Support Package for Self-Employed Share Fishermen in next 24/48 Hours

The NFFO has urged the government to act, as markets fail under the impact of reduced demand. Most export markets, the hospitality sector, and fish counters in some supermarkets have closed down. Transport links are affected.

The government and industry organisations like the NFFO, have a shared goal during this health emergency, of keeping businesses in the catching and supply chain intact, so that they can thrive again when the crisis is passed.

The support measures have been developed at pace, parallel to the increasing stringent restrictions to achieve physical distancing between people to reduce transmission of the disease. Measures announces so far have included:

• Direct support for the hospitality sector
• Interest free loans to help businesses survive the crisis. The Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), which has been established to provide support for small businesses, is now open for applications. This may be of some but probably limited value in the fishing sector
• Wage support measures (as above)
• Food production workers have been designated as key workers, acknowledging that food security is a priority and that where possible the links in the supply chain from vessel to consumer should remain intact. Whilst limiting the spread of the virus is paramount and finding ways of limiting risk all-important, people require food

Summary

Restrictive measures to prevent transmission of covid-19 are running in parallel to economic support measures. Government announcements are made daily. There is an obvious gap in terms of support for the self-employed. It is understood that a support package for the self-employed is now with the treasury for approval. Defra, urged by the NFFO and others, has made the case to include self-employed share-fishermen in the package. We are confident that the case has been made and understood.

In the meantime, the Federation is engaged in the development of a wide range of support measures through government, industry organisations and the charity sector.

Telephone calls, e-mails, tele-conferencing and video conferencing, social media and the NFFO website are all being deployed to ensure that the fishing industry’s concerns and views are being heard.

Members are urged to keep an eye on our website to track major developments and to contact the Federation with any concerns or information that is considered relevant or important.

In the first instance, contact can be made by email and we will respond quickly.

NFFO Contacts

General contacts: nffo@nffo.org.uk

Barrie Deas, Chief Executive: bdeas@nffo.org.uk

Joanna Lenehan, PA to the CE: Joanna@nffo.org.uk

Dale Rodmell, Assistant Chief Executive: Dale.Rodmell@nffo.org.uk

Elizabeth Bourke, Policy Officer: Elizabeth@nffo.org.uk

Ian Rowe, NFFO Services Limited: Ian@nffo.org.uk

Michael Atkin, Finance: Michael@nffo.org.uk

There are three tests by which the Chancellor’s package will be judged: does it hit the right targets, is it big enough and is it in time?

Fishing

Some of the measures announced to date will be relevant and significant for the fishing sector. Many will not because of the peculiarities of the way our industry is organised. The immediate challenge is therefore to identify the support measures available which can be used and the gaps which will need to be filled by additional tailored interventions.

Workers in the food industries have been designated as key workers, along with those employed in transport and so exempt from some social distancing requirements. This should help to ensure that supply chains remain operational.

The Government’s support measures include direct grants to businesses in the hospitality sector but the main support (£300 billion of the £350 billion) is earmarked for loans available to struggling firms. The massive intervention to support those in waged employment by meeting 80% of each worker’s wages (up to £2500 per month) will not be available to the self-employed, including self-employed share fishermen. This is an obvious gap.

That is why an urgent support package shaped to provide meaningful aid to the fishing sector is needed and is being worked on. We expect an announcement shortly.

It will be important that the package:

• Keeps those boats at sea, and supply chains operational, where this is an option
• Creates the conditions that allows vessels and crews which have had to tie-up to bounce back, as soon as the crisis is over

Industry Self-Help

Whilst the form of a government support package is being worked on, the fishing industry is itself taking what steps it can to help, within the strictures of a dramatically altered market landscape. Demand for shellfish species like crab and lobster has fallen away so dramatically that the knock-on effects on fishing vessels is immediate. Buyers are, with few exceptions, not buying. There are some early signs of an increase in demand from China but that is a small uptick within an otherwise unrelieved picture of desperation – especially on the back of a winter of storms which prevented most vessels getting to sea – and earning – for several months.

The situation with whitefish is more mixed, depending on the specific markets involved, and the steps being taken to maintain fish prices. Producer organisations and market authorities are evening out supply to avoid market gluts as far as possible. This is being done in different ways in different places but overall the aim is to keep the fleets at sea – albeit with a lower level of activity – to maintain supply, keep supply chains operational, people fed, maintain earnings, keep crews intact and businesses viable for when the crisis passes.

The closure of pubs, restaurants and supermarket fish counters obviously has a drastic impact on demand. At the same time, there is a recognition that social isolation measures have potentially created a significant market for door-step deliveries and there are signs, right around the coast, of fishing boats, markets, producer organisations, and existing supply businesses adapting to these new opportunities. No one is pretending that they can substitute for the mainstream supply-chain, but they are welcome and potentially important initiatives.

Regulatory measures

A range of regulatory measures could be changed to support the sector through the crisis.

These might include:

• Suspending proposed cod recovery measures in the pipeline where it is judged that the drop in demand for fish will directly reduce fishing pressure on cod and act as a substitute for restrictive measures
• Adapting the EU landing obligation to leap-frog impediments to the efficient operation of fishing vessels, and in particular eliminating the risk that chokes in mixed fisheries could tie up fleets if the quota for a minor species is exhausted
• Removing obstacles to securing storage aid for fish withdrawn from the market and temporarily frozen. Although generally cold stores are full, there is some spare capacity that could be used for this purpose
• Accessing EU tie-up aid – the UK is no longer formally an EU member state but is continuing to contribute to the EU budget in 2020, so this should be available through the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund

Charity Sector

The charity sector has swung into action by:

• Leverage and support for an emergency grant relief fund
• Raising awareness / communication support for welfare fisheries charities (Shipwrecked mariners / SAIL / Fishermen’s Mission / Seafarers Hospital etc.)
• Promoting the Fathom podcast – ‘how to sell direct’, to be broadcast on the CFPO website and circulated more broadly to industry. Here
• ‘How to sell direct’ guides
• Loan / Credit Union Support
• Identify the vulnerable
• Letter to supermarkets urging support for the fishing sector
• Development of an interactive supply chain map
• Communication materials and tools to support a home fish and shellfish delivery service

Summary

The scale and speed of the economic support measures put in place by government are both vital and unprecedented in peacetime. Being very broad-brush the measures announced to date do not amount to an adequate level or form of support that is commensurate with the challenges facing the fishing sector. Work is under way within government and within the fishing industry itself, to fill that gap.

A jigsaw of measures is appearing. Some pieces have been put in place quickly. Others are still being shaped to fit. It will be some time until the full picture emerges, in these remarkable and challenging times. Urgency is paramount.

Following a telephone conference, it has been agreed to work on a support package in four key areas:

1. The development of alternative markets and alternative routes to market. Government has a role in facilitation the shift to meet new demand in the domestic market

2. Direct and indirect financial support. The immediate task is to understand the content of the Chancellor’s £350 billion support package, to understand to what extent this will be relevant and of use to the fishing sector; and to identify where additional support will be required

3. Regulatory changes: the group is to work on reducing regulatory burdens where these impede an adequate response to the crisis

4. Development of an adaptive joint industry/government approach to the different aspects of the crisis as they evolve

A wide range of stakeholders from across the country and across supply chain brought their different concerns and insights into the discussion. A smaller, more focused group will be required to work up proposals.

Overview of Evolving Impacts

⦁ A pandemic with widespread implications for human health and with severe and widespread economic consequences

⦁ Businesses in the fishing, fish marketing and fish processing sectors face potentially existential challenges, related to short term liquidity

⦁ Crew incomes will be directly and immediately affected

⦁ The virus has impacted sequentially, with the market for crab being the first affected, but with rolling consequences for other species and sectors as social distancing advice has taken effect.

⦁ Although temporary in nature, the scale of the shock in the fishing sector is likely to be very severe

⦁ Closure of schools will have workforce consequences throughout the supply chain

Responsibilities

⦁ Businesses and representative organisations have a responsibility to take what steps are available to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the contagion

⦁ It is government’s responsibility, however, to provide temporary support, where the market or sector initiatives are inadequate to the scale of the problems generated by the virus; or where generic government support is inadequate

⦁ Government and sector are agreed on a partnership approach. We are in an evolving situation, with assessments of the scale of the numbers infected, the UK government’s response and the response of other countries varying frequently as more information becomes available

Challenges by Market Segment

Catching fish and shellfish is primary production, which will be affected directly by the coronavirus, as crews become infected, or self-isolate in line with government advice.

Fishing is also indirectly, but powerfully affected by downstream impacts from dramatic falls in demand in different parts of the market.

Restaurant and Hospitality Trade

⦁ Zero or close to zero demand, as restaurants and the hospitality industry more widely are forced to close as the public respond to of social distancing advice

Export Trade

⦁ Difficulties in export markets caused by the virus or measures/advice to contain the virus have consequential impacts downstream as intermediary firms cease buying fish and shellfish for which there is no market demand or face transport/regulatory obstacles.

Supermarket Trade

⦁ Closure of fish counters

⦁ Increased demand for tinned and frozen fish

Home Consumption

⦁ Home potential to expand but limited by difficulties in accessing fish and shellfish, following supermarkets decision to close fish counters after driving traditional fishmongers out of business. Doorstep deliveries of fresh fish by van has great potential in the current circumstances and is being trialled in Cornwall and other locations

Response

The scale of the coronavirus crisis has been described by government as requiring a regulatory response akin to putting the economy on a war footing. In the government’s phrase “doing what it takes” will shape the scale and form of support to businesses and workforces throughout this crisis.

