measures becomes known
• that the effort uptake in other areas and gear types gives less cause for concern
• to begin the new effort year with a rollover of the 2009 arrangements.

During February and throughout the coming year Defra and NFFO representatives will work closely to monitor effort uptake and to jointly agree remedial action if and when the need arises.

There will be no limits set for the month of February but any days used in February will count against each vessel’s final allocation. There will be no transfers in February.

The NFFO retains the view that effort control is an ineffectual inherently bureaucratic and economically damaging way to control fishing mortality. It sets in train perverse consequences that hinder rather than help cod recovery. Defra and the Federation share the view that effort control should be removed as soon as an opportunity occurs and replaced with targeted measures. The only thing that can be said with certainty about the current effort based cod recovery plan is that its economic impact is disproportionate to the very small direct impact that it has on cod mortality.

The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations and the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation have welcomed the news that industry body Seafish has formally written to the BBC complaining about the poor editorial standards in the TV programme ‘Britain’s really disgusting food: fish’.

The SFF and NFFO say the programme ignored the true situation regarding commercial fishing in the UK and the impact upon the marine environment.

The Federations are particularly dismayed at the continual repetition in the programme that ‘some scientists believe there will be ‘no fish left in the sea in 50 years time’. The scientist who originally made this assertion in 2006 – Professor Boris Worm of Dalhousie University, Canada – has since rescinded this hypothesis; and it is also a view not held by most mainstream scientists.

In a joint statement, the SFF and NFFO said: “This was an extremely damaging programme to the UK fishing industry where the true facts were simply ignored. It seems that the programme makers thought of a title and then made an episode to fit around their own narrow agenda.

“Seafood is one of the healthiest and most natural foods around and its consumption should be promoted, not denigrated. The programme makers totally failed to acknowledge the huge strides made by the UK fishing industry in recent years to ensure a sustainable future.

“The industry has been making changes and sacrifices to be as conservation-minded as possible, working with government on selective gear and closed areas, and embracing a conservation scheme which offers fishermen incentives to fish in a responsible way.

“Such efforts have led to the first signs of recovery in the North Sea cod stock, and a growing number of UK fisheries are now certified, or are undergoing certification, by the Marine Stewardship Council as being sustainable and well managed.

“It is a great pity that the programme makers felt unable or unwilling to report such facts. Our fishermen have a difficult and dangerous enough job as it is by bringing to our plates sustainable, nutritious and tasty seafood, without having to face a totally unwarranted onslaught of this sort.”

Nine development zones have been announced under the Round 3 programme in the North Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel and the Irish Sea. The programme surpasses other drives to develop electricity generating capacity in the 1990s that saw 26GW of gas fired power stations installed, and in the 1960s and 1970s that saw 28GW of capacity coming on stream. Proposals for the Dogger Bank, the largest of the zones with a proposed 9GW of generating capacity, represent 6 times the worldwide installed capacity of offshore wind power in 2009.

The cost similarly inspires awe, although of the eye watering kind, when the Carbon Trust estimates a development programme to deliver 29GW of capacity could require a subsidy of £60 billion or more from UK PLC1, perhaps twice the cost of installing equivalent nuclear generating capacity, according to the Economist2. It is in these heady times of climate concern, the perceived environmental friendliness of wind energy, and an aversion to seeing whirligigs blotting the horizons that such a large programme of investment is being set to sea, and for which every household in the UK will pay the premium in the form of increased energy bills and taxation.

For the fishing industry, however, an extended area of sea under wind turbines threatens to eat further into valuable fishing territory beyond the existing Round 1 and 2 programmes that are still in the process of delivery and which are presently subject to developer’s expressions of interest for expansion. Put turbines in the wrong location or ignore the real impacts to fishing and it is not just the cost to UK PLC that is at stake but also the viability of fishing businesses and the coastal communities they support.