The challenge is to build a package of support that is relevant for to fishing sector. Overall, there is a determination, where it is an option, to keep boats at sea, keep crews intact, keep supply chains supplied, keep continuity of food security. In cases where demand has fallen away completely, support will need to take the form of maintaining the potential to start again when the health crisis diminishes. A two-pronged approach will probably be required:

⦁ Support to keep fleets working and supply chains supplied

⦁ A form of tie-up aid where markets have collapsed completely

This is the task facing the fishing sector and government as we try to build a response adequate to the scale and evolution of the crisis

The market for fish and shellfish has already been badly affected, with fears of worse to come:

• An early sector to feel the consequences of the virus is the crab market, which had responded to increasing demand from China and which has now seen a dramatic fall in price, as restrictions bite
• Inventories of frozen nephrops were approaching capacity before the virus struck and saturation point will inevitably impact on buyers’ behaviours on the 1st hand market
• Whitefish prices are also softening as buyers face logistical difficulties and travel restrictions triggered by the coronavirus
• Seasonal fisheries such as cuttlefish are likely to be impacted by restrictions in Italy and France, particularly closures in the restaurant sector
• There are concerns about how fish processing units will continue to operate if the workforce is impacted directly by the virus, or by efforts to self-isolate
• Individual judgements on self-isolation will be made by fishermen but the impacts will be felt across whole crews and fishing businesses

In these unique and unprecedented circumstances, individual fishing businesses and producer organisations are taking their own steps to mitigate impacts by arranging shorter trips, staggering and planning landings, reducing quantities landed, in order to avoid flooding the market and triggering a price collapse.

Science

The production of the scientific advice for next year’s quotas has been affected and shorter, more summary advice than that we have become used to will emerge to inform the autumn management decisions – this time with the UK participating for the first time as an independent coastal state.

Support

We are in a highly dynamic situation. As the virus spreads, new impacts are becoming manifest. Evolving regulatory responses and market reactions, mean that it will be necessary to understand exactly what is happening in a rapidly changing situation.

This is the context within which the form and shape of a government support package will be discussed, with a focus on keeping the sector viable during this, temporary but undoubtedly severe shock.

Although there are already several examples of successful co-management in the UK and internationally to draw on, co-management is now expected to be a major feature of post-CFP fisheries management. The Fisheries Bill will provide the post-CFP framework for domestic fisheries management in the UK and there is scope within the new legislation for the co-design and implementation of management plans.

Formed in November last year, the Shellfish Group encompasses a wide range of shellfish interests, from all parts of the coast, engaged in the pot fisheries for crab, lobster and whelks. The meeting was also supported by Defra policy leads, IFCAs, fisheries scientists from Cefas, and Seafish.

The Shellfish Industry Advisory Group sees itself as an umbrella, which will encourage and oversee a range of bottom up grass-roots initiatives within the shellfish sector. Already a Whelk Sub-Group (the Whelk Management Group) has met to address the specific issues in the rapidly expanding whelk fishery. Likewise, a Crab and Lobster Group is now under way, and by the Group’s next meeting it is aimed to have a draft outline plan for the future management of the crab and lobster fisheries to discuss.

The intention is to thoroughly examine the different management options available, accepting that there may need to be regional variations and that the shellfish sector is in a particularly dynamic phase.

This will be a step-wise, systematic process. It will involve:

• A sound understanding of the stocks being fished
• Detailed knowledge of the fleets and gears, taking account of the dynamic changes at work
• An understanding of the economic drivers in the fisheries
• The development of a range of management options, (with pros and cons made explicit) for discussion
• Agreement on a way forward
• Scope to revisit and revise the plan to take into account new developments.

There is political support to make the plan happen and possibly financial support if it is needed. There is the will across the sector to make the group an inclusive but efficient vehicle to deliver a coherent and effective plan, supported by the industry, informed by the best available science and made to happen by government.

Management Plans

Management plans, as the place where different objectives are balanced out in the context of specific fisheries, are at the heart of the Fisheries Bill. They offer opportunities for the people whose activities will be affected by the plans, to participate in their design and implementation. It is with this still evolving structure in mind, that the Shellfish Group has grasped the nettle to take the initiative. The central idea is that working with fisheries regulators and fisheries scientists within a collaborative framework, despite the hard work involved, is more likely to deliver sustainable and profitable fisheries, than a plan prepared and handed down from above.

Although the Group is ambitious, it is modest enough to acknowledge that it is unlikely that it will get everything right from the outset. The management plan will therefore need to be adaptable enough to deal with unintended consequences or new information.

Identifying the limits of our knowledge – in the form of data gaps and inherent complexities in assessing shellfish species – will be an important part of the Group’s work.

Future of Our Inshore Fisheries

Co-management is also one of the key themes being progressed as part of the Future of our Inshore Fisheries project. The new SIAG and Whelk Management Group are building on the impetus of the October conference and are excellent examples of industry seizing the opportunity to make real improvements in how our fisheries are being managed. The report from the October conference will be released later this month and work is well under way to progress the priority initiatives that emerged from the conference, which in addition to co-management include collaborative science, and improved fisheries management. The two-day conference generated such rich material from grass-roots fishermen and international experts that it has taken longer than anticipated to pull it all together. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is momentum building to deliver a world class inshore fisheries management system capable of ensuring our fisheries, our marine environment and our coastal communities are sustainable and thriving.

Although the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU is still being thrashed out in negotiations that began in Brussels this week, there seemed to be broad acceptance in the room that beginning in 2021, the UK will not only be an independent coastal state, but will be a major player in its own right in the pelagic fisheries for mackerel, blue whiting and atlanto-scandian herring.

At present a stalemate exists between Norway, Faroes, the EU, Iceland and Greenland on their respective shares of mackerel, as the migration patterns have shifted in recent years, and new players have elbowed their way into the fishery. There are concerns that the total out-take exceeds scientific advice and the fishery is about to lose its marine stewardship council status as a result. That the stocks have remained robust under this increased pressure, says something about the difficulties in assessing this widely distributed stock.

There is no sign that the deadlock will end anytime soon. Several participants in the conference wondered whether the arrival of the UK as a major independent player could break the stalemate that has eluded agreement and therefore cooperative management of the stock.

NFFO

The NFFO explained that the UK could be expected to behave like any other coastal state when it takes place in annual coastal state negotiations. It would give equal priority to management measures that deliver sustainable fisheries in the long term – along with the pursuit of its own interests. All negotiations require compromise, but it is already clear that the UK will negotiate robustly on its own behalf. Given that a significant part of the most profitable pelagic fisheries, notably for mackerel and blue whiting, take place within the UK EEZ, the United Kingdom begins with a very strong negotiating hand. That said, the new coastal state will be looking to make strategic alliances with those other coastal states whose interests are aligned with those of the UK.

Access could be granted to fish in UK waters – but only where that brings proportionate benefits to the UK.

Summary

The big players in the North Atlantic pelagic fisheries are preparing for the UK’s arrival as an independent coastal state. With significant fisheries resources in its waters, a big market for fisheries products, and diplomatic clout, the UK will be a force to be reckoned with. Eyes are inevitably on the negotiations which began in Brussels this week at present, but no one in the room seemed to doubt that the UK would emerge as a major player with significant influence in the pelagic world. The corollary must be that the EU will be a weaker force and will have to adjust to the new circumstances.

Back to Bite

Some clever manoeuvring in 1973 by the existing EC member states, on the entry terms for UK’s entry to the EEC, gave them a huge advantage over 40 years. This has come back to haunt the present in a powerful way.

The principle of equal access, insisted upon as a precondition for UK entry, denied the UK’s prospects for a future as an independent coastal state. This would have given the UK control over its fisheries out to 200 miles (or the median line) in line with the emerging international norm at the time. Instead, the UK has been tied into an asymmetric, essentially exploitative, relationship with the other EU fishing members of the EU for over forty years. That relationship was called the Common Fisheries Policy. The British Government of the time knew what it was doing but considered fishing expendable to achieve other national objectives.

The statistics arising from that decision are now familiar. The UK is allowed to catch about 40% of the fisheries resources within its own waters, whilst other countries catch 60%. The EU fleet fishes around six times as much in UK waters as the UK fishes in EU waters. Fishing by UK vessels within the 12-mile limits of the EU member states is negligible. Fishing by EU vessels within the UK 12-mile limit is extensive.

There has been nothing balanced, fair, or reciprocal about these arrangements, especially when compared to the arrangements in other coastal states outside the CFP.

When quotas were introduced in 1983, the UK’s quota shares reflected those distorted access arrangements. The most notorious of these are becoming well known:

• Channel cod: UK share 9%, France’s share 84%
• Celtic Sea haddock: UK share 10%, France’s share 66%

A good negotiated agreement is one in which both parties emerge more or less equally happy, or unhappy. Although in the intervening years British fishermen have made common cause with European fishermen to resist the more damaging aspects of the CFP’s over-centralised form of regulation, the underlying grievance arising from the UK’s entry terms never went away.

That grievance has now proved politically toxic, feeding powerfully into the respective narratives in the referendum in 2016. It will not now go away until the terms of the relationship on fisheries between the UK and the EU are reset.

That is why comparisons between respective contributions to the GDP made by financial services and the fishing industry are irrelevant to the political arguments – a comparison between apples and oranges.

The visibility of the fishing issue is key to understanding that the UK government cannot afford, politically, to emerge from the negotiations ahead with a deal on fishing rights that does not reflect the UK’s changed status as an independent coastal state. This was true of the previous government. It is even more true of this administration. The general election results are heavily freighted with expectations that left behind communities will be a central focus of government attention. Many coastal communities are significant amongst those left behind. A reset of fishing rights is one way in which their prospects can be improved.

This explains the huge groundswell of support for a new deal on fishing across the parliamentary spectrum, large parts of the media, and the country.

A sell-out on fishing would irreparably damage the Government’s credibility. Given this background, all the signals from the Prime Minister downward, are that the UK will stand its ground on fishing.

Destination

There is nothing uncertain or opaque about the UK’s destination as an independent coastal state. The EU’s current relationship with third countries like Norway provides the standard model of how independent coastal states relate to each other in the management of shared stocks . For more than 40 years annual bilateral fisheries negotiations have successfully delivered effective management of shares stocks through:

• Total allowable catches set on the basis of scientific advice
• Quota shares that reflect the resources located within the respective zones (zonal attachment). In practice these tend to be quite stable over time.
• Agreed access arrangements
• Exchanges of fishing opportunities, where these are of mutual benefit

This is a relationship that is reciprocal and balanced, with that balance carefully calibrated through cod-equivalents.

This is a very different relationship to that which pertains to the UK’s current fisheries relationship with the UK and which the EU wishes to retain.

The Commission’s assertion that there are too many stocks to be handled by bilateral negotiations suggests a degree of desperation. It is not as though the December Council of EU Fisheries Ministers, with its history of generating unintended consequences and perverse outcomes, such as large-scale discards, could be considered the epitome rational fisheries management.

Polarised Positions

On fisheries, the UK government could not be clearer about the future.

The Prime Minister, and senior ministers, have been explicit that:

• The UK will act as an independent coastal state, in line with rights and responsibilities defined in international law (UNCLOS)
• The UK will have regulatory autonomy within the UK’s EEZ
• There will be no automatic access rights for non-UK vessels: access will be subject to negotiation
• The UK is open to annual bilateral fisheries agreements with the EU and other countries
• Legislation passing through Parliament will provide UK ministers with the powers to manage UK fisheries outside the CFP
• Although in the immediate future EU retained law will apply, the Fisheries Bill contains provisions which will allow those CFP rules to be rapidly adapted to meet UK requirements

By contrast, the EU has indicated that any free trade deal between the UK and the EU will be contingent on free access to UK waters and maintenance of the current quota shares. Not unexpectedly, the EU member states which have benefited disproportionately from the CFP over 40 years, wish to retain the current arrangements.

The Commission, in its proposed mandate, has subsequently tried to open some negotiating space for itself by referring to reciprocal access and stable quotas. This careful use of words is a fig leaf for retreat and has brought a swift response from those member states who stand to lose under this formula. Reciprocity means mutual benefit and not disproportionate benefit for one party. And stable suggests a new equilibrium, not the status quo. This first wobble on the EU side suggests that the negotiating realities on fisheries are understood in Brussels, if not yet accepted in the capitals of some member states.

The logic of the UK’s status as an independent coastal state, is that if there is no agreement in July or December, there is no automatic access to each other’s waters – exactly the same outcome if the EU and Norway currently fail to agree in their annual fisheries negotiations.

Forcing the UK to trade on WTO terms, unless it again sacrifices its fishing sector, would hurt the UK, but it would also carry serious collateral damage for several EU member states, who might be expected to withhold their consent. This looks like an opening negotiating gesture rather than a realistic outcome.

What we have at this stage are the polarised positions that might be expected at the beginning of any tough negotiations. On fisheries, the differential dependence of UK and EU fleets on access gives the UK an unusually strong hand.

Markets

The UK government has been explicit that leaving the EU means leaving the single market and the customs union (leaving aside the complexity of the Northern Ireland backstop.) Trading with the EU will therefore change. Frictionless trade will end. That is a political choice made by the UK by a government endorsed by the outcome of a general election.

The precise shape of the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU will be the subject of parallel negotiations, which will take place over the rest of this year, unless they are truncated mid-year.

The new Government is explicit that the new trading and customs terms will require businesses to adjust, including those trading in fish and shellfish across the UK/EU border. There will be significant challenges.

There will be more bureaucracy at borders to adapt to. Live shellfish and fresh fish are especially vulnerable to any form of delay. What is clear amidst the uncertainty is that fish and shellfish will continue to be caught, landed, sold, transported, processed and consumed. There are businesses in the supply chain on both sides of the Channel which need this trade to work smoothly.

New Equilibrium

No one knows what the future will bring. It is possible to speculate, however, on the general outline of a future fisheries landscape.

First and foremost, the Government’s positioning and the political dynamics within the UK, suggest that the UK will not back down on fishing in the forthcoming negotiations with the EU.

The big change, however, requires no negotiation and happens by default. There will be a new legal architecture. When the UK leaves the EU and after the transition arrangements expire, the UK will be an independent coastal state under international law. The Withdrawal Agreement recognises as much and accepts that access to fish in each other’s waters will no longer be automatic – but will be a matter of annual negotiation. The UK will negotiate fisheries agreements as an independent party and as a coastal state independent of the EU.

Within this context, the Government has signalled that it is open to a fisheries agreement in which access to UK waters by EU vessels can be presumed, subject to agreement on:

• Total allowable catch
• Rebalancing of fishing opportunities

There will be a new equilibrium. This is the shape of a future deal on fisheries.

In international fisheries negotiations, without the UK the EU will be a much-diminished force. In the North Sea, for example, it will control only around 20% of the sea area, with the balance held by the UK and Norway. In Western Waters, the UK and EU will be roughly equal partners in any future fisheries agreement. That is very different from the CFP when the UK was a single voice amongst 15 or 28.

Many fishing communities in the UK have something to look forward to. Significantly increased fishing opportunities will be available, although the changes will vary by fleet and area.

Coastal States Fisheries Agreements

The UK will emerge as a significant independent player in coastal state negotiations. Norway, Faroes, Iceland and Greenland are all closely watching political developments between the EU and the UK. All have important commercial interests at stake in the new emerging relationships in which the UK is a major independent fishing country – but also major market for fisheries products.

The number of coastal states operating in the North Atlantic will increase from six to seven. It can be expected that the UK will not behave in any way different from the existing coastal states. It will prioritise, equally:

• Sustainable fisheries management
• Its own interests

Domestic Fisheries Policy

The content of the Fisheries Bill currently passing through Parliament provides, in outline, the future shape of domestic fisheries policy.

• Initially, EU retained law, adjusted where necessary to make it operable, will be the basis for fisheries management. There will be no dramatic overnight change
• Responsibility for managing fisheries will continue to be be devolved, with international negotiations retained as a reserved power and coordination maintained through a memorandum of understanding and Joint Fisheries Statements agreed between the Secretary of State and the devolved administrations
• Management plans will provide the vehicle for sustainable fisheries management, and achieving the different objectives laid down in the primary legislation; these will be applied at the level and scale of the fishery to be managed. This structure provides significant scope for co-management, building on the forms of collaboration between fishers, fisheries managers and fisheries science already in operation
• All the signs are that the shortcomings of the CFP have been well understood and the Fisheries Bill framed to avoid the pitfalls. In particular, the CFP’s rigidity and cumbersome decision-making will be avoided. UK fisheries policy can be expected to be much more agile and adaptive. For this to be tractable, significant powers are delegated to avoid being hamstrung by over-centralisation. Over time, these powers will be used to replace EU retained law

Economic Link

In 1995 Tony Blair and the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, exchanged letters on measures that a member state might lawfully take to ensure that national quotas bring proportionate economic benefits to the country that they are allocated to, irrespective of who holds those quotas or where the fish is landed. The resultant economic link licensing conditions have been in place ever since.

Leaving the EU means that the EU Treaty provisions on freedom of movement of labour and capital and right of establishment, and oversight by the European Court of Justice, no longer apply. There is an opportunity to do things differently. Some have called for all landings of fish caught by British vessels to be made in the UK. Some would go further and reallocate all quota held by non-UK interests.

A number of factors are salient:

• What will be the UK government’s general policy be towards inward investment? Is Britain “open for business”? Or will a more restrictive approach based on narrower national priorities prevail?
• Would fishing be treated differently because fish is regarded as a national resource?
• What would the practical effect of a requirement to land all UK caught fish into the UK be, if the end user is abroad?
• What is the government’s general position on concentration of ownership of fishing rights?
• What is the legal position on the reallocation of quota? Would compensation have to be paid where the quota holders have a legitimate expectation upheld by the courts?
• Where would quota be reallocated to and on what criteria and what would the consequences be?

These are big and complicated questions that deserve proper attention. All the signs are that they will not be addressed in the first phase of adjustment to the new post-CFP equilibrium. What is more likely is a review and strengthening of the economic link licensing conditions, to ensure the UK benefits properly from its resources. Currently, UK registered fishing vessels may meet their economic link requirements in a number of ways:

• landing over 50% by weight of their catch (which are subject to EU quotas) into UK, Channel Islands and Isle of Man ports.
• demonstrating that at least 50% of the total crew man days at sea were accounted for by crew normally resident in UK coastal areas.
• providing proof that routine expenditure in the UK on goods and services for the vessel was equal to either: i) 50% of the value of quota stocks landed net of crew wages, or ii) 50% of the vessel’s total operating expenditure for the year, net of crew wages.
• donating quota to the English under-10m fleet equivalent to a value representing 10% of the value of catch landed overseas.
• any combination of the above methods agreed by the MMO.

One loophole which will require addressing relates to valuable fisheries that are not currently under quota. Bringing all catches by UK vessels under the economic links requirement would be a relatively straightforward way to deal with this gap.