It is with such concerns that the NFFO has already been working to influence the Round 3 programme to limit the impacts on the fishing industry and promote co-existence. Some of the zonation announcements are, however, disappointing, which in reality have changed minimally since September 2008 when the current selection was first identified. These pre-empted the outcome of the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Round 3 and conflicted with its recommendation to generally avoid coastal waters inside 12nm.

One of these, the Bristol Channel Zone sits on top of a bass, squid and the UK’s largest ray fishery which is of vital importance to the region’s fleet, and opportunities to relocate are virtually non existent. Despite representations made by the Federation when the zone was first identified, such decisions reflect continuing deficiencies in the early planning phases of marine infrastructure projects. The Round 2 offshore wind farm siting process saw fisheries virtually ignored and resulted in proposals in areas of maximum sensitivity to the fishing industry such as the Westermost Rough proposal, centrally located on the largest UK lobster fishery off the East Yorkshire coast.

Dale Rodmell, Assistant Chief Executive said: “Achieving coexistence between both of our industries isn’t rocket science and well established protocols developed over the last 25 years between our industry and the Oil and Gas sector show that it is entirely achievable. It is disappointing zonation decisions such as in the Bristol Channel risk increasing the scope for conflict between both of our industries. Nonetheless, while it will take significant care and attention to ensure that we can reach a mutual agreement with respect to a Round 3 Bristol Channel wind farm, I don’t think it is beyond both of our capacities to do so. It is down to a willingness to engage early and proactively and we are showing our willingness to do just that.”

In the larger zones there still remains the flexibility to site the individual installations to limit conflict between both industries.

“Whilst good spatial planning is a crucial in limiting the scope for conflict in the first place, a dialogue between the two industries is also needed to agree any appropriate fisheries mitigation measures, the application of safety zones and the management of any fisheries disruption,” Dale Rodmell concluded.

The Federation has been instrumental in devising protocols for liaison between both industries which resulted in the cross industry Fishing Liaison with Offshore Wind and Wet Renewables Group (FLOWW) Recommendations for Fisheries Liaison guidance towards achieving a spirit of co-existence between both industries. The key now is to see that guidance and best practice is reflected on the ground.

Notes:

• Carbon Trust (2008) Offshore wind power: big challenge, big opportunity: Maximising the environmental, economic and security benefits, pp 83.
• The Economist, Print Edition, January 14th 2010

These are the titles of European legislative initiatives that have the potential to affect where you fish, when you fish, what you are allowed to fish for and the gear that you can use.

For some time fishing’s relatively isolated position as a freestanding policy, only loosely linked to other areas of EU policy, has been on notice. This is what is meant when policy makers talk about the integration of the CFP into EU’s broad environmental and marine policies.

It is for these reasons that the NFFO makes space within its work to deal with these less immediate but still critically important issues.

The Federation met recently in London with Cefas scientists and Defra policy officials to discuss how European obligations on member states to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) would be implemented and to ensure that as fishing and environmental policies are integrated it is done in ways that take into account the realities of commercial fishing.

The policy aim is to develop a programme that set targets for achieving Good Environmental Status by mid 2012, identifies measures for achieving those targets by 2015, with implementation from the end of 2016. We are at the start of that process and the discussion is focused on the criteria – the units of measurement – that will be used to judge whether Good Environmental Status has been achieved.

This is likely to involve monitoring certain sentinel stocks or species that are deemed to indicate the health of the wider ecosystem. Once the indicators are identified there is a responsibility on the member states to implement remedial measures if there is a problem.

An important point is that the programme of measures for achieving GES must be developed with regard to cost effectiveness and to socio-economic impact. That gives some confidence that the programme will not be hijacked by environmental zealots in the Commission or elsewhere in the chain of command.

Also, unlike the Water Framework Directive, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive is based on the concept of sustainable development, which accepts that human activities have an environmental impact but works to ensure that that impact is within acceptable limits. The evidence base for determining what is “acceptable” in this context is uneven and seriously weak in some places, and the question in any case goes beyond science to value-judgements which must take into account the views broader society – of which the commercial fishing industry is a part.