Summary

The UK’s altered legal status as an independent coastal state, along with the UK Government’s publicly stated political priorities, suggests that although the forthcoming negotiations with the EU will be tough, change will follow.

As a coastal state, working within the framework of the UN Law of the Sea, the UK can be expected to behave like a responsible independent coastal state, which will, nevertheless press for its own interests in fisheries negotiations.

After a period of transition, things will settle down into a new equilibrium.

12. FISHERIES

86. The envisaged partnership should include, in its economic part, provisions on fisheries setting out a framework for the management of shared fish stocks, as well as the conditions on access to waters and resources and common technical and conservation measures. It should secure continued responsible fisheries that ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources, in line with the relevant principles under international and Union law, notably those underpinning the Common Fisheries Policy as laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013. The provisions on fisheries should be underpinned by effective management and supervision, and dispute settlement and enforcement arrangements, including appropriate remedies.

NFFO: The UK will have no difficulties in committing to the principles of responsible fishing and sustainable fisheries management. Any expectation from the text that the UK would have to shadow every future requirement of the Common Fisheries Policy, would be to deny the UK the sovereignty over the management of the fisheries in its waters, granted by its new legal status as an independent coastal state. The UK could not possibly accept such a provision in any circumstances.

87. The provisions on fisheries should encompass cooperation on the development of measures for the sustainable exploitation and conservation of resources, including avoiding wasteful practises such as discarding. Such measures should be non-discriminatory and follow a science-based approach aligned to the objective of achieving maximum sustainable yield for concerned stocks. The envisaged partnership should include provisions for collaboration in data collection and research.

NFFO: The Fisheries Bill currently passing through Parliament, includes a range of important objectives. These include managing stocks to achieve maximum sustainable yield on the basis of scientific advice, in balance with other important objectives, including one on climate change and another on minimising discards.

88. Besides the cooperation on conservation, management and regulation, the objective of the provisions on fisheries should be to uphold Union fishing activities. In particular, it should aim to avoid economic dislocation for Union fishermen that have been engaged in fishing activities in the United Kingdom waters.

NFFO: Quota shares are inescapably a zero-sum game, as the UK has learnt to its cost over 40 years. Rebalancing those shares to reflect the resources located in UK waters can be expected to have an impact for EU fleets. It is the EU’s responsibility to make provision for adequate mitigation measures.

89. To reach this objective, the provisions on fisheries should uphold existing reciprocal access conditions, quota shares and the traditional activity of the Union fleet, and therefore:

– uphold continued reciprocal access, for all relevant species, by Union and United Kingdom vessels to the waters of the Union and the United Kingdom;

– uphold stable quota shares, which can only be adjusted with the consent of both Parties;

– include modalities for transfers and exchanges of quotas and for the setting of annual or multi-annual total allowable catches (or effort limitations) on the basis of long-term management strategies;

– organise the modalities for obtaining fishing authorisations and the provisions that ensure equality of treatment and compliance, including joint control and inspection activities.

NFFO: Conceding to these demands would eviscerate the UK’s legal status as an independent coastal state and would commit the UK to remaining in an asymmetrical and exploitative relationship with the EU on fisheries. The UK could only accept these provisions by breaking the promises that have been made repeatedly by the Prime Minister and Cabinet level ministers, commitments on fishing made during the EU referendum. It would amount to a betrayal on a scale equivalent to the UK’s sell-out on fishing in 1973.

90. The terms on access to waters and quota shares shall guide the conditions set out in regard of other aspects of the economic part of the envisaged partnership, in particular of access conditions under the free trade area as provided for in Point B of Section 2 of this Part.

NFFO: The EU has made plain that a free trade deal would be contingent on UK concessions on fishing rights. There is no international precedent for including free access to exploit another country’s natural resources as part of a trade deal. A trade deal is important for both the UK and the EU. Some EU member states will be extremely vulnerable if the UK is forced to trade on WTO terms.

91. The provisions on fisheries should be established by 1 July 2020, in order for it to be in place in time to be used for determining fishing opportunities for the first year after the transition period.

NFFO: Given the polarised positions as the negotiations begin, it is unlikely that there will be any agreement before July. The UK will therefore enter the autumn negotiations with other coastal states, including the EU, for a fisheries agreement for 2021. It will negotiate as an independent party. This annual agreement would, following the usual pattern, cover setting total allowable catches, access arrangements, quota shares and quota exchanges.

Q. Are there problems with the new catch app?

A. Yes. After several problems were raised by members about the app at the NFFO AGM in 2018, the MMO delayed implementation of the new system. The new version was rolled out in January, but some small-scale fishermen are still facing problems.

Q. What sort of problems?

A. The NFFO has submitted this list to the MMO:

1. The app is missing several ports. The MMO advice in these circumstances is to use next nearest port. However, on the face of it, it is an offence to list wrong port when using the app to record catch

2. The app will not accept part kgs, so 250g red mullet, rounded up to 1kg, 2x 350g john dory rounded up to 1kg. Both rounding on the face of it, create offences as the estimates are automatically outside 10% tolerance

3. Some harbours have no phone signal. MMO has advised it will transmit when back in range. It is however an offence to land without prior notification

4. A 50kg exemption is available to larger vessels. That makes life a lot easier, but the same concession is not available to the under-10m fleet

Q. What has the MMO’s response been?

A. We are waiting for a definitive reply but in the meantime, the MMO has said that no fisherman will face prosecution if there are genuine problems in specific fisheries. They have said that they are not in the business of criminalising a whole sector because of problems implementing a new system.

Dispensations have been issued in cases when it is clear that the design of the new app is not fit for purpose in particular circumstances

Q. What happens now?

A. The MMO will be urged to work systematically until all the problems are resolved.

Q. Doesn’t this still leave the risk of prosecution?

A. Theoretically, yes, but every aspect of control, monitoring and enforcement relies on an element of discretion by the authorities.

Q. How many people face problems?

A. It’s hard to say but the MMO tell us that the app is successfully working on around 1000 of the active 1400 under-10s

Q. Wouldn’t it be better for the MMO to withdraw the app until all the problems are resolved?

A. It’s not unusual for new large-scale technology projects to hit problems. The way forward is to systematically resolve the shortcomings, not abandon the attempt. Besides, EU infraction procedures still have sway if started before the UK leaves the EU. There are no signs that having come this far, the MMO will abandon the project.

Q. Isn’t it inherently difficult to estimate caches, especially of small amounts?

A. It is. This has been a longstanding problem in the over 10m fleet too, especially when the margin of tolerance between logbook estimate and sales note/ landing declaration was reduced from 20% to 10%. The discretion exercised by the enforcement authorities means that this hasn’t led to endless prosecutions

Q. What’s the NFFO’s view of the catch app?

A. The bottom line is that we need accurate, catch data from all fisheries including the under-10 sector and recreational fisheries, if we are to successful manage our fisheries to maximise the benefits. The under-10 sector has suffered badly in the past because of this lack of data, in quota share outs and in battles over space to fish. The electronic log-books used by over-10m vessels aren’t appropriate for the conditions on smaller vessels and the mobile phone -based catch app seems to offer a useful tool. But the system must work. The problems that are being highlighted must be resolved.

If we are to successfully get low-impact vessels out of the quota system, the trade-off will be to have confidence that the vessels are truly low impact and the catch app will be central to that.

Q. The MMO may be taken to judicial review about the failings of the catch app. Will the NFFO support that?

A. We have to look at the big picture. The Government supports co-management and the Fisheries Bill, as the UK leaves the CFP, provides a huge opportunity. Co-management means the fishing industry, fisheries managers and fisheries scientists working together as equals to deliver sustainable and profitable fisheries. If one party is being taken to court, that cooperation will never get off the ground. The NFFO won’t be joining that bandwagon. We need to resolve our differences in a different way, rather than fund overpaid lawyers.

You can read the full article here

The BBC reports that fishing, “is the only industry to figure specifically in the list of negotiating priorities and is described as a ‘red line issue’.”

BBC report

Watershed

The 1st of February 2020 is unlikely to seem much different from the day before; but in fact, for the UK fishing industry, the date will mark a dramatic watershed our fortunes. Little will seem different, because the UK will remain subject to all aspects of EU law for the remaining 11 months of 2020, including all aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy.

In international law however, the UK will from that date, become an independent coastal state, and in EU parlance, a third country.

The UK will no longer be represented in any EU decision-making fora – including the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament or regional groups of member states – but during the remainder of 2020 it will be negotiating fisheries agreements as an independent party. This is where the change triggered on 31st January will begin to be seen.

Transition

The transition period has been drastically truncated from when it was originally envisaged. It no longer includes a December Council when the UK would (under the Withdrawal Agreement) be “consulted” but would have no vote. Questions remain about how the UK will be included in the ongoing discussions between EU and Norway, on supplementary cod recovery measures in the North Sea and other aspects of the CFP. Dialogue will take place through some vehicle, but it is an open question whether “consultation” or being one voice amongst 15 leaves the UK in a weaker or stronger position for the remaining months of 2020.

Framework Agreement and Annual Negotiations

More significantly, in parallel during the first 6 months of the year, negotiations will take place on a future UK/EU framework agreement. The aim is to finalise these talks by the beginning of July, but they may or may not conclude before negotiations for an annual fisheries agreement for 2021 begin.

This is where things will begin to be very different from the past 40 years. Whatever progress has been made on the framework agreement, the UK will negotiate directly with the EU as an independent coastal state, with ultimate say over who may fish in UK waters and under what conditions. In the North Sea the EU will control around 20% of the waters, in Western Waters around 50%. The UK will make clear that whilst remaining committed to its international obligations on sustainable fishing, access will be granted to fish in its Exclusive Economic Zone, only in return for a shift in quota shares to reflect the resources located in UK waters. It is not insignificant that the EU takes (in value terms) around 5 times as much from UK waters as the UK fleet takes from EU waters, providing the UK with important negotiating leverage.

January 2021

1st January 2021 will be the date at which the seismic changes underway will begin to manifest themselves on the ground and at sea. There will be no automatic access to fish in each other’s waters. Access will be negotiated. As will quota shares.

The arrangements should be concluded in a fisheries agreement between the UK and the EU before the end of the year. There is a risk that there is no agreement by then, in which case UK and EU fleets will be permitted to fish only in their respective EEZs – until an agreement is reached.

This is no different from the current arrangements between the EU and Norway. From time to time the annual round of negotiations fail to conclude before Christmas and the New Year opens with fishing confined to the parties’ own respective zones – until a new agreement is reached in reconvened talks in the early months of the next year.

Parallel

Parallel is a word which will be heard often over the course of the next 11 months.

Negotiations on the future economic and political relationship between the UK and the EU will take place in parallel to the fisheries negotiations.

Many strands under separate headings will take place: aviation, security, tariffs and trade quotas etc.

Parallel fisheries agreements will also be negotiated with Norway and Faeroes.

The expectation is that the fisheries experts within government, within Defra, will negotiate the fisheries components, whilst the overall negotiations will be coordinated by No 10 and the Cabinet office.

The EU has made its position clear: any overall deal will be contingent on the UK agreeing to the status quo on access and quota shares. President Macron has said that a 25-year deal, essentially tying the UK back into something close to the CFP is the price of a free trade deal.

The UK has been equally clear: Both sides need a trade deal but as an independent coastal state, the UK will grant access for non-UK vessels to fish, only on negotiated terms. And those terms will include addressing the quota shares which currently leaves the UK with only around 40% of the fish caught in its own waters.

Fisheries

No one with an understanding of how fishing was sacrificed in 1973, as a pawn in the terms of entry to the then European Economic Community, is likely to dismiss the risk that fishing could again be considered expendable for other political and economic objectives.

On the other hand, the fishing issue has a very high visibility and, politically, the Government is unlikely to want to be accused of repeating history. The Prime Minister, senior ministerial colleagues, many voices within the governing party and indeed across Parliament, recognise that the UK has been tied into an asymmetric and essentially exploitative relationship on fisheries with the EU for 40 years. The Government has repeatedly and explicitly promised to end this distortion.

In many respects fishing is seen as a litmus test for Brexit and all the signs are that the UK will take a robust stance. The Government’s confirmation that fishing is one of its five top objectives provides confidence that things will be different for fishing this time around.

NFFO

The NFFO’s role is straightforward: it is to hold the Government to account in delivering the promises and commitments it has made on fisheries. Those coastal communities which have atrophied as a direct result of political decisions made, in the lead up to the UK’s entry to the EEC, have a legitimate expectation that their fortunes will change.

To that end the NFFO and Scottish Fishermen’s Federation fifth parliamentary event in two years was held this week to underscore the industry’s key messages:

• The Common Fisheries Policy has worked systematically to the disadvantage of the UK fishing industry for 40 years
• Leaving the EU provides the opportunity to redress that balance, as the UK will become an independent coastal state. with the rights and responsibilities associated with that status
• There are high expectations that a new deal will be delivered on fisheries that will lay the foundations for a vibrant and sustainable future
• All eyes are on the Government to deliver and our expectation is that the 31st January – will mark the beginnings of that seismic shift for the better

There was also a huge level of media interest in the event from national, international and local news outlets. After speeches from UK Fisheries Minister George Eustice, as well as shadow spokespeople from the main opposition parties, teams of federation representatives from specific ports and regions engaged in briefing individual parliamentarians and journalists. Westminster studios were also fully occupied in interviews and examination of the fishing industry’s case, as the new era dawns.

The federations’ central message was that the UK’s departure from the EU provides the opportunity to break with the Common fisheries policy. Under international law, the UK will now carry the rights and responsibilities of an independent coastal state. Access for non-UK vessels to fish in UK waters, which currently catch more than 60% of the resources in UK waters, will cease to be automatic and will be negotiated on a bilateral basis. The Government has made clear that access will only be granted for a rebalancing of the asymmetric and antiquated quota shares which have pertained since 1983.

NFFO Chief Executive, Barrie Deas, said:

“The level of support expressed for the fishing industry in Parliament yesterday was incredible and reflects a widespread determination to establish the UK as a genuine independent coastal state in act as well as in law.”

“The model to which we aspire is already in existence and has been in existence for 40 years. It is the current fisheries relationship between the EU Norway – another independent coastal state and third country.”

The annual reciprocal fisheries agreement between EU and Norway:

• Sets total allowable catches on the basis of scientific advice
• Agrees quota shares on the basis of the resources in each respective zone (zonal attachment)
• Agrees access arrangements to fish in each other’s waters
• Agrees quota exchanges, where these are mutually beneficial

Barrie Deas added, “The key to the EU/Norway agreement lies in three important words: annual, balanced and reciprocal. It is an agreement which respects the regulatory autonomy of each party in their own respective exclusive economic zone and negotiates arrangements which are of mutual benefit. The annual cycle for the negotiations provides an agile and adaptive framework capable of dealing with the dynamic character of the stocks and the fishing industry itself. This is what we want for the UK”

Fisheries Bill

With a majority of 80, the government is unlikely to face major problems as the Fisheries Bill passes through its parliamentary stages. Although amendments may provide some improvements, there is little prospect that its main provisions will be derailed.

The most important of these:

• Give powers to UK ministers to manage fisheries in the UK’s EEZ after the UK leaves the EU and after any transition period
• Provides scope for ministers to amend fisheries law, initially retained from the Common Fisheries Policy to prevent any legal gap
• Sets an important range of objectives, including a new one on climate change
• Introduces the concept of statutory management plans which will balance the (sometimes conflicting) objectives in a way that makes sense in specific fisheries
• Recognises the relevance of the devolution settlement

The Bill is an important and necessary step towards managing our fisheries in ways that can bring real advantages to our coastal communities.

It is now clear that the delays and confusions, primarily caused by the absence of a government majority in Parliament, are now behind us and the UK will formally leave the EU on 31st January 2020. We will enter an 11month transition phase, during which negotiations will take place on the future economic and political relationship between the UK and the EU.

The aim is to agree a framework EU/UK fisheries agreement by the beginning of July 2020. Both the UK and EU have made extensive preparations for these negotiations. Scenario planning for multiple eventualities can now be replaced by a single-minded focus on arrangements that will secure a future for the UK as an independent coastal state outside the EU and outside the Common Fisheries Policy.

Negotiations: Opening Positions

Although, understandably, as we enter the negotiations, both sides are keeping their negotiating strategies close to their chests, it is possible from public statements, to see an outline of the overall shape of the forthcoming talks, and the fracture lines which will in the end determine the outcomes.

In its White Paper on Fisheries, the previous government spelt out that as an independent coastal state (under UN Law of the Sea) the UK will hold sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and the right to exploit the fisheries resources within it. The UK will control access over who is permitted to fish within UK waters, and under what conditions. The White Paper indicates that the Government will enter negotiations with the EU with the express objective of closing the gap between the fisheries resources available for harvesting that are located in UK waters, and the quota shares that it has received under the Relative Stability Principle since 1983.

By contrast, the EU has said that any trade deal with the UK will be contingent on the status quo on access arrangements and quota shares. It will seek to bind the UK into a long-term agreement which replicates the Common Fisheries Policy as closely as possible.

The two parties therefore enter the negotiations holding polar opposite positions. Radical change versus status quo. Negotiating leverage will take legal, moral, scientific and political forms but both parties are required by UNCLOS to cooperate on the sustainable harvesting of shared stocks, so there will also be limits on the room to manoeuvre. Both the UK and the EU have staked their reputations on maintaining the highest standards in terms of sustainable fisheries management. Failure to reach agreement could potentially set up tensions that could only lead to both parties being losers. It is something of an understatement that both parties have a lot at stake.

Withdrawal Agreement

The starting point and context for the negotiations for a framework agreement on fisheries will be the provisions of the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement. The relevant parts of the Withdrawal Agreement for fisheries:

• Accept that after the transition period, the UK will have regulatory autonomy over the exploitation of the resources within its EEZ, and that after the UK fully leaves the EU there will be no automatic right of access to fish in each other’s waters
• Points towards a UK/EU fisheries agreement, as part of a wider agreement of a future political and economic relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom
• Spells out that the UK will not participate in any EU decision-making fora during the transition period, but will be “consulted” during the annual quota setting round (this clause is now less significant than it was previously because with a shorter transition period than earlier envisaged, the UK will negotiate quotas for 2021 as and independent party)

It is worth recalling that when Teresa May’s original Withdrawal Agreement was settled, towards the end of the negotiations, there were two outstanding issues: one was Gibraltar, the other was fishing rights. This gives some sense of the political significance of the fishing issue for both the UK and the EU.

Norway

Norway has a significance in all of this as:

• A relevant party where it too shares stocks that are exploited by the UK and EU fleets
• A precedent and model for a long-term fisheries agreement between the EU and a Third Country with shared stocks and joint management arrangements.

The annual EU/Norway fisheries agreements have provided a largely successful model for cooperation on fisheries which has been in place for over 40 years. There are five essential components to the annual reciprocal agreements:

• Joint management of key stocks: TAC setting, with ICES scientific advice as the starting point
• Access arrangements, which allow fleets to fish in each other’s waters
• Quota Sharing based on the principle of Zonal Attachment
• Quota exchanges (of unutilised quota)
• Regulatory autonomy in the parties’ respective zones

Notwithstanding the EU’s largely successful fisheries relationship with Norway over 40 years, we can expect that the EU/Norway model will be anathema to the EU in the context of a future EU/UK fisheries relationship. The EU will argue that the EU/Norway agreement covers far fewer stocks than would require joint management between the EU and UK, and so is not appropriate. The UK will say that the EU’s position reflects the fact that the EU’s relationship with the UK under the CFP has been asymmetrical and exploitative, and that the EU wants to maintain this uneven relationship. By contrast, the EU/Norway fisheries agreement is balanced – in the sense that both parties benefit more-or-less equally from the arrangement. The UK will argue that therefore the current EU/Norway agreement and a relevant and pertinent reference point.

Leaving it All Behind

Whilst all remains to be fought for in terms of the UK and EU’s future relationship on fisheries, some things are already clear. After the transition period, the UK will have regulatory autonomy.

This means that the decisions, regulations, and directives of the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament, will no longer have any direct relevance to the fisheries which take place in UK waters.

Most CFP fisheries legislation will be initially retained and incorporated into UK law to avoid any legal vacuum, but the Fisheries Bill, which should shortly pass through Parliament unimpeded, will provide the scope to amend and adapt these statutes to meet the UK’s purposes. The relative powerlessness over fishing in its own waters, that has been the UK’s fate under the CFP, will end. In particular, the European Parliament’s baleful influence over fisheries policy will come to an abrupt halt. The Commission will still be required to seek negotiating mandates from the Council and European Parliament but where, for example in the North Sea, the EU will control less than 20% of the sea area and a minority of the stocks, its legal or political sway will be much reduced in negotiations with third countries.

Adjustments to the UK version of the EU landing obligation to transition from an untenable to a workable set of arrangements can be expected to be high on the list of measures for early revision.

1973 Revisited?

The scene is set for a dramatic trial of strength. Both sides have an interest in securing a trade deal which minimises trade frictions. The shape of that deal is the issue at hand. The UK Government has insisted that the new arrangements must be agreed in time for the UK to leave the EU at the end of the transition period in December 2020. This short timeframe makes the negotiation of a comprehensive trade deal less likely. A less ambitious deal, with much to be agreed in future negotiations seems, at present, the most likely outcome.

The EU may have the strongest hand of cards to play on trade because of the sheer size of its economy. On fishing, the situation is reversed. EU fleets fish around six times as much in UK waters as UK vessels fish in EU waters. To continue to access those waters concessions by the EU will be required. The UK has made clear that a rebalancing of quota shares to a fairer equilibrium will be the price of access. And that access will be subject to conditions – as any fleet fishing in third country waters would be.

Many businesses in the supply chain on both sides of the Channel depend on the trade in fish and shellfish, so from an economic perspective, both the UK and EU have a deep interest in smooth and unimpeded trade arrangements. This is particularly true of fresh and live fish where the transit times are of critical importance.

The question is to what extent this trade will become a political hostage over fishing rights, and what effect of short term disruptions to trade could have. Should trade talks fail for any reason, the UK could be forced to trade on WTO terms, which would be far from ideal – but also is very far from no trade at all. One only needs to glance at the massive trade in fisheries products between Iceland and the UK, and how quickly that was re-established after the cod wars of the 1970s, to understand that disputes over fishing rights have little long term impact on trade.

In the access negotiations when the UK applied to join the then European Economic Community in 1973, a conscious decision was taken on the UK side to sacrifice the UK fishing industry to secure other national political and economic objectives. The legacy of this decision has been to deny the UK the benefits of independent coastal state status for over forty years. It also created a deep sense of betrayal throughout the UK fishing industry and coastal communities that has been shared by many in Parliament. That sense of grievance has not diminished with time.

The optics of Brexit, in which the fishing issue has consistently been high on the list of national priorities, means Government will not want to repeat the historic betrayal of the 1970s. In this sense, fishing is an important litmus test and carries symbolic weight as well as political and economic significance. This is the reason why the UK fishing industry is confident that, whatever the negotiating challenges ahead, there will not be a repeat of 1973.

The NFFO Newssheet details the outcomes from the last December Council of Ministers in which the UK will participate as an EU member state. Outcomes region by region, issue by issue.

Setting quotas for the year (2020) in which the EU has set itself the arbitrary deadline of achieving harvesting of all stocks at maximum sustainable yield, required an element of theatre before the climbdown. There is no particular significance or logic to choosing the -50% figure. It simply splits the difference between the two positions held by Norway and the EU (more or less).

Setting aside the implications for global warming of dragging large delegations to London then Bergen and then Brussels, the Commission had to be seen to be brought to this agreement kicking and screaming. Norway argued with a great deal of validity, that a TAC set at Fmsy, implying a 34% reduction, supported by strong supporting measures, backed by the fishing industry, would be sufficient to rebuild the cod stock over a reasonable timeframe. In the end, Norway with almost all the member states and the whole North Sea fishing industry (including Norway) ranged on one side and the Commission on the other.

After a meeting in Brussels between the Norwegian Fisheries Minister and the New Fisheries Commissioner before the start of the third round, a new EU negotiating mandate was sanctioned and after a short further tussle, the agreed record was signed on Friday afternoon.

In a new departure, some NGOs made a brief appearance on the margins of the EU/Norway negotiations in Bergen, evidently concluding that their contribution justified their flights, and the CO2 generated.

Fishing Industry

A 50% reduction in the TAC for cod could be really problematic for the North Sea fishing industry, depending on the abundance found on the grounds next year. There is certainly scope for chokes in the haddock and whiting fisheries, an issue which, surprisingly, was not central to the discussions in London, Bergen and Brussels.

As described elsewhere the North Sea fishing industry has taken the initiative in proposing an integrated package of rebuilding measures. A 50% reduction in the TAC will make it more difficult to arrive at a workable package that the industry can support. It will be of the utmost importance that the industry is involved in the design and implementation of the new arrangements which will include spatial, technical and control measures.

Deal

The almost complete dominance of the negotiations by the optics of North Sea cod, obscured the fact that for the other stocks under the EU Norway agreement, either followed the ICES advice or rolled over the same arrangements as last year.

Fisheries Bill

The Government will also be in a position to reintroduce its Fisheries Bill to provide itself with powers to implement its programme on fisheries, including powers to control access over who is permitted to fish in UK waters, and to set its own quotas (accepting that for shared stocks, these will usually be set in cooperation with other coastal states.) The previous Bill was pulled after its provisions became at risk of the arithmetic in the previous Parliament.

Negotiations

Early next year, talks will begin between the UK and the EU on a framework fisheries agreement that will determine the shape of cooperation between the UK and EU, after the end of the transition period. A framework agreement could consist of very high-level statements, referencing cooperation on managing shared stocks, broad commitments to sustainable fishing, and compliance with the UN Law of the Sea. It is expected that a framework agreement could be concluded by the end of July. The current framework agreement between EU and Norway, is an obvious template.

Negotiations for an annual UK/EU fisheries agreement for 2021 would be expected to occupy the second half of 2020. There will also be tripartite and bilateral discussions with relevant coastal states such as Norway and Faeroes. The content of the annual fisheries agreement would include setting TACs, quota shares and exchanges, and access arrangements.

Both the EU and the UK accept, under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, that from the end of the transition period their fleets will have no automatic right to fish in each other’s waters. Access would be subject to negotiation, as would quota shares and quota exchanges.

The UK, in its White Paper, has made clear that some level of access could be granted to EU fleets to fish in UK waters, subject to the satisfactory negotiation of revised quota shares. The EU has made it equally clear that any free trade deal with the UK would be contingent on the status quo on access and quota shares.

In both the EU and the UK, fishing rights are a matter of high visibility and high political profile.

The stakes are therefore very high for all parties as we enter this next phase of negotiations with the EU. The UK fishing industry sees the UK’s departure from the EU as an opportunity to break free from a cumbersome and ineffective management system, and a chance to redress the asymmetrical access and quota arrangements which have worked to the UK’s disadvantage for 40 years. The EU will try to hang on to the current arrangements which work so well to its benefit.

Against this background, the NFFO will be working closely with UK Government to ensure that the commitments it has made on fisheries are delivered in full.

Overview

Taking an overview, the biggest problems ahead are in mixed fisheries where the EU’s legal obligation to manage all stocks at MSY by 2020, is in conflict with the landing obligation.

The Commission is taking a particularly aggressive approach this year. This may be because of the arbitrary 2020 deadline adopted in 2013 and the provisions of the multi-annual plans. It may be to enhance its conservation credentials on paper. Or it may be to avoid a legal challenge by some of the more litigation minded environmental NGOs. In any event, there is a single-minded focus on how the decisions ahead look, rather than the consequences of what they will mean when put into practice.

The Commission’s proposals pose serious difficulties for parts of the fishing industry and also for the member state authorities who face the challenge of putting contradictory measures into practice. That is the fracture line for the negotiations ahead next week.

The danger of the Commission’s confrontational, coercive approach, lies in its focus on destination, rather than implementation. One of the important lessons that we have learnt from previous recovery plans is that moving in the right direction is much more effective in rebuilding stocks than obsessing about objectives. Arcane debates about how to define maximum sustainable yield is a sure-fire way to avoid developing the demonstrably effective step-by-step approaches to high yield fisheries.

A big bang approach may look good on paper, but it is only if the measures (including TAC levels) are workable and make sense at vessel level, that real progress can be made.

The landing obligation and the challenges associated with applying it in mixed fisheries is well known – as now is the problem of chokes. The problems facing cod in all sea areas under the CFP, serves to amplify those choke risks, setting up an undesirable tension between achieving high levels of compliance with the economic viability of the fleets concerned.

The difficulties this year are enhanced by the number of stocks in which low recruitment features is also a problem, presumably mainly as a result of ecosystem changes. The converse, recruitment spikes in North Sea and the Celtic Sea haddock stocks, paradoxically increases the choke risk.

Stocks

Celtic Sea: In the Celtic Sea, detailed discussions have been held throughout the year on how to provide added protection for cod, without jeopardising the fishing opportunities which comprise the rest (99%) of the catch. Under the Commission’s proposals and after various deductions for pool arrangements and Hague Preference, the UK’s relative stability share of Celtic Sea cod would be 8 tonnes. It does not require a vast intellect to appreciate that this risible number is unworkable. The UK, and other affected member states, will argue for a TAC consistent with unavoidable bycatch, supplemented by ancillary support measures which minimise cod bycatches.

The Irish Sea presents its own challenges for cod and whiting posing a potential choke to the vitally important nephrops fishery.

Skates and Rays: Securing reasonable quotas for skates and rays is an NFFO priority. Providing protection for the weaker species groups whilst maximising fishing opportunities on the groups like thornback, which are in robust health, is a challenge but also a necessity.

Seabass: Similarly, maintaining progress in building the bass stock, whilst allowing the trawlers to keep a higher proportion of seabass which they catch as an unavoidable bycatch is also high on the NFFO list.

EU/Norway: EU/Norway talks will resume later this week after the failure to agree during the second round in Bergen. What will transpire is uncertain. The EU head of delegation will require a new mandate to move away from the proposed 61% cut in TAC for North Sea cod, which is opposed by Norway, almost all the member states and the whole North Sea fishing industry. The Commission may wish to take soundings from the Council, although it is already clear that the member states affected want the Commission to move from its isolated position. A fourth round of EU/Norway talks running into the New Year is possible.

Election

One slightly strange dimension of the Council in 2019, is that we don’t know who will be leading the UK delegation, as the results of the general election will only be know on Friday, with delegations travelling to Brussels on Sunday, for the start of the Council on Monday. George Eustice will remain UK Fisheries Minister until he is replaced. There is little profit in speculating about the different post-election scenarios – suffice to say that officials are preparing policy options to meet various eventualities.

Depending on how the general election on Thursday turns out, this could be the last Council in which the UK participates as a member state.

Balance

Harvesting fish stocks in a way that maximise the economic and social benefits without prejudicing future fishing opportunities, requires judgement and balance. Trade-offs are required between maintaining fleets and fishing communities and building stocks towards the MSY objective. It is when MSY stops being a useful rule of thumb and becomes an article of dogma that difficulties begin. It has been apparent since 2013, when the MSY timetable was adopted as a mandatory requirement, that ultimately there would be a reckoning with reality. 2020 is around the corner and the Council of Ministers next week will at least in part be a showdown between pragmatism and dogma.

This is dangerous. We know what works to rebuild stocks. It is a responsive and adaptive approach that reduces fishing pressure but provides fishing businesses with a way to remain viable as well-designed, tailored, measures take effect. All the signs are that at this Council the Commission stand prepared to ignore these hard-learned lessons.

Team

A full NFFO team will travel to Brussels for the Council, with representatives from the Irish Sea, Celtic Sea, Channel, North Sea and External water fisheries.

The questions and answers below are an attempt to address some of the most frequently issues about what is happening now.

Is North Sea Cod in trouble again?

Yes, after 15 years in which the biomass increased steadily, international scientists say that the numbers are again in decline.

Why?

There are probably two principle reasons, one environmental and one related to fisheries management. The distribution of cod, already at the southernmost extent of the species when in UK waters, is moving northwards by 12 km per year. In fact, all of the cod stocks in EU waters – Celtic Sea, Irish Sea, West of Scotland and Baltic – face problems, suggesting that in addition to fishing pressure, some kind of regime shift is under way. Cod are now almost entirely absent from the Southern North Sea.

Also, changes to the Common Fisheries Policy in 2013, and in particular the EU landing obligation, seem to have undermined the arrangements which delivered steady recovery of the North Sea cod stock between 2020 and 2015.

It is worth saying that not all fish stocks are in trouble. North Sea hake and North Sea plaice biomasses are higher than anything seen in the records. In fact, hake, as a voracious predator may be part of the problem with the cod stocks.

What can be done to rebuild the cod stocks?

Put simply, only one thing can be done: reduce fishing pressure to allow incoming year classes to rebuild the biomass

Is that easy?

No, it’s difficult because cod is caught in a mixed fishery along with other species like haddock and whiting. It is also caught in small quantities as an unavoidable bycatch in a range of other fisheries.

What is the significance of that?

It means that simply cutting the total allowable catch (the quota) for cod will not of itself lead to a reduction in fishing pressure. The lessons of the previous two cod recovery plans are that when the quota is slashed, it has led to widespread discarding by vessels fishing for other species

Why can’t we just ban discarding?

The EU has. With the EU landing obligation, which came fully into force in January 2019, all quota species must be landed, unless there is a specific exemption. But that creates a further problem – the problem of chokes in mixed fisheries.

So, what’s a choke?

If a vessel (or group of vessels, or a member state) exhausts its quota for cod, or any other quota species, it cannot, as in the past, discard cod and keep fishing for other species. It must stop fishing in the North Sea demersal fisheries full-stop. This is what is called a choke. The vessel is committing an offence if it lands fish for which it has no quota, but it is committing an offence if the fish is discarded. A Catch 22.

Why can’t fishing vessels just use more selective nets, that exclude cod?

They can. And this works very well with some species but less well with others. Cod is a large bodied species and its size and shape mean that the gears that have been designed to exclude cod, also lose valuable catches of monkfish, megrim, lemon sole, haddock and whiting, making the fishing trip uneconomic.

What else can be done?

Fishing vessels can try to avoid areas and periods where and when cod are likely to be caught. Avoidance can be formal, with mandatory closed areas and seasons, or skippers can voluntarily adjust their fishing strategies to minimise catches of cod. One variant is a restricted area which can be accessed only by vessels meeting certain conditions, such as using highly selective gear, or fitting CCTV cameras which are used to verify catches.

What is happening this week?

Norway and the EU are meeting again, this time in Brussels, to try to agree a package of measures for North Sea cod, as part of their annual reciprocal fisheries agreement, having failed to reach agreement earlier at meeting in London and Bergen.

What’s Norway got to do with it?

Because of its geography, cod is a shared stock and has been jointly managed by the EU and Norway for over 40 years. Each year there is a fisheries agreement which fix total allowable catches, access arrangements and quota shares. Norway has a 17% share of the North Sea cod stock, with the EU holding the balance. The UK and Denmark are the main EU quota holders.

Why do Norway and EU disagree on how to rebuild the cod stocks?

Norway, and incidentally all the affected EU member states, argue that we have to learn lessons from previous cod recovery plans. An extremely low TAC will not of itself deliver cod recovery. On the contrary, a very low quota will bankrupt fishing businesses because of the choke problem. This will drive the problem underground as some vessels try to maintain their economic viability. Recovery will be impeded, not advanced. Rebuilding the cod stock is going to take some time – five years perhaps – and a more realistic approach would be to apply a significant but not draconian TAC reduction, and work with the fishing industry on a package of supporting measures such as closed and restricted areas were concentrations of cod are located. The EU Commission, by contrast argues, that it is legally bound by its own rules to apply the scientific advice that a 61% reduction is required to (theoretically) rebuild the cod stock in one year. Throughout the negotiations the EU has been inflexible on the 61% figure and has argued that a package of supporting measures should be applied on top of this level of TAC reduction.

Has the fishing industry been sitting on its hands?

On the contrary, since the adverse advice was published in June, the North Sea industry has (for the first time ever) cooperated on building a pan-North Sea (also including Norwegian fishermen) approach to rebuilding cod. Meetings have been held in Copenhagen, Brussels and London to analyse the problem and a paper with solutions has been presented to both EU and Norway advocating a package of measures which includes:

⦁ Seasonal closures

⦁ Protection for juveniles

⦁ Real Time Closures

⦁ Restricted areas

The overall aim has been to try to redirect fishing activity away from concentrations of cod.

This initiative has been welcomed by both Norway and the EU, but the industry organisations have made clear has been that its implementation with industry support is entirely contingent on a quota level that is consistent with maintaining the fabric of the fishing industry and the communities that it sustains.

Has there been much discussion between EU and Norway on the landing obligation and this problem of chokes?

Hardly any. And that is a surprise given that:

⦁ this is the end of the first full year of the landing obligation

⦁ discard reduction has been Norway’s priority for many years

⦁ a 61% reduction in the TAC for cod would lead to EU vessels tying up or being displaced from the North Sea demersal fisheries from the first quarter of the year. There are particular concerns that a huge amount of effort would be displaced into the smaller-mesh nephrops fisheries

What are the implications of all this for Brexit?

It confirms that the Common Fisheries Policy is a blunt, inflexible, remote instrument incapable of providing effective fisheries management, especially in mixed fisheries, where a close working relationship between fisheries managers, fisheries scientists and fishermen is a prerequisite to avoid bad decisions with unintended or unforeseen consequences. The Commission’s approach to North Sea cod is not likely to persuade fishermen in any member state, much less Britain, that it is capable of moving towards effective and responsive fisheries management. Depending on the outcome of the general election this week, the UK should be in a position to negotiate during 2020 for a fisheries agreement in 2021 as an independent coastal state, not as one member state amongst many, with extremely limited leverage.

Anything else?

Yes. The scientists are having problems with the stock assessment for North Sea Cod. They have detected a retrospective bias in the model which systematically underestimates fishing pressure and overestimates the biomass. This error is corrected in subsequent years but is one of the reasons why their advice is so severe this year. Also, there is a recognition that there is significant ecosystem change underway, probably related to increasing water temperatures.

The current reference points (the fishing pressure and biomass markers for sustainable levels of fishing) may not be appropriate for the new ecosystem conditions now being experienced in the North Sea. These are under review by ICES and meetings are scheduled for 2020 and 2021. In the meantime, management decisions for 2020 are required.

What happens now?

Norway and EU delegations will meet again this week to see if the impasse can be broken and agreement reached. Three options are available:

1. The EU moves from its rigid insistence on a 61% reduction in the TAC in recognition of the unintended consequences that would follow

2. Norway caves in and agreed to the EU’s approach, moving a long way from its opening position of a 34% reduction

3. Norway and EU both shift from their current positions to set the TAC at some mid-point. A TAC is adopted consistent with a package of support measures

A fourth option is possible: a breakdown in the negotiations because of the Commission’s unwillingness to move. In these circumstances, further negotiations perhaps in the New Year might be necessary. It is unthinkable that there would be no EU/Norway agreement for 2020, or that the parties would set autonomous TACs for cod in 2020. That would be to break with 40 years of cooperation during which there have been many ups and downs but always, in the end, an agreement.

*click here for details

The background to the new group is a widespread feeling that shellfish, despite its economic and social importance, hasn’t achieved the political and management priority which it deserves. Inspiration has been taken from the Scallop Industry Group which fulfils a parallel role for the scallop sector.

The government’s current commitment to the development of different forms of co-management across the fishing sector provides an opportunity for the industry to shape policy, science, and the management regime – if it can speak with a clear and coherent voice.

There is a recognition that the shellfish sector is extremely diverse in terms of vessel size and operations and all voices in the industry must be heard. Membership will be open to all industry groups willing to commit to working collaboratively on an evidence-based approach to managing the shellfisheries.

The sector is facing important challenges, including:

• Displacement of fishing effort from other sectors into the shellfish sector
• Fishing effort in the shellfisheries has been growing rapidly. There is a general feeling that additional fishing effort will push many shellfisheries into the downward slope of the effort/yield curve
• A dynamic but volatile market is driving major change within the industry, not least in the 12metre to 15 metre sector
• Rapid technological development is a major factor
• There is a need for need for coherent and evidence-based management
• Brexit may carry market implications and there are also implications for the future of the Western Waters effort regime and what may or may not replace it
• The conclusions of the inshore conference in October could be significant for the work of the group. It will be important to have cross-fertilisation but not duplication

Government and Industry

The inaugural meeting of the new group was well attended by representatives from Defra and the Northern Ireland fisheries department, signalling an important commitment to work jointly with the shellfish sector on solutions. There is a broad recognition across government that in fisheries delivering effective management requires a close working relationship, if ineffectual policies and unintended consequences in this complex area are to be avoided.

Composition

The composition of the group and definitive terms of reference have been deliberately kept open to encourage involvement and to ensure that the new group is responsive and relevant. Nevertheless, it was encouraging that the big industry players were all present and the NFFO and SAGB membership provided the backbone of the support. The importance of ensuring that the small-scale sector of the fleet, which sometimes find it difficult to make their voices heard, was agreed.

Animated Discussion

The central part of the meeting was occupied by an animated discussion of the issues facing the industry and possible solutions. Although there was no consensus on the route forward, there was unanimity that we should examine all the options dispassionately, and with all the relevant evidence that can be marshalled, to hand. There was also solid agreement that the work of the group must have momentum and that whatever obstacles are encountered, and there were bound to be many, the initiative would keep going to produce real results.

Seafish

Seafish, fresh from the success of organising the recent inshore management conference, was asked to provide a secretariat for the new group and has accepted. It is important to have a secretariat to convert the words spoken in the Group to actions.

First Steps

It was agreed that the Group’s first step should be to conduct an overview, with the pros and cons of each management option spelt out. A meeting in February will take this ground-breaking initiative forward. The NFFO Shellfish Committee has acted like a booster-rocket to facilitate its launch but whilst NFFO members will undoubtedly continue to play a central role, the Group will steer its own course forward.

Click here to find out more

Shortly after ICES advice, recommending a 70% reduction in the TAC, was published in June, an initial meeting was convened by the Scottish Whitefish Producers Association, primarily to address the potential loss of Marine Stewardship Council accreditation but also to understand how equivalence of any new measures could be delivered. Scottish, English, and Danish fishing associations met in Copenhagen in July to discuss what could be done to mitigate the consequences of a dramatic reduction in the TAC and put in place effective remedial measures. A further meeting which included Norwegian colleagues was held in Copenhagen in August. On the EU side, the landing obligation, which came fully into force on 1st January 2019, has raised the spectre of a choke* early in the New Year which would prevent the fleets from taking their main economic quotas in 2020. The scientific projections suggest that the 78% of the haddock catch and 72% of the whiting catch would be lost if a low TAC for cod caused a choke. It goes without saying that this eventuality would carry catastrophic consequences for the fleets involved.

Against the background of this potentially dire outcome, over the summer and into early autumn, the fishing industry group was widened to include all countries potentially affected.

A paper with proposals was finalised and presented to the Scheveningen group of North Sea Member States and the European Commission. A further iteration of the paper was presented to both during the first round of EU/Norway negotiations held in London 18th to 22nd November. The Norwegian Industry presented the same paper to Norwegian officials. The Commission has acknowledged that the paper has significantly shaped the emerging approach being developed by EU and Norway, although work continues on a final package and won’t be finally agreed until the second round scheduled for the first week of December in Bergen.

Content

The content of the industry paper draws attention to the complex of issues surrounding North Sea cod, in particular:

• The northward shift in the distribution of the stock and the signs of ecosystem changes which are in play – it is calculated that North Sea cod is moving north at 12 kilometres per annum, leaving next to no cod in the Southern North Sea but major concentrations around Shetland
• Uncertainties in the stock assessments, including a retrospective bias which each year tends to underestimate fishing pressure and overestimate the size of the stock – the adjustment required explains the magnitude of the cut in TAC recommended
• The potential for cod to choke other important fisheries in the North Sea demersal fisheries
• The pitfalls and lessons learnt from previous (ultimately successful) cod recovery plans
• The legal obligations within the CFP, in addition to the MSY timetable, which obliges the parties to take into account mixed fisheries complexities, the potential for chokes and the socio-economic impact
• The fact that North Sea cod is a jointly managed stock with Norway
• The need to take into account the latest scientific advice including the revised stock assessments incorporating the quarter three survey results – this has already reduced the scale of the TAC reduction required to rebuild the cod stock in a single year from minus 70% to minus 61%

The paper makes the case for an integrated package of remedial measures which moderate the level of TAC reduction but support a range of supplementary measures designed to reduce fishing pressure on cod and allow incoming year classes to rebuild the stock. The suggested measures include:

• Seasonal closed areas to protect spawning stock
• Real Time closures (Current juvenile regulation)
• Move-on provision
• Precautionary areas linked a number of access conditions

Ground-breaking

The industry initiative on cod is ground-breaking in a number of ways. The demersal industry is large and extremely heterodox in terms of fleets, gears, target species, degree of cod in the catch, national interests etc. In the past this has been a huge obstacle to speaking with a united voice. The environmental NGO’s rigid views on achieving MSY by 2020 and Norway’s central role as a third country with joint management rights, ruled out the North Sea Advisory Council as a potential host for the necessary discussions and so the necessary dialogue has been rather ad hoc, with meetings mainly in Copenhagen , Brussels and London.

The urgency of finding a practical, workable, solution that would steadily rebuild the cod stock whilst maintaining the fabric of the fishing industry, has been the major driver in overcoming the obstacles involved in international cooperation, to deliver a consensus position paper with broad support.

Conclusion

At this stage, it is unclear what has triggered the downturn in the cod stock in the North Sea. Probably there are environmental changes at work as well as changes within the fishery. Whilst it is vital to get a handle on what is driving these changes and make the necessary adjustments to the management regime, urgent action is required to prevent the situation on cod getting worse.

Important lessons have been learnt from previous cod recovery plans. The most important of these is that simply cutting the total allowable catch is no guarantee that this will lead to a reduction in fishing mortality. For this reason, the industry paper and now the managing authorities involved, are focused on the design of a balanced package of measures which lays the foundations for real recovery of the stock. Cosmetic measures, including an eye-watering TAC reduction, may satisfy the media and some of the more naïve NGOs, but it won’t deliver stock recovery. That will require well-designed measures which have the understanding and support of the fishing industry. That is why the work of the industry itself in this ground-breaking initiative is so important.

Note: A choke occurs in a mixed fishery under the EU landing obligation, when the exhaustion of the quota for one species, which must be landed, prevents the vessel, fleet or country from prosecuting fisheries on the remainder of the stocks in that area for the rest of the year