All this also puts a heavy responsibility on national fishing organisations in the member states – like the NFFO- to make sure that the potential consequences of various options are fully understood by both scientists and policy makers on the one hand and the fishing industry on the other.

Good Environmental Status will be applied in the following areas:

1. Biodiversity
2. Non indigenous species
3. Fisheries
4. Food webs
5. Seafloor integrity
6. Eutrophication
7. Hydrographical Conditions
8. Pollution Contaminants
9. Contaminants in Seafood
10. Litter
11. Noise

Some of these have a greater potential to impact on fishing than others and it is clearly hoped that current policy initiatives like achieving maximum sustainable yield and the establishment of a network of marine conservation zones will deliver most if not all of what is required.

That trite but profoundly true phrase, “the devil will be in the detail” is very apt here and will be the reason why this will continue to be an important, if unspectacular, part of the NFFO’s work.

The article was placed on the website last Thursday (7th January) and was spotted over the weekend by Dick Grachek, owner of the 80 foot groundfish stern trawler Anne Kathryn out of Point Judith, Rhode Island.

By Monday the article had been reproduced on several American fishing industry websites and was being widely discussed on the eastern seaboard of the United States.

Fishing: a valuable source of food with low environmental impact makes the important but generally unpublicised point that, viewed across a range of objective indicators, and compared to other types of food production, fish caught at sea has a relatively small ecological footprint. This is certainly not the view that has been prominent in the sensationalist media in recent years and the article reinserts a sense of proportion into the whole debate.

It is perhaps for this reason that the article has struck a chord on the other side of the Atlantic.

The reaction to this article demonstrates how it is possible to use the new information technology to redress the lazy assumptions of much of the mainstream media that the fishing industry is in terminal decline because all fish socks are crashing as a result of irresponsible and often illegal overfishing. There is no doubt that this media myth has great traction and has influenced both the European Commission and our own Government in recent years. The Federation’s article is perhaps the beginnings of an effective campaign to rebalance these distorted perceptions.

Bellowing a strident message in splendid isolation can look heroic but if the last 20 years has taught us anything it is that this approach is unlikely to be persuasive. And if we don’t persuade others – in government, in the Commission, in Parliament, in the media and the general public– then we might as well not bother.

To make meaningful progress on practically any issue even a large national organisation like the NFFO needs allies. The Federation therefore works with a range of other groups and bodies to build support on specific issues. Depending on the issue, we can find ourselves working closely with other UK federations and fishing organisations, fishing associations in other member states, environmental NGOs, and scientists.

The need to work closely with our allies underpins the Federation’s work in the RACs, explains the central role that we have taken in the formation of the UK MPA Fishing Areas Coalition, the success of the Bass Action Group, and the ground-breaking Fisheries Science Partnership. Likewise, the relative harmonious co-existence between the fishing and offshore oil/gas industry over the last 25 years has been dependent on a close working relationship between two industries who at first sight are not obvious bedfellows.

The NFFO recognised at an early stage the need to build a mosaic of tactical and strategic alliances as well as longer term working relationships with likeminded groups. The Federation was a prominent member of the North Sea Commission (Fisheries Partnership) that brought international fishing interests and scientists together for the first time and laid the foundations for the North Sea RAC. Similarly, we were heavily involved in the Transnational Project that brought Celtic Sea fishermen from France, Ireland, Spain, Belgium and the UK together to discuss solutions to mutual problems. The North West Waters RAC had its origins in this group.

But building alliances in an industry as diverse and complex as ours is never easy or straightforward. There are always those who, if allowed, for their own sectional and parochial advantage will undermine unity. And there is always a temptation for Government to use such splits and divisions to divide and rule.

The NFFO, if it stands for anything, stands for the fishing industry’s ability to speak to Government with a single clear agreed voice. And if by working with others the message being transmitted and received is an amplified one – so much the better.

The full debate can be found on the BBC website.

The four clips below indicate widespread support across government and the main political parties for the NFFO’s arguments for radical changes to the Common Fisheries Policy: